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Abstract 
 
Social class is a longstanding locus of sociological inquiry. Prior research has 
investigated the phenomenon in an array of domains through a myriad of 
methodologies and theoretical perspectives. The heterogeneity that is posed by 
previous studies empirically and theoretically, however, is predicated upon a 
homogenous set of epistemological and ontological assumptions. This has resulted  
in a number of programmatic, enduring omissions. Most notably, research has 
neglected how social class is conceptualised and made relevant by members in  
forms of talk-in-interaction. Aligning with the commitments of Ethnomethodology 
(EM), and using Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation 
Analysis (MCA) specifically, this thesis addresses this lacuna. Data are  
composed of ordinary, naturalistic forms of talk-in-interaction conducted 
synchronously in the English language over the last half-century (n=959). The 
empirical contributions of this research concern the ontological affordances, 
formulative possibilities and praxiological functions of two families of  
interactional practices that occasion the relevance of classed identities  
recurrently – namely, “membership categorisations” and “place references”.  
Chapter 4 addresses the former, canvassing the agentic, ontological and 
intersubjective dimensions of linguistically classed membership categories.  
Chapter 5 introduces the latter as a resource used to actuate classed  
identities in a designedly referential and metonymic faculty. Chapter 6 then  
recovers the activity of “accounting” for which both practices are employed  
across action-types; specifically, “assessments”, “complaints” and “teases”.  
The central objective of this thesis thus concerns the “respecification” of  
social class as a “members’ phenomenon”; one that is made relevant within  
ordinary instances of talk-in-interaction through a stable set of interactional 
practices in order to accomplish a diverse range of practical tasks. The thesis 
concludes with a review of several candidate lines of analysis for future  
EM/(M)CA inquiry that are anticipated by the findings of this research uniquely. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is, broadly speaking, Ethnomethodological (EM) in orientation (e.g. H. 
Garfinkel, 1967). EM is a diverse intellectual enterprise centred on the practical 
methods, competencies and common-sense reasonings that are employed by 
individuals (qua “members”) as they (co-)operate in the social world and render  
their situated conduct intelligible (see Maynard and Clayman, 1991). Two  
derivative traditions of EM are “Conversation Analysis” (hereafter, CA; e.g.  
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974) and “Membership Categorisation  
Analysis” (hereafter, MCA; e.g. Hester and Eglin, 1997a). The remit of these 
traditions, and their tensions, are detailed subsequently in the thesis. 1 For  
current purpose, it will suffice to note, only, that EM, MCA and CA research 
(hereafter, EM/[M]CA) has focussed on a myriad of previously unanticipated 
dimensions of human sociality (see also, H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 340).  
Inter alia, this has included the analysis of “accountability” (e.g. Heritage, 1984a;  
J. Robinson, 2016), “categorizations” (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]), “common-sense 
knowledge” (e.g. Wieder, 1974a), “lived-work” (e.g. Livingston, 1987: Ch. 15), 
“practical reasoning” (e.g. Pollner, 1987; Livingston, 2008), “typifications”  
(e.g. Sudnow, 1965), and even the “logic” (e.g. Coulter, 1991) and “structures”  
(e.g. Atkinson and Heritage, 1984a) of social action as they are exhibited within  
social interaction.  
 
EM/(M)CA research, however, has not been occupied solely with “novel” areas of 
empirico-analytic inquiry. Investigations have also converged on a number of 
comparatively “orthodox” topics associated with classical sociological thought. 
Investigations of “bureaucracy” (e.g. Zimmerman, 1966), “economy” (e.g. Pinch and 
Clark, 1986), “identity” (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998), “indexicality” (e.g. H. 
Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970), “jurisprudence” (e.g. Travers and Manzo, 1997), “polity” 
(e.g. Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986), “organizations” (e.g. Bittner, 1974 [1965]), 
“religiosity” (e.g. Drew, 1978), “social solidarity” (e.g. Clayman, 2002), and even 
 
1 For review, see §3.2. 
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“suicide” (e.g. Sacks, 1967; Atkinson, 1978), for example, illustrate this interface. As 
outlined subsequently, EM/(M)CA research differs in a number of respects to 
foregoing sociological studies (here, see §1.7). Focal for current purpose, only, 
however, is the availability of such domains for EM/(M)CA inquiry. It is this 
availability that furnishes the very basis for this thesis. Specifically, my research 
engages with another enduring locus of sociological theorising, one that has long 
awaited EM/(M)CA research; namely, social class. Ironically, this concept is 
considered an intellectual mainstay of the sociological discipline (see, e.g., Evans, 
1992: 211), but has persistently avoided the gaze of EM/(M)CA research. This 
omission is stark – and weighs heavy upon the sociologist-cum-ethnomethodologist. 
It is my intention in this thesis, therefore, to take stock of this lacuna and to begin 
initial efforts at resolution. 
 
1.2 Why social class? 
At this point, some qualification is in order. There are, of course, a range of omissions, 
causalities and malnourished concepts in EM/(M)CA research, including other 
orphaned dimensions of social identity. Why, then, does “social class” warrant 
treatment here? And why now? 2 Normatively, in EM/(M)CA, such a warrant is 
furnished endogenously. Instantiations of some phenomenon, for example, are 
identified within situated instances of talk-in-interaction and thereby form the 
operative basis by reference to which they can be discriminated, uniquely, for 
investigation. As the ensuing chapters attest (i.e. Chapters 4-6), such instances were 
identified within this research; however, they did not form its initial impetus. My 
rationale was, instead, comparatively exogenous in origin; in this case, precipitated by 
 
2 This line of inquiry is familiar to EM/(M)CA research; although not traditionally posed at 
this level of abstraction. Canonically, this refers to the ‘pervasively relevant’ (Sacks and 
Schegloff, 1973: 299), or ‘omni-relevant concern’ (Schegloff, 2007a: 28, fn. 1), regarding 
why some constitutive component of talk-in-interaction has been (co-)produced in/with  
that (com)position. This question, as Schegloff (1998a: 413-414) clarifies, can be posed  
at ‘various orders of granularity’. In the service of exposition, I direct this question not at  
some component of talk-in-interaction, however, but reflexively upon the research itself.  
This heuristic will prove explicative for contextualising my inquiry. 
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sustained engagement with sociological literature and motivated by the generative 
quality of the concept in/for the discipline. 3 
 
To outline the warrantable grounds for this inquiry, therefore, the remainder of this 
chapter will provide an abbreviated review of this literature. This review will serve a 
double-duty. Primarily, it will provide the backdrop against which social class 
qualifies as a conspicuous absence for EM/(M)CA research relative to the sheer of 
volume of sociological research conducted on the subject. Secondly, however, and 
more pertinently, it will canvass three homologies that interconnect dominant 
approaches to the study of social class within the Social Sciences. The first concerns 
the absence of research on the “lived-work” of classed incumbents, to borrow 
Livingston’s (1987: 94) term, in everyday life. The second concerns the enduring 
status of social class as an analysts’ resource in class-analysis. The third relates to 
admissibility of latent classed status and the non-requisite status of participatory 
relevance. In this chapter, these omissions are shown shared by three dominant 
approaches to class-analysis; namely, Marxian (§1.2.1), Weberian (§1.2.2) and 
Bourdieusian (§1.5) research. It is proposed, however, that these represent more 
generic assumptions of transdisciplinary forms of class-analysis. Variationist 
Sociolinguistics is outlined illustratively to this effect (§1.4). It is my proposal that 
these enduring lacunae are uniquely examinable through the lens of EM/(M)CA 
research – and that such an investigation is, to borrow Schegloff and Sacks’ (1973: 
312, my emphasis; see also, Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977: 375) term, “ripe”.  
 
 
3 My point of departure, in other words, is not with the analysis of a problem that is 
encountered by members within ‘talk-in-interaction’ (see Schegloff, 1999a: 408), and for 
whom this is made “demonstrably relevant” (see Schegloff, 1992a: 107-110; see also, 
Schegloff, 1984a: 36, 51; Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 472) through some course(s) of social action. 
The problem to which this thesis attends, instead, is one from the ‘sociologist’s standpoint’, 
as Sudnow (1967: 61, fn. 1) writes; namely, ‘problems [that] are not in the first instance known 
to be ‘problems’ that members occupy themselves with’ (Sacks, 1970: 9 in Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 86; relatedly, see also, Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 290-291; Ryave and Schenkein, 
1974: 267; Kitzinger, 2005a: 479-480). 
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To further qualify, these three approaches by no means exhaust the scope of class-
analysis within the Social Sciences; nor do they represent its complete filiation, 
conceptual latitude, nor encompass the heterogeneous areas of research that it has 
since occasioned. The magnitude of such a genealogy clearly transcends the scope of 
this review and cannot be borne out here. I note only that social class has extensive 
etymology that precedes its assimilation into the Social Sciences, 4 and the concept 
has since been progressively (re-)defined in a myriad of ways, under the auspices of 
diverse theoretical perspectives, rubrics and cosmologies (e.g. Giddens, 1973; 
Giddens and Held, 1982). Accordingly, in the survey that follows, my remit is 
confined to what are deemed, consensually, to be three of the cornerstones of 
sociological class-analysis (here, see E. O. Wright, 2005; Crompton, 2008). In the 
service of exposition, these traditions are first outlined individually and then 
synthesised conceptually. My central objective is thus to make available the rationale 
that governed this inquiry; one that intersects with both EM/(M)CA and sociological 
research. The chapter then concludes by adumbrating the contributions of this thesis 
and by précising each of the ensuing chapters (§1.7.2). 
 
1.2.1 Marx 
The work of Karl Marx (e.g. 1961 [1887]; 1962 [1894]) occupies a central position in 
the history of class-analysis (e.g. Edgell, 1993: 2). A key contribution of Marx’s work 
was the articulation of a materialist theory of historical development (Cohen, 1978: 
Ch. I); one that accorded an agentic, antagonistic and emancipatory function to social 
classes, and to the working class, in particular (e.g. Marx and Engels, 2012 [1948]: 
 
4 As Gobo (1993: 470) observes, the term instead antedates the emergence of the Social 
Sciences. Derivations can be traced to Ancient Rome (e.g. Gobo, 1993: 470-471; 1995: 445; 
see also, Edgell, 1993: 1), for example, and to uses within the Natural Sciences (see Gobo, 
1993: 475-478). Social class was only integrated into the English language in the eighteenth 
century (see Rose, 1960: 197, Table 2). It was then in the following century that it was 
inherited by the primogenitors of the Social Sciences (see Ossowski, 1963: 122-125; Gobo, 
1993: 480); a lineage that has since been recast by the nomination of diverse luminaries (e.g. 
Aristotle, 1967 [1943]; Transon, 1830: 49 in Gruner, 1968: 467; Lenin, 1947 [1914]: 492 in 
Wright, 1979: 16; Hegel, 1952 in Szacki, 1979: 139-140; Saint-Simon, 1965 in Giddens, 1973: 
23-24). 
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e.g. 79). For Marx, one’s classed position is determined by one’s relationship to the 
“means of production”; the ways in which commodities are produced. In a capitalist 
economic system (e.g. Marx and Engels, 2012 [1848]: 74-84), the prevailing Western 
“mode of production”, these classes are, fundamentally, the “proletariat” (i.e. 
“working class”) and the “bourgeoisie” (i.e. “ruling class”). Members of the former 
are relevantly defined by their non-ownership of the means of production. These 
persons are, instead, impelled to sell their “labour power” (see Marx, 1961 [1887]: 
167) to the latter, who, inter alia, alienate, dominate, estrange, exploit, oppress and 
subjugate the former through the extrication of “surplus-value” (see Marx, 1961 
[1887]: 186-198); ‘absolute’, or ‘relative’ (ibid.: 315; see ibid.: Ch. XVI). It is only 
when the proletariat gains communal awareness of these exploitative conditions (i.e. 
“a class for itself”) – and, commensurately, awakening from their “false 
consciousness”, in the Gramscian sense (see, e.g., Eyerman, 1981: 45-46) – that an 
opportunity for socio-political change is secured (e.g. Marx and Engels, 2012 [1848]: 
e.g. 79, 82; Bendix and Lipset, 1967 [1953]: 8). Social classes, for Marx, in this way 
occupy an axial position in historical evolution. The working class, in particular, are 
distinguished as the fulcrum for the transition of socio-structural epochs and are 
organised principally vis-à-vis the means of production.  
 
This model of social classes has been held as paramount in the Social Sciences, 
inspiring a number of differently centred neo-Marxian approaches (for review, see 
Eyerman, 1981). In terms of a coherent programme of empirical research, what has 
been recognised, conventionally, as of the most systematic developments of the 
Marxian project has been realised by E. O. Wright (e.g. 2005b: 19, italics in original) 
in his pioneering research on “class structure”. One of the foremost achievements of 
this inquiry has been the development of models whereby the distributions and 
relations of social classes can be reconnoitred in the aggregate. Central to this project 
has been the concept of “exploitation” (see E. O. Wright, 1979: 14-17; 2005b: 23). 
Classically, as E. O. Wright (2002: 844-845) observes, this refers to the consequences 
of the inequitable distribution of resources between social classes as they are brought 
to bear in labour. Empirically, this concept forms the lynchpin of E. O. Wright’s (e.g. 
1997: Ch. 1) analysis. Operationalisation is achieved, in this case, by stratifying 
individuals according to their possession of different species of resource as gleaned 
through large-scale survey research. Specifically, these resources refer to ‘labour-
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power assets (feudal exploitation), capital assets (capitalist exploitation), organization 
assets (statist exploitation) and skill or credential assets (socialist exploitation)’ 
(Crompton, 2008: 58). The positions that individuals occupy in relation to these 
resources are circumscribed, for E. O. Wright (1989: 277 in Crompton, 2008: 57), 
crucially, by their employment status, and by their “jobs”, specifically. These 
differentials constitute bases for modalities of exploitation and, by proxy, for the 
discernment of class structures.  
 
1.2.2 Weber 
For Weber (e.g. 1978a; 1978b), classes are neither accorded comparable historical 
momentum, nor analytic primacy, as that which is proposed within the classical 
Marxian thesis. Prima facie, for instance, the concept simply does not feature with 
equitable frequency within the Weberian oeuvre (see Breen, 2005: 34). As Gane 
(2005: 212) notes, excurses appear save twice within Weber’s (1978a; 1978b) 
“Economy and Society”; a work dedicated to a diverse array of subject matter (see, 
e.g., Schegloff, 2001: 287), but underpinned by an abiding focus on the social 
organisation of “domination” (for review, see Roth, 1978: lxxxviii-c). Thus, while 
other Weberian analyses have been discriminated – such as those concerning 
‘rationalization’ (e.g. E. O. Wright, 2002: 835, italics in original) – it is Weber’s 
(1978a; 1978b) position, in “Economy and Society”, that is framed, typically, as 
indicative of the wider Weberian perspective. In this case, it is in a section that 
concerns different species of power in which Weber (i.e. 1978b) addresses class 
occupancies directly.  
 
Here, Weber (1978b: 927) introduces the notion of ‘class situations’. In a vein 
comparable to Marx, this situation is organised, for Weber (1978b), with respect to 
individuals’ economic positions (see Gerth and C. W. Mills, 1974: 69), and, 
specifically, according to the ‘life-chances’ (Gane, 2005: 216) that are differentially 
potentiated thereby. Crucially, this position is one stratified by the nature of an 
individual’s relationship with the market (see Giddens, 1973: 43); otherwise referred 
to as their ‘market situation’ (e.g. Weber, 1978b: 928). Broadly speaking, positions 
along this axis are divided into two classes; namely, the ‘propertied and the non-
propertied’ (see Gerth and C. W. Mills, 1974: 69; see also, E. O. Wright, 2002: 839; 
Gane, 2005: 216). However, as Weber (1978b: 928) specifies, these classes can be 
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bifurcated further according to the types of property acquired. This includes those 
‘usable for returns’ and to ‘the kind of services that can be offered in the market’ 
(ibid.). Classes, for Weber (1978b), are, therefore, organised principally by the 
different relationships between individuals and the market, and by the structural 
consequences thereof. As Weber (1978b: 928) writes: ‘Class situation is, in this sense, 
ultimately market situation.’. 
 
Akin to Marx, Weber’s (e.g. 1978b) position has achieved an enduring legacy in 
sociological analyses of class-structure (see Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001: 
25). Perhaps the most notable tradition that has sustained this approach has been 
attributed to John Goldthorpe and colleagues (e.g. Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and C. 
Payne, 1987). Programmatically, Goldthorpe (et al.) preserve Weber’s (1978b)  
focus on individuals’ market positions by operationalising the concepts of “work 
situation” and “market situation”; concepts derived proximately from Lockwood’s 
(1958: n.p.g. [EJBH: e.g. 15-16] in Edgell, 1993: 28) study of the class-consciousness 
of clerical workers within Britain. Empirically, Goldthorpe (et al.) service this 
framework to organise occupations into social classes (see Crompton, 2008: 61, 158, 
fn. 4), culminating in the construction of numerous class schema (e.g. Goldthorpe and 
Llewellyn, 1977: 259-260; Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 1979: 419-421; 
Goldthorpe, 2000: 209; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 35-47). Crucially, as 
Goldthorpe (2000: 207) has summarised, this has crystallised around a distinction 
between ‘employers, the self-employed, and employees’. Thus, it is the primacy of 
‘employment relations’ (Goldthorpe, 2000: 206, italics in original) that has 
genealogised the schema of Goldthorpe (et al.) as an extension of the Weberian 
perspective. Hence, while proponents disavow any intended inheritance of the 
Weberian mantle (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 37; see also, Breen, 2005: 42, 
fn. 5; Savage, Warde and Devine, 2005: 32), continuities remain identifiable. 
 
1.3 Synthesis  
The conceptualisations of social class offered by Marx and Weber constitute what 
have been referred to as the ‘towering contributions’ (Edgell, 1993: 2) of class-
analysis and, while both were left unfinished (here, see Giddens, 1973: 28; Gane, 
2005: 212, respectively), have given way to a range of contemporary approaches. A 
review of the similarities and differences between these traditions, and their 
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subsequent permutations, transcends the limits of space. Moreover, as others have 
noted, distinctions between Marx and Weber constitute a ‘central motif’ (see E. O. 
Wright, 1996: 694; 1997: 29) around which extensive exegeses have since 
crystallised; namely, the so-called ‘Marx–Weber literature’ (Gane, 2005: 225, fn. 9; 
see, e.g., Giddens, 1973: Ch. 1-2; E. O. Wright, 2002). 5 Three homologies that obtain 
between these two approaches, however, have considerable import for the present 
inquiry and warrant special attention here. The first refers to the procedure that is 
employed to adjudicate classed positions, and the resulting elision of everyday life 
from their purview. The second pertains to the jurisdiction under which the concept 
resides; specifically, as an analysts’ resource. Finally, the third relates to the shared 
criterion by reference to which classed identities are ascribed, and to the non-criterial 
status of participatory relevance. The three subsections that follow outline each of 
these parallels in turn. 
 
1.3.1 Everyday life  
The (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches above align in their joint 
recognition of classed “dynamics”. This component is incorporated both conceptually 
and empirically. Conceptually, the approaches are both predicated on the status of 
classed incumbents relative to one-another (here, see E. O. Wright, 2002: 839). They 
have been identified as ‘relational’ (e.g. Crompton, 1995: 60) class schema to this 
effect. For the (neo-)Marxian approach, for example, the identification of social 
classes is based upon the exploitative relations between these groups. The (neo-
)Weberian model, on the other hand, is organised around the different positions that 
individuals occupy vis-à-vis the market. The nature of these dynamics, therefore, 
differs, substantively; however, they cohere in their relational design. This opposes 
comparatively descriptive, “gradational” schema (here, see Ossowski, 1963: Ch. 3), 
such as increments of ‘income’ or ‘prestige’ (Crompton, 2008: 57), which do not 
recognise these components. The two approaches thus align conceptually insofar as 
both appreciate the interactions that occur between social classes. This parallel has 
been reflected in the areas addressed in empirical research. It can be qualified, 
 
5 For an authoritative review, see, e.g., E. O. Wright (1997: 29, fn. 33). 
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however, that the sensitivity of this research, to interactional dynamics, has been 
restricted by the empirical purview of the two approaches.  
 
The research in this tradition has been conducted at what has been referred to by 
Grusky and Weeden (2001: 206) as ‘a highly aggregate level of analysis’. It will be 
recalled that the schemata advanced by E. O. Wright (e.g. 1997) and Erikson, 
Goldthorpe and Portocarero (e.g. 1979), for example, were designed in the service of 
reconnoitring the class arrangements of various populations. E. O. Wright’s (e.g. 
1997) scheme, for example, has enjoyed a cross-continental use, and derivations of 
Erikson et al. (1979) have been applied to countries across Europe (see Connelly, 
Gayle and Lambert, 2016: 4-5). This level of empirical “granularity” – to borrow the 
term (e.g. Schegloff, 2000a) – is, of course, coherent with analytic intent. The 
objective of researchers was, again, to canvass societal class-structures. It is notable 
only, that this analysis has constrained the investigation of classed dynamics, 
accordingly. Specifically, this has been limited to examples operative at this 
purportedly “macro” level (here, see fn. 89), or incorporated components which 
permit translation at this level. Examples of the former, for instance, include 
examinations of “social mobility” (e.g. Erikson et al., 1979; E. O. Wright, 1997, Ch. 
6) and “class struggle” (e.g. E. O. Wright, 1979: 22; 1997: 382). Conversely, in the 
latter, the “lived-work” of classed occupants is assimilated through idealised, 
mathematicised models of proposedly “rational” conduct. The application of “Game 
Theory” (e.g. E. O. Wright, 2000: 969-976) and ‘deductive’ (e.g. Savage, 2000: 42, 
fn. 7) forms of “Rational Action Theory” (e.g. Goldthorpe, 2000: 164-167), for 
example, typify this enterprise (see Savage et al., 2005). 6 
 
The “lived-work” of social classes is thus accommodated both conceptually and 
empirically within the two traditions. Research has been confined, however, to the 
aggregate level, only, and what has not formed an empirical focus is the work of 
classed incumbents amidst their everyday lives. Again, this restriction has been 
 
6 Concerns with how these calculi have been integrated into neo-Marxian and neo-Weberian 
research have been canvassed by Lebowitz (1988: 193-198) and Savage (2000: 85-88), 
respectively. More broadly, see Savage et al. (2005: 34-39). Relatedly, see Goffman (1969: 
e.g. 119, 132-136; 1972 [1961a]: 35), Schegloff (1992b: xlv-xlvi) and Clayman (2002: 249). 
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reflected by the purview of the two approaches. This treatment, however, is not 
necessarily an artefact of their operationalisation. Fundamentally, it represents an 
ontological entailment. In both traditions, after all, it is assumed that the class-
structures of societies can be described through the use of particular criteria. The 
fulfilment of this objective thus rests upon the assumption of stability; namely, that 
the classed-structures of a population can be described and are, in some respects, 
durable. The recognition of classed dynamics remains limited, therefore, as the 
populations that are proposedly described are cast as stable incumbents upon their 
description (see E. O. Wright, 1997: 45-46; Wacquant, 2013: 275). This has 
implications for the nature of classed incumbencies. Specifically, they are treated, 
accordingly, as a veritable ‘threshold’ phenomenon, to borrow the term (see, e.g., 
Schegloff, 1991: 62; 1992a: 127; my emphasis). They are positioned, as such, as 
statuses that can be accorded upon the fulfilment of conditions/criteria that are 
specified by researchers and are stabilised as a result. The first notable parallel 
between these two traditions, therefore, is their joint appreciation of the relational 
design of social classes. However, the appreciation of this dynamism has been 
constrained by the empirical purview and the ontological assumptions of the two 
approaches.  
 
1.3.2 Analysts’ resource 
The second focal parallel relates to the conceptualisations of social class within the 
two traditions. To qualify, this homology is neither intendedly substantive nor 
thematic. Both the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches, of course, align 
broadly in terms of their “economic” foci (see Gerth and C. W. Mills, 1974: 69), 
however they diverge in their specifics (see, e.g., E. O. Wright, 2002: 844-845). 
Notable, here, instead, is simply the status of the concept within the two traditions, 
and the equivalent bases by reference to which the concept comes to be mobilised and 
treated as ascribable. The crucial similarity here relates to the shared underlying 
assumptions of class-analysis. In both cases, social class is treated as concept for 
which analysts are entitled to define the criteria that relevantly circumscribe their 
derivative instantiations, and are entitled to nominate, and even to prioritise the 
concept in their research. The concept is conceived jointly, in so doing, as an 
“analysts’ resource” (here, see Speier, 1973: 184-185; Smith, 1974: 42-43; W. 
Sharrock and Coleman, 1999: 20-28). Of course, within both traditions, uses of the 
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concept are not necessarily contingent wholly upon the volition of analysts. 
Applications are instead presumably regulated by their own internal constraints 
(relatedly, see Sacks, 1984a: 25; Schegloff, 1991: 50; Coulter, 1995a: 168-169). The 
matter of the alignment and/or coherence of contemporary innovations (e.g. neo-
Marxian) with their comparatively classical harbingers (e.g. Marx), for example, 
presumably instructs applications of the concept. This notwithstanding, however, the 
concept of social class remains one for which analysts are treated as legitimately 
positioned to discriminate and privilege. This is an entitlement that obtains 
irrespective of differences in substantive theorisations. 
 
1.3.3 Participatory relevance 
The third notable parallel concerns the criteria by reference to which ascriptions of 
classed incumbencies are predicated. Crucial here is the status of classed-awareness – 
or class-consciousness – as immaterial. Both traditions are uniform, in this respect. 
The classed positions which persons proposedly occupy need not necessarily be 
relevant for these populations, and such an awareness does not form a condition on 
the basis of which the adjudication of classed statuses is contingent (see Grusky and 
Weeden, 2001: 206). This position is shared by exponents of both the classical 
Marxian and Weberian positions, canvassed above, and has been inherited by 
contemporary developments. Central to the Marxian thesis, for example, is the 
position that individuals only become cognisant of their classed position (and, with it, 
galvanised) upon the fulfilment of certain socio-structural conditions (Bendix and 
Lipset, 1967 [1953]: 8). While they only emerge as social classes, proper, when 
cognisant of such positions (see, ibid.: 10-11), they remain identifiable, for Marx, 
regardless (see Giddens, 1973: 29-30). Comparatively, for Weber (e.g. 1978b), it is 
this very basis that separates occupancy in social classes from memberships within 
“communities” (see E. O. Wright, 2002: 834); the former is distinguished from the 
latter inasmuch as it does not share a relevantly social basis (for review, see Gane, 
2005: 216). 
 
Participants’ reflexive awareness of their classed positions is thus treated in both 
traditions as unnecessary. It is not a condition for which fulfilment permits the 
ascription of classed incumbencies by analysts. The device functions, instead, an 
ascriptive resource that is mobilised by analysts, on the behalf of their participants, 
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and for which the relevance of ascribed statuses is inessential. Their demonstrable 
awareness of such incumbencies has therefore been elided, overwhelmingly, in the 
two approaches. Consideration has been given only to specific strata – canonically, 
the working class (here, see Devine and Savage, 2005: 4-5) – or have incorporated 
classed-awareness not as a requirement for issuing classed ascriptions, but as an 
outcome thereof. The ‘Structure-Consciousness-Action (S-C-A) model’ (see 
Lockwood, 1982; 1996 in Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2001: 877; see also, Pahl, 
1989: n.p.g. in Savage, 2000: 26) typifies this approach, locating such a situational, 
intersubjective awareness not as criterial for classed ascriptions, but as precipitative 
of relevantly classed conduct. 
 
1.3.4 Summary 
Social class represents a perennial focus of sociological inquiry. The origins of this 
research are located consensually in Marx and Weber (cf. fn. 4). As outlined above, 
the contributions of these theorists are considerable and exceed the scope of the 
present review. Across this section, I have highlighted that two components remain 
missing from contemporary developments of these traditions. These concern the 
habitual, “lived-work” of classed incumbents and the recognition of their status, as 
such. To reiterate, these dimensions have not been presented as empirico-theoretical 
deficiencies, nor as reductions. They have been distinguished as programmatic 
omissions, only; absences within their classical formulations and which have been 
perdured by contemporary research. In §1.5, below, I introduce one additional 
approach that has partially redressed the former omission. This tradition has been 
referred to as the ‘cultural turn’ of class-analysis (here, see Chaney, 1994: n.p.g. in 
Devine and Savage, 2005 [2004]: 1) – or, eponymously, the “Bourdieusian turn” 
(Parker, Uprichard and Burrows, 2007: 905). 7 Before this, however, it is first worth 
clarifying the status of the omissions introduced above. Specifically, these 
 
7 This is not the only approach that has attempted to reconcile this deficit. Others include the 
lesser purveyed models of class-analysis that are associated with the neo-Durkheimian 
approach of David Grusky and colleagues (see Grusky and Galescu, 2005: e.g. 59), for 
example. For brevity, however, and provided the prevalence of the Bourdieusian paradigm, 
and its occasional integration with EM/(M)CA (e.g. §2.4.1; §2.5.2; see Flynn, 1991: 48-49, 
243, 246), I detail this approach only. 
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homologies, as set forth here, have been derived from Marx and Weber, two of the 
foremost theorists of social class. In the next section, however, I show that these 
omissions are not limited to these approaches, nor bound to the Social Sciences. 
Instead, I propose that these are generic, transdisciplinary assumptions of class-
analysis. Investigations of the concept in sociolinguistics offers one illustrative 
example of this conceptual congruence. 
 
1.4 Variationist Sociolinguistics 
Like sociology, the influence of social class in linguistics is widely felt and can be 
identified across several of its central domains of empirical inquiry. This includes 
“bi/multilingualism” and “second language acquisition/learning” (e.g. Block, 2014: 
Ch. 4 and Ch. 5, respectively). A discussion of social class and linguistics should, 
accordingly, situate it against this backdrop as a whole. As such a cohesive review 
would, however, transcend the limits of space, I confine my remit to a single 
subdomain; namely, “Variationist Sociolinguistics” (hereafter, VS). This area of 
inquiry, as detailed below, has not been discriminated as one that is, necessarily, 
representative of linguistics – nor, equally, as reflective of the discipline’s wider 
relationship with social class. Its perspicuity for the present discussion is furnished 
purely by virtue of the predominance of social class in this tradition (here, see 
Rampton, 2010: 4). 8 Accordingly, it is on this basis, and for economy, that I restrict 
my discussion of social class in sociolinguistics to VS, alone. 
 
The focus of VS concerns variations in linguistic conduct according to their 
stratification by ‘extra-linguistic factors’ (e.g. Kerswill and Williams, 2000: 93), or 
‘social correlates’ (e.g. Llamas, Mullany and Stockwell, 2007: xvii). Procedurally, 
research involves the recruitment of participants who can be stratified according to 
particular sociodemographic criteria. Social class represents a modal aspect of social 
identity in this tradition. Broadly, the device has been organised by using what Labov 
(1990: 220; my emphasis) has referred to as ‘objective indicators’, such as ‘education, 
 
8 The omission of Basil Bernstein’s (e.g. 1971; 1973; 1975) research, concerning the 
distributions of “restricted” and “elaborated” codes, is a regrettable shortcoming of this 
restriction. For review, see §7.4.2. 
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occupation, or income’ or, alternatively, by ‘subjective measures’ – such as ‘status’, 
for instance. 9 These specifications are operationalised variously. As Snell (2014: 1-2) 
has observed, for instance, single indexes – such as ‘occupation’ (e.g. Horvath, 1985 
in Ash, 2002: 411) – in addition to composite measurements (e.g. Trudgill, 1972: 181), 
are both customary in this tradition; the latter of which has been celebrated for the 
consistency of the findings it has uncovered (e.g. Dodsworth, 2009: 1316). 
 
This research may proceed deductively or inductively. A definition of social class 
may, for example, be selected into which participants are distributed. Alternatively, 
strata may be educed from within the data itself. These logics notwithstanding, VS 
research involves the collection of participants’ linguistic conduct. The ‘Labovian 
sociolinguistic interview’ (Johnstone, 2006: 47) is a classical elicitation method used 
in this tradition. Variations are then sought – or are sought to be “falsified” 10 – 
between participants’ recorded conduct and aspects of their socio-demographic 
attributes. Thus, social class is employed as a potentially explanatory resource; one 
mobilised in the service of explaining intergroup discrepancies or consistencies as it 
pertains to some dimension(s) of conduct. Examples of this research has connected 
social class with a battery of linguistic practices, chiefly ‘phonological’ (see Cheshire, 
2005: 480). Specifically, analyses of the relative (in)frequencies of conduct across 
classed schema (e.g. Macaulay, 2002: e.g. 400-403; Kerswill and Williams, 2005: 
1041 in Kerswill, 2007: 57; Moore, 2010: 362-364; Kirkham, 2015: 631-633) are 
recurrent in this tradition. One study that is illustrative of this approach is Labov’s 
(2006 [1966]) study of variation in the Lower East Side of New York City.  
 
Using an existing (composite) measure of social class (see Michael, 1962 in Ash, 
2002: 406-407), Labov (2006 [1966]: 134) distinguished social classes, broadly, 
according to their ‘occupation, education, and income’. Three main groups were 
identified through this approach: ‘lower class’, ‘working class’ and ‘middle class’ 
(ibid.: 139, italics in original). Variations were then observed between the 
circumscribed groups with respect to their production of several productional features. 
 
9 See Dodsworth (2009) and Labov (2006 [1966]: 132-141), e.g., for comprehensive reviews. 
10 Popper’s (2013 [1959]: 411, italics in original) term.  
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The variables studied included: (r), in ‘final and pre-consonantal’ position (ibid.: 33; 
e.g. ‘bore or bored’ [ibid.: 33, italics in original]); (æh) ‘[t]he height of the vowel in 
bad, bag, ask, pass, cash, dance’ (ibid.: 33, italics in original); (oh) ‘the mid-back 
rounded vowel heard in caught, talk, awed, dog, off, lost, all’ (ibid.: 35); and (th and 
dh) ‘the initial consonants of thing and then’ (ibid.: 36, italics in original). A 
curvilinear relationship, for example, was identified with the variable (oh), where 
higher vowel use was found associated with the working class, and lower use by the 
lower and higher groups (e.g. ibid.: 142).  
 
Whilst unique in scope, Labov’s (2006 [1966]) study typifies the procedure of VS 
research. To summarise, the focus of VS concerns the differential distribution of 
linguistic conduct across groups. Several components of this approach warrant 
independent discussion. The bifurcation of language and identity, for example, as 
distinctive ontological domains, is relevant provided the EM/(M)CA perspective of 
this thesis (here, see R. Watson, 1992a: 6; 1992b: 259; see also, Drew and Heritage, 
1992: 7); specifically, insofar as it represents a contrastive approach (see §2.2.1; 
§3.3.1). What is noticeable here, however, is simply the isomorphic status of social 
class in VS relative to the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches, above. 
Focal, in particular, are their convergent perspectives on the “lived-work” of classed 
incumbents (§1.3.1) and participatory relevance (§1.3.3).  
 
For review, social class is treated, once more, as an analyst’s resource, where the 
parameters of the concept are determined, normatively, by researchers. 11 Again, it is 
by satisfying the criteria privileged by analysts, on some occasions, that co-
participants come to be treated as legitimately assignable into classed groups. The 
concept is therefore operationalised as an aspect of identity that can be fulfilled by 
 
11 This obtains even for approaches in which the habitual, processual and active dimensions 
of social class are emphasised (e.g. Dodsworth, 2009: 1320-1321). Participants, here, are 
nevertheless classed according to some criterion – or are assigned, by proxy, into some 
“community of practice” (here, see Mullany, 2007: 87-89) – that has been stipulated by 
analysts. How social class is defined, therefore, is retained as a matter of analysts’ 
determination, and the ascriptions that are eventuated, accordingly, are reified as static 
incumbencies. 
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reaching or exceeding some “threshold”. The nature of such thresholds varies 
substantively. They remain homogenous, however, insofar as participants’ classed-
awareness are treated as non-criterial for their ascription. It remains equivocal, 
therefore, whether the classed positions that are accorded to participants are 
necessarily salient or meaningful, uniquely, for those participants when it comes to 
the (non-)production of the linguistic practices with which they are (dis-)connected 
(see Schegloff, 1993: 124, fn. 26). Indeed, even in the limiting case in which 
participants’ perceptions regarding the focal conduct is solicited, the nature of this 
relevance remains qualified both in terms of their relative analytic import and 
empirical parity.  
 
In the former, participatory recognition appears to occupy a depreciated explanatory 
status in the tradition. The proposition of classed relevance in this way remains, 
fundamentally, an analytic decision, one ascribed with or without participatory 
avowals. Such recognition, therefore, is not necessarily treated to be criterial for 
classed incumbencies. Furthermore, empirically, the nature of this relevance is one 
that is displaced from the linguistic practices with which it is proposedly associated. 
Participants, in other words, need not explicate the relevance of social class for 
themselves when the conduct in focus is produced. The adjudication of this 
(ir)relevance is, instead, offset temporally (and, thus, sequentially) from the focal 
conduct, and is eventuated in different interactional milieux. When researching 
changes in practices, for example, that ‘operate within public consciousness” 
(Dodsworth, 2011: 195), participants’ recognition, thereof, are not investigated 
endogenously, when (co-)produced, but gauged retroactively, such as through self-
report methods. The classed relevance of practices are thus evaluated in an 
interactional environment (e.g. “interviews”) in which different (i.e. exotic) 
interactional relevancies are at stake (see, e.g., Heritage, 1984: 135-[1]78 in Drew, 
1989: 113, fn. 3; Schegloff, 1998b: 252, fn. 18). 
 
The two homologies educed from within the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian 
approaches, introduced above, therefore, stand also in the different disciplinary 
context of VS research. The significant contributions of this body of research thus 
provides equally for a number of glaring omissions. The most significant, here, 
concern the matters of how and where “social class” is made relevant by and for 
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participants in the course of their habitual conduct in their everyday life. The most 
notable contribution to this line of inquiry has been conducted under the auspices of 
the ‘cultural turn’ (e.g. Chaney, 1994 in Devine and Savage, 2005 [2004]: 1). 
 
1.5 The Cultural Turn 
The pivotal dimension of this approach is the conceptualisation of classed identities 
as an ongoing, active accomplishment. Classed identities, in this tradition, are no 
longer conceived as passive, static attributes; instead, they have a revised status as 
processual and dynamic identities. This ontological disjuncture has reverberated 
substantively. The field of employment, for example, no longer represents the 
operative context upon which classed identities are uniquely relevant. Instead, as 
Johnson and Lawler (2005: §1.2) write, research has begun to uncover ‘the ways in 
which we are constituted as classed subjects long before we enter the workplace’ (see 
also, Crompton, 1995: 6). The cultural turn has in this way ushered in a new 
“ecological niche” 12 of and for class-analysis; specifically, everyday life. This is a 
field of study in its own right, for which numerous analyses have been posed by 
diverse theoretical and epistemic communities (see Lawler, 2017). 13 The integration 
of this domain of inquiry within class-analysis, however, and in the “cultural turn” 
specifically, has been precipitated, to a considerable extent, by the increasing 
transition towards the scholarship of one theorist in particular; namely, Pierre 
Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2006 [1986]; 1987; 1989).  
 
1.5.1 Bourdieu 
For Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1987; 1989), social classes are 
understood to represent positions in “social space”. In a similar vein to the (neo-
)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian traditions, the position that one occupies within this 
space is determined, to some extent, by virtue of one’s economic position within a 
mode of production. It is not this dimension in isolation, however, that dictates this 
position; nor is this determinant granted the same degree of analytic primacy as that 
 
12 Schegloff’s (e.g. 1997a: 455; 1998c: 535; 2006a) term.  
13 For theorists relevant to the EM/(M)CA position, see, e.g., H. Garfinkel (e.g. 1967), 
Goffman (e.g. 1959; 1963; 1967; 1983 [1982]; cf. §2.3.1) and Sacks (e.g. 1992), inter alia. 
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which is endowed by both the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian perspectives (see 
Savage et al., 2005: 39-42). Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1989), instead, 
relaxes this focus, offering what has been described as a comparatively ‘multi-
dimensional’ (Savage et al., 2013: 223) and agentic (see Savage et al., 2005: 39) 
conceptualisation. Here, individuals’ positions, vis-à-vis “production”, remain 
significant for determining classed statuses; however, this is also informed by their 
quotidian forms of “consumption” (see Burrows and Gane, 2006: 806; see also, 
Brubaker, 1985: 761 in Crompton, 2008: 100); a novel arena for class-analysis. 
 
The positions occupied by individuals in this space are governed by their possession 
of different species of “capital” (see Bourdieu, 2011 [1986]). This includes both 
‘generic’ forms of “economic”, “social”, “cultural”, “political” and “symbolic” 
capital, amongst other ‘field-specific’ modalities (Savage et al., 2005: 40). The 
distribution of these capitals, across populations, constitutes the structured space of 
different “fields” (ibid.: 42). Social classes are derived through the ‘volume’, 
‘structure’ and ‘the relative weight’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 17) that are awarded to 
dimensions of capital across different fields. Social classes, for Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 
[1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1987; 1989), are not then theorised merely as reflections of 
persons’ economic circumstance. Instead, it is through their habitual practices of 
cultural consumption that classed statuses come to be indexed and affirmed. 14 This 
position is epitomised, most notably, in Bourdieu’s (1984 [1979]) “Distinction”; an 
investigation of the relationship between judgements of taste and social classes in 
1960s France. Bourdieu (1984 [1979]: Ch. 1) not only investigates the consumption 
of canonical modalities of culture – such as perceptions of art (ibid.: 5) – but also 
comparatively prosaic activities, including ‘clothing, furniture and cookery’ (ibid.: 
13). 
 
Contemporary Bourdieusian research continues to uphold the primacy awarded to 
everyday life and connections have since been established with various aspects of 
consumption (e.g. Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal and Wright, 2009). 
 
14 These classes, as Bourdieu (1987; 1989: 17-18) qualifies, however, are classes only on 
paper; they are not necessarily “real” groups”. 
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Again, this has addressed “archetypal” forms of culture – such as artistic aesthetics 
(e.g. ibid.: Ch. 7) – but it has also has incorporated comparatively “mundane” 
activities; such as tastes in reading (e.g. ibid.: Ch. 6) and other forms of media 
consumption (e.g. ibid.: Ch. 8). The status of “everyday life” is therefore elevated 
within the Bourdieusian tradition; it is positioned as integral to the formation of 
classed incumbencies. As detailed below, this research has been predominantly 
quantitative in appreciation, paralleling the sociological and sociolinguistic 
approaches introduced above. This has been complemented, however, and further 
specified, through qualitative forms of class-analysis. Feminist Class-Analysis, in 
particular, has progressed this line of inquiry most notably (e.g. Adkins and Skeggs, 
2004). 
 
1.5.2 Feminist Class-Analysis 
As a microcosm of class-analysis (see Crompton, 1995), Bourdieusian (e.g. 1984 
[1979]; 2011 [1986]; 1987; 1989) forms of class-analysis have classically eschewed 
engagement with feminist social theory (see Skeggs, 2004: 19-20). Since at least the 
1990s, however, a successful synthesis of the two traditions has been realised, 
culminating in a distinctive programme of Feminist Class-Analysis. Central to this 
interface has been the Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) model of “capitals”. In 
Feminist Class-Analysis, this schema is enlisted metaphorically (here, see Skeggs, 
1997a; 1997b: 10; 161; 2004: 16; 48) in order to analyse the affective, habitual and 
experiential aspects of classed-belonging. 15 This is in diametric opposition to 
alternative operationalisations in which the schema is used mathematically (see 
Walkerdine et al., 2001: 39) – that is, as a(nother) form of ‘political arithmetic’ 
(Skeggs, 2004: 20, 43, 62) class-analysis – in which it is employed to allocate 
individuals into social classes. Conversely, in Feminist Class-Analysis, the schema 
has been used to describe how classed identities are (re-)produced in everyday life 
(e.g. Skeggs, 2004: 3, 5, 100-101, 108, 117-118) and, specifically, how classed 
identities are forged relationally, through so doing. 16 Skeggs (1997b) offers an 
 
15 On “metaphor”, as a Formal Analytic resource, see §2.3.1. 
16 This conceptualisation shares a number of similarities with the emerging “Critical Social 
Psychology of Class” (see K. Day, Rickett and Woolhouse, 2017: 475-480; see also, Holmes, 
2019a). 
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illustrative example of this approach in her ethnography conducted with a group of 
working class, white women. 
 
In this research, Skeggs (1997b) demonstrates how the classed identities of her 
participants came to be constituted through the details of their relational, quotidian 
practices. Skeggs (1997b: Ch. 5) observes, for example, that participants enacted a 
number of habitual practices to “dis-identify” with working class values, and so 
insulate themselves from negative judgements. Practices included, for instance, 
making ‘investments in their bodies, clothes, consumption practices, leisure pursuits 
and homes’ (Skeggs, 1997b: 95). The social class positions of Skeggs’ (1997b) 
participants were, in this way, enacted through the constitutive features of their 
different lifestyles. Further still, these identities were constituted relationally; 
constructed with respect to what they omit or negate. This habitual, relational 
perspective of class-formation is a key contribution of Feminist Class-Analysis, and 
has been furthered in subsequent research. Lawler (2005: 431), for example, has 
argued that the construction of middle class identities can be furnished through 
articulations of ‘disgust’ vis-à-vis working class values (see also, Walkerdine and 
Lucey, 1989: 30; Lawler, 1999: 14; Tyler, 2008: 19-20).  
 
Feminist Class-Analysis, as conducted within the Bourdieusian idiom, has thus 
functioned to further respecify the active conceptualisation of social class promoted 
in the Bourdieuisan oeuvre (Holmes, 2019a; 2019b). In summary, social class is 
positioned, here, as an aspect of social identity that is (re-)constructed actively and 
relationally in everyday life (see Crompton, 2008: 100; Tyler, 2015: 500). In contrast 
to the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches outlined above, the 
Bourdieusian position does not elide the “lived-work” of social class(es); nor is it 
treated simply as addendum through the mediatory lens of “Game Theory” and/or 
“Rational Action Theory” (see Skeggs, 2004: 43, 67). This comparatively agentic 
conceptualisation of social class instead forms a locus for sociological inquiry in its 
own right. 
 
1.6 Summary 
The Bourdieusian approach thus relocates social class to the realm of consumption 
and, with it, everyday life. The lived-work of classed occupants is thereby 
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accommodated in this tradition and informs the statuses they can be legitimately 
ascribed. Qualitative research conducted using this framework – such as Feminist 
Class-Analysis – appreciates this component most markedly. The Bourdieusian 
perspective is not employed here simply to classify populations in preparation for 
quantitative inquiry, and/or for their analysis in the aggregate (e.g. Savage et al., 
2013). Focal, instead, are the quotidian elements of classed-belonging. 
Programmatically, therefore, this tradition, in particular, preserves the “dynamic” 
conceptualisation of social class advanced by Bourdieu. Furthermore, it also upholds 
this theorisation procedurally insofar as it does not focus on the ascription of 
individuals into fixed classed positions.  
 
How Bourdieu’s approach has been operationalised, therefore, is distinctive of 
preceding approaches by virtue of the primacy awarded to everyday life and to its 
corresponding focus on the lived-work of classed incumbents. Classed statuses are 
treated, therefore, not as static ‘threshold’ phenomena (à la Schegloff, 1991: 62; 
1992a: 127), but as performative social identities that are both achieved in and 
reflexively expressed through the details of persons’ everyday lives. Bourdieusian 
(e.g. 2011 [1986]) class-analysis can therefore be distinguished in this respect. 
However, this is not to say that it is, as such, completely removed from the (neo-
)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian traditions introduced above. Instead, homologies 
continue to obtain with respect to the use of social class as an analysts’ resource and 
regarding the status of participatory relevance. These two parallels are outlined 
subsequently. Before they are addressed, however, the extent to which Bourdieusian 
(e.g. 2011 [1986]) research investigates classed incumbencies within everyday life 
requires qualification. 
 
1.6.1 Everyday life 
The empirical study of everyday life has a central position in Bourdieusian class-
analysis. As introduced above, such research has investigated this domain through 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. Feminist Class-Analysis in the 
Bourdieusian mould, for example, has attended to the perceptions and lived-
experiences of classed incumbents, culminating in qualitative descriptions of how 
classed identities are formed and sustained relationally and habitually (see, e.g., 
Skeggs, 2004: 118), and so uncovering what have been described elsewhere as the 
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“hidden injuries” of social class (Sennett and Cobb, 1972: e.g. 32, 38, 49). 
Bourdieusian research, however, nonetheless remains limited in the investigation of 
this domain. Most notable, here, is the level of granularity upon which everyday life 
has been analysed. In this case, this research has restricted its purview, 
overwhelmingly, to participants’ accounts of their situated conduct, whereby 
perceptions are gleaned through “self-report” methods, such as interviews (e.g. 
Lawler, 1999; Reay, 2002; see also, Savage et al., 2001; 2005a; 2005b), focus groups 
(e.g. Skeggs, Thumin and Woods, 2008) and video-diaries (e.g. Walkerdine, et al., 
2001).  
 
What it remains unable to provide, therefore, are insights into the details of 
individuals’ situated conduct, itself. In other words, they cannot be employed to 
analyse the practices that make relevant persons’ classed identities by/for co-
participants. This distinction, between accounts of situated conduct, and of the 
conduct itself, has been elaborated by Psathas (1990: 9), who notes that recollections 
may constitute ameliorated versions of the reported conduct, and which are subject to 
the contingencies of remembering and forgetting (here, see also, Heritage, 1984a: 234-
238). It will also be recalled that participants’ retrospective reports are not only re-
processed from howsoever they were experienced, initially, into some subsequent 
interdiscursive form (Psathas, 1990: 6), but participants’ very testimonies are equally 
conditioned by the vicissitudes of the local environments within which they are 
recalled (e.g. Schegloff, 1998b: 252, fn. 18). Bourdieusian research has, therefore, 
acknowledged that social class is reportedly and/or observably enacted in everyday 
life. But it has not investigated how, where and/or for what practical purposes it is 
relevant for individuals in their everyday interactions.  
 
To qualify, this omission is, of course, surprising. As others have noted, Bourdieu 
articulates an elegant theory of social class; one that promotes the significance of 
everyday life. However, this approach has neither elaborated, nor borne out, a 
procedural apparatus that can be used to examine the naturally-occurring social 
interactions occurrent between individuals (see Schegloff, 1996a: 162; Maynard, 
2003: 71; M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 161; see also, Ford, Fox and S. Thompson, 2002a: 
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7). 17 It is paradoxical, therefore, that since (at least) the “cultural turn” of class-
analysis, social class has been heralded as an agentic achievement; one that is 
produced and reproduced through quotidian praxis. In this sense, it has been 
respecified from a purely economic, “threshold” phenomenon, such as that which has 
been differently calibrated in the traditions of Marx and Weber, to a performative 
concept that is indexed through practices of cultural consumption (Holmes, 2019a; 
2019b). Nevertheless, this research has not investigated how classed identities come 
to be occasioned in and through the details of individuals’ naturally-occurring 
conduct. Social class is re-conceived habitually, therefore, but how it features in 
situated interactions remains overlooked or obscured. The Bourdieusian tradition 
thereby aligns with the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian approaches in this respect.  
 
1.6.2 Analysts’ resource 
Everyday life is therefore embraced by the Bourdieusian tradition, but only to a 
qualified extent. This contrasts the two remaining homologies which continue to 
obtain. These relate to the status of social class as an analysts’ resource – one that 
researchers are entitled to define – and to the absent requirement of participatory 
relevance. It is not that these homologies are incorporated but qualified by the 
Bourdieusian tradition, but rather that differences are negligible; both approaches 
align closely with the positions adopted in (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian 
research. The case of the former is most readily appreciable: Social class, here, 
remains a concept for which analysts are licensed to adjudicate. Whether this is 
determined ‘mechanically’ (see Savage, 2000: 110) through ratios of “capital” 
(Bourdieu, 2011 [1986]), or as ‘metaphors’ (see Skeggs, 1997b: 10; 161; 2004: 16; 
48), the coordinates of the concept remain delimited by analysts who define the 
operative ‘“cutoff” points’ for “classed” incumbencies, to borrow the expression 
(here, see Cicourel, 1976 [1968]: 168). Substantively, of course, Bourdieusian 
research entails a considerable shift in priorities from (neo-)Marxian and (neo-
)Weberian research; what has formed the prevailing focus of critical comparisons. 
How the phenomenon is adjudicated, for example, is no longer discriminated 
unilaterally through an economic criterion, but by way of Bourdieu’s (e.g. 2011 
 
17 Susen (2013) is one notable exception. 
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[1986]) comparatively multidimensional schema (recall §1.5.1). However, this 
notwithstanding, the concept remains, fundamentally, an analytic resource; one 
circumscribed consensually by analysts.  
 
1.6.3 Participatory relevance 
Neither the qualified status of everyday life in the Bourdieusian tradition, nor the 
treatment of the concept as an analysts’ resource, have formed the focus of 
considerable sociological reflection. The final homology, by contrast, is a much-
discussed feature of the Bourdieusian approach. This concerns the status of 
participatory relevance. For both the (neo-)Marxian and the (neo-)Weberian 
traditions, it will be recalled that the populations proposedly described need not 
identify with the ascriptions that are issued by analysts in order to warrant their 
classification, as such. In other words, the approaches align inasmuch as neither 
operate on a basis of participatory relevance. This position is also shared by the 
Bourdieusian tradition. It is set forth explicitly by Savage (2000) in the following 
passage.  
 
“Bourdieu’s approach allows us to see class relationships as fundamental to 
claims of legitimacy and entitlement. However, his arguments lead not to an 
emphasis on class as heroic collective agency, but towards class as implicit, as 
encoded in people’s sense of self-worth and in their attitudes to and awareness 
of others – in how they carry themselves as individuals. Social distinctions that 
Bourdieu sees as lying at the heart of class processes might not always be 
apparent to people themselves, since if the culturally advantaged recognized 
their taste explicitly as part of that privileged class, this would devalue it, by 
contaminating it with a pragmatic and instrumental meaning utterly at odds 
with its claims to be universal, which lie at the heart of the entire Kantian 
aesthetic. It is hence the very salience of class struggles over distinction which 
explains why it is so difficult for them to be explicitly named and identified by 
their protagonists, and to be tied down into a neat model specifying the 
relationship between social location and culture.” 
(Savage, 2000: 107, my emphasis)  
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In order for phenomena to be cast in classed terms, therefore, these need not be 
recognised by participants, commensurately. Bourdieusian research does not, in this 
way, trade upon a criterion of participatory relevance. Social class is understood, 
instead, to undergird social relations implicitly; that is, sub-/un-consciously (see W. 
Sharrock and Anderson, 2016: 26). This conceptualisation is sustained in the 
quantitative tradition pioneered by Bourdieu (e.g. 1984 [1979]), using geometric 
methods of data-analysis (here, see Rouanet, Ackermann and Le Roux, 2000), in 
addition to the qualitative research conducted within Feminist Class-Analysis. 
 
In the former, methods such as “Correspondence Analysis” and “Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis” (see Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010) are employed to 
explicate and to visualise latent homologies that potentially undergird sets of 
categorical data. What such methods do not yield, however, is whether such 
relationships are avowedly relevant for the co-participants intendedly described; a 
condition that is presumably orthogonal – even antithetical – to the use of latent 
methods of modelling. Social class positions are understood, accordingly, as a 
phenomenon that may be educed by the researcher through the construction of 
particular indices (e.g. Savage et al., 2013: 225-229), and where the boundaries 
between social classes are determined by using – and, specifically, by way of 
comparing (C. Mills, 2014: 441) – statistical methods of model selection; or, 
alternatively, through a criterion of theoretical coherence (e.g. Savage et al., 2015: 
1030). A similar position regarding participatory relevance is upheld in qualitative 
Bourdieusian research; including that adopted in Feminist Class-Analysis. The 
research of Charlesworth (2000), for example, an ethnography conducted in 
Rotherham, typifies this position. 
 
Charlesworth’s (2000: 7) approach involved looking ‘beneath what is said’ by 
participants. Through this approach, Charlesworth (2000) imputes the relevance of 
social class when participants do not articulate this relevance explicitly. 18 Examples 
 
18 I have limited myself, here, to one exemplar of this approach. Additional instances, 
however, proliferate in Bourdieusian research (e.g. Skeggs, 1997b: 30-31, Ch. 5, 151; 2005: 
50-54; Savage et al., 2005a: 146; 2005b: 114-116, 121). Examples can also be located in 
related traditions of class-analysis (e.g. Willis, 1977: 119-126, 137, fn. 1, 173; 2001: 200-
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of such an approach punctuate Charlesworth’s (2000) research. This includes, inter 
alia, the production of “expletives” (e.g. ibid.: 114-115), “profanity” (e.g. ibid.: 231-
234), “laughter” (e.g. ibid.: 146), the absence of “euphemism” (e.g. ibid.: 214-215, 
227, 229), and use of “brevity” (e.g. ibid.: 231-232). Charlesworth (2000: 237) even 
ventures so far as to attribute the entirety of the working class ‘articulatory style’ to 
their classed status. For Charlesworth (2000), therefore, this absence of participatory 
avowals of their self-conscious awareness is not a requirement for ascriptions of 
classed relevance; nor is it an omission, thereof. It is conceived, instead, as affirmative 
of the classed positions that are occupied by participants. In other words, it is because 
participants are deprived of such reflexive resources that they could not frame their 
experiences in classed terms (e.g. Charlesworth, 2000: 143). The very absence of 
participants’ orientations to social class is thereby transposed, en passant, into an 
instantiation of its putative omnirelevance (here, see fn. 252). 
 
Participatory relevance thus occupies a non-criterial status in Bourdieusian class-
analysis, aligning with the (neo-)Marxian and (neo-)Weberian traditions previously 
arrayed. In this case, it is not by-product of how the concept has come to be 
operationalised in quantitative, aggregate focussed inquiries. Rather, akin to the 
position of Marx and Weber (§1.3.3), it is fundamentally ineluctable of the approach. 
19 Social class is conceptualised, as Skeggs (1997b: 74) writes, as a ‘structuring 
absence’, undergirding social relations implicitly. While Bourdieusian research has, 
then, reconfigured social class as an everyday achievement, this contribution is 
qualified with respect to the level of abstraction upon which this project has been 
realised (§1.6.1). Moreover, it has further retained the concept as an analytic 
phenomenon (§1.6.2); one that can be defined and ascribed by analysts, at their 
discretion, regardless of participatory (dis-)consensus (§1.6.3). 
 
 
 
 
215). “Feminist Psychology”, for instance, showcases a host of conforming examples (e.g. 
Reay, 1999: e.g. 90, 95, 102; Walkerdine et al., 2001: 46-47). 
19 For EM/(M)CA reflections on this procedure, see, differently, e.g., Atkinson (1978: 211, 
fn. 8), Travers (1999: §5.1-§5.5) and W. Sharrock and Anderson (2016: 26). 
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1.6.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided a partial review of transdisciplinary traditions of class-
analysis. This has been conducted with modest ambition. I have shown that social 
class constitutes a longstanding locus of sociological inquiry; one that has been 
researched and theorised since the inception of the discipline (cf. fn. 4) under the 
auspices of diverse approaches. My purview here has been confined to three of the 
most predominant traditions of class-analysis; namely, Marxian (§1.2.1), Weberian 
(§1.2.2) and Bourdieusian research (§1.5). In turn, I have outlined how social class 
features within these traditions and underscored three novel homologies that are 
shared by these approaches and which also hold for other disciplinary traditions (e.g. 
§1.4). Condensed, these are as follows: 
 
(1) Everyday life. Social class has been overwhelmingly neglected in everyday 
life. When recognised, it has been investigated predominantly through 
theoretical models or self-report methods.  
(2) Analysts’ resource. Social class is treated as a concept that is legitimately 
adjudicated and circumscribed by analysts. 
(3) (Ir)relevance. The ascription of an individual, or set of individuals, into a 
social class does not require avowed recognition of this incumbency by the 
population ascribed. 
 
Together, this position has been shown to be differently sustained across a range of 
traditions of class-analysis. As ethnomethodologists have observed, however, this 
approach is not localised to this tradition of research but represents a more generic 
type of sociology. Livingston (2008), for example, captures this dimension, in part, 
under the rubric of “Sociologies of the Hidden Order”: 
 
“In sociologies of the hidden order, the workings of society are believed to 
underlie, or be hidden within, the visible actions and behaviors of members of 
society … In contrast, sociologies of the witnessable order examine how 
members of society produce and sustain the observable orderliness of their 
own actions.” 
(Livingston, 2008: 124 in Heritage, 2018: 35) 
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To this effect, past sociological research has been content to treat social class as a 
status that need not be salient for the populations described, but one that can be 
employed by analysts at their discretion. A related dimension to this is what Bloor 
(1976 in Heritage, 1984a: 67; see also, Bloor, 1973; Benson, 1974: 127; Atkinson and 
Drew, 1979: 235, fn. 11; Wooffitt, 1992: 1-2) has referred to as the ‘sociology of 
error’. Analysts, in this capacity, are not merely entitled to define the occasions in 
which social class is (ir)relevant, but that their very ascriptions, thereof, can be 
prioritised over participants’ own (dis-)identifications, irrespective of whether these 
align, compete with or contradict those stipulated by analysts. Taken together, these 
dimensions represent a distinctive form of sociology; what has been referred to 
elsewhere as ‘constructive analysis’ (e.g. H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 340) – or 
‘formal analytic sociology’ (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1991: 10; hereafter, FA). 20 As 
illustrated above, this has left a clear domain of inquiry available for EM/(M)CA 
research; namely, occasions in which classed social identities are made avowedly 
relevant for individuals, in situ, in the course of their everyday lives. Thus, it is to 
these comparatively “overt” orientations to social class that I direct my attention to 
here; that is, to the study of social class in the ‘witnessable order’ (see Livingston, 
2008: 124 in Heritage, 2018: 35). 
 
1.7 My contribution 
My focus in this thesis concerns how social class is made relevant by individuals in 
their everyday lives; specifically, in their interactions with one-another, qua co-
interlocutors. Again, these areas of inquiry are those which have been previously 
neglected in traditional forms of class-analysis. Notably, however, these same 
omissions are made available for study uniquely through the parameters of 
EM/(M)CA; an approach that is introduced in Chapters 2 and 3. Summarily, EM 
centres around members’ methods of sense-making in their everyday lives. The 
derivative approaches of CA and MCA, in particular, for example, enable this at an 
unprecedented degree of empirical granularity (see §3.2.1 and §3.2.2, respectively). 
Furthermore, EM/(M)CA research is unique insofar as it also relinquishes the 
 
20 The latter term is preferred here for acronymic clarity (i.e. “FA”); that is, so as not to 
overload the existing designation of “CA” (i.e. “Conversation Analysis”). 
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epistemic privilege that is ceded to analysts within “Sociologies of Hidden Order” 
(Livingston, 2008) and/or the “Sociology of Error” (Bloor, 1973). Focal to this 
tradition, instead, are how socio-cultural institutions, for example, are made relevant 
for individuals in their everyday lives (see §2.2.1). The enterprise is disinterested, 
therefore, in ascribing individuals into so-called “objective” classed positions (see 
Pollner, 1987 in Pascale, 2008a: 348), and further remains agnostic and uncommitted 
to any purportedly “correct” definition of the concept. 21 For this reason, scare 
quotation marks will enclose the term “social class” hereafter. 22 EM/(M)CA will 
therefore be introduced in the ensuing chapters as an approach committed to the 
analysis of “social class” as a members’ resource; and, more exactly, one that is 
analysed when relevant for individuals in the course of their everyday lives. The 
contribution of this research is therefore directed towards a domain that has been 
perpetually omitted from FA research. 
 
1.7.1 Research questions 
The central objective of this thesis is to investigate “social class” as a members’ 
phenomenon as it is occasioned, recurrently, within ordinary forms of talk-in-
interaction. This objective is one informed by existing FA research, and especially 
from the centrality of everyday life in/for the study of social class (§1.6.1). 
Nevertheless, it departs from this literature with respect to the position it adopts 
regarding participatory relevance (cf. §1.3.3 and §1.6.3). This thesis not only then 
attends to “classed” identities as they are (co-/re-)produced in interaction, but it also 
analyses those occasions in which it is made expressly relevant for co-interlocutors 
 
21 On ‘ethnomethodological indifference’, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970: 345).  
22 This procedure is familiar to EM (e.g. Richards, 1955: 17-55 in H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 
1970: 343) and CA research (e.g. Jefferson, 2004a: 118), amongst other traditions (e.g. Roth, 
1978: cvii). The practice is not employed here ironically (see Clift, 1999: 530-531), but to 
reflect a commitment towards stipulative disinterest. It has been illustrated in this chapter, 
after all, that “social class” does not, perforce, designate nor privilege the same set of 
coordinates when referred to within FA. Instead, as others have noted, when used, it is likely 
to be theorised differently (e.g. Jarvie, 1972: 98). It is by virtue of this versatility, therefore, 
and to index an impartial position, thereon, that “scare” quotation marks are used hereinafter. 
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themselves. This is the overarching objective of this work, and translates into three 
research questions:   
 
(1) How is “social class” conceptualised and reflexively rendered see-able and 
accountable by and for co-interlocutors?  
(2) Which social actions, activities and interactional projects are accomplished, 
recurrently, when co-interlocutors make “social class” demonstrably relevant?  
(3) What can EM/(M)CA contribute to sociological investigations of “social 
class”? 
 
As I detail in §1.7.2, these three research questions are taken up serially across this 
thesis. I begin, first, by establishing how co-interlocutors relevance “social class” in 
talk-in-interaction, focusing on the productions of “classed” membership categories 
(i.e. Chapter 4) and references to place (i.e. Chapter 5). Next, I then analyse the 
practical work accomplished through these two families of practices (i.e. Chapter 6). 
In my discussion, I recapitulate the possible contributions of EM/(M)CA for FA 
“class-analysis”, outlining candidate lines of inquiry for future research (i.e. Chapter 
7). Together, these areas of inquiry constitute a coherent attempt to respecify “social 
class” as a members’ phenomenon; one that is made relevant for members within 
ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. 
  
1.7.2 Thesis outline 
My objectives are, then, principally, threefold. Note that the first two objectives, 
however, co-implicate three separate issues. These pertain to (1) how “social class” is 
treated as see-able by analysts; (2) how “classed” relevancies are occasioned by co-
interlocutors; and (3) the social actions for which these practices are reflexively 
mobilised, in situ. These issues, I propose, follow on from one-another logically. That 
is, once I have outlined how “social class” is recognisable, the practices that co-
implicate these instantiations can then be identified and then the practical work for 
which these practices are mobilised can be discerned. This thesis does not therefore 
foreground the analysis of social action directly; what will be distinguished in 
Chapters 3 (§3.2.1) and 6 (§6.2), as a hallmark of CA inquiry. Instead, this objective 
is deliberately held in abeyance (i.e. Chapter 6) until I have demarcated how the 
concept is operationalised (i.e. Chapter 4), and after two corresponding practices have 
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been described (see Chapter 4 and 5). Regrettably, this culminates in a layout that is 
not as linear as that which is desired customarily. Nevertheless, this organisation 
remains faithful to the process of empirico-analytic attrition that was entailed in this 
research, and it stands as a testament to the procedure that I have used in order to 
abrade a foothold on “social class”. 23 For clarity, this organisation is disaggregated 
by chapter, below. 
 
Chapter 2 canvasses the ethnomethodological (EM) filiation of this thesis. This 
chapter introduces EM and outlines three recurring ways in which “social class” has 
been previously incorporated into EM/(M)CA research; namely, (1) “instantial 
references”, (2) “ethnographic allusions” and (3) “propaedeutic commentaries”. Two 
strands of substantive EM/(M)CA research concerning “social class” are then 
reviewed and two homologies which underpin research on talk-in-interaction are 
educed. It is against these parallels that the unique contribution of this thesis is 
positioned, specifically. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the data and methods utilised in this research. Conversation 
Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) are first introduced 
as my two forms of ethnomethodological (EM) data-analysis. I then outline the 
underlying tenets and empirical practices which consensually underpin their use. The 
secondary- and primary-data analysed are then summarised, and the procedures used 
to collect my data are detailed. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses my first research question concerning the recognisability of 
“social class”. Specifically, the chapter considers how “social class” is made see-able 
and accountable, by co-interlocutors, through the production of membership 
categories. The chapter begins by illustrating the prevailing EM/(M)CA approach to 
“social class”. In the remainder of the chapter, I propose a modified approach that 
involves the analysis of linguistically “classed” instantiations (e.g. “middle class”). 
 
23 To borrow Coulter’s (1973a: viii) phrasing, the organisation of this research ‘reflects the 
logic of my own understanding of the salient issues’. Differently, see also, e.g., Atkinson 
(1978: 6-7) and Pfaller (2017: 15-16). 
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This approach is shown to present three empirico-analytic affordances, concerning 
“agency”, “ontology” and “intersubjectivity”.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces “place references” as a second family of practices used to 
occasion “classed” identities recurrently. The first half of the chapter attends to 
references to locations that are mobilised in the service of referring (qua “locational 
formulations” [Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b]). Four practices are introduced in this 
section; namely, (1) characterisations; (2) allusions, (3) co-selections and (4) 
intentional misidentifications. The latter half then addresses references to locations 
that are not invoked relevantly in the service of referring, but in a relevantly 
metonymic, “classed” faculty (qua “place references”). Two variations of this practice 
are introduced in this section. 
 
Chapter 6, my final empirical chapter, addresses my second objective, concerning 
‘action formation’ (see Schegloff, 2007a: 7, my emphasis). This chapter introduces 
three recurrent social actions that are accomplished by co-interlocutors through 
“classed” membership categorisations and references to place; namely, (1) 
assessments, (2) complaints, and (3) teases. How and where linguistically (non-
)“classed” instantiations are enlisted into these activities, recurrently, are detailed 
throughout this chapter. “Classed” orientations are distinguished, in so doing, to 
function in a relevantly explanatory capacity in each social action. 
 
Chapter 7, my discussion, draws the thesis to a close. The chapter begins by 
recapitulating the key findings of the thesis as they pertain to my three research 
questions. My third research question is recovered explicitly in this section. The 
remainder of the chapter then adumbrates possible directions for prospective 
EM/(M)CA research on “social class” that are occasioned by this thesis and its 
shortcomings. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the novel contributions of this 
research.  
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1.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has introduced the focus of the thesis and has contextualised the novel 
contributions posed. The chapter began with an abbreviated review of past 
sociological approaches to “social class”. The purview of this review has been 
indicative and non-comprehensive. My focus here has been to underscore “social 
class” as a perennial focus in the sociological discipline, and one that has been 
conceptualised as a product of, and enactment in, everyday life. I have shown, 
however, that three homologies obtain to this literature consistently. These relate  
to the focus on the everyday lives of “classed” incumbents; how “social class” is 
mobilised as an analysts’ resource; and the non-criterial status of participatory 
relevance. In so doing, I have shown there to be a programmatic omission of how 
“social class”, defined by (co-)participants, is made relevant within their ordinary 
social interactions. Thus, it is against this backdrop that I have contextualised the  
novel contribution of this thesis. In the next chapter, I provide the counterpart to  
this review, distinguishing how EM/(M)CA has addressed “social class”, heretofore, 
and by introducing how my approach departs from the remit of existing research.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis adopts an ethnomethodological (EM) approach to “social class”. The 
objective of this chapter is to explicate this perspective, and to outline how “social 
class” has been analysed previously in this tradition, and from within its derivative 
analytic programmes; specifically, Conversation Analysis (CA), Membership 
Categorisation Analysis (MCA) and Discursive Psychology (DP). The chapter begins 
with a review of EM, contextualising this perspective vis-à-vis the conventional 
coordinates of Formal Analytic sociology (FA), such as those embodied by the 
traditions of class-analysis introduced in Chapter 1. The EM approach to social 
identity is then outlined. How “social class” has been addressed in EM/(M)CA 
research is then individuated. Two homologies in existing studies of talk-in-
interaction, and against which this research poses a novel contribution, are 
disaggregated. The chapter concludes as I situate how this thesis poses a novel 
contribution with respect to these similarities. 
 
2.2 Ethnomethodology 
EM is a diverse intellectual enterprise. It has proximate origins in the writings of 
Harold Garfinkel (e.g. 1967) and, differently, Aaron V. Cicourel (e.g. 1964) – 
although it is conventionally associated with the former (e.g. W. Sharrock and 
Anderson, 1986: 4-6); the latter considered ‘[p]roto-ethnomethodology’ (see Lynch, 
1991: 83), and, latterly, “cognitive sociology” (à la Cicourel, 1973). 24 
Programmatically, as introduced in Chapter 1 (see §1.1 and §1.7), EM is concerned 
with the structures of individuals’ – qua “members” – common-sense knowledge. 
Previously, this dimension of human sociality has been taken for granted in 
sociological research (see Zimmerman and Pollner, 1974 [1970]). It has been 
employed by the sociologist, in this sense, without interrogation; that is, ‘as an 
unexplicated resource’ (ibid.: 81). EM research, in contrast, focalises this domain, 
investigating the practical actions, reasoning and methods that are constitutive of 
“everyday life”. As Zimmerman and Wieder (1974 [1970]: 289, italics in original) 
 
24 On the changing status of the Cicourelian oeuvre, see, e.g., Flynn (1991: 153-156). 
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write, the principal interest of the ethnomethodologist – and of EM, more broadly – 
concerns ‘how members of society go about the task of seeing, describing, and 
explaining order in the world in which they live’.  
 
This focus has culminated in a diverse programme of empirical research (for review, 
see H. Garfinkel, 1991: 15-16) from which numerous variants/sub-streams have 
emerged (e.g. Maynard and Clayman, 1991). EM remains coherent, however, with 
respect to its underlying status as a respecification of Parsonian systems theory, and 
specifically, its ‘voluntaristic’ and ‘neo-Kantian’ (see Heritage, 1987: 229, fn. 11) 
solution to the Hobbesian problem of social order (see Heritage, 1984a: Ch. 2). 
Centrally, in this case, it is not ‘socialization’ (Heritage, 1987: 227) that is 
distinguished as the crucial basis for intersubjective understanding, but the 
interpretative capacities of members (here, see W. Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 32). 
This innovation is reflected in the preoccupations of EM. Primacy is awarded, 
accordingly, to the methods that (re)produce human sociality, and intersubjectivity, 
and render it ‘account-able’, in H. Garfinkel’s (1967: e.g. 1) terms. EM, in so doing, 
focuses on the repertoire of mundane, ordinary and/or institutional sense-making 
practices – or “ethnomethods” (e.g. Psathas, 1968) – that are employed by members 
in the (co-)construction of the social world, and on the basis of which its  
natural facticity is practically sustained (see Pollner, 1987). It is in this sense  
that EM is describable as a “respecification” of the Social Sciences (here,  
see H. Garfinkel, 1991). EM research on social identities illustrates this perspective. 
 
2.2.1 Social identity 
As Benwell and Stokoe (2006: 36) summarise, EM adopts an ‘indexical, context-
bound understanding of identity’. Social identities are not conceived as inherent nor 
stable properties tied to individuals, but as interactional, ongoing accomplishments 
that are locally sustained, practically managed and (re-)negotiated (Berard, 2006: 
243). Identities are treated, in other words, as ‘talked into being’ (Heritage, 1984a: 
237). H. Garfinkel (1967: Ch. 5) furnishes a classical example of this understanding 
in his seminal research with a male-to-female transsexual pseudonymised as “Agnes”.  
 
Through a series of preoperative and postoperative interviews, Agnes is distinguished 
as a ‘practical methodologist’ (H. Garfinkel, 1967: 180); one who manages her 
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changing gender identity through her everyday practice. Preoperatively, for example, 
this involved Agnes’ use of resources to preserve the female identity with which she 
identified. Postoperatively, by contrast, this concerned how Agnes managed her status 
despite having undergone surgical reassignment, experiencing its anatomical, 
physiological and psychological ramifications, and continuing to lack a female 
biography. This study illustrates the EM understanding of social identity. Most 
notably, it shows how a “gendered” identity comes to be (re-)configured through its 
doing, and it is not, in contrast, an essentialised property that inheres to and/or is 
dictated by one’s biological sex. 
 
This approach towards identity has been furthered in subsequent EM research. 
Research using CA, by example, has specifically investigated how social identities 
come to be occasioned and sustained within situated instances of talk-in-interaction 
(e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998a). This interface between talk-in-interaction and 
social identity – as a form of social structure – has been referred to as the 
‘interaction/social structure nexus’ (e.g. Schegloff, 1991: 48) – or, as J. Robinson 
(2006: 138, italics in original) writes, a ‘constitutive view of relationships’. In two 
papers, Schegloff (1991; 1992a) explicates the CA approach to “context” by 
contrasting it with the existing sociological (i.e. FA) procedure. 
 
“One type of solution can be characterized as the “positivist” stance, in one of 
the many senses in which the term is currently used. In this view, the way to 
warrant one, as compared to another, characterization of the participants (for 
example, in interaction) is the “success” of that way of characterizing them in 
producing a professionally acceptable account of the data being addressed. 
“Success” is measured by some “technology” – by statistical significance, a 
preponderance of historical evidence, and so forth. Sometimes there is an 
additional requirement that the characterization which produces “successful” 
analysis be theoretically interpretable; that is, that the selection of descriptive 
terms for the participants converge with the terms of a professional/scientific 
theory relevant to the object of description.” 
(Schegloff, 1991: 50, my emphasis) 
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According to this solution – referred to, hereafter, as the “positivist” solution 25 – 
individuals are classified at/upon the discretionary judgement of analysts. 
Classifications of persons are stipulated when intelligible, interpretable and/or 
defensible vis-à-vis one’s intellectual/professional commitments. For Schegloff 
(1991; 1992a), it is this solution that is implemented within sociology. The CA 
approach to “social structure” – and, operatively, social identity – is contrasted with 
this approach. Specifically, for an aspect of social identity to be awarded analytic 
primacy it must be oriented to by those co-interlocutors, as such. In this respect, it 
must be showable, endogenously, in the here-and-now of the talk-in-interaction 
described, that it is “demonstrably relevant” (see Schegloff, 1991: 49-52) and 
“procedurally consequential” (ibid.: 52-57) for the unfolding of the interaction in 
which co-interlocutors are momentarily embroiled. 
 
The rationale for this requirement is simple. It is a longstanding proposition that 
descriptions can be (re-)formulated in an indefinitely extensible number of ways (see, 
e.g., Leibniz, n.d. in Waismann, 1960 [1951]: 122). In EM/(M)CA research, this has 
been expressed variously, such as ‘the etcetera problem’ (e.g. Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91), 
‘one-person identification problem’ (see Schegloff, 1992c: xxxvii), ‘problem of 
multiple description’ (see Schegloff, 1987a: 218), or the problem of ‘selecting 
identifications’ (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 588, italics in original), and has been 
explored empirically in a number of domains (e.g. Enfield, 2013). Inter alia, this 
includes references to persons (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 41; Sacks, 1972), locations 
(e.g. Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b) and times (e.g. C. Raymond and White, 2017). 
Members, for instance, could be categorised according to their “age”, “nationality”, 
“religion”, “sex”, “sexuality” or “social class”, inter alia. For select populations, of 
course, some categorisations will prove inapplicable. Crucially, however, at least two 
axes are available along which any member could be stratified (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. 
 
25 To qualify, how conduct comes to be interconnected with social identity needs not be 
“positivist” in some classical (e.g. Comtian) sense. Rather, as Schegloff (1991: 51) 
acknowledges, ‘the animating concerns may be drawn from quite anti-positivistic theoretical 
sources or commitments’. For further discussion, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 19-20). 
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I: 418); namely, “sex/gender” and “age”. 26 There are, therefore, multiple ways in 
which individuals can be classified on the basis of their “correctness”, howsoever 
described (here, see, e.g., Coulter, 1991: 41; see also, fn. 74). To circumvent this 
dilemma, CA, therefore, adopts a local approach to “relevance”. 
 
For CA research, it must be showable, by reference to the details of the analysed 
interaction-in-progress, how this facet of social identity is made relevant and 
consequential in this moment. Such categories must, in other words, pass a 
‘relevancing procedure’ (Schegloff, 1987a: 218) whereby they are oriented to as 
relevant and consequential for co-interlocutors within the ‘observable details’ 
(Schegloff, 1996b: 25) of their ongoing interaction. It is by using these criteria that 
CA evaluates the putative relevancies of social identities for episodes of talk-in-
interaction. As others have recognised (e.g. G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 679-
680), this domain of inquiry has been explicated through the investigation of how 
socio-cultural institutions come to be made relevant within instances of talk-in-
interaction.  
 
2.2.2 Forms of talk 
Interactional conduct has been analysed within a myriad of environments in CA 
research. Medical settings (e.g. Heritage and Maynard, 2006), beauty salons (e.g. 
Toerien and Kitzinger, 2007), courtrooms (e.g. Drew, 1978; Atkinson and Drew, 
1979), classrooms (e.g. McHoul, 1978), helplines (e.g. Pudlinski, 1998), emergency 
telephone calls (e.g. Whalen, Zimmerman and Whalen, 1988), police interviews (e.g. 
Stokoe, 2010), political speeches (e.g. Atkinson, 1984a), and counselling sessions 
(e.g. Silverman, 1994), offer an indicative selection. This research has proved 
explicative in demonstrating how institutional identities are not preordained nor 
accorded aprioristically to some spate of talk-in-interaction. The relevance of 
identities instead remains a situated accomplishment, or an ‘achieved outcome’ (G. 
 
26 These classifications are, in Sacks’ (1972: e.g. 33; see also, Sacks, 1967) terms, ‘a Pn-
adequate device, type 1’ – or ‘‘which’-type sets” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 40); devices 
applicable to any member. For discussion, see §7.3.4. 
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Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 696); achievements which are – at least in the first 
instance – actuated and sustained locally. 
 
CA research on social identity has also been applied to forms of “ordinary talk”. 
Following harbingers in EM research (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967: 116-185, 285-288; 
West and Zimmerman, 1987; West and Fenstermaker, 1995a; 1995b), a predominant 
dimension of social identity has been “gender” (e.g. Hopper and LeBaron, 1998; 
Stokoe and Smithson, 2001; Kitzinger, 2009; Stokoe, 2010; Jackson, 2011a; 2011b; 
Speer and Stokoe, 2011). Since at least the 1990s, CA has been invested in the 
respecification and de-reification of essentialised conceptualisations, attending to the 
interactional mechanisms used to relevance “gendered” identities in ordinary 
instances of talk-in-interaction, and whereby they are consequential for co-
interlocutors. This tradition remains the foremost area of CA research into social 
identity in ordinary talk. However, CA research has also addressed several other 
‘cultural institutions’ (à la West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 34, fn. 15). Analyses of 
“age” (e.g. Nikander, 2001), “ethnicity” (e.g. D. Day, 1998; Hansen, 2005), 
“(hetero)sexuality” (e.g. Kitzinger, 2005a; 2005b) and “race” (e.g. Whitehead, 2007; 
2009; 2011; 2013; 2015; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009), for example, populate CA 
literature, amongst other forms of interpersonal relationship (e.g. G. Raymond and 
Heritage, 2006).  
 
In both institutional and ordinary interaction, therefore, there is a clear precedent for 
the study of social identities within CA research. As outlined in Chapter 6, this has 
centred largely around how identities come to be employed practically in the service 
of social actions and activities (recall §1.7.2). What is notable for current purpose, 
however, is that while there has been occasion for this study, “social class”, as an 
aspect of social identity, has not arrested a comparable degree of empirico-analytic 
attention to other facets. Rather, it has been comparably neglected. Thus, it is to the 
relatively peripheral status of “social class” within the EM/(M)CA tradition to which 
we now turn. 
  
2.3 Social Class 
The history of “social class” in EM/(M)CA research is one yet to have been written. 
Provided the constraints of space, this is not something that can be canvassed 
53 
adequately here. Instead, what follows is but a partial review of some of the most 
recurrent ways in which EM/(M)CA has addressed “social class”. This review is 
bifurcated into references to “social class” in EM/(M)CA texts (§2.3), and to 
substantive occasions in which it is analysed empirically (§2.4). The former is 
collapsed into three principal uses. 27  
 
(1) Instantial references: Statements which attest to the (in)capacity of 
EM/(M)CA research to address the relevance of “context” for social 
interaction. 
(2) Ethnographical allusions: “Classed” characterisations of individuals, 
locations, and/or topics that are co-implicated by, or within, the interactions 
analysed. 
(3) Propaedeutic commentaries: Preliminary, orthogonal, and/or hitherto 
unrealised analyses which position “social class” as eligible for EM/(M)CA 
research.  
 
These forms of reference will be explicated serially across this section (§2.3). 
Subsequently, I outline how “social class” has been respecified through EM/(M)CA 
 
27 These usages are not exhaustive. Others can be acknowledged illustratively but not 
“tracked” (à la Jefferson, 1990: 82) systematically. This includes, for example, (1) their 
possible production in data cited in EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 60, 
185; Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 386; Hester, 2000: 220; Stokoe and Smithson, 2001: 256-258; G. 
Raymond, 2003: 953-954; Stockill and Kitzinger, 2007: 230, 235, fn. 3; Whitehead, 2007: 11-
13; Reynolds, 2011: 416-418; Clift, 2016: 103, 192); (2) references to “social class” as a 
device that contrasts the present object of inquiry (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 81; Maynard and 
Wilson, 1980: 292; Jalbert, 1989: 231-232, 234-235); (3) as a dimension that has been 
addressed in past research in relation to which the present inquiry is notably (dis)connected 
(e.g. Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963: 3-5; M. H. Goodwin, 1980: 689, 692, fn. 25; Benson and 
Hughes, 1983: 15; Emmison and Western, 1990; Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 362-365; Schegloff, 
1972a: 433, fn. 16; 1972b: 130, fn. 13; Jefferson, 2004a: 119; W. Sharrock and Coleman, 
1999: 20-28; Kitzinger, 2005b: 259-260, fn. 1); and (4), references to E. M. Albert’s (1964: 
e.g. 40-41) anthropological investigation of verbal behaviour and “social class”/“caste” in 
Burundi (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 481-482, 624-632, 643; 1970, Part 2: 33; Sacks et al., 1974: 
698, fn. 6; differently, see Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 293). 
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research that is dedicated to the concept (§2.4). Before commencing, however, the 
scope of this review requires qualification. 
 
2.3.1 Parameters of the review 
The occasions in which EM/(M)CA has been employed empirically in the service of 
respecifying “social class” are relatively few and far between. Anticipations (e.g. 
Rawls, 2002: 29, fn. 28), provocations (e.g. Roche, 1975: 134), (mis)attributions (e.g. 
Silverman and Gubrium, 1994: 180; Kitzinger, 2000: 172; Pascale, 2008a: 348) and 
oblique references (e.g. Wootton, 1975: 76-92) notwithstanding, “social class” 
remains conspicuously absent from empirical EM/(M)CA research. Speculative 
reasons for such an omission are numerous (e.g. DeMott, 1990 in West and 
Fenstermaker, 1995a: 28-29; West and Fenstermaker, 2002: 539, 555), and 
indefinitely extensible. 28 This very omission has, itself, been incorporated and 
accounted for within criticisms of EM/(M)CA. 29 Recognition of this absence from 
 
28 See Ossowski (1963: 101-102), DiMaggio (2012: 16-17) and Block (2015: 169-171) for 
potential explanatory factors. 
29 Two variations of this indictment are recurrent. The first trades upon the status of “social 
class” as a second-order construct. On this basis, the concept has been considered 
‘meaningless’ (e.g. Taylor, Walton and Young, 2003 [1973]: 199) or of ‘limited utility’ 
(Phillipson and Roche, 1971: 28 in Taylor et al., 1973: 199) for EM/(M)CA research. It is 
positioned as a phenomenon that EM/(M)CA is incapable of addressing (e.g. Gleeson and 
Erben, 1976: 476-477), or one that is ‘smuggled in’ in some other-than-analytic-capacity (e.g. 
Worsley, 1974: 9). Conversely, in the second, EM/(M)CA research is accused of ignoring 
social context, and/or of conceiving individuals as incapable of instituting social change. 
EM/(M)CA is positioned, accordingly, such that it either abstains from researching “social 
class” – alongside other ostensible modalities of “power” (e.g. Giddens, 1976: 53; see also, 
Coser, 1975: 696, 698) – or is simply considered unable to do so (e.g. Attewell, 1974: 181-
182; see also, Miller, 1993: 351 in Pascale, 2007: 15). In so doing, EM/(M)CA is maligned 
for abrogating its purported mandate of catalysing “social change” (e.g. Gellner, 1975: 436; 
Eriksson, 1978: 109-110); a task for which it is reproached as ill-equipped (e.g. Gleeson and 
Erben, 1976: 476-477) or complacent (e.g. Freund and Abrams, 1976: 376). In consequence, 
EM/(M)CA has been upbraided, variously, as an ‘ahistorical’ (Gleeson and Erben, 1976: 475), 
‘a-political’ (e.g. Gellner, 1975: 437), ‘atheoretical’ (e.g. Coser, 1975: 698) or “conservative” 
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EM/(M)CA practitioners, however, has yielded only sparse, concessionary comments 
(see, e.g., M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 221, Travers, 1999: §10.1; G. Raymond and 
Heritage, 2006: 680). For current purpose, however, what is crucial here is not the 
status of “social class” as a noteworthy omission, but how the concept has been 
addressed in this tradition. The review that follows begins to take stock of this 
literature. 
 
To qualify, I have chosen to work inclusively in this review. Every effort has been 
made to review the contributions of analysts central to EM/(M)CA, but who have also 
been relatively neglected in this tradition, and/or consigned, by some, to its margins; 
that is, for example, as “outsiders” (see Flynn, 1991: Ch. 1) or “boundary” members 
(see Fehr, Stetson and Mizukawa, 1990: 473-474). Indicative examples include, for 
instance, Aaron V. Cicourel (1976 [1968]; 1981; Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963), Jeff 
Coulter (1971; 1982; 1995a; 1996) and Lena Jayyusi (2014 [1984]), Michael 
Moerman (1996 [1988]) and Edward Rose (1960). 30 Provided the parallel 
commitments of this work with EM/(M)CA, I have assimilated this research 
accordingly. Note that I have also chosen to include some research that has an 
uncertain status in the EM/(M)CA tradition. Two such texts are those by David 
Sudnow (1967) and J. Maxwell Atkinson (1978) on the social organisation of death 
and suicide, respectively. Both authors depreciate the status of their research with 
respect to the EM tradition (here, see Sudnow, 1967: 5; Atkinson, 1978: ix-xi, 187). 
As both have since been canonised (e.g. H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 341, fn. 6; 
Maynard and Clayman, 1991: 406, respectively), however, I have admitted these 
inquiries. 
 
Not all research conducted by EM/(M)CA practitioners, or which has been located as 
EM/(M)CA, however, has been incorporated uncritically. Comparatively penumbral 
EM investigations have, instead, been omitted. This includes analyses conducted 
 
(for review, see Lynch, 1993: 31) enterprise (see also, Rawls, 1989: 10-14); one that is 
reducible to the status of an ‘élite hobby’ (Gellner, 1975: 450). 
30 See, e.g., Lynch (1991: 83-84; see also, fn. 24), ten Have and Psathas (1995: xviii, fn. 3), 
Hopper (1990-91: [e.g. 162] in Nelson, 1994: 316-317) and Carlin (1999: 61), for review, 
respectively. 
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under related rubrics – such as “Ethno-methodos-Logos” analysis (e.g. Roche, 1975; 
see, here, Coulter, 1977) – in addition to independent research projects. 31 Further 
notable omissions include the investigations of domains by practitioners 
characterisable as ethnomethodologists, but in ways that do not cohere with the 
consensual coordinates of EM/(M)CA (see §2.2). Noticeable omissions include 
analyses of “Freak Culture” conducted by Don H. Zimmerman and D. Lawrence 
Wieder (1971; see also, Wieder and Zimmerman, 1974; 1976) and the anthropological 
investigation of agricultural change by Michael Moerman (1986a). These analyses 
have been conducted by researchers identified as (“second-generation”) 
ethnomethodologists (see Flynn, 1991: 36) and both include recurring allusions to 
“social class”. In the former, for example, analyses of “middle class culture” are 
conducted using ‘ethnographic and ethno-semantic methods’ (Zimmerman and 
Wieder, 1971: ii); in the latter, “classed” observations are made concerning rice 
consumption (see Moerman, 1986a: e.g. 11). With the exception of subsequent 
inquiries (i.e. Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977; Moerman, 1996 [1988]), however, these 
analyses appear distant, intellectually, from the commitments of EM/(M)CA. 32 They 
have, therefore, been omitted on this basis.  
 
A final notable absence from this review is the research of Erving Goffman (e.g. 
1959), a sociologist of profound influence on the study of social interaction and 
everyday life (see fn. 13). To qualify, Goffman does not identify with EM/(M)CA but 
occupies a uniquely orthogonal position to the enterprise; namely, as a notable 
influence-cum-critic of CA (see Schegloff, 1988; Schegloff, Ochs and S. Thompson, 
 
31 This includes research by Gobo (1993; 1995), on the etymology of “social class”, Hiller 
(1973a; 1973b; 1975a; 1975b), on perceptions of the concept, and Green’s (1983) analysis of 
three nineteenth-century policy documents. While Gobo (1993; 1995) and Hiller (1973a; 
1973b; 1975a; 1975b) have been identified as ‘ethnomethodological’ (e.g. Travers, 1999: 
§10.1, fn. 8), elsewhere, they are not situated in these terms. The absence of this avowal 
provides for their exclusion here. Conversely, Green’s (1983) avowedly EM/(M)CA 
investigation (i.e. ibid.: ix) has been omitted insofar as “social class” is co-implicated 
tangentially, only, such as through characterisations of the reports (e.g. “Minority Report”, 
1909: 1214 in Green, 1983: 89) and the persons effected thereby (e.g. ibid.: 103, 161). 
32 For reflections on the latter work, see Moerman (1992: e.g. 27). 
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1996: 13-14; see also, §3.2.1). Goffman’s (e.g. 1959; 1963) work is also particularly 
notable on thematic grounds. References to “middle class” culture, for example, 
suffuse several of his major treatises; although, with the exception of a single paper 
(i.e. Goffman, 1951), this does not form a substantive focus of Goffman’s analysis 
(see Drew and Wootton, 1988: 3). 33 However, it is neither the incidental status of 
“social class” within Goffman’s oeuvre, nor the predominantly “ethnographic” form 
of these references which provide for its omission. 34 Goffman’s oeuvre is instead 
relevantly excluded by virtue of the contrastive commitments that underlie this 
research. Most fundamentally, as R. Watson (1992a: 3-16) notes, are the different 
origins of “order”. For Goffman, for example, order is sourced exogenously; that is, 
by way of ‘order-enhancing procedures’ (Anderson and W. Sharrock, 1982: n.p.g. 
[EJBH: i.e. 83] in R. Watson, 1992a: 4), such as through use of metaphor (see 
Silverman, 1998: 34-35) and/or simile (here, see R. Watson, 1998: 204, fn. 5). 
Conversely, for EM/(M)CA research, the orderly properties of human conduct are 
located endogenously to the observable conduct analysed. Accordingly, it is this 
ontological break that furnishes the operative reason for Goffman’s omission 
hereafter. 35  
 
2.3.2 Instantial references  
There is a recursive criticism of EM – one inherited, latterly, by CA – that pertains to 
the legislative power of “context” (see Lynch, 1993: 28-30). This grievance has been 
formulated, variously. Distilled, its gravamen is as follows: 
 
EM/(M)CA either cannot attend to context (e.g. Gleeson and Erben, 1976: 
479-482); provides limited recognition (e.g. Bandyopadhyay, 1971: 19), 
 
33 This treatment of “social class” is consistent with Goffman’s peripatetic approach and 
purview; referred to elsewhere as ‘analytic pointillism’ (see Schegloff, 1988: 101). 
Nevertheless, this omission is surprising considering the research to which Goffman 
contributed earlier in his career (here, see Collins, 1988: 43). 
34 A comparable form of reference recurs across EM/(M)CA texts (see §2.3.3). These are 
notable, however, provided their contradictory position relative to the coordinates of 
EM/(M)CA (cf. §2.3.2). 
35 See Psathas (1990: 25, fn. 4) on two potential exceptions in Goffman’s oeuvre. 
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gravity (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1973: 458-459; Worsley, 1974: 9-12) and/or 
appreciation (e.g. Gellner, 1975: 443-445; Bernstein, 1989: 25; DiMaggio, 
2012: 15) of context; and/or purposefully denies (e.g. Taylor et al., 2000 
[1973]: 206-207), diminishes (e.g. Grabiner, 1975: 80), overlooks (e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1973: 72; Coser, 1975: 696, 698; McNall and Johnson, 1975: 59-
60; Law and Lodge, 1978: 374-375) and/or relinquishes (e.g. McSweeney, 
1973: 151-153; Attewell, 1974: 181-182) a focus on the influential role that 
context performs. 
 
Whilst enduring, misplaced, and cogently refuted, 36 this critique has encouraged a 
proportionate sum of EM/(M)CA responses. These rebuttals are formulated more or 
less explicitly, and they vary in the extent to which they concede, weather and/or 
gainsay such statements. Relevantly, they remain connected insofar as they account 
for the EM/(M)CA position on “context” by invoking social identities. One such 
identity to which allusions are made is to “social class”. Harvey Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 
502-505), the foremost progenitor of the CA enterprise, offers a prototype of this 
practice. 
 
“The papers permit us to clearly and sharply pose certain fundamental 
problems for sociology: (1) The availability to members of alternative category 
collections by reference to any of which any population may be classified sets 
for the sociologist the pervasive task of describing in each and every case 
where members make some categorization how they do it; i.e., what methods 
they use so as to provide the relevance and propriety of the category collection 
which contains the categories they employ. Only when such methods have 
been described can the sociologist other-than-trivially assert that some person 
X is “white” or “male” or “middle class” where, when he [(sic)] does so, he 
[(sic)] intendedly conveys some information relevant to his [(sic)] analysis.”  
(Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 803, my emphasis) 
 
 
36 See §3.2.1. For targeted rebuttals, see, e.g., Benson (1974) on Goldthorpe (1973), Maynard 
and Wilson (1980: 307-308) on Giddens (1976), Coulter (1982: 45, fn. 15) on Law and Lodge 
(1978) and Rawls (1989: 19, fn. 6) on Grabiner (1975). 
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This type of reference will be referred to, hereinafter, as an instantial usage. “Social 
class” is referred to here, “en bloc”, 37 alongside other ostensibly analogous 
dimensions of social identity (e.g. “age”, “ethnicity”, “gender”, “race”, “sexuality”, 
etc.), which can and/or should be analysed using the EM/(M)CA criteria of 
“relevance” and “consequentiality” (recall §2.2.1). As with the other identities with 
which they are abutted, “social class” is marked as an identity which can be 
appreciated in EM/(M)CA research by way of an endogenous analytic approach to 
“context”. Examples of this usage pervade EM/(M)CA texts. A review of 
contemporary literature furnishes a collection of illustrative allusions (see, e.g., 
Moerman, 1972: 176, 207; Maynard, 1984: 26; 2003: 83; W. Sharrock and Anderson, 
1986; 100; Benson and Hughes, 1991: 123-124; Maynard and Clayman, 1991: 399; 
Hilbert, 1992: 195; Schegloff, 1987a: 215; 1992a: 106; 1997b: 182; 1999b: 577; see 
also, Schegloff in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 43-44; Lynch, 1993: 28-30; 
Silverman and Gubrium, 1994: 180; Edwards, 1995: 582; G. Raymond, 2003: 962; 
Berard, 2005: 213; 2006: 243; Land and Kitzinger, 2005: 411, fn. 1; Glenn, 2003: 173-
174, fn. 1; Sidnell, 2010: 5; Clift, 2016: 30).  
 
Thus, it is as an illustration of how EM/(M)CA accommodates the analysis of 
“contexts”, proper, that “social class” has subsisted. This usage is as a recurrent 
capacity in which “social class” is referred to within EM/(M)CA. It is curious, 
therefore, if slightly ironic, that the second form in which “social class” surfaces 
within the EM/(M)CA tradition are occasions in these very methodological and 
epistemological conditions are contravened – or waivered. 
 
2.3.3 Ethnographic allusions 
The second occasion in which references to “social class” are frequent are those in 
which aspects of talk-in-interaction are categorised in “classed” terms non-relevantly. 
On these occasions, “social class” is effectively deployed, as it were, ‘as another 
Member’, to use Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 42) phrase. In other words, it remains unclear, 
in these cases, whether “social class” is, indeed, germane for the individuals classified. 
 
37 Schegloff’s (1996b: 22, my emphasis) term. 
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38 They are instead simply ascriptions of “classed” statuses. Classically, such 
ethnographic allusions have been made to the types of persons recruited into 
EM/(M)CA research, generally, or to the co-interlocutors comprised within an 
interaction, or a dataset, specifically. In the former, the “classed” statuses of 
participants are alluded to unproblematically. Schenkein (1978a) supplies a clear 
example of such an orientation within his introduction to an edited volume of CA 
research. 
 
“To begin with, they are all conversations conducted in English, although 
materials from many regions of North America and England are included here. 
They are all conversations conducted by persons for whom interactional 
competency is not obscured by accent, impediment, or other speech distortion, 
although materials from conversations among adults diagnosed as “mentally 
retarded” [(sic)] are included here. And they are, for the most part, 
conversation of the white middle class.” 
(Schenkein, 1978a: 2, my emphasis) 
 
In the latter usage, by contrast, reference is made to members’ “classed” positions 
when these are both pertinent to the objectives of the research (see, e.g., Sudnow, 
1967: 5, 20, 29, fn. 7, 30, 31, fn. 4, 57, 107, 157, 171, 176; M. H. Goodwin, 1980: 
674; 2006: 18-20, 24-25, 41, 59, 63, 71-78, 108, 160, 175, 182, 185, 187, 189, 203, 
211, 217, 233, 239, 249, 251; Wetherell, 1998: 389; Duneier and Molotch, 1999: 1265; 
West and Fenstermaker, 2002: 559, fn. 17; Evaldsson, 2005: 763; 784; Pascale, 2007: 
18; 2008a: 350; Scharff, 2008: 334-335; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010: 179-180, 
185), but also when ancillary. The latter are both distributional and targeted. They are 
made concerning co-interlocutors who populate a dataset broadly (e.g. Schegloff, 
1979a: 27; M. H. Goodwin, 1982: 802; 1985: 316; 2001: 77, 101; 2011: 252; Maynard, 
1985: 2; 1986: 261-262, 282; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986: 119; Heritage and Sefi, 
1992: 414, fn. 3; Antaki, 2002: 22, fn. 2; Pascale, 2008b: 726; Jackson, 2011a: 285; 
 
38 A subsidiary omission here is information concerning how the classifications were 
eventuated empirically or framed theoretically. To the former, notable exceptions include 
Cicourel (1976 [1968]: 33, 55, fn. 15), Heritage and Sefi (1992: 414, fn. 3) and West and 
Fenstermaker (2002: 559, fn. 17). 
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Haugh and Pillet-Shore, 2018: 265, fn. 4; C. Goodwin, 1979; 1982 in C. Goodwin and 
Heritage, 1990: 292) and about those who habilitated some interactions specifically 
(e.g. C. Goodwin, 1979: 114, fn. 4; 1981: 36; Schegloff, 1992d: 1308, fn. 10; 
Moerman, 1996 [1988]: 23; Edwards, 1998: 19; M. H. Goodwin, 2001: 83-84; 
Jefferson, 2004b: 21). Comparable references have also been made concerning 
“classed” locations (e.g. Sudnow, 1967: 5, 20, fn. 4, 96, 176; 1983: 201; Jefferson, 
Sacks and Schegloff, 1977: 27; Schegloff, 1987a: 211; M. H. Goodwin, 1990: 29, 31-
33; 2006: 15, 35-36; Heeschen and Schegloff, 1999: 379) or when co-interlocutors 
addressed some “classed” norms (e.g. Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977: 203) or topics 
of conversation (e.g. C. Goodwin, 2007: 18; Wooffitt, Jackson, Reed, Ohashi and 
Hughes, 2013: 98). 39  
 
EM/(M)CA literature is, therefore, replete with ethnographic allusions to “social 
class”. As referred to above, these allusions are invoked by analysts in the way in 
which contextual features were advised against in §2.3.2; namely, when they are 
neither shown to be “relevant” nor “consequential” for co-interlocutors in talk-in-
interaction. 40 While “social class” is not then localised to methodological discussions 
of “context” in EM/(M)CA research, it is nonetheless referred to similarly; that is, 
superficially.  
 
2.3.4 Propaedeutic commentaries 
“Social class” has therefore perdured in EM/(M)CA texts, overwhelmingly, as a 
backdoor, token reference, and as an ethnographic or socio-biographical variable. In 
this sense, it has “haunted” (see Holmes, 2018a) EM/(M)CA as an un-explicated 
 
39 Hypothetically, see also, Schegloff (2004 [1969-1970]: 100, fn. 3). Relatedly, for possible 
references to co-interlocutors within specific interactions, or in which co-interlocutors are 
located to have come from, or to have attended “classed” locations, see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 
143), Schegloff (1968: 1090) and Schegloff and Lerner (2009: 95). 
40 On this irony, see Antaki (1998: 72), Edwards (1998: 19-20), Weatherall (2000: 286-287) 
and Stokoe and Smithson (2001: 249). Of course, as C. Goodwin (1981: 36) qualifies, such 
information is not necessarily enlisted with analytic intent; nor, equally, is it necessarily 
derived through procedures that are enshrined by EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Jefferson et al., 
1977: 27, fn. 1). 
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resource, and eluded close empirical description. However, there are exceptions in 
which the concept has been reconfigured as a permissible field of inquiry; that is, as 
one available for “respecification”. These types of reference will be referred to 
hereafter as propaedeutic commentaries. In these instances, “social class” does not 
form the dedicated focus of the EM/(M)CA text but features of the device are, 
nonetheless, discriminated. These include observations that are made about the 
concept directly and those mediated through some designedly “higher-order” 
conceptual prism, such as “difference” (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 1995a; 1995b), 
“ideology” (e.g. Smith, 1974), “inequality” (e.g. Berard, 2006), “prejudice” (e.g. 
Speier, 1973) and “ownership” (e.g. W. Sharrock, 1974). Two observations 
concerning “social class” directly can be found within the lectures of Harvey Sacks 
(1992 [1964-1972]). 41  
 
The first observation pertains to “perspective”. Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 45-46) notes that 
“age” and “social class”, as ‘categorisation devices’, in Sacks’ (1972: 32) terms, 
possess a unique sense of ‘relativity’ (Schegloff, 1992b: xxxiv). For example, if a co-
interlocutor is categorised in terms of these devices (e.g. “old”; “middle class”), it 
leaves that categoriser reflexively inspectable for how they, too, might be categorised 
using this device. 
 
“If any Member hears another categorize someone else or themselves on one 
of these items, then the way the Member hearing this decides what category is 
appropriate, is by themselves categorizing the categorizer according to the 
same set of categories. So, if you hear B categorize C as ‘old,’ then you would 
categorize B to decide how you would categorize C. And again, the same 
procedure works for such a thing as social class.”  
(Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 45, italics in original) 
 
 
41 To qualify, while Sacks (1992) does not dedicate a lecture to “social class”, exclusively, 
this is by no means unusual – nor is it necessarily indicative of limited engagement (see 
Coulter, 1976: 508; Coulter, 1995b: 334). I limit my purview here to two of Sacks’ (1992) 
perspicacious observations in which “social class” is addressed both explicitly and uniquely. 
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As Schegloff (1992b: xxxiv) assesses, this is a novel observation regarding the 
constitution and utility of “classed” categories in talk-in-interaction (although, cf., 
Gobo, 1995: 457-458). Importantly, this contrasts with other devices, such as ‘race 
and sex’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 45), which do not necessarily co-implicate the same 
pragmatic and/or categorial implications provided their comparatively nominal 
constitutive logic and form. 
 
Sacks’ (1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 742; Vol. II: 122) second observation concerns 
some recognisable bases of “classed” incumbencies. Anticipating later studies (e.g. 
West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 26-27), concerning optics, “social class” is 
distinguished, here, as a device that can be treated, by members, to be visibly 
appreciable – or ‘perceptually available’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 58, italics in 
original).  
 
“It’s in parallel interesting that some of the things which work for kids’ groups, 
e.g., to be a hippie you have to have long hair, and things like that, are the sort 
of things such that you could be an acceptable hippie today and tomorrow an 
acceptable middle class kid, i.e., you go get a shave and a haircut and some 
new clothes. This can be compared to those sorts of memberships whose 
conditions are such as to make it not only work to get in, but work to get out.” 
(Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 122) 42 
 
In these sections, Sacks (1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 742; Vol. II: 122) does not take 
the concept of “social class” for granted, as an ethnographic or socio-demographic 
variable, but explicates the social organisation of “classed” incumbencies. 
 
42 On the “two-set” (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 47-48) formulation of “hippies”/“freaks” 
and the “middle class”, more generally, see Zimmerman and Wieder (1971: Ch. 1). Note, 
however, that “social class” is missing from Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 47) discussion of ‘two-set 
classes’. Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 48) does, however, recognise this practice to have been one 
used by ‘Marx’ (see §1.2.1), and subsequent explanations of this device have included the 
bifurcation of ‘proletarian/bourgeois’ (i.e. Drew, 1989: 113-114, fn. 8; see also, Atkinson, 
1984a: 130, 154-157). For a linguistically “classed” example of this practice, see Extract 31 
(e.g. l. 75). For further discussion, see §7.3.3. 
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Observations made in a similar faculty can also be derived from a diverse set of 
EM/(M)CA texts. Five notable accomplishments of these commentaries can be 
itemised as follows: 
 
(1) Identity: “Social class” is situated in terms of the EM/(M)CA approach to 
“social identity” (e.g. Mehan and Wood, 1975a: 521-522; H. Garfinkel, 1990 
[1963]: 3-4; West and Fenstermaker, 1995a; 1995b), as introduced above 
(§2.2.1). Again, as West and Fenstermaker (1995a: 30) write, social identities 
are to be treated as an ‘ongoing, methodical, and situated accomplishments’. 
The potential “omnirelevance” (see, e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 515-522) of 
“classed” identities has also been proposed (see Schegloff, 1992c: xxxi; 
Heritage, 2005a: 111; G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 680). “Classed” 
identities are positioned, in this sense, as devices with an ever-present 
referential availability. Finally, the relevance of such identities has also been 
recognised through forms of “oppression” that are analysable through 
EM/(M)CA research (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 1995b: 508; Kitzinger, 
2005a: 479-480). 
(2) Second-order phenomenon: The existence of “social class” is not necessarily 
contested in EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Hilbert, 1990: 796; Schegloff, 1991: 
48, 51; 1992a: 106, 109; Coulter, 1995a: 168-169; Maynard, 2003: 71-72; J. 
Lee, 2016: 535). It is simply construed, instead, as an emergent product of 
members’ work (e.g. Dingwall, 1975: 495; Benson and Hughes, 1983: 15; 
Wilson, 1991: 26-27; G. Watson, 1992: xx; Eglin and Hester, 1999: 197; W. 
Sharrock and Coleman, 1999: 22-23). As Mehan and Wood (1975a: 519) 
write: ‘There are no things in the sensuous world like “bourgeois 
consciousness” or “class” or “the capitalist system,” there are only people 
doing their lives in a succession of here-and-nows.’. 43 
(3) Ordinary-language concept: “Social class” is (re-)conceptualised as a device 
that is derived from ordinary-language use (e.g. Coulter, 1982: 36-38, 41; R. 
Watson, 1992b: 257, 260; Hester and Eglin, 2017: 301-310). The concept is 
understood as one that is employed by members in their everyday lives (e.g. 
 
43 See also, mutatis mutandis, Mehan and Wood (1975b: 216). 
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Speier, 1973: 185-186; Coulter, 1971: 314-315; 1996: 340-341; Berard 2006: 
244-245; G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 680) and which possess meanings 
and/or functions that are comparatively primordial to the “technical” 
denotations that it has since been endowed professionally (e.g. Rose, 1960: 
197, Table 2; differently, see also, Ossowski, 1963: 124; Gobo, 1993: 475-
483).  
(4) Constitution: Analysts have envisaged the warrantable bases for ascribing 
“classed” categories (e.g. Speier, 1973: 185-186), in addition to their 
corresponding forms (e.g. Jackson, 2011b: 45). Coulter (1996: 341, italics in 
original), for instance, distinguishes “social class” as a ‘non-self 
membershipping’ device; that is, ‘membership itself is not such as to require 
or presuppose any actual self-conscious “self organisation” such as 
characterises the various self-membershipping collectivities’. Jayyusi (2014 
[1984]: 52), similarly, identifies the Marxist conceptualisation of “social 
classes” as ‘morally organized’ vis-à-vis ideation. 44 The category of ‘the 
ruling class’ is also identified as classification potentially implicated by the 
obligations of other categories – such as the ‘police’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 
131). EM/(M)CA research has also positioned “social class” as a device that 
can be gauged visibly, or through behavioural manifestations; that is, as 
‘perceptually’ or ‘behviourally available’, to borrow Jayyusi’s (2014 [1984]: 
58, italics in original, 74, respectively) terms. “Classed” inferences have been 
drawn from occupational (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 26-27), 
institutional (e.g. Wieder, 1974b: 167, fn. 11) and domestic attire (e.g. H. 
Garfinkel, 1967: 119), signs of homelessness (e.g. Duneier and Molotch, 1999: 
1291; Pascale, 2007: 80), names (e.g. Schegloff, 1972a: 91; 1972b: 111) and 
possessions (e.g. M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 184-186). Specialised forms of 
interactional work have also been discriminated through their “classed” 
interpretability. Sudnow (1965: 266), for example, in his investigation of 
public defenders (hereafter, P.D.s), identifies ‘putting in a request to see the 
P.D.’ as an activity oriented to by P.D.s such that it indicates a defendant’s 
 
44 On the Marxian position, see §1.2.1. On the EM/(M)CA analysis of “classed” collectives, 
see §7.3.  
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‘lower position in the class structure of the community’. Hester and Eglin 
(2017: 304-307), citing Sudnow (1965) and Maynard (1984), also discriminate 
‘the public defenders’ pitch for a reduced sentence’ (ibid.: 304) as a further 
exposition of “class” status. 45 
(5) Procedure: Approaches to researching “social class” by using EM/(M)CA 
have been outlined. W. Sharrock (1974: 51) and R. Watson (1974: 93), for 
example, have indicated how the notion of “owning knowledge” could be 
applied to “classed” membership categories (see also, Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 
54-55; §7.4.1). Similarly, Hester and Eglin (1997b: 162) note how “social 
class” could be respecified through the MCA tools of ‘[c]ategory’ (see also, 
Coulter, 1982: 36 in Hester and Eglin, 1997c: 3) and ‘predicate’. 
Methodologically, Travers (1999: 6.1-11.9), developing Speier (1973), has 
proposed the use of ethnographies (ibid.: 11.4-11.6) and auto-ethnographies 
(ibid.: 11.3) as candidate approaches, and highlights the topics of “social 
mobility” (ibid.: 11.7-11.8), “industrial disputes” (ibid. 11.4, fn. 11) and 
“professions” (ibid.: 11.9) as possible heuristics. 46 In a further synthesis of 
existing EM/(M)CA research, Berard (2006: 247-252) has also indicated the 
availability of “social class” as an (in)explicit resource in talk-in-interaction. 
Lastly, Jackson (2011b: 45) has anticipated the production of “social class” 
through the resources of ‘person reference’ and ‘membership category 
devices’.  
 
“Social class” has therefore been addressed in EM/(M)CA texts recurrently as a non-
focal subject in the form of propaedeutic commentaries on the subject. These 
commentaries extend beyond the references introduced above, insofar as they do not 
 
45 The two editions of this text differently interpret Maynard’s (1984) analysis. In the first 
edition, Hester and Eglin (1992: 218-222) omit reference to “social class” save a single 
ethnographic, locational allusion (ibid.: 219). In the second edition, however, and in a new 
chapter on “social class” (Hester and Eglin, 2017: Ch. 7), “classed” identities are, 
comparatively, foregrounded. 
46 Relatedly, see Cicourel (1981: 72-76) on potential research on “social mobility”. This 
research may co-implicate an investigation of “social class” implicitly by virtue of how 
Cicourel (1981: e.g. 71) construes the subject.  
67 
merely state the eligibility of “social class” for EM/(M)CA research (cf. §2.3.2), nor 
broach the subject in ways that are distinctive (even contradictory) of underlying 
EM/(M)CA tenets (cf. §2.3.3). These commentaries instead adumbrate how “social 
class” could (and/or should) be researched empirically. Such research has, in effect, 
laid the foundation, therefore, from which concentrated, empirical EM/(M)CA 
research can commence. Thus, it is to this literature that we now turn. 
  
2.4 Targeted research 
The previous section has shown the recurrence of different allusions towards “social 
class”. These recurrences notwithstanding, however, efforts have – to borrow the 
phrase – proved ‘on the whole more promissory than productive, more programmatic 
than empirical’ (à la Sudnow, 1965: 256). That is, while “social class” has been 
situated iteratively within the EM/(M)CA tradition, this has yet to translate into a 
programme of empirical research. As Antaki (2011: 4) has observed, for example, 
even when ‘macro issues’ or ‘social problems’ – how “social class” has been 
traditionally bracketed (cf. fn. 89) – are focalised in CA research, this has not 
crystallised as the locus of sustained inquiry. Rather, only on a relatively scarce 
number of occasions has “social class” been formalised as the express focus of 
EM/(M)CA research, or in which it has been incorporated as an analytic focus. 
Broadly, such research has developed predominantly in two main ways: (1) 
Investigations of “social class” in observational and self-report studies; and (2), 
analyses of “social class” within talk-in-interaction. These two literatures are 
introduced below.  
 
2.4.1 Observational and self-report 
The analysis of “social class” by way of observational and self-report studies was 
distinguished in Chapter 1 (e.g. §1.6.1) as an established area of FA “class-analysis”. 
Notable for current purpose, is that EM/(M)CA research has employed such methods 
in the analysis of “social class”. In the former, investigations have proceeded by way 
of ethnographic, observatory methods. The most notable piece of research, to this end, 
is Sudnow’s (1967) investigation of death and dying. In this research, the concept of 
“social class” is deprived of an explicit definition. Nonetheless, clear attention is 
awarded in this research to how such un-explicated identities are made available 
through the situated conduct of co-interlocutors; in this case, by physicians and 
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service-users. 47 Instances of physician conduct, for example, includes allusive 
orientations to the “classed” demographics (ibid.: 5). Examples of the latter include 
the behaviour of “middle class” mothers with infants (ibid.: 87), their announcements 
of death (ibid.: 134-135), and how the “middle class” disseminate news of a death 
(ibid.: 154). Thus, while the concept of “social class” is taken-for-granted in this 
research, and like past observational studies (e.g. Sudnow, 1965: 266), is without 
definition, the differentials of “classed” conduct forms a central component of this 
research.  
 
Central to self-report studies, by contrast, is how participants conceptualise and 
understand “social class”. This dimension has been incorporated into some 
EM/(M)CA studies as a subsidiary component (e.g. Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963: 70-
73; Moerman, 1968b: 162). These are taken up most explicitly, however, in inquiries 
conducted by Pascale (2007; 2008a). In this case, under the auspices of EM/(M)CA 
and post-structuralism, Pascale (2007; 2008a) employs in-depth interviews to elicit 
participants’ discursive perceptions of their “classed” positions, or lack thereof. 
Pascale (2007; 2008a) demonstrates that some respondents (dis-)identified with 
established conceptualisations of “social class” by invoking comparatively folk 
theorisations that are not focalised in traditional “class-analysis”. Specifically, as 
Pascale (2007: e.g. 85, 106; 2008a: e.g. 346, 357) refers to “social class” in a 
Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) tenor – specifically, in terms of “social” and 
“economic capital” – participants who conceptualised “social class” differently were 
conceived in terms of “disorganization” (e.g. Pascale, 2008a: 352) and/or 
“irrelevance” (ibid.: 358). 48 In several interviews, for example, interviewees 
 
47 Following Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 73, italics in original), this will be referred to as 
‘[b]ehavioural availability’. For discussion, see §7.3.1. 
48 Claims of ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ (see fn. 21) and ‘analytical bracketing’ (e.g. 
Pascale, 2007: 11) notwithstanding, this conceptualisation of “social class” is affirmed by 
Pascale (2007: e.g. 19, 75-76, 80, 82-84, 86, 88, 91, 94, 105-106) with varying degrees of 
explicitness. Passages, such as the following, betray such a position. 
 
“Further, at a time of unprecedented gaps between rich and poor, the presence and 
meaning of class in daily life is arguably more vague than at any other time.”  
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responded to Pascale (2007) with “classed” identifications (e.g. “full-blooded 
Mexican” [Pascale, 2007: 93; 2008a: 355]; “transgender” [Pascale, 2007: 93; 2008a: 
355]; “immigrant” [Pascale, 2007: 94; 2008a: 356]) which do not align with this 
implicitly Bourdieusian (e.g. 2011 [1986]) schema. These identifications are 
conceptualised by Pascale (2008a), accordingly, as dis-identifications of “social 
class”; an exigency conceived to have the socio-political consequence of ‘making it 
highly unlikely that shared class-based interests will emerge in the public imaginary’ 
(ibid.: 346). 49 
 
A small body of EM/(M)CA has, therefore, taken up the analysis of “social class” in 
research mediated through observational and/or self-report methods. These studies 
have not given way to an established research agenda, however, and remain isolated. 
We turn next to the most established substantive approach towards “social class” in 
talk-in-interaction, where research has also addressed its operation as a concerted, 
scenic accomplishment. This is the area to which my research interconnects and 
departs. 
 
2.4.2 Talk-in-interaction 
The analysis of “social class” in talk-in-interaction, using EM/(M)CA, represents the 
most sustained form of its inquiry. In this area of investigation, there have been 
increasing moves towards an analysis of “social class” using methods that are 
derivative of EM. This includes the methods of Discursive Psychology (DP), 
Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA), for 
example. 50 This research has addressed “social class” both independently and 
collectively alongside other dimensions of social identity. These two literatures are 
separated below for clarity. 
 
 
(Pascale, 2007: 8) 
 
Indicated, instead, is a quiet preoccupation to a pecuniary theorisation of “social class”. 
49 For a cognate case, see Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963: 70-71). For a similar instance in which 
EM research capitulates this position, see W. Sharrock and Coleman (1999: 20-28). 
50 For introductions to CA and MCA, see §3.2.1 and §3.2.2, respectively. 
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2.4.2.1 Independent  
As an independent dimension of social identity, in its own right, “social class” has 
been addressed directly in a relatively shallow body of EM/(M)CA research. The 
majority of this research has been conducted on data collected for the purposes of 
social research. One example is captured by Moerman (1996 [1988]: Ch. 5) as they 
employ a ‘culturally contexted’ (ibid.: 7) form of CA to analyse data that they 
collected formerly in an ethnography conducted in Thailand (here, see Moerman, 
1968a). 
 
Focal here, for Moerman (1996 [1988]: 80), is their ethnographically derived 
distinction concerning the consumption of ‘glutinous rice’ and ‘ordinary rice’ (see 
Moerman, 1968a: 9-11, 195-197). In Moerman’s (1968b) earlier research, this 
distinction is established through anthropological, observational techniques. In his 
subsequent investigation, Moerman (1996 [1988]) analyses multi-party, recorded 
interactions whereby this distinction is relocated into participants’ orientations 
themselves. In this case, explicit allusions towards “social class” do not feature in 
Moerman’s (1996 [1988]) data – an event previously deemed expectably rare (e.g. 
Moerman, 1968a: 11). The former distinction around consumption is, for Moerman 
(1996 [1988]), is instead observed locally. The distinction between “glutinous” and 
“non-glutinous” rice is thereby treated, by proxy, as an orientation towards “social 
class” in action. 
 
A similar investigation to Moerman (1996 [1988]) has been produced more recently 
by J. Lee (2016: 550) in a ‘sample’ MCA inquiry. J. Lee (2016: 537) analyses 
interviews conducted with two mothers, in South Korea, concerning an ‘English 
immersion policy’; namely, ‘a proposal to reform the current teaching system and 
improve Koreans’ English proficiency’ (ibid.: 537). J. Lee (2016: 549) observes how 
co-participants occasioned “social class” through the construction of membership 
categories concerning ‘social, educational, and locational memberships’. These 
categories, like those analysed by Moerman (1996 [1988]), do not refer to “social 
class” explicitly. Their interpretation, as such, is furnished, for J. Lee (2016), instead, 
by their use in constructing a situation of “inequality” between the pupils attending 
public and private schools. As with Moerman (1996 [1988]), “social class” is, 
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therefore, gauged as a locally produced interactional resource by proxy within research 
interviews; one that is used recurrently in the service of negative appraisals of the 
immersion initiative. 
 
A third empirical investigation concerning “social class” has been conducted by 
Scharff (2008), using the method of DP. This research is an investigation of how 
“social class” was co-produced by co-participants during research interviews 
concerning their perceptions of feminism. Scharff (2008) focalises the rhetorical 
operations used to instantiate “classed” identities interdiscursively. This included 
establishing ‘respectability’ (ibid.: 335); casting oneself as ‘responsible’ (ibid.: 336); 
‘critiquing existing systems of classification’ (ibid.: 331, 339); and ‘using rhetorical 
devices that allowed for the construction of a moderate and reflexive self’ (ibid.: 331). 
These resources are distinguished as practices that occasion “social class” in talk-in-
interaction, albeit within research interviews. To note, however, this investigation is 
perhaps not as ‘close and empirically grounded’ (ibid.: 331) as it is claimed, 
neglecting, inter alia, a sequential analysis of the social actions for which these 
practices were serviced, in situ. These omissions are key components of an 
EM/(M)CA inquiries (§3.2.1) and have been substantiated in subsequent (M)CA 
research. 
 
M. H. Goodwin (2006), for example, using CA, has investigated the (co-/re-
)production of “middle class” values at an American school. Like the prior studies 
(e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; J. Lee, 2016), this research initially establishes the 
“classed” positions of co-participants (e.g. ibid.: 77) and designates indicative 
signifiers thereof (e.g. ibid.: 180, 275, fn. 31, 275, fn. 37). M. H. Goodwin (2006: 29, 
248-250) then locates several activities which advance corresponding “classed” 
values. These include ‘storytelling[s]’, ‘[d]escriptions’, ‘bragging’ and ‘assessments’ 
(ibid.: 29). In the former, for example, co-interlocutors who were deemed not to 
possess requisite access to some “classed” referent were perceived, thereby, to be 
denied co-participation, and thus liable to “hidden injuries of class” (ibid.: 175; see 
Sennett and Cobb, 1972: e.g. 32, 38, 49). 51 “Classed” values were therefore 
 
51 On this practice, more generally, see Lerner (2003: 190-195). 
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considered perpetuated through “descriptions” and “brags” concerning members’ 
(non-)ownership of items that have a normative, cultural value – or “classed” currency. 
“Middle class” values were thus said to be perpetuated when participants who had 
been ascribed this status, and/or marshalled leisure activities indicative thereof, 
employed these social actions (see M. H. Goodwin, 2006: e.g. 174-175).  
 
The final piece of relevant EM/(M)CA research, here, has been conducted by Robles 
(2016: 85). This is an analysis of group-formation – or ‘membering’. Using a 
combinatorial form of CA, ethnography of communication, and critical discourse 
analysis, Robles (2016: 97) presents one instance in which she produces a “classed” 
ascription of a “locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972; 1972b) qua co-
interlocutor. 52 The focal instance occurs in a group with respect to which Robles 
(2016: 87) has self-identified as an “outsider”, and whereby the “classing” of this 
location offers a means against which this status is negotiated. Specifically, this 
ascription operates aligns Robles (2016: 97) with a member of the group who has 
already delivered a criticism of the focal location. Like the interactional research 
previously discussed, “social class” is not named in the interaction explicitly. The 
relevantly “classed” status of the ascription is, instead, furnished retroactively.  
 
In summary, these five studies illustrate a nascent body of scholarship. Following  
the tradition of Sacks (1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 40-48, 742; Vol. II: 122), this 
research has contributed towards the analysis of “social class” in forms of talk-in-
interaction. This research has not developed in isolation, however. Like FA research 
(recall §1.5.2), EM/(M)CA inquiries have also addressed how “classed” identities 
converge with other dimensions of personhood. “Gendered” and “racial” compounds, 
for example, have also been focalised (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002; Evaldsson, 
2005; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010; Whitehead, 2013; 2015: 387, fn. 3), addressing 
how “intersectional” (see Crenshaw, 1989: e.g. 140) identities are occasioned in 
interaction (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002; Evaldsson, 2005); how the common-
sense knowledge associated with such categories are mobilised (e.g. Whitehead, 
2013); and how intersections are accomplished without reference to “classed” 
 
52 See §5.5.1.2 and fn. 167. 
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membership categories (e.g. M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010). The next section 
reviews this endeavour. 
 
2.4.2.2 Intersectional 
I have demonstrated, above, that a frequent reference to “social class” in the existing 
EM/(M)CA literature have been those prosecuted in an instantial capacity (§2.3.2); 
that is, where “social class” is referred to, alongside other dimensions of social 
identity, as one that can be analysed using the EM/(M)CA approach to context. This 
proposition, I have claimed, houses an implicit presupposition, whereby “social class” 
is marked as an aspect of identity that is supposedly analogous to other dimensions 
with which it is selectively accompanied (e.g. “gender”, “race”, “age”, etc.). In 
contemporary EM/(M)CA research, this longstanding presupposition has begun to 
form the focus of interactional research and has accrued empirical support. The 
research of West and Fenstermaker (2002), for example, typifies this tradition.  
 
In focus in this research is how “classed”, “gendered” and “racial” identities are 
occasioned in the speeches delivered by participants in a UC Regents’ meeting; 
specifically, one that culminated, as they write, in the termination of ‘affirmative 
action policies at the University of California’ (ibid.: 538). Through this analysis, the 
authors find that whilst “gender” and “race” were indexed through practices of self-
identification, and by reference to non-present parties (e.g. historical figures), 
“classed” identities were not made relevant as explicitly (e.g. ibid.: 553). Instead, these 
were implicated, by proxy, by reference to various surrogates. ‘[E]ducational 
background’ (ibid.: 553) and stories of overcoming ‘hardships’ (ibid.: 553), for 
example, represent two illustrative practices. West and Fenstermaker (2002) 
demarcate the latter as exhibiting features – or ‘core qualities’ (ibid.: 554) – of 
putatively “middle class” identities; namely, ‘character, industriousness and 
determination’ (ibid.: 554).   
 
A second contribution to this tradition has been made by Evaldsson (2005). Using a 
combination of CA and MCA, and informed by supplementary ethnographic 
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information, 53 Evaldsson (2005) examines the structures and implicature of insult-
exchange sequences (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 160-162) between “working class” 
and immigrant, preadolescent boys in Swedish playground interactions. Evaldsson 
(2005: 773) observes that membership categories were mobilised frequently within 
these sequences, including the pejorative ascription of “gender”, “ethnic” and 
“classed” categories. In two examples, co-interlocutors’ “classed” identities are 
understood to be intimated through the heuristic of “poverty”. As with other 
EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; J. Lee, 2016; Robles, 2016), this 
apparatus is not named explicitly, but is interpreted by Evaldsson (2005: 770-773) as 
one way in which the focal sequences were organised.  
 
The research of M. H. Goodwin and Alim (2010) has also contributed to this 
programme of research. Focussing on the intersections of “race” and “social class”, 
the authors analyse the use of “transmodal stylisations” and “stance taking” by pupils 
in an American school. M. H. Goodwin and Alim (2010: 183) show that their 
participants stylise two intersectional identities in conflictual interactions; namely, 
“Valley girls” and “Ghetto girls”. Both identities are claimed to have “classed” and 
“racial” implications. The former is associated with ‘wealthy white’ girls; and the 
latter with ‘working-class black’ girls (ibid.: 179). For M. H. Goodwin and Alim 
(2010), therefore, the stylisations of these stereotypes, by co-participants, represent 
occasions in which “race” and “social class” are mobilised. The stylised production of 
a “neck roll”, for example, is identified as an index of the identity of ‘Ghetto girl’ 
(ibid.: 189). The production of this practice within an “insult-exchange sequence”, 
therefore, functions, for the authors, by proxy, to instantiate the relevance of this 
intersectional identity. 
 
A final contribution to this area of research has been made by Whitehead (2013). In 
this research, Whitehead (2013) investigates how “social class” is made relevant 
through the production of membership categories. Analysing radio-show interactions 
in South Africa, Whitehead (2013) demonstrates that co-interlocutors interconnect 
“racial” and “classed” categories seamlessly and unproblematically through various 
 
53 On this practice, see fn. 86. 
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resources. One practice by which this is achieved involves ‘asymmetrical contrastive 
pair[s]’ (here, see Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 616; see also, §5.2.3 and §5.5.3).  
This practice involves the antonymic framing of categories drawn from different 
devices. One example, for instance, would be ‘“a poor guy” and “a white guy”’ 
(Whitehead, 2013: 55). These categories do not form a ‘“standardized” relational pair’, 
in Sacks’ (1972: 37) terms: the former is understood, for Whitehead (2013), in terms 
of “social class”, and the latter in terms of “race”. However, it is by contrasting these 
asymmetric categories that the latter becomes relevantly hearable in terms of the 
former; in this case, specifically, as antonymic thereof. Whitehead (2013: 52, italics 
in original) demonstrates that these intersections of “race” and “social class” function 
as ‘interactional resources’ on the basis of which various orders of social action are 
accomplished, including, for example, ‘complaining, accounting, answering, 
disagreeing, joking and so on.’ (ibid.: 61).   
 
2.5 Homologies 
A relatively small body of EM/(M)CA research has attended to how “social class” 
comes to be occasioned in synchronous forms of talk-in-interaction. This includes 
both independently (§2.4.2.1), as a standalone dimension of social identity, and its 
inclusion within composite forms (§2.4.2.2). Thus, it is against this backdrop that my 
research is situated. Specifically, this thesis is designed to complement this tradition 
in two respects. These concern the contexts of the interactions studied, and the 
conceptualisations of “social class” adopted. Past EM/(M)CA inquiries, I propose, 
have adopted comparable positions in relation to these domains, leaving scope for 
further research. The two subsections that follow outline these homologies and 
introduce the complementary and novel approach that my research provides. 
 
2.5.1 Perspicuous settings  
A conspicuous homology of the research reviewed above has been the study of 
interactions within “institutional” milieux, with Robles’ (2016: 96-97) single-case 
representing one notable exception. Previous EM/(M)CA research on talk-in-
interaction, it will be recalled, has analysed playground encounters (e.g. Evaldsson, 
2005; M. H. Goodwin, 2006; M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010), meetings (e.g. West 
and Fenstermaker, 2002), radio-shows (e.g. Whitehead, 2013) and research interviews 
(e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Scharff, 2008; J. Lee, 2016). Research conducted using 
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observational and self-report studies, has been distributed similarly. Sudnow (1967: 
e.g. 3-5) focuses on interactions in hospitals, for example, and Pascale (2007; 2008a) 
on research interviews. Thus, foregoing inquiries have confined their focus to 
“classed” identities within “institutional” contexts, leaving comparatively “ordinary” 
forms of talk-in-interaction unattended. However, this omission is not merely 
incidental. Institutional occasions have instead been privileged insofar as they 
represent what have been described elsewhere as a ‘fertile’ (à la Clayman, 1992: 167) 
or ‘perspicuous setting’ (here, see H. Garfinkel, 2002: e.g. 182) in which “classed” 
identities are mobilised. 
 
The perspicuity of these domains, for the investigation of “social class”, is provided 
for variously. In some cases, this can be attributed to the interactional situations in 
which the analysed interactions were conducted. These include meetings into 
“affirmative action” policies (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002: 543; 557-558, fn. 6), 
or the context of “research interviews” (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Scharff, 2008; J. 
Lee, 2016). Alternatively, their auspicious quality is furnished by the wider socio-
cultural-temporal contexts (howsoever formulated [see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b]) – 
within which the research features. Analysing interactions between co-interlocutors in 
differently privileged schools (e.g. Evaldsson, 2005), hospitals (e.g. Sudnow, 1967) 
or in post-apartheid South Africa (e.g. Whitehead, 2013), for example, are three 
occasions in which “meso-” or “macro-contexts”, as they are referred to 
conventionally (cf. fn. 89), are understood to privilege the relevance of “classed” 
identities as an interactional exigency.  
 
This body of EM/(M)CA research has therefore encountered “social class” in a 
number of contexts in which analysts have considered it prioritised. In so doing, 
research has been weighted inordinately – and nearly exclusively – to inquiries 
conducted within diverse forms of institutional contexts. Accordingly, it is in this 
initial respect that my analysis designedly departs from and complements this 
literature. Specifically, instead of researching occasions in which “social class” is 
expectably salient, I examine interactions in which “classed” identities are not 
comparatively privileged. In this case, I investigate orientations (co-)produced within 
ordinary instances of talk-in-interaction; that is, ‘forms of interaction that are not 
confined to specialised settings or to the execution of particular tasks’ (Heritage, 
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2005a: 104). Such instances, after all, have not been shown to possess any affinity 
with “classed” identities. Ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction are therefore 
considered eligible for my inquiry. My focus on “ordinary” forms of talk-in-
interaction is not, then, elected merely by which to fulfil the terms of a comparative 
investigation (here, see Drew, 2003a; Drew and Heritage, 1992: 19; see also, §7.4.1). 
Instead, this affordance is purely a by-product of investigating “social class” in a 
domain in which it is not expectably privileged. 
 
2.5.2 Analysts’ resource 
The second way in which my research represents a development of previous 
EM/(M)CA literature concerns the conceptualisation “social class”. Indeed, to look 
back across prior EM/(M)CA research (e.g. observational; self-report; talk-in-
interaction), “social class” has been conceptualised, recurrently, through a three-step 
procedure. This can be glossed as follows:  
 
(1) Co-interlocutors employ a device that is not framed, locally or explicitly, in 
terms of “social class”. 
(2) This device is selected by the analyst, directly or indirectly, as a felicitous 
index of the concept. 
(3) The index designated is then recast, retrospectively, as an unmediated 
instantiation of “social class”. 
 
This procedure holds for the body of EM/(M)CA research that has addressed “social 
class” directly. Variation is present only in terms of whether indices are nominated 
directly or indirectly (i.e. Step 2). Instances of the former are itemised below: 
 
(1) “Consumption of rice” (Moerman, 1996 [1988]); 
(2) “Hardships in educational attainment” (West and Fenstermaker, 2002); 
(3) “Wealth/Homelessness” (Pascale, 2007; 2008a); 
(4) “Respectability” (Scharff, 2008); 
(5) “Wealth/Poverty” (Whitehead, 2013);  
(6) “Finances, parental circumstances and location” (J. Lee, 2016); 
(7) “Wealth” (Robles, 2016). 
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Conversely, occasions in which indices are selected indirectly can be found in 
Evaldsson (2005: e.g. 770-773) and M. H. Goodwin (2006: e.g. 174-175). In this 
former, “material inequality” is read-off as an index of “poverty” which, itself, is 
construed as an instantiation of “social class”. Similarly, in the latter, “differentiations 
of leisure activities” are read-off as an index of “wealth” which is treated as the 
operative basis for “social class”. 
 
The common point of departure for past EM/(M)CA research has thus been to 
circumscribe what “social class” is on behalf of co-interlocutors. Analysts have, in 
other words, “sublimated” 54 the devices that are employed by co-interlocutors, in situ, 
as those which are interpreted as the relevant ontological bases of the concept. 
Research has, in this way, operated comparably to the FA research examined in 
Chapter 1 (§1.6.2), where “social class” is operationalised and preserved as an 
analysts’ resource. In this case, akin to the ethnographic allusions (§2.3.3), this 
manoeuvre can be treated unproblematically by analysts, in which it is neither 
explicated nor vindicated (e.g. J. Lee, 2016). Alternatively, when justified, this 
procedure is ratified through three recurrent lines of reasoning: 
 
(1) Received definition(s) of “social class” (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; 
Evaldsson, 2005; M. H. Goodwin, 2006; Pascale, 2007; 2008a; Scharff, 2008); 
(2) Socio-cultural context(s) (e.g. West and Fenstermarker, 2002; Whitehead, 
2013); 
(3) Tacit knowledge (e.g. Robles, 2016). 
 
The first collection is dominated by a recourse to a Bourdieusian (e.g. 1984 [1979]; 
2011 [1986]) – or Bourdieusian-inspired theorisations (here, see §1.5). M. H. 
Goodwin (2006: 160-161), Pascale (2007: e.g. 85, 106; 2008a: e.g. 346, 357) and 
Scharff (2008: 332-334), for example, invoke definitions of “social class” that are 
inherited from this tradition to justify “leisure activities” (here, see Bourdieu, 1984 
[1979]), “social” and “economic capital” (here, see Bourdieu, 2011 [1986]) and 
“respectability” (here, see Skeggs, 1997b), respectively, as the operative indices of the 
 
54 Freud’s (n.d. in Jameson, 1973: 86) term. 
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concept. Moerman (1996 [1988]: 80) and Evaldsson (2005: 783), in contrast, invoke 
their professional and lay understandings to position the consumption of ‘glutinous 
rice’ (here, see Moerman, 1968a) and “poverty” as salient, respectively. Conversely, 
in the second collection, West and Fenstermaker (2002: 555) and Whitehead (2013: 
e.g. 52) invoke normative cultural conceptions of “social class” in America and South 
Africa, respectively, as the salient bases for deriving “social class”. These are 
positioned such that they provide for the indices of “educational hardships” and 
“wealth” as salient instantiations, respectively. And lastly, in the third case, Robles 
(2016: 97) invokes her “tacit knowledge” 55 to account for how “rich people” 
encompasses ‘anyone who is white and/or middle class’. 
 
The substantive bases according to which “social class” is theorised therefore vary 
considerably in this tradition, as do the lines of reasoning behind the definitions that 
are privileged. Nonetheless, the procedural logic of this research approximates: 
“Social class” is retained as an analyst’s resource, where analysts, operating by way 
of ‘fiat’ – to borrow the term (e.g. Cicourel, 1964: 266, fn. 6) – are entitled to stipulate 
the remit and relevance of the concept on the behalf of co-interlocutors. 56 What has 
 
55 Polanyi’s (n.d. in Coulter, 1979a: 21) term. 
56 The constraints of space preclude a detailed evaluation of the propriety of each line of 
reasoning when situated vis-à-vis the assumptions of EM/(M)CA. Even a cursory review, 
however, indicates varying degrees of dissonance.  
The use of received definitions, for instance, appears to contravene the kernel 
EM/(M)CA criterion of “demonstrable relevance” (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1991: 49-52). The 
devices (e.g. “wealth”) that are invoked by co-interlocutors, locally, after all, are not shown 
to be (co-)produced for those co-interlocutors in a relevantly “classed” tenor. The putative 
relevance of “social class” is, instead, emplaced by analysts at their discretion.  
Recourse to the contexts (howsoever configured; see Schegloff [1972a; 1972b]) in 
which social interactions occur, and/or to the psychological states of co-interlocutors 
(howsoever formulated) also violate this principle. These lines of reasoning are distinctive, 
however, as they are compounded by secondary transgressions. 
Selective invocations of context, for example, not merely foregoes “demonstrable 
relevance” (see §2.2.1), but also trades upon a “container-contained” (see Burke 1945 in 
Heritage, 1987: 242), or “bucket theory” of context (see Heritage, 1987: n.p.g. in Heritage, 
2005a: 109; see also, Drew and Heritage, 1992: 19). The contexts in which the interactions 
80 
been comparatively neglected, therefore, are those occasions in which the concept, 
and/or its indices, are made relevant by co-interlocutors themselves. Thus, it is in this 
second respect that my research intendedly represents a novel contribution. 
Specifically, it is my intention in this thesis to analyse “social class” as device that is 
made avowedly relevant for co-interlocutors; that is, as a members’ phenomenon. In 
this case, in order to complement existing EM/(M)CA research, I choose to focus on 
those occasions in which the concept is (co-)produced explicitly (e.g. “middle class”), 
in situ. This represents a departure from past EM/(M)CA research, where “social 
class” is not demarcated, substantively, on the behalf of co-participants. This will be 
the starting point for my analysis. Subsequently, I will elaborate a candidate basis 
which enables the principled inclusion of the linguistically non-“classed” orientations 
(here, see fn. 102) that have been analysed heretofore in EM/(M)CA research (see 
Chapter 4). Focal here, therefore, is how “social class” comes to be defined and 
employed by co-interlocutors, in their own terms, in their habitual, ordinary 
interactions. 
 
2.5.3 My contribution 
Extant EM/(M)CA research that has been dedicated to “social class” is therefore 
homologous in two ways. Firstly, the focus of inquiries, I have shown, have been 
directed previously to those occasions in which “classed” identities have been 
 
unfold, in this sense, are reified such that they are proposedly determinative of situated 
conduct. In this case, they are positioned to account for co-interlocutors’ ‘[p]ractical 
ontological work’, to borrow Rose’s (1967: 138) phrase from a different context. 
Invocations of tacit knowledge also results in a joint infringement. As outlined in 
Chapter 3 (see §3.2.1), after all, EM/(M)CA research traditionally rejects the invocation of 
cognitive, mentalistic and psychological states when these are not made relevant by co-
interlocutors, in situ (e.g. Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008: 217-221). Insofar as these lines of 
reasoning are therefore invoked in the service of establishing the salience of particular 
theorisations of “social class”, it thus contradicts this stance.  
Each of these lines of reasoning thus differently (dis-)connect with consensual 
commitments of EM/(M)CA research. This notwithstanding, what is focal, for current 
purpose, is their practical upshot, only, whereby the concept is retained as an analysts’ 
resource. 
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identified to have some aprioristic relevance; be that relevance induced through 
received definitions, socio-cultural contexts, or by way of intuition (§2.5.1). 
Overwhelmingly, this has involved research in “institutional” settings. Secondly, I 
have shown that research has investigated a number of unique configurations of 
“social class”. These conceptualisations, however, remain theorisations selected by 
analysts. Three lines of reasoning were introduced on the basis of which this has been 
accomplished. In this section, I have proposed that these homologies have left 
considerable latitude for EM/(M)CA research. Moreover, I have claimed that the 
positions I have taken on these grounds distinguishes my research as a novel 
contribution. My analysis of “ordinary” interaction, for example, complements the 
existing focus of research on perspicuous, institutional fora. Equally, my focus on 
occasions in which “social class” is made avowedly relevant for participants, 
complements the substantive derivations of “social class” that have been privileged 
previously. Thus, it is chiefly in these two ways that my research offers a novel 
contribution not merely to FA “class-analysis”, but also to the allied body of 
EM/(M)CA research reviewed above. How this position was operationalised forms 
the focus of Chapter 4. 
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed EM/(M)CA texts that have addressed “social class”. The 
chapter began with a review of the EM/(M)CA approach to social identity. A review 
was then provided of the three recurring forms in which “social class” has been 
incorporated into EM/(M)CA research (i.e. “instantial references”; “ethnographic 
allusions”; “propaedeutic commentaries”). How the concept has been addressed 
substantively was then detailed. This review was bifurcated into observational and 
self-report research, and into research conducted on forms of talk-in-interaction. The 
latter was stratified further into research that has addressed “social class” as an 
independent aspect of social identity, or as an intersectional component. The next 
section then introduced two homologies which obtain to this literature (i.e. 
“perspicuous settings”; “analysts’ resource”), and with respect to which my analysis 
offers a novel contribution. My alternative approach was then introduced in 
programmatic terms. The next chapter complements this focus with a review of the 
data and methods upon which this research is predicated. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The two preceding chapters have situated my research with respect to existing 
literature in sociology and EM/(M)CA. The focus of the present chapter concerns the 
design of my research. The first section introduces my methods of data-analysis; 
namely, Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisation Analysis 
(MCA). I begin first by extricating five of the central tenets of CA. MCA is then 
explicated, and its relationship to CA clarified. The section closes by reviewing my 
three stages of data-analysis. The second half of the chapter then introduces my 
dataset. For clarity, this section is bifurcated into secondary- and primary-data. This 
data is described by using the conventional cleavages of CA research. The section 
closes with a review of the procedure used to collect the latter, and of how this 
procedure conformed to ethical codes of conduct. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of my approach. 
 
3.2 Method 
Conversation Analysis (CA) integrated with Membership Categorisation Analysis 
(MCA) is the principal method of data-analysis used in this research. This chapter 
begins with an exposition of the former method, outlining five of its central tenets. 57 
 
3.2.1 Conversation Analysis 
Conversation Analysis (CA) was borne out of the lectures delivered by Harvey Sacks 
(1992 [1964-1972]) at University of California, Los Angeles, and subsequently 
developed and formalised in collaboration with Emanuel A. Schegloff and Gail 
Jefferson (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). Broadly, CA involves the 
 
57 There is, of course, significant latitude, here. As Lynch and Bogen (1994: 75) write, 
‘research in conversation analysis is diverse, and it would be inaccurate to suppose that it is 
governed by a single set of theoretical or methodological principles (Maynard and Clayman, 
1991)’. Previous EM/(M)CA research has, however, disaggregated some stable tenets that 
undergird the enterprise (see, e.g., Heritage, 1984a: 241-244; 1989: 22-24; 1995: 394-398; 
Psathas, 1995: 2-3). It is a recapitulation of such consensual assumptions that follows 
hereafter.   
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description of the ‘methods persons use in doing social life’ (Sacks, 1984a: 21). It 
focalises the empirical methodicity of language-use within its “ecological niche” 
(recall fn. 12) of talk-in-interaction, investigating the interface of this domain with 
other non-vocal/non-verbal modalities – or ‘unspoken activity’ (Atkinson and Drew, 
1979: 242-243, fn. 4). As an intellectual enterprise, CA is a ‘research stream’ 
(Heritage, 1984a: 241) that is derivative of EM (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967); however, it 
is also informed variously by other luminaries (e.g. Maynard and Clayman, 2003: 
176). As introduced in §2.3.1, for example, Goffman’s (e.g. 1959; 1963; 1967; 1983 
[1982]) influence is particularly notable. Together with EM, these two approaches 
furnish a mandate for the principled study of “everyday life” – or the “interaction 
order” (e.g. Goffman, 1983 [1982]). This domain is positioned not only as one that is 
viable for serious analysis, but as one that is conceptually primary to/for human 
sociality (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1996c: 54; 2006a; see also, §7.2.3). CA research 
sustains this focus on everyday life, awarding primacy to the study of social 
interaction. The principal focus of this research concerns how individuals – qua “co-
interlocutors” – accomplish forms of social action through the observable details of 
their conduct, and how these trajectories come to be empirically and progressively 
realised in situated, comprehensible and reproducible ways. The abiding concern of 
CA research is thus with the description of the social actions employed by co-
interlocutors, in situ. It is concerned, specifically, with the construction of ‘another 
grammar’ (Sacks, 1984a: 25; see also, Sacks, 1967) – that is, a ‘natural history’ 
(Heritage, 2003: 7), or ‘technique’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 421) – of talk-in-interaction.  
 
The programmatic focus of CA is, thus, accumulative; to assemble an inventory of 
social actions which, together, as Schegloff (1996a: 209) writes, ‘compose the 
culture’s repertoire’ (see also, Schegloff, 1999c: 147, fn. 5). 58 In the realisation of  
this objective, CA is predicated upon a constellation of ‘analytic commitments’ 
(Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997: 64). For brevity, these can be condensed into five kernel 
predicates, concerning social action, ordinary talk, order, sequence and context. In 
practice, these tenets interdigitate empirically. They are individuated here, however, 
 
58 On the accumulation of findings in EM/(M)CA research, see Psathas (1995: 50) and, 
indirectly, Atkinson and Drew (1979: 235-236, fn. 15).
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for clarity. In the first instance, this is included for any readers previously 
unacquainted with EM/(M)CA. However, it is further considered warranted, 
analytically, as CA has recursively incurred criticism for being ‘inexplicit’ (Levinson, 
1983: 287) and/or for leaving ‘unarticulated’ (Kitzinger, 2000: 165) its underlying 
precepts (e.g. Segerdahl, 1998: 319-322). Like the criticism charged at EM (see 
Lynch, 1999: e.g. 213; e.g. Coser, 1975: 698) – and at Durkheim before it (see 
Heritage, 1987: 224, fn. 3) – this has culminated in an array of indictments. 59 This 
chapter does not present a forum in which to respond to such criticism. A layer of 
defence is intercalated here, however, prophylactically, by way of exposing, as 
opposed to embedding, such assumptions (here, see fn. 122). It is hoped that this 
procedure will, in so doing, obviate the need for further exposition.  
 
(1) Social Action. Language has long been located as a domain within which 
forms of social action are realised in everyday life (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1968 
[1953]: e.g. §23; Austin, 1975 [1962]: e.g. Ch. 1; Searle, 1976). CA upholds 
this focus, refining this through the analysis of interaction – or ‘talk in 
interaction’ (see Sacks et al., 1974: 720). This domain is understood as a – or, 
even, the – primary medium for social action. 60 This includes, inter alia, the 
actions of “accusing”, “disagreeing”, “inviting”, “offering”, “requesting” and 
“teasing”, for example. Talk-in-interaction, then, is not understood as 
redundant, nor otiose, nor is it conceived, simply, as the ‘behavioral 
realization’ (Clayman and Whalen, 1988/1989: 243), or ‘conduit’ (cf. Reddy, 
1979: n.p.g. [EJBH: 288] in Clift, 2016: 6), of the cognitive processes 
implicated in the transferral of information, or meaning, only. Instead, as 
Schegloff (1997a: 500, italics in original) writes, talk-in-interaction is 
 
59 An indicative criticism of EM has been thematised in Chapter 2 (e.g. §2.3.2; see fn. 36). 
CA, by contrast, has been criticised, inter alia, for its ostensibly ‘a-theoretical’ (ten Have, 
1997: n.p.a.) and ‘technocratic’ (Weltman, 2003: 355) character, ‘positivist orientation’ 
(Whelan, 2012: 281), as ‘‘anything goes’ sociology’ (Heritage, 1987: 225) and a ‘method 
without substance’ (Heritage, 2008: 301). This has culminated in characterisations of the 
undertaking as putatively ‘bland’ (ten Have, 1997: n.p.a.), ‘dustbowl’ (Coser, 1975: n.p.g. in 
Heritage, 2008: 300) and ‘abstracted empiricism’ (R. Watson, 1997a: 58). 
60 On the latter reading, see Levinson (2005) and Schegloff (2005b; 2017). 
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conceived such that it ‘virtually always implicates action’. As Drew and 
Heritage (1992: 17, italics in original) observe, this veritable ‘activity focus’ 
constitutes the ‘decisive feature’ of CA and is implicated in the ‘bulk’ 
(Schegloff in Prevignano and Thibault, 2003: 166) of CA research. 
(2) Ordinary talk. Talk-in-interaction is theorised as the most primary socio-
cultural institution that underpins human sociality (see Schegloff, 1995a: 187; 
1996a: 171a; 1996b: 4; 2006a: 70-71; 2007a: xiii). As Heritage (1995: 394; 
2008: 305), writes, this is understood to antedate the inception of other 
institutions both ‘phylogenetically in the life of society and ontogenetically in 
the life of the individual’ (see also, Schegloff, 1996c: 54). The primary form 
of interaction is referred to in CA as “ordinary talk”. This rubric refers to 
‘forms of interaction that are not confined to specialised settings or to the 
execution of particular tasks’ (Heritage, 2005a: 104). In CA research, this 
speech-exchange system is conceptualised as the ‘primordial site of human 
sociality’ (Schegloff, 1986: 112), and the relationship between ordinary and 
institutional talk is compared to ‘a master institution and its more restricted 
local variants’ (Heritage, 2005a: 108). Ordinary talk is treated, accordingly, as 
an ‘autonomous’ domain (e.g. Schegloff, 1992c: xxxi), and considered ‘the 
natural and cultural bedrock’ (Schegloff, 1996b: 3). In fine, it is understood as 
the most ‘predominant’ (Heritage, 1990: 45, fn. 6) and ‘among the most 
ancient’ (Heritage, 1984a: 239) mediums co-interlocutors employ to engage 
with and co-constitute human sociality. It is understood, as such, to constitute 
‘sociological bedrock’ (Schegloff, 1996b: 4).  
(3) Order (possible) at all points. Language-in-use has been assumed, 
traditionally, to represent an inappropriate domain of academic inquiry (e.g. 
Chomsky, 1965: 4, 58); one that is analytically subordinate to “competence” 
(ibid., italics in original) or “langue” (Saussure, 1966 [1959]: 9, italics in 
original; see also, Searle, 1970 [1969]: 17), abstract, hypothetical studies of 
language use. In CA research, however, this assumption is inverted. Talk-in-
interaction is conceptualised and operationalised, in contrast, as a potentially 
systemic and systematic ‘locus of order’ (Schegloff, 2005a: 17, italics in 
original). Research has demonstrated, recurrently, that talk-in-interaction is 
‘structurally organised’ (Heritage, 1989: 22), constructed, co-constructed 
(Schegloff, 1999a: 409) and reconstructed by co-interlocutors, methodically, 
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as a site of coordinated order (see Sacks, 1984a: 22; Psathas, 1995: 45). The 
upshot of this assumption is the injunction ‘order at all points’ (e.g. Sacks, 
1992, Vol. I: 484); namely, that no province of human sociality, as it is 
instantiated through talk-in-interaction, may be ‘dismissed, a priori, as 
disorderly, accidental or interactionally irrelevant’ (Heritage, 1984a: 241, 
italics in original). This orderliness is not conceived as a worldview that is 
simply superimposed by the analyst, exogenously, but is exhibited by co-
interlocutors endogenous to the interaction(s) analysed (see Schegloff and 
Sacks, 1973: 290). 
(4) Sequence organisation. Talk-in-interaction is analysed in CA as it is 
accomplished sequentially, turn-by-turn. The sense in which “sequence” is 
referred to here is in a ‘strong fashion’ (see Schegloff, 1972a: 76; see also, fn. 
178), to borrow the phrase. Talk is not analysed simply in terms of its 
chronological production, but relationally. As Schegloff (in Čmerjková and 
Prevignano, 2003: 27) observes, a turn-at-talk is analysed for how it is 
‘conditioned by its position in a stream of interaction’. In this respect, turns-
at-talk are subject to what has been described as a ‘barely finite regress’ 
(Schegloff, 2002a: 289): In the moment in which they are (co-)produced, they 
are responsive to a prior whilst, at the same time, making “conditionally 
relevant” (see Sacks, 1967; Schegloff, 1968: 1075, 1083), who can/should 
contribute next, and how. 61 Turns-at-talk are not, then, produced in a ‘null 
 
61 To qualify, while talk-in-interaction (i.e. “first pair parts” [Schegloff, 2007a: 13]) is 
proposed to have a ‘sequential implicativeness’ (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 296, fn. 6), this 
organisation is not to be misunderstood as ‘regulative’ (Drew, 1978: 5) of conduct (see 
Coulter, 1973a: 37, 142, fn. 3; R. Watson and Weinberg, 1982: 60; Heritage, 1984: 256a; 
Schegloff, 1988: 118; Wootton, 1989: 252; Zimmerman and Boden, 1991: 10-11; Drew and 
E. Holt, 1998: 510-511). Certainly, social actions can be processed to privilege certain 
responses (e.g. Stivers and Rossano, 2010), ‘strengthened’ (e.g. Schegloff et al., 1977: 368, 
fn. 15) and rendered more ‘forceful’ (e.g. Clayman and Heritage, 2009: 303); however, they 
do not necessarily eventuate determinate occurrences or intended outcomes. The extent to 
which interaction can be described as empirically “forcing”, therefore, should not be 
overstated; although the moral implications of this position are worth entertaining (e.g. 
Psathas, 1990: 22-23). 
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context’ (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 6), but are ‘doubly contextual’ 
(Heritage, 1984a: 242), both ‘context-shaped’ and ‘context-renewing’ (ibid., 
italics in original). Furthermore, as utterances are hearable against a prior, they 
can be inspected by co-interlocutors, in situ, and analysts, ex post facto, for 
how they have demonstrably (mis)understood prior turns. In this respect, the 
concepts of “intersubjectivity” (e.g. Schegloff, 1992d) and “meaning” (e.g. 
Clift, 2001), for example, are hypostatised sequentially – even ‘incarnately’  
(à la H. Garfinkel, n.d. in Heritage, 1984a: 259) – as provisional and 
inspectable accomplishments.  
(5) Context. Talk-in-interaction is conceptualised in CA as a system, syntax or 
grammar that operates autonomously of the idiosyncrasies of co-interlocutors, 
and their psychologies (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1992c: xxxi). As canvassed in 
§2.2.1, however, this does not mean that dimensions of “context” are, by 
implication, necessarily occluded from the purview of EM/(M)CA research, 
nor are rendered inappreciable thereby (cf. Cicourel, 1981: n.p.g. in 
Mandelbaum, 1990/1991: 333; Thompson, 1984 in Hutchby, 1999: 85; 
Goffman, 1981: 32 in Heritage, 2003: 5). The salience of a “context” is, 
instead, adjudicated through the use of a ‘relevancing procedure’ (Schegloff, 
1987a: 218) in CA research. Specifically, analysts must identify orientations 
to the “demonstrable relevance” (see Schegloff, 1992a: 107-110) and the 
“procedural consequentiality” (ibid.: 110-116) of that context by co-
interlocutors. Forms of context, therefore, whether “distal” (see Schegloff, 
1992e: 195, my emphasis) – such as ‘institutional matrices’ (ibid.) – or 
“proximate” (ibid., my emphasis) – such as “discourse identities” (see 
Zimmerman, 1998: 90) – in this sense, ‘earns its way into the arena of 
analysis’, as Schegloff (1992e: 215) writes. Context is treated, as such, as a 
contingent, situated achievement; one that is (re-)negotiated by co-
interlocutors collaboratively, in situ (see Schegloff, 1999b: 579; e.g. Drew, 
2002). It is not treated, in contrast, as either a ‘threshold’ phenomenon (see 
Schegloff, 1991: 62; 1992a: 127; see also, Schegloff in Wong and Olsher, 
2000: 124) nor ‘analytic object’ (Schegloff, 1991: 47), to borrow the 
expression, wherein the scope and/or the magnitude of its putative 
(ir)relevancies are determined by the diktat of analysts (here, see Benson, 
1974: 127; Lynch, 1993: 30; Schegloff, 1999b: 577). Instead, CA affords an 
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evidential apparatus to evaluate the relevance of “contexts” for co-
interlocutors both endogenously and accountably (see §3.2.2).  
 
These tenets, I propose, represent five central assumptions which undergird CA 
research. CA, as such, is underpinned by a coherent set of empirico-analytic 
convictions. Consequently, the approach is not ‘merely formalistic’ (Schegloff in 
Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 29, italics in original; see also, Schegloff, 1988: 
131), nor devoid of theoretical assumptions. 
 
3.2.2 Membership Categorisation Analysis 
Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) is a cognate enterprise to CA. Sharing 
heritage in the lectures of Sacks (1992 [1964-1972]), MCA is interested in the 
‘methods’ and ‘reasoning’ of membership in interaction, and the social actions, 
activities and/or projects 62 for which these are accomplished upon production 
(Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015: 5). Central to this enterprise are the heuristics of 
“membership categories” and “categorization device[s]” (see Sacks, 1972: e.g. 32). 
As Hester and Eglin (1997c: 3) write, the former refers to the ‘classifications or social 
types that may be used to describe persons’. ‘[T]he middle class’, for example, as 
noted by Coulter (1982: 36 in Hester and Eglin, 1997c: 3), furnishes one topical 
example of this work. The latter concept, in contrast, refers to collections of 
membership categories that are interconnected by their shared relationship to some 
device (here, see Sacks, 1972: 32). The avowedly “classed” membership categories 
“middle class” and “working class”, for example, might be read-off, on some 
occasions, to constitute the device of “social class”, itself. 63 
 
Using these heuristics, inter alia, 64 MCA studies the taken-for-granted methods of 
categorisation that are employed in everyday life and investigates how identities are 
invoked through discourse. In this way, it shares a number of assumptions with CA. 
Members’ classificatory practices, and the practical work for which these are 
 
62 Schegloff’s (2007a: 244-249) distinction. 
63 Here, see R. Watson (1978 in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 260, fn. 29). 
64 See, e.g., Jayyusi (2014 [1984]), Hester and Eglin (1997a) and Stokoe (2012a). 
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mobilised, for example, are treated as (potentially) orderly (see §3.2.1). Social 
identity, as a form of “context”, is also treated as a situated, occasioned and 
accountable accomplishment, and not as an aprioristic, invariant and/or static 
phenomenon (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 46). Furthermore, MCA research has also 
attended to the social actions (e.g. “complimenting”; “complaining”) for which these 
classificatory practices are mobilised (see, e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 597-600). Thus, 
MCA shares the ‘activity focus’ (Drew and Heritage, 1992: 17, italics in original) of 
CA (see §3.2.1). As a result, MCA appears broadly compatible with CA, sharing 
several of its programmatic tenets. However, this confluence notwithstanding, the 
relationship between these enterprises remains, in some sense, equivocal. 
 
3.2.3 Synthesis 
For some, CA and MCA are distinct traditions of EM, with marginal intersections in 
their ambits. CA has been seen to prioritise the sequential organisation of talk-in-
interaction, for example, whereas MCA focuses on members’ practices of 
categorisation (e.g. Hester and Eglin, 1997c: 2; R. Watson, 1997a). If and how these 
two approaches can/should be reconciled, therefore, has generated a range of 
perspectives. Some, for example, consider a convergence necessary (e.g. Stokoe, 
2012a; 2012b); permissible only upon the fulfilment of certain conditions (e.g. 
Schegloff, 2007b: 477); and even superfluous for others still (e.g. Fitzgerald, 2012). 
As this research strives for an integrative approach, it is worth making my position 
clear. In this case, CA and MCA are treated as fundamentally compatible. As to 
whether my particular focus (i.e. “social class”), is occasioned through resources that 
have originated from MCA, and/or CA, I remain agnostic. Both will be employed 
where appropriate, hereafter. This approach is preferred to one that involves an 
arbitrary pledge to one enterprise at/to the expense of the other. That which is 
prioritised, instead, is whether my claims are defensible, where this is evaluated 
against the demonstrable orientations of co-interlocutors. This position has been 
informed by the approach adopted by Whitehead (2012) in the following passage. 
 
“As a result, although I have been trained primarily in CA, under the direction 
of people who would most likely be viewed as representatives of a CA 
perspective, I am not overly concerned about whether my contributions are 
characterized as exemplifying a CA or MCA approach, or both. I am 
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concerned, however, with whether my work is faithful to the empirical details 
of the data on which it is based, and whether it makes a contribution to the 
understanding of social organization broadly, and social categories and talk-
in-interaction in particular. I would thus argue that, regardless of where our 
research interests come from or how the data that we examine is selected, the 
crucial issue is whether, once we have the data in front of us, we are bound by 
its integrity (Schegloff, 2005).”  
(Whitehead, 2012: 341, my emphasis)  
 
The differences between the two enterprises are, therefore, moot. I will draw on 
resources that are differently associated with CA and MCA according to what is 
relevant for co-interlocutors in some moment. In so doing, this thesis aligns with a 
growing tradition – or ‘renaissance’ (Stokoe, 2012a: 278) – of analyses of social 
identity as occasioned sequentially in forms of talk-in-interaction (for review, see 
Whitehead, 2012: 338). In summary, MCA features in this research not as a distinct, 
second method of data-analysis, but as an analytic sensibility that is ‘mutually 
elaborative’ (Fitzgerald, 2012: 307) of CA. 
  
3.3 Procedure 
The application of EM/(M)CA is defined by a number of key empirical stages. For 
clarity, these are disaggregated into three activities: (1) recording, (2) transcription 
and (3) collection building. In practice, data-analysis did not follow these stages 
chronologically. This owed to the analysis of primary- (n=59) and secondary-data 
(n=900). As the latter comprised previously recorded instances of interaction, it 
thereby alleviated the need for recording. Thus, whereas primary-data required this 
step, secondary-data were, upon acquisition, available for transcription; if not 
collection building. Secondary-data were also not analysed in a discrete empirico-
analytic stage, but as and when it was accrued, iteratively (see §3.4.2.4). As primary-
data (n=59) was collected, for instance, a small proportion of secondary-data (n=186) 
was analysed, simultaneously, for which I possessed existing access. The three stages 
individuated below did not, therefore, necessarily obtain for each data corpus, nor 
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were they completed consecutively. As “ideal-types”, 65 however, this procedure 
characterises my process accurately, if not temporally. This procedure satisfied the 
requirements of the “Research Ethics Framework” (ESRC, n.d.) and passed ethical 
review conducted by the “Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology 
Ethics Committee” (i.e. “ELMPS”) at the University of York. 
 
3.3.1 Recording 
An initial stage in conducting CA research involves gaining access to recorded 
instances of talk-in-interaction. Recordings are criterial to CA research (see Psathas, 
1995: 45; Schegloff, 1996a: 166) and, as a technology, represent one of the primary 
affordances that enabled the emergence of the enterprise (see Schegloff in Čmerjková 
and Prevignano 2003: 17-18). The limits of space preclude a review of the numerous 
affordances that are presented by this analysis. Suffice it to note only that recordings 
provide unparalleled access to the particulars of talk-in-interaction, allowing for the 
repeated inspection of materials that have not been distorted by, or deteriorated 
through, the recollection of analysts (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 3), and/or have 
been constrained by the horizons of their imaginations and/or intuitions (see Sacks, 
1984a: 25; 1992, Vol. I: 115; Vol. II: 419), inter alia (see Psathas, 1990: 9; see §1.6.1). 
 
The recordings analysed in this research include both audio- (n=905) and video-
recordings (n=54). In the collection of primary-data (n=59), video-recordings of face-
to-face interactions were prioritised in the assembly of this corpus. In total, these 
represent approximately two-thirds of the primary-dataset (n=39). This type of 
recording represents the ‘state-of-the-art form’ (Schegloff in Prevignano and Thibault, 
2003: 167) in relation to face-to-face interaction, conferring the analyst with 
expectably greater (e.g. “holistic”) access to the contexture of the interactions than 
that made available through unimodal, audio-recordings (for review, see, e.g., 
Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 413-414, fn. 2; Mondada, 2006). Previous EM/(M)CA 
research, for example, has demonstrated the consequentiality of non-vocal modalities 
 
65 Weber’s (1978a: e.g. 9, my emphasis) term. 
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(e.g. “embodiment”; “spatiality”) for unfolding instances of talk-in-interaction. 66 
Video-recordings were, therefore, privileged inasmuch as they expectably afford 
greater access to non-vocal domains; domains which could, again, theoretically, 
inform aspects of the interaction. This was of particular importance for this research 
due to the paucity of empirical EM/(M)CA inquiries into “social class” (see §2.4). 
Specifically, as the parameters for how “social class” could be made relevant by co-
participants were equivocal, video-recordings were privileged in order to capture as 
much of the interaction as possible. Once collected, recordings were available for 
repeated inspection. Where candidate orientations to “social class” were observed, 
these instances were transcribed. 
 
3.3.2 Transcription 
Transcription constitutes a ‘pervasive and elementary’ (Bogen, 1992: 280) component 
of CA research. Theoretically, this process is ‘never-ending’ (Coates and 
Thornborrow, 1999: 596); CA transcripts are ‘virtually endlessly revisable’ 
(Schegloff, 1988/1989: 238, fn. 3; 1992a: 133, fn. 9), and, in practice, are amended 
and added to iteratively (see Kitzinger, 1998). The transcription system devised by 
Jefferson (2004b) is the ‘de facto standard’ (Hepburn and Potter, 2006: 175) of 
EM/(M)CA research. 67 This system of modified orthography – or ‘symbology’ 
(Coulter, 1995b: 336, fn. 1) – comprises a set of standardised conventions used to 
capture the details of talk-in-interaction (e.g. lexical, sequential, prosodic, temporal, 
etc.) as they are (co-)produced, sequentially, verbatim. 68 Jeffersonian (2004b) 
transcripts primarily attend to vocal communicative practice; however, it is also 
integrated routinely with systems of multi-modal transcription (see, e.g., Clift, 2016: 
 
66 On the former, e.g., see Stivers (2008). On the latter, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 281-284), 
LeBaron and Streeck (1997) and Schegloff (2000b: 5), differently. 
67 For the transcription conventions used in this research, see Appendix 1.0. 
68 As with other forms of transcription (see Ochs, 1979: 44) – and description more broadly 
(see Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91-93) – the Jeffersonian (e.g. 2004b) system is irremediably 
selective. Nevertheless, the system furnishes analysts the opportunity to attend to such 
features. 
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52-53). 69 The Jeffersonian (2004b) system is, then, mutable, and provides the basis 
for the analysis of recorded instances of talk-in-interaction in CA research. Notably, 
the system also performs a regulatory function in the EM/(M)CA tradition. 
Specifically, the use and dissemination of Jeffersonian (2004) transcripts allows for 
the ‘public verification’ (see S. Albert et al., 2018: 401) of analytic claims. By 
reviewing transcripts in conjunction with their recordings, researchers occupy a 
position in which they can (dis-)confirm (un-)substantiated claims (see Whitehead, 
2011: 5; see also, Widdicombe, 1993: 109 in Kitzinger, 1998: 138), and, moreover, 
are positioned such that they can authenticate these claims independently (e.g. C. 
Goodwin, 2003: 58-59). Thus, just as “sequence organisation” endows co-
interlocutors with an “architecture of intersubjectivity” (see Heritage, 1984a: 254-
260), the Jeffersonian (2004b) system reflexively emplaces an “architecture of 
accountability” upon analysts. 
 
Jeffersonian (2004b) transcription was conducted manually in this research (see 
Bolden, 2015). Audio-files were replayed using the programme “Audacity 2.1.2” and 
video-files using “Quicktime”. Where secondary-data were already transcribed, their 
veracity was corroborated by repeated listening to audio-/video-files. Only the 
relevant segments of recordings were transcribed in this research. This resulted from 
the time-consuming nature of Jeffersonian (2004b) transcription. A transcription of 
the entire corpus (n=959) – one that is uncharacteristically large for EM/(M)CA 
research (see §3.4.2.4) – would have impinged upon the remaining time for analysis. 
70 Excerpts of the recordings were thus transcribed only in the instances in which 
candidate orientations to “social class” were identified. On such occasions, detailed 
transcripts were constructed in order to attend to the range of components that the 
 
69 The utility of a number of variants (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1981; Kendon, 2004; Rossano, 2012) 
were tested in previous research (i.e. Holmes, 2015). In this research, Mondada’s (2014) 
system was selected for integration. Due to my focus here on vocal practices, however, this 
system has not yet been incorporated. Following previous EM/(M)CA research, I instead 
provide characterisations of the ‘grossly apparent [non-verbal/vocal] actions’ (see Drew, 
1989: 99). A systematic analysis of such embodied practices awaits future EM/(M)CA 
research (see §7.3). 
70 For comparable concerns, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 3). 
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Jeffersonian (e.g. 2004b) system appreciates. This inclusive procedure is one familiar 
to CA research (e.g. Wiggins, 2002: 81), and provides for the contingency that if co-
interlocutors made “social class” relevant through some unanticipated interactional 
resource, or in the service of some unexpected social action, this could, theoretically, 
be incorporated into this research, and not excluded aprioristically and/or 
unknowingly. 
 
3.3.3 Collection building 
Once candidate instances had been transcribed, these were subject to dedicated 
individual analysis (here, see Schegloff, 1987b). As these analyses accumulated, 
putative “patterns” were observed, and which formed the substantive basis for 
emergent “collections” (see Psathas, 1995: 50). Collections, simply put, comprised 
more than one instance of the candidate phenomenon; conventionally, these include 
at least three cases (see Clift, 2016: xvi; Drew, 2006: 80, fn. 4; Clift and C. Raymond, 
2018: 93; differently, see Sacks, 1978: 254; Jefferson, 1990: 66-68). The process of 
collection building involves accreting cases of the focal phenomenon which are, in 
some way, homologous; be that with respect to their form (e.g. syntactic, semantic, 
prosodic, etc.), function and/or intersubjective operation, for example. 71 The 
accumulation of decidedly similar cases furnishes the context by reference to which 
the coordinates of core, “clearcut [(sic)]” (à la Schegloff, 1997a: 529) cases can be 
adjudicated, and whereby comparatively “deviant”, “equivocal” and/or 
“countervailing” cases (howsoever described) can be discriminated (here, see 
Heritage, 1999: 70; see also, Coulter, 1983: 373-374). 72 Analytically, instances of the 
 
71 On the processual analysis of these components in CA, see Heritage (2011a). For 
commentaries on collection building specifically, see Schegloff (1996a; 1997a: 501-502; 
2009: 391-393; 2000 in Wong and Olsher, 2000: 118; in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 
16) and Clift and C. Raymond (2018). 
72 Inter alia, this includes so-called ‘aberrant event[s]’ (Whalen, Zimmerman and Whalen, 
1988: 340), ‘ballpark phenomena’ (Jefferson, 2004c: 134), ‘boundary cases’ (Schegloff, 
1997a: 502), ‘counter cases’ (Jefferson, 1983: 22), ‘deviant cases’ (Heritage and Atkinson, 
1984: 2), ‘official absences’ (Schegloff, 1968: 1083ff in Clayman and Maynard, 1995: 29-30, 
fn. 8), ‘eventful absences’ (Clift and C. Raymond, 2018: 96), ‘negative cases’ (J. Robinson 
and Bolden, 2010: 526), ‘non-practices’ (Lynch, 1985: 295, fn. 17) and ‘relevant 
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latter (qua “outliers”), offer analysts opportunities to evaluate the stringency of a 
collection (see Silverman, 1993: n.p.g. in Silverman, 1994: 434). In some occasions, 
this proved explicative, whereby cases could be understood, profitably, as 
transgressions (howsoever characterised).  
 
Collection building proceeded “inductively” in this research, with limited formal 
circumscription (here, see Psathas, 1995: 50). However, as others have qualified (e.g. 
Silverman, 1998: 59; Clayman and Gill, 2004: 596), pure “induction” is, of course, 
procedurally untenable. To investigate some phenomenon, one must have some 
preliminary notion (howsoever tentative), thereof. In this case, as I explicate in 
Chapter 4, candidate instances in which “social class” was made relevant for co-
interlocutors, in some way, were adjudicated using a designedly inclusive, threefold 
criterion. 
 
(1) When and insofar as they aligned with Formal Analytic (FA) 
conceptualisations of “social class”; that is, resonating, in some capacity, with 
the analyst’s professional knowledge (qua “sociologist”). 
(2) When and insofar as “social class” was more or less explicitly named by co-
interlocutors themselves.  
(3) When and insofar as some component of talk-in-interaction was otherwise 
simply hearable as “classed”; that is, resonating, in some capacity, with the 
analyst’s lay knowledge (qua “member”). 
 
This trichotomy offers a broad and inclusive operationalisation of “social class” 
according to which candidate instantiations were accumulated. It is worth highlighting 
here that a FA understanding of “social class” was not “bracketed” (see Schegloff, 
1992a: 118; see also, Heritage, 1987: 231-232) and divorced from this analysis – such 
as that associated with ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ (see H. Garfinkel and 
Sacks, 1970: 345; recall fn. 21). FA conceptualisations were, instead, retained in order 
to allow for the possibility that co-interlocutors serviced such “professional” 
 
nonoccurrence[s]’ (Schegloff, 1996a: 192; see also, Schegloff, 1993: e.g. 107-110; 2007a: 19-
21). 
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understandings so as to reflexively instantiate the relevance of this device. This 
criterion, however, was employed in order to glean candidate cases, only. Whether 
“social class” was demonstrably relevant for co-interlocutors required these co-
interlocutors to explicate this relevance, in situ. Thus, where an instance resonated 
with some extant conceptualisation of “social class” (e.g. “lay”; “professional”), this 
did not equate with “demonstrable relevance” (see Schegloff, 1991: 49-52; 1992a: 
107-110). The instances accrued through this criterion were, thereby, treated in the 
same way as “intuitions” in EM/(M)CA research. 73 As Levinson (1983: 287) writes, 
these ‘do not circumscribe the data’; instead, they are required to be ‘disciplined’ 
(Zimmerman, 1988: 421 in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591) through the prism of 
“demonstrable relevance” (Schegloff, 1991; 1992). Thus, collections were formed 
inclusively when they contained putative orientations to “social class” in some 
recognisable and potentially reproducible capacity (here, see §3.4.1.2). 
 
Like transcription (see §3.3.2; Bolden, 2015: 277), collection building is not a 
preliminary to EM/(M)CA research, and one undertaken prior to analysis, proper 
(Toerien, 2014: 331). Instead, it forms a crucial, constitutive part of the analytic 
process. Whether something constituted an orientation to “social class” was subject to 
revision as additional instances were transcribed. As more cases were encountered, 
these collections were streamlined through a process comparable to ‘analytic 
induction’ (see Wieder and Zimmerman, 1976: 339, fn. 3; Pomerantz, 1988: 361; 
Clayman and Maynard, 1995: 7; Heritage, 1995: 399), whereby the systematics 
identified within previous cases were (re-)applied to those newly discovered. The 
remit of collections was, thus, designed inclusively – even ‘generously’ (see 
Schegloff, 1996a: 176; 1997a: 502, 539) – with the intention being able to 
accommodate the contingencies of each case. My collections in this way sought to 
provide comprehensively, and not to represent only those cases considered “most 
clear” (see Znaniecki, 1934 in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 601). Accordingly, my 
collections mutated significantly as this research progressed. New collections 
 
73 Here, see, e.g., Schegloff (1967: 49-50; 1984a: 46), Coulter (1979a: 24), Heritage (1984a: 
238), Zimmerman (1988: n.p.g. in R. Watson, 2008: §58), Schegloff in Wong and Olsher 
(2000: 118) and Clift (2005: 1642). 
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emerged; some were revised; others collapsed. Several ‘core collection[s]’ (Schegloff, 
1996a: 177), however, stabilised. These comprised practices in which “social class” 
was actuated by co-interlocutors (e.g. Chapters 4 and 5), and the social actions for 
which these practices were serviced, in situ (e.g. Chapter 6). 
 
3.4 Data 
This section provides a descriptive overview of the data analysed in this thesis. For 
clarity, I focus first on the secondary-data analysed in this research (§3.4.1). I turn next 
to the primary-data that I have collected and analysed (§3.4.2). This distinction is, 
however, purely nominal. They are bifurcated here in interests of transparency, to 
facilitate interpretation; they were not treated, procedurally, as distinct. 74 In the 
chapters that follow, both the primary- and secondary-data are analysed in 
conjunction. Justification for this homogenising approach is elaborated in §3.4.1.2, 
below.  
 
3.4.1 Secondary-data 
The secondary-data comprised twenty existing corpora of naturalistic instances of 
talk-in-interaction (n=900; see Table 1).  
 
 
 
74 The distinctions here, regarding the constitution of my dataset, are confined to those 
considered explicative vis-à-vis the objectives of this research (§1.7.1). Theoretically, there 
are an indefinite number of axes by reference to which my dataset could be disaggregated; 
that is, for example, when adjudicated against some criterion of ‘correspondence’ (Sacks, 
1992, Vol. I: 418; 1972: 33; Schegloff, 2004 [1969-1970]: 82; 1972a: 81; 1972b: 97), 
‘descriptive’ (Schegloff, 1992c: xxxvii), ‘literal’ (R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 208; Wooffitt, 
1992: 59), ‘objective’ (Moerman, 1968b: 160) and/or ‘sheer correctness’ (Schegloff, 1992e: 
195). The solution implemented in this section is, thus, comparatively ‘positivistic’ (see 
Schegloff, 1987a: 218; 1991: 51; 1992a: 108; 1997: 166; see also, Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 
19-20; recall fn. 25) in orientation. The classifications imposed are not informed by the 
orientations of co-interlocutors, endogenously, but derived from the exogenous conventions 
of EM/(M)CA; a set of conventions to which this very caveat belongs (i.e. Schegloff and 
Sacks, 1973: 291-292, fn. 4). 
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Table 1 – Secondary-data 
Corpus Data count 
CallFriend 119 
CallHome 119 
Conversation Analytic British National Corpus (CABNC) 35 
CTS 75 
Examples 1 
Freelunch 6 
Griffith Corpus of Spoken Australian English (GCSAusE) 39 
Heritage 96 
Holt 83 
ISL 14 
Movin 3 
Newport Beach (NB) 26 
Rahman 22 
Saarbrücken Corpus of Spoken English (SCoSE) 17 
Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE) 39 
Santa Barbara Ladies (SBL) 21 
Single calls  42 
Switchboard (SWB) 37 
UC Discourse Laboratory (UCDiscLab) 103 
Wheatley 3 
Total 900 
 
These datasets combine both the so-called ‘classic’ and ‘contemporary’ CA corpora 
(see Kitzinger, 2005b: 225; Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011: 66, fn. 4). The former is 
comprised of five datasets (n=168), for which a breakdown is presented in Table 2. 
These corpora comprise exclusively landline telephone calls collected over the 1960s-
1970s and which include a number of ‘“cult” fragments’ (Mondada, 2006: 53) 
frequently re-analysed in CA research (here, see Heritage, 1984a: 238). Since their 
collection, these data have been distributed at the discretion of CA practitioners and 
figure frequently in EM/(M)CA research (see S. Albert et al., 2018: 402, 419, fn. 3). 
Reflecting the anglophone heritage of CA (see Heritage, 1995: 391-393; see also, 
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Antaki, 1994: 91; Clayman, 2002: 247), this data is conducted by participants in 
American- (n=47) and British-English (n=121).  
 
Table 2 – Classic data 
Corpus Data count 
Heritage 96 
Newport Beach (NB) 26 
Rahman 22 
Santa Barbara Ladies (SBL) 21 
Wheatley 3 
Total 168 
 
The remaining secondary-data (n=732) analysed forms the “contemporary” CA 
corpora, comprising fifteen datasets (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 – Contemporary data 
Corpus Data count 
CallFriend 119 
CallHome  119 
Conversation Analytic British National Corpus (CABNC)  35 
CTS 75 
Examples 1 
FreeLunch 6 
Griffith Corpus of Spoken Australian English (GCSAusE) 39 
Holt 83 
ISL 14 
MOVIN 3 
Saarbrücken Corpus of Spoken English (SCoSE) 17 
Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE) 39 
Single Calls  42 
Switchboard (SWB) 37 
UC Discourse Laboratory (UCDiscLab) 103 
Total 732 
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Like the “classic” data, the “contemporary” corpora were predominantly telephonic 
(n=465), with a smaller proportion conducted as face-to-face interactions (n=267). 
Interactions were (co-)produced in American- (n=495), British- (n=196) and 
Australian-English (n=41) and were collected for academic analysis. The data have 
not, therefore, been repurposed. Access to eleven datasets (n=497) was mediated 
through the data repository TalkBank (i.e. MacWhinney, 2007). 75 Access to the 
CABNC (n=35) was provided through a separate databank (i.e. S. Albert, de Ruiter 
and de Ruiter, 2015). 76 The three remaining datasets (n=200) were made available by 
their respective custodians. 77 
 
3.4.1.1 Summary 
The secondary-data corpus initially contained 1034 interactions. 78 An initial analysis 
was conducted whereby each interaction was listened to and, where applicable, 
watched. The dataset was “cleaned” through this process so as to retain only ordinary 
 
75 Namely, “Examples” (n.d.), “UCDiscLab” (n.d.; see Ervin-Tripp and Kuentay, 1995), 
“CallFriend” (n.d.), “CallHome” (n.d.), “SWB” (i.e. Godfrey, Holliman and McDaniel, 1992; 
Graff and Bird, 2000), “Movin” (n.d.), “Freelunch” (n.d.), “SBCSAE” (n.d.), “SCoSE” (n.d.), 
“GCSAusE” (n.d.) and “ISL” (n.d.). I am grateful to Professor Brian MacWhinney for 
granting me permission to analyse these datasets. 
76 My thanks to Dr Saul Albert for facilitating access to this dataset. Only a sample of total 
recordings were incorporated for analysis after parsing their corresponding transcripts. This 
method of data-collection – while certainly ‘less exhaustive’ (Drew, 1997: 73, fn. 1) – is often 
employed in CA research (e.g. Drew, 2003a: 297; Clayman, 1992: 198, fn. 2). Additional 
orientations may, therefore, have been overlooked. 
77 The “CTS” corpus, for example, was collected, transcribed and provided by Dr Clare 
Jackson (for review, see Jackson, 2011a). It is not to be confused with the ‘Children Tell 
Stories’ corpus cited in classic EM/(M)CA texts (see Pitcher and Prelinger, 1963 35, 31 in 
Sacks, 1972: 430, fn. 15; 1992, Vol. I: 223, fn. 1). The corpus “Single Calls” includes a 
combination of “classic” data in addition to recordings made available by a number of 
colleagues. Special thanks to Dr Marc Alexander, Dr Rebecca Clift, Professor Charles 
Goodwin, Professor Marjorie Harness Goodwin, Professor Richard Ogden and Professor 
Elizabeth Stokoe for their generosity. 
78 This amounted to 361 hours, 50 minutes and 20 seconds, with an average length of 21 
minutes, 20 seconds.  
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forms of talk-in-interaction conducted in English (n=900). 79 The data remaining 
amounted to 325 hours, 5 minutes and 47 seconds, with a mean duration of 21 minutes, 
58 seconds per datum. This comprised an assemblage of telephone calls (n=633), both 
landline and mobile, and co-present, face-to-face interactions (n=267). Interactions 
were conducted in American- (n=542), Australian- (n=41), and British-English 
(n=317) and were largely discrete, with some oriented to as return-calls, and 
‘conversations-in-a-series’ (Schegloff, 1980: 106; see also, Button, 1991). The co-
interlocutors habilitating the dataset also occupied various relationships with one 
another, including, inter alia, acquaintances, colleagues and relatives, amongst other 
‘reason for the call relationships’ (Schegloff, 1992c: xxi). Accordingly, the secondary-
dataset represents an eclectic corpus. The implications of this data for the nature of 
my claims, therefore, deserves qualification. 
 
3.4.1.2 On generalisability  
The bases by reference to which “generalisability” is adjudicated in sociological 
research are diverse (for review, see Gobo, 2008). One canonical line of reasoning 
revolves around the derivation of representative sample of the focal population. 
Observations that are made from this sample are then treated such that they can be 
extrapolated, legitimately, to the host population from which they have been derived. 
When situated in such terms, therefore, my research does not appear promising. 
Provided the heterogeneity of my secondary-dataset, it is difficult to imagine the 
broader population for which such a corpus could be considered representative. As 
outlined in Chapter 2 (§2.5.3), my purview has been confined to “ordinary talk” 
conducted within the English language. Beyond this, however, my data has not been 
further delimited. It was not circumscribed according to the interactions of particular 
co-interlocutors, for example, at particular times and/or in particular settings. My 
research may, therefore, be considered limited in the extent to which my findings 
could be considered “generalisable” when so evaluated; presumably constrained by 
interactional forum (i.e. “ordinary talk”) and language (i.e. English).  
 
79 Interactions were culled on the conditions in which data was duplicated (n=6), recordings 
corrupted (n=2), or in which participants oriented, predominantly, to their respective 
institutional identities (n=125). 
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It is worth qualifying, however, that this sense of “generalisability” was not an 
aspiration of this research (cf. §1.7.1) and, moreover, it also enshrines a set of 
commitments that are incongruent with those embodied by this inquiry. 80 Specifically, 
such a sense of “generalisability” is derived from an epistemology in which the 
stipulation of actor relevancies is permitted for analysts. This is required in two senses. 
Exogenously, analysts must select how their cohort (qua “sample”) qualifies as 
representative (howsoever delimited) of the population from which they have been 
derived. Concurrently, they are required to delineate what would constitute an 
adequate sample of the focal phenomenon itself. The former is obligated insofar as 
objects of description can be specified infinitely. It is therefore incumbent upon 
analysts, so invested, to nominate the salient bases in relation to which the sample 
can(not) be considered representative (recall §2.2.1). Similarly, regarding the latter, 
what counts as a satisfactory sample of an interactional practice – as explored 
elsewhere – remains unestablished (i.e. Holmes, Toerien and Jackson, 2017: 422, fn. 
6). Thus, as these features form the basis for claims to ‘exogenous distribution’ 
(Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591), to borrow the phrase, they require stipulation by 
analysts. 81  
 
To resolve these problematics, therefore, and to claim “generalisable” results in the 
FA idiom, thus requires a “positivistic” solution to the problem of relevance (see fn. 
25 and fn. 74). As this would be incongruent with the EM/(M)CA commitments of 
 
80 Whether the practices analysed could be localised and/or extrapolated to particular 
substantive conditions (e.g. persons, places, times, etc.), for example, is therefore, 
fundamentally extraneous. Furthermore, as observed elsewhere, the examination of 
“generalisability”, in this sense, would logically postdate the completion of the present 
inquiry. It is necessary, after all, to first delineate the object in relation to which a sample is 
proposedly representative before establishing the parameters of its purported genericity (for 
review, see Pomerantz, 1980: 234; Schegloff, 1993: 102, 113; Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591). 
81 On the problem of “adequacy”, more generally, see, e.g., Coulter (1973a: 6-7; 1979a: 25; 
1990: 182-183), Cicourel (1974: 197), Goffman (in Verhoeven, 1993 [1980]: 340-341), 
Schegloff (1993: 110-114, 123, fn. 17; 2000c: 210, 241, fn. 20; 2005b: 471, fn. 10) and 
Schegloff and Lerner (2009: 113).  
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this research, such a sense of “generalisability” was not therefore pursued. However, 
to qualify, this does not concede that my findings are purely an artefact of 
circumstance and/or the unique complexion of my corpus (howsoever formulated). 
Instead, following previous EM/(M)CA research, the type of generalisability at stake 
is one of a different order (see, e.g., Zimmerman and Pollner, 1974 [1970]: 97; 
Atkinson, 1978: 185-186; Silverman, 2000: 108-109 in Whitehead, 2011: 8). This 
concerns the ‘possibilities of language use’ (Peräkylä, 2011: 375, italics in original). 
Specifically, I claim that if “social class” has been made relevant by co-interlocutors 
once, such orientations are at least potentially reproducible by others (here, see 
Holmes et al., 2017: 422; see also, Ziferstein, 1972: 113-114). In this sense, the 
findings that are discerned from my data potentially represent durable social 
structures. 82 Thus, while I am limited, empirically, and disinterested, 
epistemologically, in FA senses of “generalisability”, my integration of disparate 
sources data may still provide the potential for generalisable results, differently 
conceived. Accordingly, it is on this basis that I have predicated my inquiry on the 
analysis of a diverse corpus of secondary-data. 
 
3.4.2 Primary-data 
The second source of data incorporated in this research comprises a corpus (viz. 
“EJBH corpus”, titled acronymically) of face-to-face audio- (n=20) and video-
recordings (n=39) collected between May-October 2016 in four counties across the 
United Kingdom (see Table 4). 83 
 
82 On the potential of this order, see Schegloff (2005a: 17-18). Of course, this is not to deny 
that such practices may be culturally (see Schegloff, 1996d: 471, fn. 2) and/or historically 
sensitive (see Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 618). However, as others have observed, the 
purposes for which they are mobilised by co-interlocutors possesses a greater degree of 
stability than their form dictates (see Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 634; see also, Heritage, 
2011: 268 in Clift, 2016: 31). 
83 Following previous research (e.g. Jackson, 2011a: 91), recordings have been assigned a 
three-part, alphanumeric identifier (e.g. EJBH_F1_01). This comprises the initials of the 
researcher (i.e. “EJBH”); the field site (e.g. “F1”) under the auspices of which the recording 
was conducted; and an integer that reflects the chronological assembly of the corpus (e.g. 
“01”). None of the “EJBH” extracts are to be reproduced without permission from the author. 
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Table 4 – Primary-data 
Field site: Data count Hours Minutes Seconds 
#1 14 7 26 47 
#2 7 7 1 4 
#3 2 1 24 39 
#4 36 52 4 18 
Total 59 67 56 48 
 
This dataset comprises a total of 78 participants from a diverse array of socio-
demographic backgrounds. Some participants contributed to multiple interactions, 
amounting to a total of 170 interactants. The mean number of participants per 
recording was 3, with the minimum of 2 and a maximum of 6. It was envisaged, 
initially, that a corpus of exclusively video-recorded, co-present interactions would be 
accrued. 84 As data-collection progressed, however, audio-recordings were found to 
be preferred by participants. As the research also suffered from a low-participant 
response rate, unimodal audio-only recordings were treated as admissible. In total, the 
corpus comprises 59 face-to-face interactions including video-recorded (n=39) and 
audio-only (n=20). Interactions possessed a mean duration of 1 hour, 9 minutes, and 
6 seconds, with a minimum of 6 minutes 59 seconds, and a maximum of 3 hours 14 
minutes and 2 seconds.  
 
The collection of primary-data followed two trajectories. The first involved the 
collection of data with members of the public, or “non-intimates”, at publicly 
accessible locations. The second, in contrast, was conducted with familiars, or 
“intimates”, in comparably private settings. In both cases, data was collected ethically, 
adhering to the guidelines of the ELMPS Committee (i.e. University of York), 
Research Ethics Framework (i.e. ESRC, n.d.), British Sociological Association (i.e. 
BSA, 2002) and Data Protection Act (1998). For clarity, these procedures are 
explicated serially below. 
 
 
84 Recall §3.3.1. 
105 
3.4.2.1 Non-intimates 
A number of prospective field-sites were contacted, in person, to determine whether 
video-recordings, and/or audio-only recordings, could be conducted onsite. The 
majority of these locations included cafés and restaurants. These environments were 
selected not as the situs of some particular “classed” groups, but as species of “open 
place” (see Goffman, 1963: 134); locations in which diverse groups of persons 
expectably congregate. It was this dimension that furnished the perspicuity (see H. 
Garfinkel, 2002: e.g. 182) of these settings for my purpose; not their potentially 
“classed” connotations (howsoever described; cf. §2.5.1). After receiving permission 
to record, participant recruitment began. 
 
Participants were recruited followed an opportunistic, non-random sampling strategy 
(see Peräkylä, 2011: 377). Prospective participants were approached in groups and 
invited to participate. I briefed prospective participants of what the research entailed, 
the benefits of their involvement, and the anticipated outcomes of the research. If 
prospective participants expressed interest in participating, they were invited to review 
the project information sheet (see Appendix 2.0) and to ask any questions. If 
prospective participants declined to participate, they were thanked and not re-
approached (see BSA, 2002: §17). Those who expressed willingness were then 
provided a further opportunity to field questions, allay concerns, and ward off 
misunderstandings. Participants were then apprised of their entitlements.  
 
Participants were informed that their data would be confidential (BSA, 2002: §18-19 
and §34), remain anonymised by way of pseudonyms (see BSA, 2002: §36) and 
through the visual obscuration of video-recordings. 85 Participants also reserved the 
 
85 Like preceding EM/(M)CA research, pseudonyms were accorded to all (co-)participants, 
including references to non-present parties (e.g. Drew and E. Holt, 1988: 400, fn. 2) and to 
(co-)participants who have been identified within previous research (see, e.g., Whalen, 
Zimmerman and Whalen, 1988: 336, fn. 1; Clayman and C. Raymond, 2015: 389, fn. 1; cf. 
Lerner and Kitzinger, 2015: 58, fn. 1). The single exception here is Extract 37. The 
pseudonyms used in prior research (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1980) have been preserved in this 
instance to cohere with the established title of the data as it has been cited elsewhere. 
References to place, including those analysed within Chapter 5, have also been 
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right to withdraw from the research for up to two-weeks following their recording(s), 
at which point their audio/video recording(s) would be deleted, their questionnaire 
destroyed, and their video-recording release form void (see BSA, 2002: §25). 
Participants were also shown how to operate all recording equipment (detailed below), 
equipping them to terminate their involvement in the research at their discretion. 
Participants were also informed of a number of general and site-specific organisations 
they could contact if distress was experienced during their participation (BSA, 2002: 
§13, §26). Those who indicated having understood their rights, were then invited to 
complete an informed consent form (see BSA, 2002: §16; see Appendix 3.0) and 
video-recording release form (see Appendix 4.0). The latter enabled participants to 
specify the conditions under which their recording(s) could be reused. The template 
employed in this research was constructed by Jackson (2011a: 294-295) and represents 
a derivation of Ervin-Tripp (n.d. in ten Have, 1999: 220-221). 
 
Audio-recordings were collected using two mobile, unobtrusive Dictaphones: a 
Tascam DR-07 and an Olympus WS833. Dictaphones were spaced between co-
participants evenly. Video-recordings were collected using a wireless Kodak camera 
affixed to an extendable tripod. Emulating previous interactional research, the camera 
was set horizontally, simulating the viewpoint of an additional, static party (see 
LeBaron and Streeck, 1997: 23). The location of the video-camera was not specified 
in advance of the interaction but remained variable. This was contingent upon what 
has been described elsewhere as the spatial “formation” (see Kendon, 1980: 209, 
italics in original) adopted by participants. Whether I remained co-present for the 
interaction, operating recording equipment, or remained onsite, but out of frame, was 
determined by co-participants. Once participants completed their recording, they or I 
would switch-off all the recording equipment. Participants then completed a short 
socio-demographic questionnaire. 86 
 
pseudonymised following existing EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Stivers, 2002: 300-301). 
However, with the permission of Professor M. H. Goodwin, Extract 37 has again been 
exempted to preserve the unique operation that is accomplished through the focal 
“misidentification” (i.e. §5.5.4). 
86 The questionnaire was used as a resource for preserving information about the “EJBH 
dataset” for future analyses; a recurring problem for secondary-data analysis (see 
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3.4.2.2 Intimates 
Alongside recordings of non-familiars, a corpus of recordings was collected with 
participants at social occasions to which the researcher was privy. These recordings 
were conducted between familiar ‘recurrent parties’ (Schegloff, 1979a: 26) – such as 
relatives, colleagues and friends – at prescheduled events; events organised not for  
a recording, but other social functions (here, see Drew, 1989: 96) – or “dominant 
involvements” (see Goffman, 1963: 44). The procedure by which data-collection was 
conducted paralleled that performed with non-familiars (see §3.4.2.2) save three 
points of divergence. Firstly, not all recordings were conducted in public locations. 
The sites in which recordings were collected were instead contingent upon the nature 
of the occasion, resulting in recordings in both “public” and “private” environments, 
such as within cafés and homes, respectively. Secondly, these participants (qua 
“intimates”) could be contacted in advance of the recording. Prospective participants 
were thereby given greater opportunity in which to consider their participation. 
Thirdly, whereas I was excluded from the interactions between “non-intimates”, I 
frequently featured within these interactions qua co-participant.  
 
This practice has an uncertain status in CA research. Traditionally, as Heritage (1988: 
130; 1990: 29) observes, CA has been used to analyse data ‘which is as 
uncontaminated as possible by social scientific intervention’ (see also, Schegloff, 
1967: 239-240; ten Have, 1999: 48-50). In this vein, to feature within one’s data 
effectively contravenes such a non-interventionist commitment. Illustrations of this 
position are readily available. This includes occasions in which analysts eschew 
recordings in which they feature (e.g. E. Holt, 1991: 64), or diminish the extent of 
their contributions qua co-interlocutors (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1996: 381; Schegloff, 
2007a: 6; Schegloff and Lerner, 2009: 95) – casting themselves, in effect, as ‘out of 
 
Hammersley, 2010: §3.4). To be clear, it was not employed in an attempt to eventuate 
explanations of/for participants’ interactional conduct, ex post facto (see R. Watson and 
Weinberg, 1982: 76, fn. 4; Psathas, 1990: 9), nor to appeal to their intentions thereof. On 
related concerns, see, e.g., Zimmerman and Pollner (1974 [1970]: 91, fn. 27), Heritage 
(1984[a]: 135-[1]78 in Drew, 1989: 113, fn. 3), Wootton (1989: 254), Nelson (1994) and 
Schegloff (1998b: 252, fn. 18). 
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play’, to borrow Goffman’s (1963: 40) phrase. One’s inclusion within one’s 
recordings, therefore, furnishes the basis for both pragmatic and professional 
dilemmas (see e.g., Maynard, 1984: 21-22). 87 One such concern, regarding the 
capacity of analysts to influence the trajectory of an interaction, has been assuaged 
above (recall fn. 61). Further concerns, however, warrant review.  
 
One refers to that which Wowk (2007: 148, fn. 27) has referred to as ‘a post hoc 
“archaeology” of motives’. EM/(M)CA, it will be recalled, commits to a prohibitive 
stance towards non-relevant psychological ascriptions (e.g. Schegloff, 1996a: 184).  
Analysts, again, are not permitted to stipulate claims concerning the putative 
psychologies of co-interlocutors (howsoever described) when these are not 
demonstrably relevant to some locally unfolding sequences of social action. 
Traditionally in CA research, provided its non-interventionist commitment, this 
practice is associated with stipulating claims concerning the psychologies of co-
interlocutors. In this respect, such a manoeuvre is not merely infelicitous, but, 
theoretically, defeasible. Recourse can be made, in other words, to the opinions of 
participants, post hoc, who can license or falsify such claims. The nature of this 
defeasibility is distorted, however, when analysts also figure as co-present co-
interlocutors. Minimally, for instance, their participation, as such, affords an 
additional party onto which they could, theoretically, impute psychological states, 
intentions and/or motives. What is threatened uniquely, however, is that their joint 
status, as co-interlocutor and analyst, positions them as epistemic authorities over 
these claims (here, see §7.4.1). This entitlement, after all, is one that is endowed by 
their very opportunity to lay claim to continuity in personhood. Thus, provided the 
EM/(M)CA position on underhanded cognitivism, one’s involvement within one’s 
data represents a resource – or a temptation, at least – that analysts could use to  
accredit or demerit assertions by invoking some ostensibly privileged access to the 
interaction. 
 
 
87 This practice is, of course, no less erroneous than that of ascribing un-explicated mental 
states upon co-interlocutors with whom they do not share a transpersonal connection. 
Nonetheless, it does, presumably, alter the rhetorical (i.e. unassailable) status of such claims.  
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A second concern relates to the risk of adulterating the integrity of an interaction 
through the analyst’s presence; a problem related to notions of “observer effects” or 
“demand characteristics” (see Wooffitt, 2007). On this reading, one might contend 
that the interaction would have progressed differently had the research not been 
conducted, and/or the researcher absent – a requirement of Potter’s (2003 in Jackson, 
2011a: 97) “Dead Scientist” test. Whether this would, indeed, be the case, however, 
remains equivocal; a contingency captured by Labov’s (1972: n.p.g. in Clayman and 
Gill, 2004: 591; see also, Maynard, 1984: 20-21) “observer’s paradox”. It is possible, 
however, that providing an overview of the research to one’s participants 
compromises the status of data as “naturally-occurring”. Minimally, the very co-
presence of the researcher, for example, might foreground, and/or inadvertently 
privilege the relevance of other than normative (e.g. “academic”) relevancies (see 
Moerman, 1968b: 165; 1992: 27). Conversely, when conceived maximally, it is 
possible that co-interlocutors (qua “co-participants”) could be understood to align 
with and/or to facilitate the interests of the researcher, and to be understood 
accordingly (i.e. to be “in league”). My research therefore contrasts inquiries on 
“social class” that resist foreshadowing such a focus (see, e.g., Lawler, 1999: 6; M. 
Holt and Griffin, 2005: 252). 
 
Unique dilemmas are therefore occasioned by the study of data in which the analyst 
features. These problematics are not necessarily insurmountable, however. The 
former, for example, concerning privileged access to the interaction, would be 
rendered visible within my analysis, and would thus be available for sanctions. 
Furthermore, good reasons provide for this analysis despite the potential for 
researcher-effects. Conceptually, for instance, as C. Goodwin (1981: 44 in Clayman 
and Gill, 2004: 591) notes, the condition of being observed is generic to social 
interaction; it is not one that is unique to recording conditions. It is therefore 
considered unlikely that the presence of the researcher, or recording equipment, for 
example, would necessarily interfere with, and/or vitiate, the integrity of the 
interaction. Moreover, the inclusion of this data was also supported logistically. 
Specifically, these interactions would have been unavailable for recording in my 
absence; my presence at the occasion was, at once, a condition for their collection. 
The alternative scenario, of withdrawing myself, would have defeated the very 
possibility of recording; equally, not participating, but remaining co-present (qua 
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“bystander”), may have been more artificial than, indeed, participating. Thus, it was 
on conceptual and logistical grounds that I have aligned with previous EM/(M)CA 
research in which my presence within my recordings was not removed, but retained 
(e.g. Wiggins, 2002: 83-84; Jackson, 2011a: 97-104).  
 
3.4.2.3 Summary 
The EJBH corpus comprises 59 face-to-face interactions. Data was collected with 
“intimates” and “non-intimates” and included both video- (n=39) and audio-only 
(n=20) recordings. The total number of different participants in the corpus was 78, 
with several participants recurring throughout. When aggregated with the secondary-
data, the total number of interactions analysed in this research were 959, after 
“cleaning”, 88 amounting to 393 hours, 2 minutes and 35 seconds, comprising both 
face-to-face (n=326) and telephonic (n=633) interactions. This is an 
uncharacteristically large quantity of data for CA research; a method that has been 
bracketed, traditionally, as a species of ‘microsociology’ (e.g. Scheff, 2006: 3005) – 
or ‘ultra-micro-analysis’ (e.g. Mennell, 1975: 300). 89 A further qualification on the 
quantity of data is therefore merited. 
 
3.4.2.4 On quantity 
Research in the CA tradition has typically been chastised for the ‘disinclination […] 
to deal with large amounts of data’ (Schegloff in Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 
12). 90 Increasingly, however, a burgeoning association has developed between 
(M)CA and the analysis of ‘large conversational data corpora’ (Stokoe and 
Attenborough, 2015: 51). This approach has been undertaken both manually (e.g. 
 
88 1093 interactions were analysed before cleaning, with a total duration of 429 hours, 47 
minutes and 8 seconds. 
89 This misunderstanding is one inherited from EM (recall §2.3.2); an enterprise which has 
also been condemned to handle (ostensibly) diminutive, ‘microsociological’ problems (e.g. 
Szacki, 1979: 528). For a range of correctives, consult Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 65), Schegloff 
(1987a: 209; 1988: 100-101), Lynch (1985: 188), Hilbert (1990: 794-802), R. Watson (1992a: 
16-17) and Coulter (1996: 339). 
90 Although, see Schegloff (1967: e.g. 42, 46-47; 1968: e.g. 1079; 1993: 115) and Jefferson 
(1989: 170, 176), for classical exceptions. 
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Ekberg, Shaw, Kessler, Malpass and Barnes, 2016: 312), but also facilitated by 
innovations in computing software (e.g. Rühlemann and O’Donnell, 2012). As 
clarified above (see §3.3.2), this research was conducted manually, and aligns with 
the former tradition. The analysis of such a seemingly significant quantity of data 
(n=959) was not, however, intended, a priori. This approach was obligated, instead, 
owing to the relative dearth of “clear” orientations to “social class” observed within 
my initial dataset (n=186).  
 
This problem is one endemic to (M)CA research, and which owes to the inherent 
“contingency” of naturally-occurring instances of talk-in-interaction (e.g. Schegloff, 
1996b: 21-22). That is, it cannot be known where, how or whether the focal 
phenomenon will be prosecuted by a co-interlocutor in some instance of naturally-
occurring talk-in-interaction (here, see Egbert, 2004: 1482; Stokoe and Edwards, 
2007: 343; Pomerantz and Mandelbaum, 2005: 154 in Stokoe and Attenborough, 
2015: 52). In this research, this problematic pertained to categorial/characterological 
orientations, insofar as the relevance of social identities ‘resist’ anticipation. 91  
However, this problem is also a generic property of talk-in-interaction (see, e.g., 
Schegloff et al., 1977: 363; for review, see fn. 93). Thus, while this bind is not 
exacerbated by the investigation of “social class”, uniquely, it is nevertheless 
underscored acutely thereby. There are, however, at least two solutions that can be 
employed by analysts to increase the probability of encountering candidate cases 
through procedures that comply with the consensual remit of EM/(M)CA research. 92   
 
The first solution is “situational” in circumscription. Analysts can increase the 
probability of encountering the focal phenomenon by relaxing or abdicating, the 
criteria for inclusion and by reverting to circumstances in which the phenomenon 
embodies a normative expectancy, and/or to which they share some affinity. This 
solution can be formulated in more or less constraining ways. It may, for example, 
entail recourse to particular ‘class-specific contexts’ (West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 
31) in which the phenomenon is expectably co-implicated as an ‘item-of-business’, to 
 
91 Coulter’s (e.g. 1976: 508; 1993: 262; see also, Coulter, 1995b: 334) phrase. 
92 For non-EM/(M)CA solutions, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 3-4). 
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borrow the phrase (see Button and Casey, 1988/1989: 64). Alternatively, inquiries 
might be confined to contexts in which orientations possess an ‘occasion-based 
omnirelevance’ (Whitehead, 2009: 330), such in as focus-groups (e.g. Whitehead, 
2007), meetings (e.g. West and Fenstermaker, 2002), interviews (e.g. Stokoe, 2010: 
62-63), or (particular) radio-broadcasts (e.g. Whitehead, 2011; 2013), for example. 
More tenuous still, research might be delimited to contexts in which differently 
situated persons (howsoever described) are conferred the opportunity in which to 
interact, and whereby the relevance of the focal phenomenon (e.g. “social class”) 
represents a probabilistic outcome, thereof (see, e.g., M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 249; M. 
H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010: 180-181).  
 
The second solution, in contrast, is “brute-force” in operation. Researchers can 
increase the probability of encountering the focal phenomenon by increasing the 
quantity of the data analysed originally. This solution, unlike the former, does not 
impose further delimitations upon what constitutes permissible data; nor does it 
circumscribe which ‘environments of relevant occurrence’ (à la Schegloff, 1993: 103, 
italics in original) qualify as eligible for analysis. Rather, to borrow the phrase, the 
solution enables the focal phenomenon to ‘proceed under its own imperatives’ (see 
Schegloff, 1991: 64). In other words, no attempt is made to subdue the effects of 
contextually extraneous and/or confounding variables. Candidate cases are, instead, 
accrued from within the ecological coordinates that are endogenous to the data 
previously analysed.  
 
In this research, it was this second, “brute-force” solution that was adopted. After 
analysing my initial corpus (n=186), additional instances of ordinary talk were 
collected (n=714) and searched for candidate orientations to “social class”. 
Presumably, this solution was the least parsimonious of the two; that is, where 
parsimony is adjudicated relative to the quantity of data analysed. It amounted, in 
effect, ‘to a search for the proverbial needle in the haystack’ (Van Dijk, 1987: 18, 119 
in Stokoe and Attenborough, 2015: 52; see also, Hiller, 1973b: 19). Economy, 
however, was not awarded a premium in this research. Focal, instead, was fidelity to 
my original research objective; namely, the analysis of “social class” in ordinary 
instances of talk-in-interaction. Recourse to a “situational” solution might then have 
optimised this inquiry – that is, for example, requiring the analysis of fewer 
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interactions in order to yield candidate cases. 93 However, this would have been 
potentiated only by depreciating or capitulating the interactional environment in 
which the phenomenon was originally pursued (i.e. “ordinary talk”). This approach 
would, therefore, have violated the coordinates of my inquiry as set forth  
originally – the specifics of which formed part of the initial motivation for this  
research (see §2.5.3). 94  
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the methods of data-collection and data-
analysis employed in this research. An outline has been given to the underlying 
principles of CA and MCA and to the practices by which they were implemented in 
this research. The secondary-dataset (n=900) was then introduced and summarised, 
and an overview has been given of the primary “EJBH” corpus (n=59), and of the two 
conditions in which it was collected. Three issues that are relevant for this research 
have also been introduced. These have concerned generalisability, the inclusion of 
analysts in their data, and regarded the quantity of data analysed in EM/(M)CA 
research. The chapters that follow demonstrate how the approach introduced in this 
chapter has been employed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 Of course, this affordance is promissory only (see fn. 61). For both solutions, there can be 
no guarantee that this probability will translate empirically – let alone proportionally (pari 
passu) – according to the quantity of data analysed. Even where “classed” identities are 
privileged, in some way, as an interactional exigency, their status as “expectable” – or even 
“preferable” – does not impel their occurrence. To borrow the term, other moves, or 
vicissitudes, are, instead, ‘legal’ (here, see Sacks, 1987 [1973]: 56). Concerning the 
“contingent” status of talk-in-interaction, see, e.g., Schegloff (1996b: 21-22), Schegloff et al. 
(1977: 363) and Holmes et al. (2017: 422, fn. 6). 
94 On this contingency (i.e. “factum valet”), see H. Garfinkel (1967: 20-21). 
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Chapter 4 – Membership categories  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Previous EM/(M)CA research has proposed that members’ “classed” identities are 
occasioned, recurrently, through the production of membership categories. Research 
has proceeded by selecting conceptualisations of “social class” (e.g. “wealth”), that 
have been justified along one of three lines of reasoning (see §2.5.2), and by treating 
the derivative instantiations (e.g. “rich”; “poor”), thereof, as invariantly “classed” for 
co-interlocutors. This chapter takes stock of this approach. I argue that this procedure 
has proved invaluable for EM/(M)CA research, rehabilitating “social class” as a 
phenomenon negotiated upon the plane of talk-in-interaction. It is my contention, 
however, that this approach remains limited, empirically, and there remains further 
scope for the “respecification” (here, see H. Garfinkel, 1991) of “social class” as 
a members’ phenomenon. I propose that analysts need not circumscribe the ontology 
of “social class”, ex cathedra 95 – that is, aprioristically and exogenously – but can 
concentrate also on those occasions in which the device is avowedly occasioned,  
in situ. The co-production of linguistically “classed” membership categories (e.g. 
“middle class”), is one resource used to this effect. This chapter introduces the 
empirico-analytic affordances of this approach. It concludes by considering how 
linguistically non-“classed” membership categories (e.g. “rich”) could be 
incorporated alongside this approach, offering an account for how this could be 
accomplished more cautiously. 
 
4.2 Membership categories 
A conventional point of departure for EM/(M)CA research into forms of “social 
identity” involves the analysis of “membership categories”. Defined broadly, this 
refers to ‘classifications or social types that may be used to describe persons and 
nonpersonal objects (see Jayyusi, 1984, p. 212)’ (Hester, 1992: 157). In previous 
research, membership categories have been analysed in relation to a range of 
dimensions of personhood, including “age” (e.g. Nikander, 2001), “ethnicity” (e.g. 
Hansen, 2005), “gender” (e.g. Stokoe and Smithson, 2001), “race” (e.g. Whitehead, 
 
95 Schegloff’s (1998b: 256) term. 
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2009), “sexuality” (e.g. Kitzinger, 2005a; Kitzinger, 2005b) and “social class” (e.g. 
Whitehead, 2013), inter alia. This programme of research has cohered through its 
abiding focus on social action. Membership categories are analysed for the practical 
purposes for which they are invoked on occasions of use (e.g. Edwards, 1991). 
Membership categories have thus been used as a window into the social actions for 
which social identities are occasioned in talk-in-interaction. 
 
As the present inquiry examines “social class” as a dimension of identity, membership 
categories are adopted as the conventional, if not indeed the logical point of departure. 
My initial focus on this resource, however, departs from the prevailing focus of 
EM/(M)CA research. Specifically, I first address an antecedent problematic; namely, 
“What qualifies as a “classed” membership category?”. 96 This problematic underlies 
the traditional focus of EM/(M)CA research. After all, before the social actions for 
which “classed” membership categories are serviced can be reconnoitred, 
meaningfully, what counts as a “classed” membership category must first be 
delimited. As I demonstrate below, this matter of “apprehension”, or 
“recognisability”, is deceptive, and, if neglected, restrictive, even confounding  
(see §4.5). The focus of this chapter is, therefore, principally invested in this 
problematic. In the next section, I explicate the entailments of this issue more  
fully (§4.3). I then revisit how previous EM/(M)CA research has operationalised 
“social class” (§4.4), exploring the consequences of alternative renderings. 
 
4.3 Recognisability  
As introduced in Chapters 2 (§2.2.1) and 3 (§3.2.1), invocations of “context” and 
“social identity” are regulated stringently in EM/(M)CA research. It will be recalled 
that this approach is typified by the criterion of “demonstrable relevance”  
(see Schegloff, 1991; 1992a). According to this tenet, for any characterological 
attribute (e.g. “age”, “race”, “social class”, etc.) to be distinguished as salient and/or 
consequential for interactional conduct, this dimension must be made relevant, 
explicitly, by/for those co-interlocutors who are co-constitutive of that interaction. 
 
96 As Hester (1992: 156) writes in a different context, vis-à-vis “deviance”, this problematic 
is ‘a fundamental interpretive issue’. 
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When satisfied, the focal aspect of identity then qualifies as relevant (howsoever 
delineated), and can be enlisted, warrantably, into the analysis of that spate. 
EM/(M)CA analyses of “gender”, for example, exemplify this approach. Here, co-
interlocutors are not simply to be accorded a “gendered” social identity (e.g. 
“woman”) by virtue of their “correctness” as such (recall fn. 74). Instead, it is 
incumbent upon analysts to demonstrate how this social identity – irrespective of  
its putative (in)correctness – becomes occasioned through the conduct of co-
interlocutors (e.g. Stockill and Kitzinger, 2007). 
 
The problematic with which the EM/(M)CA researcher of membership categories is 
traditionally confronted is, therefore, as follows: To adjudicate whether some 
linguistically provided for categories (e.g. “gendered”; “gender-neutral”) are (co-
)implicated relevantly and consequentially on the occasions in which they are (co-
)produced. This approach is integral to the EM/(M)CA analysis of membership 
categories and has been applied to various aspects of social identity. In the case of 
Stockill and Kitzinger (2007), for example, the category-concept “woman” is 
legislated as a linguistically “gendered” category, a priori. The objective of an 
EM/(M)CA inquiry is then to discriminate whether the (co-)production of such 
“gendered” or “gender-neutral” categories are serviced in a relevantly “gendered” 
faculty, and for what practical purposes (e.g. Kitzinger, 2007; Kitzinger and 
Wilkinson, 2017). With respect to the analysis of “gender”, this procedure has 
appeared unproblematic, culminating in a stable body of cumulative research  
(e.g. Speer and Stokoe, 2011). When translated for “social class”, however, this 
approach appears to be left wanting.  
 
In large part, this problematic centres upon the comparatively uncertain ontological 
constitution of “social class” within the natural language. For “gender”, for example, 
the relationship between the focal phenomenon and its derivative membership 
categories is given over normatively. The categories “woman” and “man”, for 
example, are conventionally associated with the device as co-class members. For 
“social class”, however, a stable set of equivalent categories is not imparted this 
readily. “Social class”, in other words, does not correlate with a fixed index or 
epiphenomenon, a priori. As such, while “gendered” nouns and pronouns, for 
example, occupy durable positions within the English language (e.g. Speer and 
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Stokoe, 2011), there does not appear to be a comparably ingrained “classed”  
syntax or grammar. 97 The initial problematic with which analysts of “classed” 
membership categories are confronted, as a result, is not whether categories are 
relevantly “classed” for co-interlocutors, but indeed which categories qualify as 
consensually denotative thereof, for a cohort. The problems that are co-implicated 
when the EM/(M)CA approach to “gender” is applied to “social class”, therefore, 
crystallise around this disjunction; namely, the socio-cultural stability of the former 
relative to the flexibility of the latter. 98 Thus, the categories that are treated as 
derivative of “social class” are much less stable than, for example, linguistically 
“gendered” membership categories. West and Fenstermaker (1995a: 17, 27), for 
example, amongst others (see, e.g., Gobo, 1995: 456; Skeggs, 2004: 138), provide 
support for this observation.      
 
“Admittedly, the normative conceptions that sustain the accountability of 
persons to class category are somewhat different from those that sustain 
accountability to sex category and race category. For example, despite earlier 
attempts to link pauperism with heredity and thereby justify the forced 
sterilization of poor women in the United States (Rafter 1992), scientists today 
do not conceive of class in relation to the biological characteristics of a person. 
 
97 This is not to say that co-interlocutors do not routinely impute such inferences; an aspect 
long recognised in FA research (e.g. Bernstein, 1964; 1972 in Schegloff, 1999a: 413). For 
examples in my dataset, see Samuel’s orientation to his putatively “classed” grammar in 
Extract 19 and Sarah’s orientation to Ellie’s “open-class repair initiator” (Drew, 1997), 
‘Pardon?’ (l. 30), in Extract 43. Furthermore, for “possibly” (see §4.7) “classed” examples, 
see an orientation to the “posh” hearing of the term “gastroenteritis” in a healthcare 
consultation, in Clift (2016: 103); a complaint-implicative orientation to “doing being”  
(here, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 352; Sacks, 1984b) audibly “posh”, in Atkinson and 
Drew (1979: 60, 185); to a literary readership in Clift (1999: 543); and for orientations to 
“fancy” names in two successive “choral” moments (here, see Schegloff, 1995b: 36-37, 41, 
fn. 4; 2000b: 6, 48, fn. 7; 2002a: 291, fn. 1) in Lerner (2002: 229, 231). 
98 The distinction of these devices can be formalised using Sacks’ (e.g. 1967; 1972: e.g. 33) 
notions of “Pn-adequacy (Type 1)” and “‘which’-type sets” (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 40). Recall 
fn. 26. 
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There is, moreover, no scientific basis for popular notions of what persons in 
particular class categories “look like” or “act like.”” 
(West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 27) 
 
“Social class”, in this sense, is amorphous. To borrow terms that have been used to 
describe vastly different phenomena, it may be conceptualised here as a “floating 
signifier” (Pascale, 2007: 27), to possess an “inner-moving complex” (Blumer, 1967: 
91 in Coulter, 1973a: 41) and a veritable “anisotropic” (Jammer, 1964: 40 in Casey, 
2000 [1987]: 185) quality. In other words, what it is that “social class” refers to 
conceptually, in the abstract, is unclear. In this regard, the device appears to be far 
removed from the identities (e.g. “age”, “gender”, “race”, etc.) with which it is 
routinely adjoined “instantially” within EM/(M)CA research (cf. §2.3.2). Instead, it 
aligns more closely with other consensually indexical devices, such as 
“schizophrenia”, for example; a locus of prior EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Coulter, 
1973a; Land and Kitzinger, 2011: 53-55). 
  
“In effect, then, ascriptions of ‘schizophrenia,’ lacking any uniformly 
interpretable indicators for diagnosis, do not function like ascriptions of 
physical ailments. They are not arrived at in the same kind of way, and they 
do not carry any clear latitudes of symptomatological or therapeutic 
information. For a reader or researcher, being informed that ‘X’ was diagnosed 
as a ‘schizophrenic’ and no more, is to be given far less informational content 
than being told that ‘X’ was diagnosed as suffering from pneumonia. 
Researchers in psychopathology, therefore, if they use the pre-established 
diagnoses of professional clinicians to generate their sample populations, must 
rely upon the tacit knowledge of their scientific readership in extreme measure 
to establish some correspondence between their research descriptions and the 
phenomena researched. […] When replications are attempted, this issue 
becomes critical. As D. Bannister [(1968)] has pointed out in his important 
paper on the logic of research programmes in psychopathology into the 
schizophrenias, […] the term ‘schizophrenia’ has tended to function as an 
omnibus category, an overarching classificatory concept covering such diverse 
features as flatness of affect, syntactic distortion, delirious elation, grandiose 
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yet articulate belief systems and hallucinatory experiences in various 
combinations.” 
(Coulter, 1973a: 5, italics in original) 
 
To be sure, a battery of differences distinguishes the aetiologies of “schizophrenia” 
from ontologies of “social class”. Nevertheless, the latter parallels the former with 
respect to its ambiguous constitution, inasmuch as it is similarly devoid of a 
consensual one-to-one correspondence with some default ontology (here, see also, 
Smith, 1978: 26-27). Thus, “social class” qualifies equally, as such, as another so-
called “omnibus category” (à la Bannister, 1968: n.p.g. [EJBH: e.g. 183] in Coulter, 
1973a: 5, italics in original). 99  
 
“Social class” does not, therefore, necessarily correspond with a clear set of 
membership categories within the natural language. It is this characteristic, I claim, 
that problematises the procedure that has been applied to “gender”, where the 
categories “woman” and “man”, for example, are canonical. It is in the absence of 
such fixed categories that the remit of “social class” emerges as a “live” – or a 
‘standing issue’, to borrow the phrase (here, see Lynch, 1985: 191), for empirical 
research.  
 
This problematic, whether focalised or disattended, is empirically and analytically 
primary. It obtains to all research on “social class” and antedates any investigation  
of the practical purposes for which the device is mobilised in talk-in-interaction;  
the traditional object of EM/(M)CA inquiry. As such an initial problematic, the 
implications of this decision therefore form the focus of this chapter. In the next 
section, I reintroduce how EM/(M)CA research concerning “classed” membership 
categories has proceeded in previous research. In the remainder of this chapter, I  
then propose a novel, more cautious alternative. 
 
 
 
99 For additional examples in which “signifiers” make available (see §7.3.1) multiple 
categorial incumbencies, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 70). 
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4.4 “Classed” membership categories 
As indicated in Chapter 2, “social class” has stymied as an area of empirical 
EM/(M)CA research relative to other aspects of “social identity”, such as “gender”, 
which continue to flourish (see §2.2.2). The reasons for this dearth of research, to 
reiterate, remains equivocal (see §2.3.1). This research has not been foreclosed 
entirely, however. On the contrary, this programme of research presently enjoys a 
veritable “second wind”, where “propaedeutic commentaries” (see §2.3.4) on the 
subject are progressively superseded by substantive EM/(M)CA inquiries (recall 
§2.4). 
 
The foremost object of inquiry in this emergent field are the practical purposes for 
which “social class” is mobilised in interaction. The ontological coordinates of the 
device, in contrast, have not formed the locus of empirical research. Instead, this 
problem has been relegated as a subsidiary concern; one that is typically determined 
by analysts, ex cathedra, in preliminary conceptual expositions, and/or intercalated, 
en passant, only. As outlined in Chapter 2 (§2.5), this procedure follows a recurring 
pattern in EM/(M)CA research. This can be abbreviated as follows:  
 
“Social class” is endowed, by analysts, with a first-order, observable referent 
(e.g. “wealth”). The nominated epiphenomenon (howsoever circumscribed) 
then obviates the problem of “relevance” by stipulating how enactments of 
and/or orientations to “social class” (howsoever defined) are to be derived 
empirically. 
 
In this vein, the relevance of “social class” is determined upon the discretionary 
judgement of analysts by way of “fiat”. 100 It is adjudicated according to whether  
the conduct of co-interlocutors corresponds with the theorisation of “social class” 
prioritised by analysts, explicitly or inexplicitly, on some occasion. This 
understanding of the concept is subsequently advanced irrespective of whether this 
self-same conceptualisation is demonstrably upheld by those co-interlocutors for 
 
100 Cicourel’s (1964: e.g. 226, fn. 6) term.  
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whom this device is proposedly operative. 101 This procedure is hegemonic in 
EM/(M)CA research and represents a version of the “positivist” solution outlined  
in Chapter 2 (i.e. §2.2.1; see fn. 25 and fn. 74). Previously, this approach has been 
predicated on three lines of reasoning. 
 
(1) Received definition(s) of “social class” (e.g. Moerman, 1996 [1988]; 
Evaldsson, 2005; M. H. Goodwin, 2006; Pascale, 2007; 2008a; Scharff, 2008); 
(2) Socio-cultural context(s) (e.g. West and Fenstermarker, 2002; Whitehead, 
2013); 
(3) Tacit knowledge (e.g. Robles, 2016). 
 
By way of these manoeuvres, prior EM/(M)CA research has accrued an array of 
putatively “classed” indicators. For the purposes of illustration, Table 5 presents an 
indicative, non-exhaustive list of the categories gleaned from my dataset by using 
these approaches.  
 
Table 5 – Linguistically non-“classed” categories 
Extract 
01: 
CTS08 
“Chav”  
(l. 92). 
Extract  
02:  
CABNC 
[KC7_2] 
“the rich”  
(l. 91); 
“the poor”  
(l. 93). 
Extract 
03: 
CTS29 
“Scally”  
(l. 505). 
Extract 
04: 
UCDiscLab 
[Ccon1b] 
“Bourgeois 
people” 
(l. 43). 
Extract 05: 
UCDisc 
Lab 
[Wcon1] 
“Lower 
socioeconomic 
group.” 
(l. 40). 
Extract 
06: EJBH 
_F4_32 
“toff.” 
(l. 14); 
“common” 
(l. 58); 
“posh” 
(l. 67). 
Extract  
07:  
CABNC 
[KBB_35] 
“Highbrow” 
(ls. 31 
and 35). 
Extract 08: 
CallHome-
eng-5866 
“Whitetrash¿”  
(l. 420). 
Extract 
09: Call 
Home-
eng-4092 
“Blue collar 
man.” 
(l. 118). 
 
 
101 On ‘operative identities’, see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 327, italics in original). 
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These categories are produced in a diverse array of contexts, both interactional and 
sequential. They are homologous, however, insofar as their recognisability, qua 
“classed” categories are contingent upon, and vindicated through, various lines of 
mediatory reasoning. In other words, the categories qualify as “classed” only when 
particular theorisations of the concept are deployed. They are describable as 
linguistically non-“classed”, 102 in this respect, inasmuch as they do not “self-
explicate” 103 their “classed” hearability through their linguistic form. Conversely, 
membership categories and descriptions which include such components will be 
described, hereinafter, as linguistically “classed” forms (e.g. “middle class”).  
 
In summary, prior EM/(M)CA research has adjudicated what “social class” is to  
be on the behalf of co-interlocutors on/for some occasions, invoking explanatory  
lines of reasoning to derive non-“classed” indices thereof. As acknowledged in 
Chapter 2 (§2.5.2), this approach presents an array of analytic affordances, with  
which I sympathise. The central objective of this chapter, however, concerns how  
this approach can be recalibrated to appreciate how “social class” is employed as  
an ordinary-language phenomenon. This will be advanced by focusing on what I  
have characterised as linguistically “classed” categories; occasions in which co-
interlocutors use terms which attest to their linguistically “classed” relevance. Two 
benefits will be underscored through this approach. First, I show that there are 
occasions in which aprioristically derived characterisations of “social class” (e.g. 
“wealth”) are defeated by co-interlocutors, in situ. Secondly, I propose that by 
analysing occasions in which co-interlocutors make this work explicit also makes 
 
102 This term is borrowed from Stockill and Kitzinger (2007), regarding “linguistically 
gendered” and “linguistically non-gendered” categories. My use of the former (i.e. 
linguistically “classed”), however, is confined only to instances in which “class” is 
incorporated avowedly (e.g. “middle class”). It does not encapsulate resonant categories 
which do not include the term (cf. §4.3). The latter are reserved for the designation 
linguistically (non-)“classed”. 
103 That is, in which the sense of an object is made available reflexively within, and 
conterminously to, its situated (co-)production. Term derived from Pollner (1979 in Lynch, 
1985: 289, fn. 2, my emphasis). See also, e.g., H. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970: 350), Heritage 
and R. Watson (1979: e.g. 128), R. Watson (1992a: e.g. 7) and Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: e.g. 83). 
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available an array of empirical and conceptual insights; insights hitherto unanticipated 
in preceding EM/(M)CA research. 
 
4.5 Ambiguity and defeasibility 
As illustrated in Table 5, defining “social class” can glean an array of putatively 
“classed” membership categories. Using the example of “wealth”, for instance, the 
membership categories “rich” and “poor”, might be derived accordingly, inter alia. 
What has been comparably neglected, however, are the limitations which inhere to 
this approach. Fundamentally, these are twofold. These crystallise around both the 
“ambiguity” of these categories as “classed”, for co-interlocutors, and their 
“defeasibility” as such. These problematics can be formulated as follows:  
 
(1) Ambiguity. Whether the membership categories (e.g. “rich”, “poor”) are 
employed by co-interlocutors in a relevantly “classed” faculty remains 
equivocal. It is unclear whether some other proximate/alternate 
(epi)phenomenon is, instead, superordinate (e.g. “wealth”). 104  
(2) Defeasibility. Whether the membership categories (e.g. “rich”, “poor”) are 
employed by co-interlocutors in a relevantly “classed” faculty remains 
defeasible. This approach is vulnerable to occasions in which the “classed” 
relevance of the selected membership categories is expressly defeated or 
otherwise (re-)specified by co-interlocutors.  
 
The contingencies of the former have been explored above. Again, these have been 
resolved, conventionally, by way of analytic diktat: They are retained as “classed”  
by virtue of how analysts have construed the concept on particular occasions of use. 
Instances of the latter, however, have yet to be considered. On these occasions, a 
membership category is (co-)produced which could be endowed with a “classed” 
valence (howsoever characterised). Amidst the interaction, however, the focal 
 
104 Multiple senses of “ambiguity” have been discussed with respect to membership 
categorisations. To clarify, the sense of “ambiguity”, discussed here, is not one that is 
furnished sequentially (cf. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 671); it cannot be resolved using the 
“consistency rule” (cf. Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 220; 1992, Vol. I: 239), nor by ascribing 
“category-bound activities” (cf. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 584-585). 
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category is explicitly inoculated against such a “classed” interpretation by co-
interlocutors. It is designated as a category that is not relevantly analysable as 
“classed” in this moment. The salience of “social class” that is arrogated, ex cathedra, 
is thus subsequently contradicted, in situ. This contingency can be illustrated with 
respect to the ontology of “wealth”; one that has been equated with “social class” in 
previous EM/(M)CA research through various prisms (recall §2.5.2). Extract 10, 
below, presents an example of such defeasance in action. 105 In this instance, the 
“classed” relevance of the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘[The poorer 
people,]’ (l. 108), is explicitly rejected by its progenitor, Joseph (ls. 104-105 and 108).   
 
Extract 10: CABNC [KB1_6] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Joseph has complained about mortgage 
payments to Peggy and Maria.))
Jos:   In thuh- (.) in ↓thee:. Especially in thee (.)  48 
      whats↑ (.) name ↓count*ries.* 49 
      (.) 50 
(?):   (°.hhhhh°)= 51 
Chi:   =((Mumbles))= 52 
Peg:   =(   ) [(↑   )] 53 
Jos:      [Communist] countries¿ 54 
     (0.6) 55 
Jos:   ↑Everything's owned by the °↓g::: b°:y  56 
    d’Govern*↓ment*’an uh (.) I know it's not a right  57 
  good ↑thing like ↓but .hhh if it could Work (0.2)  58 
     ↑properly it would be a damn good ↑thi[ng¿] 59 
Mar:                                         [W  ]atch  60 
    she don't ↑bite yer. 61 
  (2.0) 62 
Jos:   I mean communism [in Eng°land.°] 63 
 
105 References to line numbers are abbreviated as “l. X”, following Jefferson (1978a: 246, fn. 
6). The focal phenomenon illustrated is emboldened and indicated with the symbol “→”. On 
occasions in which multiple iterations of the same phenomenon occurs, instances are 
numbered (e.g. “1→”), following Schegloff (1987b: 105). On occasions in which a 
phenomenon is composed of multiple components, a second arrow is used (i.e. Þ). 
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Chi:                    [((Mumbles.)) ] ((Mumbles. /  64 
    0.5)) 65 
  [((Mumbles.))  66 
Jos:   [In it's- 67 
   (0.9) 68 
Jos:   In ↑it- (0.3) proper (.)↑form, (.hhhh / 0.6)  69 
     °would be the ↑wonderful ↓thing.°  70 
     (0.5) 71 
Jos:   *.Hhh*hh (0.5) ↓But (0.3) t’er. (0.2) it's ↑on    72 
       (.) because (0.3) ↓t’er (1.8) It's ↑only the rich 73 
    people what make people (0.5) poor.=hhh.  74 
  (0.5) 75 
Peg:   °↑I know.° 76 
    (2.9)  77 
Jos:   The same as the (0.2) damned edu↑cation *↓like* 78 
  (.) the bloody ↑Tory: ↓sods. 79 
     (0.3) 80 
Jos:   .hhh (0.2) Jus’ took all blin[↑kin’:¿ 81 
Chi:                                [(  ) (0.3) 82 
     (     ) 83 
   (0.3) 84 
Jos:   [For a-] (.) ↑for (.) ↑all these= 85 
Chi:   [(    )]        86 
Jos:   =[pe     ]ople what's [going to] col[le]ge.=  87 
Peg:   =[(HARRY)]            [↑She’s  ]    [up] 88 
Peg:   =upstairs in bath*r[oom.*] 89 
Jos:                      [Ev   ]ery time they(’d) (.)  90 
    drop on holiday they’ve [got nothing to ↑keep]=  91 
Chi:                           [(                  )] 92 
Jos:   =‘em. 93 
   (0.3) 94 
Chi:   ↑(Mu:[:m,)] 95 
(?):        [°Sh ]e’s as↑l[ee::p¿°] 96 
Jos:                      [So     ] in my  97 
    o (.) ↑pinio[n what this government's doing is] 98 
Chi:               [↑(                             ).] 99 
Jos:   stopping °de-°  100 
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      (0.4) 101 
Chi:   (Peà,) (0.2) °(Peà).° 102 
   (0.2) 103 
Jos:   Stopping the lower ↑cla-=well I say lower classes 104 
    °(b-)° (0.6) the ↑l- °*↓uh*° the- 105 
  (0.8)  106 
Mar:    °Ca[re ( ) >isn’t there ↑now:.)<°] 107 
Jos:→      [The poorer people,           ] 108 
   (0.3) 109 
(J):   °.hhhh° 110 
   (0.4) 111 
Jos:   They stop 'em getting ↑educated.=That >I'm I'm<    112 
     (0.3) al[most ] [↓con]= 113 
Peg:           [°Yeah] [::.°] 114 
Chi:                   [(  )]= 115 
Jos:   =[↑vinced¿] 116 
Chi:   =[(      )] (    .) 117 
   (0.3)  118 
Jos:   [Becau °se-°] 119 
Peg:   [°It ↑seem  ] >everything they're ↑doing it   120 
      seems- seems to is going back to the eighteenth  121 
    century when you hear about these Ca-°< Catherine  122 
  ↑Cookson days an’ (0.2)  123 
(?):   (That[‘s ↑it.) ] 124 
Peg:        [You can’t] be educa↑ted an’ (0.2) cuttin’  125 
    back en’. 126 
   (0.4) 127 
Jos:   They're cutting [back on] [edu↑ca  ] [t↓ion.]  128 
Mar:                   [Oh.    ] [Don’t go] [tell  ]ing  129 
    me [(where I am).] 130 
Jos:      [They're ma   ]king it so only the rich can be 131 
     ↑educated.= 132 
Peg:   =↑Yeah. 133 
  (.) 134 
Peg:   [Trying to turn it back into (↑     )]=   135 
(?):   [(                                      )]= 136 
Peg:   =[again.   ] 137 
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Joseph’s complaint concerns the administration of mortgage payments. Over the 
course of this sequence, Joseph asserts that ‘It’s ↑only the rich people what make 
people (0.5) poor.=hhh.’ (ls. 73-74). A parallel to this set of circumstances is then 
drawn on concerning the educational policy of the then Conservative government. 
Joseph asserts that the government is preventing what is adumbrated as the ‘lower 
classes’ (l. 104) from receiving education (ls. 97-98, 100, 104-105, 108, 112-113 and 
116). As this linguistically “classed” membership category is produced, however, 
Joseph initiates “self-repair” (see Schegloff et al., 1977: 364; see also, Lerner, 2013: 
108). After resurrecting the repairable, and then initiating a re-repeat, thereof, 106 
Joseph replaces this category with a linguistically non-“classed” alternative; namely, 
‘[The poorer people,]’ (l. 108; see →). 107 By way of this “post-positioned” (see 
Schegloff, 1979b: 272) repair, Joseph marks that the partially produced category, ‘the 
lower ↑cla-’ (l. 104), a linguistically “classed” category, is not treated as synonymous 
with the locally ascendant linguistically non-“classed” category (see Jackson and 
Jones, 2013). Thus, while Joseph orients to the relevance of “social class” 
momentarily (i.e. ls. 104-105), he explicitly annuls this analysis by topicalising the 
projected troublesource over a ‘postscript’ (see Lerner, 1992: 267) or ‘postmortem’ 
(see Schegloff, 2007a: 146) to the repair, and by replacing it with a category that does 
not proclaim the relevance of “social class” through its linguistic form. Extract 10 
therefore presents an instance in which the relevance of “social class” is explicitly 
repealed – or “suppressed”; 108 and, specifically, disconnected with a category that is 
normatively indicative of “wealth”. 
 
To summarise, this section has focussed on the ambiguity and defeasibility of 
linguistically non-“classed” membership categories. I have shown that the prevailing, 
prescriptive approach to the EM/(M)CA analysis of “social class” is susceptible to 
 
106 On the former, see Schegloff et al. (1977: 376) and Schegloff (1993: 121-122, fn. 11; 
1997c: 36). On the latter, see Jefferson (1996: 12-13), Glenn (1995: 53-54) and Hopper (1995: 
58). 
107 On the “replacement” operation of self-initiated self-repair, see Jefferson (1972a: 28-35) 
and Schegloff (2013: 43-45). With respect to its use on membership categories, see Stokoe 
(2011). 
108 Schegloff’s (2003a) term. 
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falsification (see fn. 10) by co-interlocutors, in situ, and can be thrown into sharp 
relief. Through a single-case analysis, I have shown that the putative “classed” 
relevance of such categories can be dispelled and overruled by co-interlocutors and 
that the relevance of this device is not corroborated, but unravelled, where the 
constitutive features thereof are re-particularised to a designedly alternative 
characterological domain. The prevailing procedure adopted in EM/(M)CA research 
on “social class” thus appears to be left wanting, leaving latitude for occasions in 
which the definitions that have been emplaced by analysts are explicitly unendorsed 
or are even respecified by co-interlocutors, in situ. Howsoever attractive, intuitive 
and/or totalising definitions of “social class” might appear, therefore, aprioristic 
definitions remain “fragile”, 109 and, fundamentally, defeasible – liable to forms of 
local falsification. 
  
4.6 A respecification 
The prevailing EM/(M)CA approach to “social class”, I propose, is susceptible to this 
contingency. Various solutions are available, however, to surmount this problematic 
(see Anderson and W. Sharrock, 1982). One resource introduced in Chapter 1 (§1.6.2; 
see fn. 18), for example, involves additional transformations by analysts. Variations 
of this approach ramify. Distilled, however, this involves (re-)conceptualising the 
instances in which the membership categories that are included in Extracts 01-09 are 
produced as “classed” irrespective of the orientations of co-interlocutors. These 
procedures include, for instance, reflexively (re-)construing co-interlocutors’ “dis-
identifications” with “social classes” as (re-)affirmations, thereof (e.g. Skeggs, 1997b: 
Ch. 5). 110 Alternatively, in cases in which such categories are explicitly denied, this 
might involve problematising the terms of falsification, for example, whereby the 
logic that proposedly underlies co-interlocutors’ reasoning is “faulted”, 111 in some 
way.  
 
 
109 Sacks’ (1992, Vol. II: e.g. 311) term. 
110 On ‘knowledge protected against induction’, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 336, italics in 
original; see also, ibid.: 180) and Schegloff (1992b: xli; 2007b: 469-470). 
111 Wootton’s (1975: 79, my emphasis) term.  
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These two approaches differ procedurally, but their outcomes approximate: 
Membership categories qualify as “classed”, for co-interlocutors, but only ‘behind 
their backs’ (à la Heritage, 1984a: 30), as it were. Such solutions do not, therefore, 
cohere with the epistemic commitments of EM/(M)CA; an approach that rejects 
recourse to ironic correctives and/or distanciations (see R. Watson, 1992a). My 
objective in this chapter is, thus, to canvass a novel solution that satisfies these 
requirements. Specifically, I propose that primacy is awarded to linguistically 
“classed” conduct; occasions in which the relevance of this device is avowedly 
proclaimed or disclaimed. These enactments, I argue, affords access to how “social 
class” is theorised in talk-in-interaction, and the procedures that are employed to 
regulate this interpretive/constructivist/hermeneutic work, in situ. Thus, it is such 
perspicuous occasions within the natural language that I seek to exploit, displacing  
the onus of this “ontological work” (recall fn. 56) from analysts to co-interlocutors.   
 
The principal focus of the remainder of this chapter thus concerns membership 
categories which declare their “classed” interpretability through the details of their 
categorial form/linguistic design; that is, linguistically “classed” categories (see fn. 
102). One such category admitted through this approach is presented in Extract 11.  
 
Extract 11: CABNC [KBM_11] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Mike and Ellen have previously 
discussed the results of their local by-election.)) 
Ell:   ((Yawning.)) 4 
   (28.0) 5 
Mik:   Come on mum. °↑Talk to me.°  6 
   (2.2) 7 
Ell:   ↑No::.=I don't talk to Conservatives. 8 
   (0.7) 9 
Mik:   °↑Don't you.°  10 
   (1.2) 11 
Ell:   [°↑(No).°] 12 
Mik:   [So      ]rry I forgot you’re so (0.2)  13 
     common.=°↑Oh I don’t talk (  ).°  14 
    (0.3) 15 
Ell:   Yes. 16 
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    (0.3) 17 
Ell:   There we ↑are then. 18 
   (0.2)  19 
Mik:   (You sure are ↓l:ow.) 20 
   (1.0)  21 
Ell:   ↑Yes. 22 
   (0.3) 23 
Mik: → You’re jus’ (.) lower class.   24 
   (5.2)    25 
Ell:   ↑Mm¿ 26 
   (0.6) 27 
Mik:   <*Low:er::.*>= 28 
Ell:   =↑Little- (0.3) capitalis:t. 29 
   (0.6)  30 
Mik:   °What’s wrong with that,° 31 
 
The focal category here is ‘lower class.’ (l. 24). This is produced by Mike, after two 
preceding categorisations (ls. 13-14 and 20) which proposedly accounting for why 
Ellen has refused to speak with him (ls. 8, 12 and 16). Holding such practical purposes 
and other categorial implications in abeyance, what is central for current purpose, is 
that the membership category mobilised by Mike is one that self-explicates its 
“classed” relevance overtly. This is accomplished by inclusion of the term “class” 
within the membership category of the ‘lower class.’ (l. 24). It is this type of 
membership category with which I am concerned, initially. Other membership 
categories which similarly satisfy this criterion are presented across Extracts 12-14 
(see →). 
 
Extract 12: CallHome-eng-4705 
((A telephone call. Alice and Karen are discussing Alice’s meeting with the 
mutually-known non-present party, Alannah.))
Ali:   .hhh But ↑let me just tell you a little bit  22 
     about <↑Alan*nah.*> 23 
 
  ((Twenty-nine lines omitted.)) 
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Ali:   An:::d ah:::. (0.7) She invited us (0.2) over 53 
     to her ↑home. 54 
    (0.5) 55 
Ali: → And it’s a <ver:y nice> (0.4) you know (0.5)  56 
     she‘s (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class:.  57 
    (0.3) 58 
Kar:   .h= 59 
Ali:   =You kno[w.] 60 
Kar:           [M ]:hm.  61 
    (.) 62 
Ali:   And so her- she has a lovely ↓home an’ (0.3)  63 
  she has a swimming pool a[n’]  64 
Kar:                            [↑H]::m:. 65 
 
Extract 13: EJBH_F1_02 
((A face-to-face interaction. Ben, Charlie and Adam have been discussing their 
family homes. A classed “formulation” from Ben [omitted from transcript] 
gives way to a flurry of “classed” identifications.)) 
Ben:               [We’re ↑sort of- ] (.) We’re 282 
  [sort  of   cat]egorising ourselves right= 283 
Cha:   [No: I haven’t-] 284 
Ben:   =↓here.   285 
  (0.3) 286 
Ben: → Middle class, (.) ↓middle class. (.) ↑middle  287 
     class, °*like-*°= 288 
Ada:   =↑Wh:↑ite, (.) [middle *↓class.*       ]289 
 
Extract 14: CABNC [KBF_46] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Helen is moving home. Victoria’s 
suggestion of renting touches-off a storytelling.))
Hel:   °That's right.° (.hhhh) But (.) I- (.) ↑I don't  39 
  know whether Paul has- I mean (0.2) you see (1.5)  40 
  my friend Julia ((Surname removed from  41 
  recording.)) whose husband Bi:ll (0.8) is an  42 
  airline *↓pilot* (2.0) ↑sh:e (.) knows quite a  43 
  bit about ↓this ↑because (1.3) Bill was (0.5) an  44 
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  illegitimate *child.* (0.9) in Borough in North  45 
  Town. 46 
  (0.2)  47 
Vic:   °Hm.° 48 
   (0.3) 49 
Hel:   His ↑mother was an office *cleaner.* (1.4)  50 
  and. (0.5) she con↑ceived Bill (.) by a    51 
  married *man.* 52 
   (1.2) 53 
Hel: → Erm. (0.2) °a° poor (0.3) working *class  54 
    man.* 55 
   (0.6)  56 
Hel:   No question of a divorce and *marriage* she  57 
  just had to get on with it.58 
These categories are invoked in a diverse range of sequences for a wide array of 
practical purposes. This includes categories produced independently (i.e. Extract 12), 
listed (i.e. Extract 13) 112 and those aggregated as a ‘conjoined’ (see Whitehead and 
Lerner, 2009: 638, fn. 23), ‘hybrid’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 55) or ‘composite 
membership category’ (see Lerner, Bolden, Hepburn, Mandelbaum, 2012: 198, italics 
in original; i.e. Extract 14). These productional variances notwithstanding, these 
membership categories are similar insofar as they each qualify as self-avowedly 
“classed”, containing the term within their linguistic form. The analysis of these 
categories, I propose, presents a number of affordances for EM/(M)CA research. I 
have shown above, for example, that it provides access to occasions in which co-
interlocutors arbitrate this relevance, for themselves, and where it is not 
predetermined, ex cathedra. In the remainder of this chapter, I propose that two 
 
112 The nature of different listings is specified in §4.6.2 and §6.5.1. Note that “social 
class” is not the only device actuated through this practice. Such listings instead 
represent a resource for ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw, 1989: e.g. 140, my emphasis; 
here, see §2.4.2.2; §7.3) and ‘cross-membership[s]’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 590, my 
emphasis). As my focus concerns “social class”, in isolation, however, my analysis 
attends to the “classed” components, primarily. For a related qualification, see 
Whitehead (2013: 62, fn. 4). 
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additional affordances are enabled through this approach. Specifically, these relate  
to ontology and intersubjectivity. The two subsections that follow canvass these 
prospective insights. I then conclude the chapter by returning to linguistically  
non-“classed” categories and proposing a strategy for their disciplined integration. 
 
4.6.1 Ontology 
The capacity in which linguistically “classed” categories (e.g. “middle class”) have 
been introduced, above, is one of analytic defeasance: I have proposed that when 
analysts invoke a definition of “social class”, ex cathedra, linguistically “classed” 
categories may be consulted so as to appreciate the relevancies that are awarded 
primacy by co-interlocutors, in situ. As typified by Extract 10, and the proposedly 
epiphenomenal interrelationship between “wealth” and “social class”, these 
theorisations can compete with and even violate the parameters that are selectively 
enshrined by analysts. This affordance, however, is neither merely nor primarily 
available to analysts. Instead, in the first instance, it obtains, sequentially, as a 
members’ ontological resource. The following section illustrates this capacity. I 
demonstrate that the progenitors of linguistically “classed” categories accommodate 
ontologies of “social class” at three sequential-temporal positions: 
 
(1) Prospectively. In turns-at-talk that precede the focal category. 
(2) Concurrently. In the turn-at-talk in which the category is produced.  
(3) Retroactively. In turns-at-talk that follow the focal category. 
 
In each instance, a linguistically “classed” category is (co-)produced (see →). By 
virtue of its sequential placement, it can be seen to encode a locally constructed 
ontology of “social class” (see Þ). This accommodation will be shown to assume 
various forms. In the majority of cases, these categories are mobilised synonymously; 
they are positioned as an alternative reference to the same population differently 
described. Alternatively, the ontology can be further specified. For instance, they can 
denote the designedly constitutive/criterial feature of a categorisation, or function to 
distinguish it as a “category-bound” (see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 222) or “-tied” (see 
Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 37) component thereof. As a result, I propose that linguistically 
“classed” membership categories represent an omni-available resource to co-
interlocutors, the use of which can encapsulate an array of “classed” ontologies. 
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Notably, this can include potentially unexpected theorisations of “social class” for 
which there may not exist dedicated category-concepts in the natural language to 
envelop and simultaneously endow these ontologies with an accountably “classed” 
relevance. The use of linguistically “classed” categories in this way affords a flexible 
ontological resource.  
 
4.6.1.1 Prospective 
The turns-at-talk which precede the production of linguistically “classed” categories 
furnish a routine locus for ontological work. This may occur within the turn-
constructional unit (hereafter, TCU; see Sacks et al., 1974) that precedes the 
production of the linguistically “classed” category or can be explicated over several 
anterior turns-at-talk. Extracts 15-17 illustrate this pattern. 
 
Extract 15: SWB2446 
((A telephone-call. Sandra and Richard have discussed American foreign 
policy. Richard has recalled his experience in South America.))    
Ric:   .hh Well you were in (.) ↑Chile¿ 99 
   (0.4) 100 
San:   .HH (0.2) Yeah I was in ↑Chile::. 101 
   (0.9) 102 
San:   ↑But, uh:::m:. (0.7) I- there weren’t, (0.2)  103 
     as I ↑recall::, (0.4) ↑are (.) uh- (.) least    104 
     I wasn’t ↑aware::.=.hh (0.3) of that many   105 
     Americans there ↑except (0.2) for*::* (.) a  106 
     very heavy concentration of (.) ((Company name.))  107 
     volunt*eers.=[This was*] >on the-< (0.2)= 108 
Ric:       [Uhhuh.   ] 109 
San:   =((Company name.)) first ↑Started, (.) [and it= 110 
Ric:                                          [Uhhuh.=    111 
San:   =wa]s=.hhhh (0.2) one of the ↑targets. 112 
Ric:   =  ] 113 
   (1.0) 114 
San:   ↑An::d uhm. (0.6) I don’t- (0.2) I don’t  115 
     think hh. at that time at leas’ ((Company name.)) 116 
     *was::* (1.0) *uh::m. .hhh (0.7) an obnoxious  117 
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     group in the sense tha- ((Voice creaks.)) that  118 
     we were very controlled:: re↑garding, .hhh  119 
     hu’eh- ↑number of days ↓OFF:: an’ .hhh  120 
     [an’ you could]n’t just hh. (0.3) ↑take up=  121 
Ric:   [↓Oh.         ] 122 
San:   =(0.3) uh- take off and lea::ve (.) your  123 
     ↑group an’ go explore *an’* an’ things like  124 
     that. 125 
Ric:   °↑Uh huh.°= 126 
San:   =.hhh (0.4) ↑[But      ] (.) an- I was=  127 
Ric:       [(°Sure.°)] 128 
San: Þ =working actually in the house and ↓home 129 
  programme h. So. (.) that was quite  130 
     ↑specialised.=Although I was living in the  131 
    → ↑slums:: I was (0.2) really working with the 132 
     ↑middle ↓class:. 133 
   (0.3) 134 
Ric:   Uhuh. 135 
 
The linguistically “classed” category in focus is ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ (ls. 132-133) 
produced by Sandra. The focal sequence begins as Sandra adheres to Richard’s 
“itemised news enquiry” (l. 99; see Button and Casey, 1985: e.g. 6), concerning her 
time in Chile. In this telling, Sandra disconfirms the expectation that she came into 
contact with many Americans, recalling only the high density that accompanied her 
as part of her company (ls. 103-108). Continuing, Sandra enacts a move that is 
comparable to “defensive detailing” (see Jefferson, 1985a: e.g. 444): She reports that 
the company embodies different connotations today than it did when she was a 
member; specifically, the connotations of “not-working/skiving/truancy” are 
positioned as new acquisitions, and which did not obtain during her tenure (see ls. 
115-121 and 123-125). Here, Sandra then transitions (i.e. ‘an-’ [l. 127]; ‘actually’ [l. 
129]; see C. Goodwin, 1979: 111; Clift, 2001) into a topically-related telling 
concerning her role within the organisation. This is the backdrop against which the 
linguistically “classed” membership category, ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ (ls. 132-133), is 
produced.  
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Like Extracts 11-14, this linguistically “classed” category verbalises its “classed” 
hearability at its point of production through the inclusion of the term ‘↓class:.’ (l. 
133). Sandra, however, does not self-explicate how concept and device is relevantly 
understood on this occasion – nor how it is delimited by this particular (i.e. ‘↑middle’ 
[l. 133]) gradation. In this case, how “social class” is understood appears to be 
furnished, instead, through Sandra’s preceding turns-at-talk. Firstly, this includes a 
designedly derivative assessment, ‘So. (.) that was quite ↑specialised.’ (ls. 130-131). 
113 This upshot specifies the nature of the work in which Sandra was involved. 
Accordingly, by explicitly categorising that same population as ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ 
(ls. 132-133), Sandra makes available “the-specialised-nature-of-working-in-the-
House-and-Home-programme” 114 as grounds by reference to which the category can 
be understood. The second feature, in contrast, invokes a disjunctive state of affairs. 
This is one with which incumbency in the linguistically “classed” membership 
category is expressly (i.e. ‘Although’ [l. 131]) contrasted: ‘=Although I was living in 
the ↑slums:: I was (0.2) really working with the ↑middle ↓class:.’ (ls. 131-133). This 
component, as an ‘asymmetrical contrastive pair’ (Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 616), 
demarcates what is explicitly not encapsulated within the category of ‘the ↑middle 
↓class:.’ (ls. 132-133); in this case, again, ‘living in the ↑slums::’ (ls. 131-132). 115  
 
Thus, it is Sandra’s upshot (ls. 130-131), in addition to her contrast (ls. 131-132), 
which indicate how her avowedly “classed” membership category can be understood 
on this occasion. Again, this pertains to the “specialised-nature-of-working-in-the-
House-and-Home-Programme”, and “not-living-in-the-slums”; a unique ontology of 
“social class”. These two features are instantiated over her preceding turns-at-talk and 
are positioned by Sandra such that they are accommodated by her linguistically 
“classed” membership category. Some indication is therefore provided of the 
operative ontology that underlies this category prior to its production. However, the 
status of these features remains equivocal. For example, they are neither positioned 
explicitly as a/the “constitutive” component(s) of the category (see Jayyusi, 2014 
 
113 On “So”, as upshot adumbrative, see, e.g., G. Raymond (2004: 186-189). 
114 This has been anonymised. 
115 For the inverse, retrospective operation of this practice, see §5.5.3.2. 
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[1984]: 25-26), nor as explicitly “bound” (e.g. Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 221-224) to or 
“generated” thereby (see R. Turner, 1970: n.p.g. [EJBH: 184] in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 
37). They are simply employed, instead, to describe the same population to which 
Sandra has previously referred. They are treated as practically synonymous, to this 
effect. 116 
 
Two comparable cases in which co-interlocutors encapsulate ontologies through the 
talk that precedes the (co-)production of linguistically “classed” categories are 
presented in Extracts 16 and 17. 
 
Extract 16: UCDiscLab [Bar] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Hugh has topicalised Roger’s hitherto 
unsuccessful efforts at starting a relationship with Maggie, a non-present 
party.)) 
Jac:   Maggie knows she’s missing out on a good thing. 113 
   (0.2) 114 
Hug:   What. 115 
   (0.3) 116 
Jac:   Maggie ↑Knows she’s missing out on a  117 
     [°good (thing°).  ] 118 
Hug:   [I think Maggie ju]st ↓Uh:: (1.5) is in  119 
     transition. ((Staccato delivery.)) 120 
   (0.7) 121 
Jac:   Yeah. 122 
   (0.4) 123 
Hug:   >She doesn’t know what’s going on< °I don’t  124 
     think.° 125 
   (1.0) 126 
Hug: Þ Because she never (di) ↑really have a job::. 127 
   (1.0) 128 
Hug: → She’s upper middle ↑Cla:ss. 129 
   (0.4) 130 
 
116 On “synonymy”, see, e.g., Jefferson et al. (1977: 37-38) and Clift (2003). Regarding 
linguistically non-“classed” categories, see Whitehead (2013: 53-54). 
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Hug:   And she’s trying to snag a guy that’s really way    131 
     up there.  132 
   (0.2) 133 
Jac:   Yeah. 134 
   (0.8) 135 
Hug:   An’ (.) all power to her.=but at the same time is  136 
     there’s (  ) you gotta go for a (0.2)   137 
     (  ) (packer) right¿ 138 
   (1.1) 139 
Jac:   I ↑think so. 140 
     (1.7) 141 
Jac:   I don’t think she thinks so. 142 
 
The linguistically “classed” category here is ‘upper middle ↑Cla:ss.’ (l. 129). This 
category is produced by Hugh in a categorisation of the non-present party, Maggie. 
Like the category within Extract 15 (i.e. ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ [ls. 132-133]), this 
category does not self-explicate how “social class” is understood in this moment; and 
nor Maggie’s status, specifically. It indicates only that the category is hearable as 
“classed”, and that whatever comprises or undergirds this category is stratified 
gradationally and that Maggie is classifiable as ‘upper middle’ (l. 129) along this 
undisclosed spectrum. Like Extract 15, however, once Hugh’s ascription is 
contextualised against his preceding turns-at-talk, greater access is afforded to the 
operative ontology of this category.  
 
In this case, Hugh has asserted that Maggie is oblivious (ls. 124-125); a trait he 
attributes to her employment history – and, specifically, her lack, thereof: ‘Because 
she never (di) ↑really have a job::.’ (l. 127). Hugh’s classification of Maggie as ‘upper 
middle ↑Cla:ss.’ (l. 129) follows this account in the subsequent turn. This 
classification is neither explicitly nor directly bound to Hugh’s prior account – such 
as by way of “explanatory connective” (here, see Parry, 2013: 106), for example. 
Nonetheless, by virtue of its consecutive sequential positioning, it is hearable against 
this backdrop as a possible “formulation” (here, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; 
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Heritage and R. Watson, 1979), follow-up categorisation and/or reworking of his 
previously (post-positioned) account. 117  
 
Hugh’s categorisation of Maggie as ‘upper middle ↑Cla:ss.’ (l. 129) is therefore 
hearable such that it encompasses this predicate of “never-really-having-had-a-job”, 
in some capacity. Thus, while this category does not announce how it is understood, 
at its point of production, Hugh’s preceding account (i.e. l. 127) furnishes some 
specification of this category. 
 
A final example of this prospectively organised ontological work can be observed in 
Extract 17; a telephone call between John and his father, Adam. 
 
Extract 17: CallHome-eng-6298  
((A telephone call. John has phoned Adam to discuss purchasing a land lot in 
Peru.))
Joh:   Per [square metre. [They’re three thousand=  405 
Ada:       [( )         [(    ) 406 
Joh:   =sol per square metre. .hh[hh 407 
Ada:                             [Oh man °I [can’t= 408 
Joh:                  [And Uh=     409 
Ada:   =believe it.°] 410 
Joh:   =            ]m:.= 411 
Ada:   =huh I Can[’t Believe it.] 412 
Joh:             [THE SMAll     ]est, (0.8) the  413 
     smallest lot available.= 414 
Ada:   =people over there [don’t     ] have any= 415 
Joh:                      [(Yeah/Is).] 416 
Ada:   =Money how in the hell can (.) they (.) .hhh= 417 
Joh: 1Þ=No [no Dad     ]it- (0.2) jus- (.) just the= 418 
Ada:       [(PAY that.)] 419 
Joh:   =opposite is tr[ue. 420 
Ada:                  [Oh. 421 
Joh:   .hhh Either they [have lot of money.=              422 
 
117 On this sequencing, see §6.4. 
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Ada:                    [People that DO have money.= 423 
Joh:   = ][Or they haven’t. 424 
Ada:   = ][Oh yeah. 425 
     (.) 426 
Ada:   °Yea[h.° 427 
Joh:       [Have Lots of [it. 428 
Ada:            [°Yes,  429 
Joh:   People [that don’t have any have absol[utely=  430 
Ada:          [Yes.°       [°Yeah.=  431 
Joh:   =none. ] 432 
Ada:   =Okay,°]  433 
Joh: → .hhh[hh SO  ] but there is a growing middle= 434 
Ada:       [°Okay.°] 435 
Joh:   =class. And that’s what these Lots are ↑targeted  436 
     at. tch. .hh[h 437 
Ada:               [°Mhm.°= 438 
Joh:   =*The growing middle ↑cla[ss.*] 439 
Ada: 2Þ         [.hh ]hh (.) But that  440 
     middle class [is ] pretty high Class if they can=  441 
Joh:                [Eh-] 442 
Ada:   =spend that >kind of money.< 443 
 
The linguistically “classed” category in this extract is the ‘growing middle [((…))] 
class.’ (ls. 434 and 436). This is produced by John within an assertion (ls. 415, 417 
and 419), counter-assertion (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430 and 432), qualification 
sequence (ls. 434, 436-437 and 439; here, see Coulter, 1990), concerning the 
distribution of wealth (cum “social class”) in Peru. Like the linguistically “classed” 
categories produced in Extracts 15 and 16, this category does not explicate the salient 
property that underpins its organisation upon its point of production. It indicates only 
that the category is avowedly “classed”, and emergent (i.e. ‘growing’ [ls. 434 and 
439]). 118 Nonetheless, like Extracts 15 and 16, this property can be derived from the 
 
118 On the “temporal” constitution of “classed” categorial incumbencies, see §7.3.2. 
For further instances in which “wealth” is reconstrued, retrospectively, in “classed” 
terms, see McHoul and R. Watson (1984: 292-293, 297) and Widdicombe (2017: 471). 
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immediately preceding talk. In this case, this ontology is supplied as a “qualification” 
or “modification” (see Lynch, 1985: Ch. 7: e.g. 208-209), by John, to his previous 
“counter-assertion”. 
 
In the just-prior talk, John has counter-asserted that people in Peru either have lots of 
money, or none (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430 and 432); an assertion that designedly 
(e.g. ‘just the opposite is [((…))] t[rue.’ [ls. 418 and 420]) counters Adam’s prior 
generalisation (i.e. ‘people over there [don’t] have any [((…))] Money’ [ls. 415 and 
417]). The focal membership category is then mobilised, by John, in the service of 
qualifying his counter-assertion (see 1Þ), inserting an interstitial category within his 
proposed polarity; namely, ‘a growing middle [((…))] class’ (ls. 434 and 436). Again, 
in this turn, John does not explicitly locate the salient ontology by reference to which 
“social class” – and/or, indeed, this particular stratum (i.e. ‘middle’ [l. 434]) – is 
relevantly organised. The focal category absorbs its meaning, instead, by virtue of its 
sequential placement and pragmatic function. Specifically, it is by qualifying the terms 
of John’s prior counter-assertion (e.g. ‘but’ [l. 434]) that he predicates the salient 
ontology of the category in terms of relative wealth. While the category is not then 
self-explicated through its linguistic form, its ontology is made available through the 
local sequential context that is established by the progenitor of this category; and, 
specifically, through the social action of qualifying.
 
Extract 17 thereby supplies a third case in which a linguistically “classed” category is 
produced by a co-interlocutor by which to environ a unique ontology that has been 
made available through their preceding talk. Worth noting, here, is that this analysis 
is not simply some logical derivation – or ‘academic’ (Schegloff, 1984a: 36) 
abstraction – that is divorced from the situated business of the ongoing interaction; 
nor, equally, is it a product of ‘reconstructed logic’ (see Kaplan, 1973: n.p.g. in W. 
Sharrock and Anderson, 1982: 80), or of intellectualising the ‘adequacy of members 
constructs’ (see Heritage, 1984a: 52; see also, Heritage, 1990/1991: 330, fn. 7), to 
borrow the fallacies. Instead, this self-same understanding of the focal category can 
be seen to be locally processed by the co-interlocutors themselves. Adam, for example 
– the recipient of the since-qualified counter-assertion – attests to this shared 
conceptualisation when he subsequently reconfigures the category of ‘=*The growing 
142 
middle ↑cla[ss.*]’ (l. 439), on these very grounds: ‘[.hh ]hh (.) But that middle class 
[is ] pretty high Class if they can [((…))] spend that >kind of money.<’ (ls. 440-441 
and 443; see 2Þ). In this case, Adam predicates his reconfiguration of the category, 
‘=*The growing middle ↑cla[ss.*]’ (l. 439), into ‘pretty high Class’ (l. 441), on the 
basis of its organisation in terms of “relative wealth”, proposing that the ability to 
spend that amount of money is one that is bound (here, see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 221-
224) to an avowedly higher (i.e. ‘pretty high’ [l. 441]) “classed” category. Adam, 
therefore, indirectly accepts the previously established premise set forth by the 
linguistically “classed” category insofar as he subsequently upgrades it in analogous 
terms (i.e. “relative wealth”).  
 
In summary, Extracts 15-17 are examples in which linguistically “classed” 
membership categories are mobilised by co-interlocutors to admit unique ontologies 
of “social class”. These extracts are connected sequentially. In each case, the 
progenitor of the focal category makes available this ontology through the foregoing 
talk. In Extract 15 (i.e. ‘the ↑middle ↓class:.’ [ls. 132-133]), this was accomplished 
through a designedly derivative assessment (ls. 130-131), and the production of an 
‘asymmetrical contrastive pair’ (ls. 131-132; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: e.g. 616). 
In Extract 16 (i.e. ‘upper middle ↑Cla:ss.’ [l. 129]), this was “premonitored” 119 by the 
terms of an anterior account (l. 127) and subsequent proposition (ls. 124-125). Lastly, 
in Extract 17, the membership category a/the ‘growing middle [((…))] class.’ (ls. 434 
and 436) was predicated upon the terms of the progenitor’s preceding counter-
assertion (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430 and 432). Aspects of co-interlocutors’ 
foregoing talk thus furnish an inferential context against which linguistically “classed” 
categories can be understood, and which, as Extract 17 has demonstrated, can be 
recognised by co-interlocutors, in situ.  
 
4.6.1.2 Concurrent 
Talk that precedes the (co-)production of linguistically “classed” membership 
categories is not the only position in which such categories are specified by 
progenitors. A second sequential environment in which ontologies are routinely 
 
119 Jefferson’s (1980) term. 
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furnished is in and through the very (co-)production of those categories. The social 
actions for which these categories are (co-)produced, for example, is a primary 
mechanism that is employed to this effect. In Extract 18, below, for example, the 
membership category, ‘upper cla:ss> (0.2) ↑Indians’ (l. 167), is specified, to some 
extent, through the social action of “accounting” to which it contributes. 120 
 
Extract 18: CallHome-eng-5712 
((A telephone call. Beth and Adele have been discussing two non-present 
pupils to whom Beth teaches English as a foreign language.)) 
Ade:   =.hh And what was the other language- a  130 
     language I never heard of before. 131 
   (0.3)  132 
Ade:   That some kid spoke. 133 
   (1.3) 134 
Bet:   Indonesian. 135 
   (0.3) 136 
Ade:   No. 137 
 
((Thirteen lines omitted.)) 
 
Bet:   [Oh ↑Ur]:du. 151 
   (0.2) 152 
Bet:   >Urd[u.<] 153 
Ade:       [<I ](t’)s (.) ↑Ur↓du:.> 154 
   (0.9) 155 
Bet:   Urdu is- is an Indian language.=hh. 156 
   (1.1) 157 
Ade:   Urdu is an (.) <Indian language?> 158 
   (0.6) 159 
Bet:   Uhuh, 160 
   (0.3) 161 
Ade:   ↓Oh:. 162 
   (1.5)  163 
 
120 The activity of “accounting” is recovered in Chapter 6. 
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Bet:   Yeah I have Eh- Ehan Baqir. 164 
   (0.8)  165 
Bet: → .hh (0.2) Bu:t. (0.3) <Like most (.) of the    166 
    upper cla:ss> (0.2) ↑Indians he speaks  167 
  En*glish.* 168 
   (0.5) 169 
Ade:   Yeah.  170 
   (0.2) 171 
Bet:   British English.  172 
   (0.2) 173 
Ade:   Yeah. 174 
   (1.6) 175 
Bet:   With a real slant to it.=.hhh 176 
 
The excerpt begins as Beth and Adele search for the name of a third student who is 
disfluent in English. After Beth identifies the sought-after student (l. 164), she then 
effects a ‘de-listing’ (Jefferson, 1990: 76; ls. 166-168), disqualifying the now-
identified pupil from the list-in-progress of “Beth’s-students-who-speak-English-
poorly”; the collaborative activity hitherto underway. This activity is instituted by 
Beth by invoking the pupil’s extant bilingualism (ls. 166-168, 172 and 176); a 
competence that she attributes, indirectly, to his linguistically “classed” status: ‘hh 
(0.2) Bu:t. (0.3) <Like most (.) of the upper cla:ss> (0.2) ↑Indians he speaks 
En*glish.*’ (ls. 166-168) – specifically, ‘British English.’ (l. 172; see Schegloff, 
1997c), ‘With a real slant to it.=.hhh’ (l. 176). The student is ascribed into this 
“classed” category indirectly through the ‘transitivity of attributes’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 49): He is ascribed a “classed” categorisation by virtue of enacting an activity 
(i.e. speaking (British) English [ls. 168, 172 and 176]) – and/or for possessing a 
capacity for such an activity – that is, for Beth, proposedly bound/tied to the majority 
(i.e. ‘most’ [l. 166]) of the incumbents of this categorial position (i.e. ‘upper cla:ss> 
(0.2) ↑Indians’ [l. 167]); a category with an avowedly “classed” organisation. 121 
 
 
121 See Extract 21 (ls. 107 and 109) for a second instance in which an avowedly 
“classed” ontology (i.e. “whiteness”) is positioned as similarly non-constitutive. 
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The linguistically “classed” category, ‘upper cla:ss> (0.2) ↑Indians’ (l. 167), is thus 
produced by Beth as she accounts for the removal of the since-identified student from 
the list of “Beth’s-students-who-speak-English-poorly”. On this occasion, the 
student’s fluency in British-English, is treated as the salient factor which warrants his 
status as an exception. Specifically, it is positioned as a “category-bound activity” (e.g. 
Sacks, 1974 [1972]) or “knowledge” (e.g. W. Sharrock, 1974) that is attributed, 
reflexively, for Beth, to the avowedly (i.e. ‘upper class’ [l. 167]) “classed” status of 
the student. Thus, while the focal category does not self-explicate its substantive 
ontology through its linguistic form, this is furnished by Beth incrementally (see 
Schegloff, 2016 [2001]) through the action of the turn into which it contributes; 
namely, “accounting”. Like Extracts 15-17, then, this linguistically “classed” 
membership category encapsulates a unique ontology of “social class”; one that is 
operative for co-interlocutors amidst the interaction, and which might be 
unanticipated, and/or elided when extant, professional theorisations are selectively 
enforced.  
 
Extract 18, therefore, presents a case in which the salient ontology of a linguistically 
“classed” category is specified through the social action of “accounting” to which it 
contributes. However, this is not the only practice whereby ontologies are made 
available at their point of production. A second resource concerns the turn-
design/categorial constitution of the membership categories themselves. Two 
examples of this practice have been adduced in Extracts 12 and 14. 
 
Extract 12 (Reproduced): CallHome-eng-4705 
Ali:   And it’s a <ver:y nice> (0.4) you know (0.5) 56 
→ she's (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class:.  57 
 
Extract 14 (Reproduced): CABNC [KBF_46]
Hel:   His ↑mother was an office *cleaner.* (1.4)  50 
    and. (0.5) she con↑ceived Bill (.) by a  51 
        married *man.* 52 
  (1.2) 53 
Hel: → Erm. (0.2) °a° poor (0.3) working *class  54 
        man.* 55 
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The two categories in these extracts differ from those in Extracts 11, 13, 15-18. 
Previously, the categories considered have each expressed their “classed” 
interpretability through their linguistic form (i.e. “class”), but they do not also 
proclaim their underpinning ontologies. In other words, they do not necessarily self-
explicate how “social class” is substantively organised in the moments in which they 
are (co-)produced. Instead, these categories have been shown to “expose” 122 only 
gradational/hierarchical specifications; what might be described, otherwise, as 
‘measure terms’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: e.g. 322), ‘measuring categories’ (see 
Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 59), or ‘measuring terms’ (see Jefferson, 1996: 22), to modify the 
concepts. 123 These “classed” membership categories do not, then, announce how  
they are undergirded, phenomenally, through their linguistic design; nevertheless,  
they stipulate that such categories are ordered by reference to an “underlying 
ordinality”; 124 albeit one that is left unspecified, linguistically.        
 
The linguistically “classed” categories in Extracts 12 and 14 differ notably in this 
respect. Both categories declare how they can be understood, to some extent, through 
the details of their categorial form. In each case, this is accomplished through their 
inclusion of what Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 26, italics in original) terms a ‘descriptor 
concept’. For Extract 12, this is the descriptor ‘Wealthy’ (l. 57), and in Extract 14, 
‘working’ (l. 51). These two descriptors differ significantly from the 
gradational/hierarchical terms (e.g. “lower”, “middle”, “higher”, etc.) included in 
Extracts 10, 11, 13, 15-18, insofar as they both name comparatively substantive 
ontological bases upon their point of production. “Wealth” and “employment”, for 
example, are specified in these cases. These are positioned such that they should not 
 
122 Jefferson’s (1987 [1983]) term. 
123 This is not to propose that such categories are, as a result, devoid of common-sense 
connotations. It has been established by Sacks (e.g. 1967; 1972; 1974 [1972]; 1992, Vol. I: 
40-48, 113-125), after all, that the intelligibility of membership categories trades upon such 
knowledge. Furthermore, as Atkinson (1978: 81) notes, it is this very knowledge that has made 
‘linguistic categories’ available as objects of sustained Sociological scrutiny (see also, 
Wootton, 1975: 20; Jayyusi, 1984: 3 in Hester, 1992: 156; see also, ibid.: 173 and 173, fn. 4; 
W. Sharrock and R. Watson, 1989: 433; Hester and Eglin, 2017: 307-308). 
124 Hardy’s (1993: 10, fn. 2, my emphasis) phrase. 
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be heard proximately as instantiations of these devices, but distally, and 
epiphenomenally, as the relevant indices of “social class”. Upon their point of 
production, therefore, these categories not only self-explicate the “classed” 
interpretability (e.g. “wealthy class”), but also announce how they are relevantly 
understood upon their point of production (e.g. “wealthy class”).  
 
Of course, this is not to propose that such ontologies are necessarily, therefore, 
specified through their naming, alone. Nor equally, that such avowed ontologies 
cannot be “refurbished”, 125 sequentially, in ways comparable to designedly gradated 
“classed” membership categories. These categories are instead equally vulnerable to 
specificatory work. They retain an irremediable ‘second-order availability’ (Jayyusi, 
2014 [1984]: 27), to this effect. As Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 27), observes, ‘the 
constitutive feature is available in the naming’, however the bases by reference to 
which one qualifies as a ratified incumbent are left unspecified. Through the 
specification of their operative ontology through their naming, therefore, such 
categories are not somehow impervious to the vagaries of indexicality. They simply 
avow one such underpinning that can be (re)specified by co-interlocutors, in situ. 
Extract 19, and the production of the linguistically “classed” category ‘working 
↑class’ (ls. 30-31), illustrates such a specification in action. 
 
Extract 19: EJBH_F4_34 
((A face-to-face interaction. Samuel, Tim, Luke, Simon, Nick and David are 
playing “Texas hold ‘em”.))
Tim:   (Got / And) a great mix lined up >↓Luke.< 6 
   (0.9) 7 
Tim:   >Do you know what you’re [doing.<] 8 
Sam:                            [Check. ] 9 
   (0.5) 10 
(?):   °(   )-°= 11 
Luk:   =Y[eah   ] on Facebook= 12 
Sim:     [Check.] 13 
Luk:   =↑li[(h)ve.] 14 
 
125 Anderson and W. Sharrock’s (1982: 83) term. 
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Sam:       [Got a ]ce:. 15 
   (2.3)  16 
(?):   ((Sniffs.)) 17 
   (0.6) 18 
(?):   ((Clears throat.)) 19 
   (0.2) 20 
(?):   ((Sniffs.))= 21 
(?):   =.hhhhHH[HH.    ] 22 
Luk:           [↑OH::::] 23 
   (0.4) 24 
(?):   °hhhhh.°  25 
   (1.0) 26 
Sam:   I got ace:.  27 
   (0.3) 28 
Nic:   [<That you: said.             ] 29 
Sam: → [He’s was- just gonna put me d]own as working  30 
     ↑class inne.  31 
   (0.2) 32 
Nic:   £Hy(h)eah.£ 33 
Sam:   °Fuck.° ((Whispered.)) 34 
Nic:   I heard that [as well and I did think that= 35 
Sam:       [(.hhhhh  / hhhhh. ) Tim.= 36 
Nic:   =straight away.] 37 
Sam:   =              ] 38 
   (0.4) 39 
Tim:   £S(h)am.£ 40 
   (0.4) 41 
Sam:   I’m so sorry audi°en° (    ) ((Trails off.))  42 
(?):   .hhh= 43 
Nic:   =°Nothing wrong with being working class Sam.° 44 
   (0.5) 45 
Sam:   .hhh (0.4) I got ↓ace:. 46 
   (1.6) 47 
Nic:   °Tim identified himself as working° CLASS,  48 
   (0.4) 49 
Sam:   Shoulda said I Ace. 50 
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The interaction is joined as Samuel (ls. 9 and 15) and Simon (l. 13) complete a hand 
of poker. The linguistically “classed” category in focus, ‘working ↑class’ (ls. 30-31), 
is produced by Samuel as he topicalises (relatedly, see Glenn, 1995: 54) – although 
inadvertently “re-formats” (see Schegloff, 2013: 62-68) – the linguistic form used to 
announce his holding initially (l. 27; cf. l. 15). This form is treated, by Samuel, to 
furnish warrantable grounds by reference to which the researcher, who is co-present, 
could classify him as ‘working ↑class’ (ls. 30-31). This is an inference that is 
ostensibly shared by Nick (ls. 35 and 37), but who subsequently vindicates this 
identification (see l. 44), dispelling its purportedly transgressive quality and, 
correspondingly, any putative need for Samuel to apologise (cf. l. 42; see Drew and 
Hepburn, 2016). 126 
 
Like Extracts 12 and 14 – and the latter, especially – the ontology that underpins this 
membership category is provided, in part, upon its production, through the inclusion 
of the ‘descriptor concept’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 26, italics in original), ‘working’ (l. 
30). Samuel, in this way, self-explicates the underlying ontology of this device, to 
some extent, concurrently with its production. Considered in isolation, for example, 
this might position “employment” as the operative underlying organisation of the 
concept. When the use of the category is contextualised sequentially, however, the 
details of the Samuel’s preceding talk reflexively furnish the ontological foundations 
of the category in ways that are comparable to the unspecified, gradated categories 
considered previously (e.g. “middle class”). In this case, the category is positioned  
by Samuel (ls. 30-31) as the identity he will be ascribed by the researcher on the basis 
of his hand-announcement (see ls. 15, 27 and 50). The relevant basis for the category 
is therefore furnished sequentially through the turns preceding the production of  
the category and is not simply provided for through the details of its linguistic design. 
 
To summarise, therefore, the underlying ontologies of linguistically “classed” 
categories can also be furnished concurrent to their production, not only through 
specifications from the preceding talk. This work can be accomplished through the 
social actions (e.g. “accounting”) delivered through the turns-at-talk into which the 
 
126 On ‘‘performer’/‘audience’’ partitions, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 593; Vol. II: 104-113).  
 150 
membership categories feature (e.g. Extract 18). Alternatively, ontologies could be 
specified provisionally, on a ‘second-order’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 27), through the 
inclusion of a ‘descriptor concept’ (ibid.: 26, italics in original). The ontologies of 
linguistically “classed” categories are not merely rendered observable through the 
work enacted in the preceding turns-at-talks but can also be made available 
concurrently upon their point of production. 
 
4.6.1.3 Retrospective  
The previous sections have presented cases in which linguistically “classed” 
categories admit ontologies of “social class” that have been made available 
prophylactically, in the preceding talk, and/or which are furnished concurrently 
through the social actions for which these categories are serviced, and/or through the 
particulars of their categorial form. There are occasions, however, in which both of 
these structural opportunities for ontological (re)specification are foregone, and in 
which such categories are compassed retroactively. The two cases that follow 
illustrate this practice. Here, linguistically “classed” categories are introduced as a 
‘prospective indexical’ (here, see C. Goodwin, 1996: 384, italics in original), and 
where their ontology is subsequently imbued following their (co-)production. 
Specifically, in Extracts 20 and 21, this is accomplished through the continuation  
or extension of the same TCU in which the linguistically “classed” category is  
(co-)produced.  
 
Extract 20: EJBH_F1_01 
((A face-to-face interaction. Amy is delivering a complaint-implicative telling 
about her father and his prejudices towards the unemployed.)) 
Amy:   =Yeah, (.) But do you know what it’s weird ‘cuz  256 
     like we’re talking about how (.) .hhh (0.2)    257 
    ↑ehm:: ((Voice wavers.)) (1.1) °.tch° (0.3) Like  258 
    how <experience:> (.) is a way of (.)  259 
  under[↑standing.    ] 260 
Rac:        [°.tch° *Yeah.*] 261 
     (.) 262 
Amy:    And like broadening your view on the [*↑world*]= 263 
Rac:                                         [Mhm.    ] 264 
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Amy:   =.hhh (0.2) But ↑like- (0.4)  265 
   ((Distortion. / Knocking. / (0.2) ))  266 
   (.) 267 
Amy:   It doesn’t seem ↑to work like that everyone¿ hh.  268 
     (0.3)  269 
Amy:   .hh[h][(.) li]ke (0.4) I mean my ↓Da::d. (0.7) I=  270 
Rac:      [N][o:    ] 271 
Amy:   =don’t- (hh./ ((Sighs.))) (0.3) I don’t have much  272 
     to do with *my Dad* 273 
     (.)  274 
Rac:   Mhm hmm.= 275 
 
((Eighteen lines omitted. Amy details her father’s political, racial and regional 
allegiances.)) 
 
   (0.4) 294 
Amy:   Erm. (0.2) (.tch) I don’t ↑think (0.3) he knows  295 
     to many people who are.=.hhh (0.2) like Asian  296 
     which is the main= 297 
Rac:   =Mm hm[m. ] 298 
Amy:         [Eth]nic minority in our area?=.hhh (0.2) 299 
     Uhm. (0.4) An’- (.) And also ↑he::. (0.2) doesn’t    300 
     (.) really know or didn’t really °know many    301 
     people° who (were / are) on ↑benefits? 302 
   (.) 303 
Amy:   .hhh (.) So I *↓thought ↑that-* (.) His: (.) Uhm.  304 
     (0.4) that his: (0.6) °c:(hh.)°rappy, horrible.  305 
     .hhh (.) like (0.2) narrow minded atti*tude.*  306 
     (0.2) were to do with not knowing those  307 
     peo[ple¿ ] 308 
Rac:      [Yeah.] 309 
Amy:   And not having that ↑experience (.) .tch .hhh  310 
     (0.3) ↑BUT. hh. (0.6) .tch (.) .hh ↑he was (.)  311 
     ehm::. (.) .tch .hh (0.2) he got made re↑dundant, 312 
   (.) 313 
Amy:   From his job,=He’d done the same job from school.  314 
     (.) .hhh [for like (.) t]wenty odd years (.) And=  315 
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Rac:            [Mhm hmm.      ] 316 
Amy:   =then. .hhh (.) came into work one day and found  317 
     that ↑he:: (0.6) there’s a letter saying >↑he’d  318 
     been made redundant?< 319 
   (0.4)  320 
Amy:   .hh[hh    ] 321 
Rac:      [.tch (.)] °God.° 322 
   (.) 323 
Amy:   Uh::m. (.) And so ↑he:: (.) had to go through the  324 
     whole ↑thing of like having .hhh (0.2) ↑Uhm::.  325 
     (0.4) >Being on jobseeker’s allowance  326 
     [and having] to< sign on and= 327 
Rac:   [°Mhm hmm.°] 328 
Amy:    =and things¿=[.hhh] Which he used to talk about= 329 
Rac:                [Yeah] 330 
Amy:   =f:eeling really degraded, (.) ↑doing  331 
     [and] [(0.2) li]ke it was= 332 
Rac:   [Mh ] [m hmm   ] 333 
Amy:   =demeaning and *that-*=.hh (0.2) he::. (0.2) ‘cuz  334 
     as far as >he’s concerned like he’s< (.) paid  335 
     into a system:. and [there][fore he] sh:ould↑=  336 
Rac:                       [.tch ][*Yeah.*] 337 
Amy:   =(.) .hh (0.2) be able to get stuff. (.) out of  338 
     it without (.) being¿=.hh (0.2) without (.)  339 
     being.=°s- tre-° (.) °t-° being made to feel. 340 
     (.) 341 
Rac:   m’Yeah. 342 
   (.) 343 
Rac:   >B[ad about *it.*<] 344 
Amy:     [Like ↑de       ]gra[ded?   ]=.hhh (.) S:O,= 345 
Rac:                         [*Yeah.*] 346 
Amy:   =(0.6) I would have thought that that might have  347 
     made him realise::, (.) a little ↑bit (.) about  348 
     his ↑prejudices? 349 
     (.) 350 
Amy:   [.hhh    ] (.) ↑Uhm:. (0.8) but it totally= 351 
Rac:   [Mhm hmm.] 352 
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Amy:   =↑didn’t. 353 
   (.) 354 
Amy: → He’d ↑still=.hhh (.) >I mean the other thing<  355 
  *that he::* (.) *that ‘e* (.) totally (.) doesn’t  356 
  take into a↑ccount.=.hh (.) Is the fact *that-*  357 
  (.) *Yes:* he was unemployed.=.hh (0.2) but    358 
  because ↑he’s¿ (0.3) *like* fr::om. (0.2) °.tch   359 
  .hhh° (0.3) quite a sort of (.) privileged family   360 
  an’ his friends tend to be ↑more sort of (0.4)  361 
     Þ uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business]= 362 
Rac:                                       [<Mhm.>  ] 363 
Amy:   =owners and ↑things=.hh (.) that his:: (0.5)  364 
     friend who:. (0.5) has (.) busi*ness.* (.) .hh  365 
     (0.2) was able to like (.hh) (0.2) Ehm:. (0.2)  366 
  give him a- (.) you know create a job for ‘im in  367 
     his (0.3) business. So [he      ] wasn’t= 368 
Rac:                          [(°.tch°)] 369 
Amy:   =unemployed for that long¿=.hh[h  370 
Rac:                                 [.tch y[eah. 371 
Amy:         [‘cuz he had  372 
  ↑connections?=.hhh (0.3) Eh:m. (0.3) and he (.)  373 
  totally l- (.) like lost *th:at.* .hh (.) And  374 
  then (.) so the following *year* I was speaking  375 
  to him near christmas (.) ↑and .hh (0.3) You  376 
  know. (.) it was ↑christmas (.) ehm (.) and I  377 
  think they’re with. (.) I think there was like a  378 
  scheme ↓where. (0.4) uhm. (.) people who got  379 
  certain benefits could get like. (.) reduced (.)  380 
  pri[ce ] st[amps¿] 381 
 
The category in focus in this extract is ‘middle class’ (l. 362). This is produced by 
Amy over a complaint-implicative telling about her father. 127 As Amy formulates 
 
127 On ‘Story-Complaints’, see Coulter (1990: 195) and Jefferson (1996: 35). On 
‘intimate complaining’, see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 311; see also, H. Garfinkel and 
Sacks, 1970: 344, fn. 14). For an analysis of this extract, qua “complaint”, see §6.5.2. 
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over lines 256-260 (here, see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; Heritage and R. Watson, 
1979), the two have been discussing how individuals’ “experiences” furnish a 
mechanism for understanding (ls. 258-260) and can inform their worldview (l. 263). 
As projected in Amy’s formulation (e.g. ‘it’s weird’ [l. 256]), 128 however, and realised 
over the course of her complaint-implicative telling, Amy cites a deviant case. This 
telling pertains to Amy’s father, who, despite experiencing redundancy (ls. 310-312 
and 314), and a spate of unemployment – and, with it, its ameliorative processes  
(e.g. ls. 324-327 and 329), and psycho-social “injuries” (here, see Sennett and Cobb, 
1972; e.g., ls., 329, 331, 334-336, 338-340 and 345) – neither recognised nor rectified 
his existing “prejudices” (see ls. 345, 347-349, 351 and 353) towards persons who 
were similarly positioned; prejudices that were, for Amy, presumptively attributable 
to his inexperience with such persons (e.g. ls. 299-302 and 304-308). It is this lack of 
reflexivity that forms the basis of the ensuing complaint. 
 
Focal in this extract is the successively extended turn-at-talk (here, see Lerner, 1991: 
444) that is produced by Amy following what is projected as the dénouement of her 
telling-in-progress (ls. 351 and 353). Amy opens, here, with what is adumbrated (i.e. 
‘He’d ↑still-’ [l. 355]) as an exposition of her prior paternal assessment (ls. 351 and 
353). 129 This is cut-off before completion, however, as Amy initiates a designedly 
new, topically coherent turn-at-talk (‘>I mean the other thing<’ [l. 355]). In this turn, 
Amy does not volunteer some exposition of the veritable “punchline” of her 
complaint, and/or of the normative conduct transgressed by her father (see Drew, 
1998: 306-309), previously projected (i.e. ‘He’d ↑still-’ [l. 355]). Instead, Amy cites 
a second, interrelated irony that pertains to her father’s aforementioned prejudices. 
Amy explains that not only should her father’s experiences of redundancy and 
unemployment (etc.), have precipitated some realisation and/or revision of his 
intolerances, but that he should also have gained awareness (ls. 372-374) of his 
privileged position relative to others undergoing the same experiences. This lack of 
 
128 On the adumbrative properties of “story prefaces”, see, e.g., Sacks (1974: 340-341).  
129 On the use of “still” in complaints, see Drew (1998: 308) and E. Holt (2000: 437) and, 
differently, Gafaranga and Britten (2005: 80). For its use in maintaining a position, more 
broadly, see Sacks (1970, Ch. 4: 41-44; 1992, Vol. I: 344-345, 736-737) and Heritage (2011b: 
178, fn. 3).   
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reflexivity is attributed by Amy to two reasons. Firstly, ancestry. Her father is 
positioned to lack this reflexivity by virtue of coming from ‘quite a sort of (.) 
privileged family’ (l. 360). 130 Secondly, and most focally, this is attributed to his 
friendship network; that is, the persons who are characterised as ‘↑more sort of (0.4) 
uhm. (.) middle class’ (ls. 361-362), and who are identified, by Amy, to have 
performed an integral role in extricating her father from his status qua “unemployed” 
(ls. 364-368, 370 and 372-374). 
 
The linguistically “classed” category is thus produced by Amy in the service of 
qualifying why her father did not occupy the typical footing of persons equally 
describable as “unemployed”. What is most notable for current purpose, however, is 
that Amy produces a category which self-explicates its “classed” hearability, but that 
does not account for how “social class” is to be understood in that moment. This 
conceptualisation is instead supplied retroactively as Amy contiguously volunteers 
canonical examples of the type of jobs that these avowedly ‘middle class’ (l. 362) 
persons possess: ‘like (.) [business] [((…))] owners and ↑things=.hh’ (ls. 362 and 364). 
Amy’s linguistically “classed” category is thus mobilised to encapsulate what might 
be glossed as a type of “managerial occupation”, an ontology that is made available 
through the continuation of her TCU. What is relevantly denoted by the linguistically 
“classed” category (i.e. ‘middle class’ [l. 362]), then, is compensated retrospectively, 
obtaining its unique ontology from the sequential environment in which it is  
co-produced. A related example to this is produced in Extract 21, where the ontology 
of the focal category is furnished through the extension of a TCU-in-progress. 
 
Extract 21: UCDiscLab [Scon1] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Luke and Owen are discussing the 
problems of majoring in science, and the implications this has for the 
attainment of “power”.)) 
Owe:   .tch We asians man:.= 52 
Luk:   =Hm. 53 
     (0.3) 54 
Luk:   Uh huh [huh huh (.) °↑huh.°] 55 
 
130 On indirect (e.g. ‘fr::om.’ [l. 359]) “classed” ascriptions, see §7.3.2. 
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Owe:           [I'm telling you.   ] 56 
   (1.3) 57 
Luk:   S(hh)cience¿ (0.3) or n(h)o m(h)ajor.=↑Huh  58 
     huh- 59 
   (1.5) 60 
Owe:   °It's s-° sa:d¿  61 
     (0.4) 62 
Owe:   In a way¿ 63 
   (0.5) 64 
Luk:   °Yeah.° 65 
   (3.3) 66 
Owe:   Because if you go into ↑science there's no  67 
  power really.  68 
   (0.4) 69 
Luk:   Um hmm.= 70 
Owe:   =There's not much power. 71 
     (0.2) 72 
Owe:   You got a go into political science and (0.5)    73 
     [(bunch a)] government. 74 
Luk:   [(Uhm     ] 75 
     (0.6) 76 
Owe:   ‘Cuz (.) you know. 77 
   (1.8) 78 
Luk:   Yeah I’d think so too. 79 
   (2.4) 80 
Owe:   (See) you’d be ↑manipulated. (.) You know.  81 
     (0.6) 82 
Owe:   By the other. 83 
   (1.1) 84 
Owe:   They’re mostly (0.6) ((Knocking.)) (1.2)  85 
     (.tch) uhm:. (0.7) people go into: uhm. (0.4)    86 
     .tch liberal arts are whites:. 87 
   (0.5) 88 
Luk:    Uhm hm[m. 89 
Owe:          [They're the one who’s gonna control  90 
     the government¿ 91 
   (0.7) 92 
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   ((Knocking.)) 93 
   (0.5)  94 
Luk:   Yeah I think so. 95 
   (6.6) 96 
Owe:   That's kind of too bad though.  97 
   (0.4)     98 
Luk:   ↑(Y’)no. (1.4) it's just like uh science    99 
     people (   ) especially if you're like (0.7)  100 
     ↓now (0.2) minority- ethnic minority?= 101 
Owe:   =Uhm hmm. 102 
     (1.4) 103 
Luk:   You're like working totally under the  104 
     government you know?  105 
     (0.4) 106 
Luk: → All the government [people are those up]per= 107 
Owe:                      [↑Hmm hmm.          ] 108 
Luk: Þ =class you know (.) mostly whites. 109 
     (0.5) 110 
Owe:   That's true. 111 
     (0.5) 112 
Luk:   Yeah.= 113 
Owe:   =.tch (0.6) All you're doing is- (0.5) is    114 
     rubbing your ass really¿ 115 
   (0.3) 116 
Luk:   °Yeah.° 117 
   (0.7) 118 
Owe:   Rubbing their ass maybe.=T(hh)oo.= 119 
Luk:   =Yeah. (0.3) I think so too. 120 
 
This excerpt begins as Owen stipulates a putative homology between Asian students 
and the study of the natural sciences. This correlation is evaluated negatively by Owen, 
invoking the lack of power that inheres within and/or is afforded by the natural 
sciences, as opposed to reading ‘political science’ (l. 73); the students of which, he 
categorises, at first incipiently (see ls. 73-74), and then more fully, as those ‘who’s 
gonna control the government¿’ (ls. 90-91). Luke agrees with Owen’s assessment (l. 
95) and stipulates his own upgraded position, asserting that natural scientists are 
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completely subjugated by the government (ls. 104-105). It is here in which Luke self-
explicates exactly what is denoted by the category ‘government [people’ (l. 107), 
disaggregating two constituent dimensions; namely, ‘All the government [people are 
those up]per [((…))] class you know (.) mostly whites.’ (ls. 107 and 109). It is the 
production of this latter linguistically “classed” membership category that is of 
particular import here. 
 
Like Extract 20, at the point at which Luke has produced the focal category, ‘up]per 
[((…))] class’ (ls. 107 and 109), neither co-interlocutor has self-explicated how it is 
relevantly constituted in the moment in which it is (co-)produced. All that can be 
educed, instead, is that this un-explicated category contributes towards the parent 
category of ‘the government [people’ (l. 107). Like Extract 20, however, further 
information concerning the underlying ontology of this category is then supplied 
retroactively. In this case, this occurs following the extension of Luke’s TCU-in-
progress by way of the “modular pivot” (see Clayman and C. Raymond, 2015: 398-
401; see also, Fox, 1993 in Lerner, 2004a: 176, fn. 3), ‘you know’ (l. 109): ‘All the 
government [people are those up]per (([…])) class you know (.) mostly whites.’  
(ls. 107 and 109). The use of this pivot extends Luke’s TCU-in-progress, and it is in 
this extension that Luke specifies an underlying dimension of the category ‘up]per 
[((…))] class’ (ls. 107 and 109); namely, ‘mostly whites.’ (l. 109).  
 
What might be glossed as “whiteness” is therefore positioned as the focal ontology 
that relevantly underpins Luke’s linguistically “classed” membership category (i.e. 
‘up]per [((…))] class’ [ls. 107 and 109]) on this occasion. Akin to Extract 18 (l. 166), 
this ontology is cast such that underlies this category; however, it is not cast as its 
constitutive component (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 25-26). This is indicated through 
the inclusion of the qualifier ‘mostly’ (l. 109; see Edwards, 2000: e.g. 352, 358). 
Specifically, Luke, here, attests to the composition of the ‘up]per [((…))] class’ (ls. 
107 and 109) in terms of “whiteness”, predominantly, but not exclusively. This 
ontology is therefore configured as the operative basis for the linguistically “classed” 
category, but it is not promoted as its criterial dimension. In other words, for Luke, 
‘All the government [people’ (l. 107) are positioned as ‘up]per [((…))] class’ (ls. 107 
and 109); however, incumbents of the ‘up]per [((…))] class’ (ls. 107 and 109) are not 
exclusively ‘whites.’ (l. 109). 
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Luke, in this extract, thus expounds one expressly non-criterial (i.e. ‘mostly’ [l. 109]) 
dimension of the linguistically “classed” membership category, ‘up]per [((…))] class’ 
(ls. 107 and 109), through their extension of the TCU in which the category is 
produced. In this case, this is realised by way of the “modular pivot” (see Clayman 
and C. Raymond, 2015), ‘you know’ (l. 109). Extract 21 thereby presents a second 
case in which a co-interlocutor furnishes a linguistically “classed” category, 
previously produced, with a unique ontology of “social class” retroactively. 131 
 
4.6.1.4 Discursus 
This section has canvassed three sequential positions at which the ontologies of 
linguistically “classed” terms are made available in talk-in-interaction. These have 
been divided, broadly, into “prospective” (§4.6.1.1), “concurrent” (§4.6.1.2) and 
“retrospective” (§4.6.1.3) occasions. In each instance, linguistically “classed” 
terminology is mobilised that admits some ontology of “social class” that has been 
occasioned, locally, for some set of practical purpose(s). This finding, I have proposed, 
is novel and has procedural implications for EM/(M)CA research. Indeed, I have 
established that extant EM/(M)CA research on “social class” has limited its purview 
to circumscriptions (e.g. “wealth”) that are elected, ex cathedra. Again, there is good 
precedent for this approach (see §4.4), and for which affordances obtain. What is 
revealed through my analysis, however, is that resources are available to analysts 
such that they are able to glean what are treated as avowedly “classed” for co-
interlocutors, in situ. This procedure is radically different from that of existing 
research. The former privileges a theorisation of “social class” (e.g. “wealth”) and 
hypostatises that self-same conceptualisation as a members’ accomplishment. 
Conversely, my alternative approach displaces the onus of ontological work from 
analyst to participant, enabling co-interlocutors, not analysts, to designate the 
occasions that are expressly characterisable as relevantly “classed”. In other words, 
they are conferred agency to adjudicate the operative ontological bases of “social 
class”. 
 
 
131 For a third case of this retrospective operation, see Extract 27.  
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As I have argued, this shift in purview aligns conceptually with the objectives of 
EM/(M)CA research. Specifically, I proposed that it enables analysts to respecify 
“social class” further as a “members’ phenomenon”. Moreover, this approach also 
opens-up novel lines of empirical inquiry. The ontologies captured in Extracts 15-21, 
for example, illustrate the prospects of this research clearly. These examples, it will 
be recalled, comprise a diverse array of examples. This includes variables privileged 
formerly in FA research (see Chapter 1), in addition to potentially extraneous or 
transgressive ontologies; that is, ontologies which transcend or contradict how the 
concept is defined by/for analysts. Examples of the former include “never-really-
having-had-a-job” (i.e. Extract 16), “relative wealth” (i.e. Extract 17) and “infelicitous 
syntax” (i.e. Extract 19), inter alia. The latter, in contrast, include the comparatively 
heterogenous ontologies of the “specialised-nature-of-working-in-the-House-and-
Home-programme” (i.e. Extract 15), “speaking-in-British-English-with-a-real-slant-
to-it” (i.e. Extract 18) and “whiteness” (i.e. Extract 21). The former set illustrate that 
the ontologies enclosed by linguistically “classed” categories can intersect with 
theorisations that are have been articulated previously in professional research and 
might even share parameters with concepts that are otherwise captured by existing 
category-concepts within the natural language. 
 
What is particularly notable, however, is that the linguistic neutrality of these terms 
enables co-interlocutors to embed diverse ontologies of “social class” that have not 
traditionally been formulated (and, so, formalised) in these terms, and/or which 
transcend the taken-for-granted limits of extant categorisations. The latter set of 
ontologies indicate such esoterica and penumbra. It is this interactional and 
ontological work, I propose, that is made available, uniquely, by linguistically 
“classed” terms, and which is facilitated by the seeming vacuity/opacity of their 
linguistic form (e.g. “middle class”). Specifically, I contend that it is this quality that 
enables co-interlocutors to attune hitherto and/or consensually “unclassed” ontologies 
as expressly “classed” in some moment. After all, some other linguistically non-
“classed” category (e.g. “rich”) might be formulated to accommodate such diverse 
ontologies. However, what is not achieved through such a classification, is an 
expressly “classed” valence. Linguistically “classed” terms, in this vein, are a 
versatile, generative resource for synthesising novel ontologies of “social class”  
in explicitly “classed” terms, including ontologies for which there may not be  
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extant category-concepts within the natural language that are recognised, 
consensually, to designate the self-same phenomena in an avowedly “classed” tenor. 
 
To award primacy to linguistically “classed” categorisations, therefore, provides 
access to occasions in which the meaning(s) of “social class” are negotiated by co-
interlocutors. The analysis of these categories thus opens up a possible array of 
“classed” phenomena that is not constrained by the perceptions, imaginations or 
allegiances of analysts and which cannot necessarily be foreknown nor intuited, a 
priori. 132 Linguistically “classed” terms thus afford analysts a glimpse into how 
cohorts mobilise their own circumscriptions of “social class”, practically, and 
negotiate the terms of their natural “facticity” (e.g. Extract 17). 133  
 
4.6.2 Intersubjectivity 
Extracts 15-21 have illustrated how co-interlocutors routinely furnish ontologies of 
“social class” before, during and following their (co-)production. What has been 
previously neglected, however, are the status and reception of these categories in 
interaction. Indeed, what is particularly notable about such terms is that they are 
mobilised routinely to encapsulate a diverse (and, theoretically, endless) set of 
ontologies, yet they remain understood when (co-)produced, and treated 
unproblematically. That is, upon their (co-)production, co-interlocutors relinquish 
opportunities that are structurally provided for in which to pursue, clarify and/or 
(dis)confirm their understandings through the mechanics of “repair” (here, see 
Schegloff et al., 1977); one that is omni-available to co-interlocutors in talk-in-
interaction (e.g. ibid.: 375). This repeated non-occurrence furnishes an important 
insight for EM/(M)CA concerning “intersubjectivity”. This can be formulated as such: 
 
Despite the indexical and the indefinitely extendable uses of linguistically 
“classed” categories – and their veritable catch-all ontological affordances – 
they are routinely treated as procedurally understandable by/for co-
interlocutors, and do not beget the initiation of “repair”. 
 
132 On the limits of “imagination”, recall §3.3.1. 
133 H. Garfinkel’s (1967: 10) term. See also, e.g., H. Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston (1981). 
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This observation can be seen borne out across Extracts 15-21; none of which are 
subsequently implicated in repair. This capacity can be illustrated most clearly, 
however, with reference to the environment of what Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: Ch. 3) has 
termed “cumulative-category lists”. This is a genre of listing in which each component 
collocates with the co-selections as ‘a gestalt’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 78, italics in 
original). Focal about this sequential environment is that co-interlocutors do not  
make the undergirding ontologies of linguistically “classed” terms available, nor  
“on-record”. 134 Nonetheless, these membership categories are routinely exempt from 
repair, and are not pursued upon their production. What is designated as “classed”, in 
other words, is left acceptably absent, and procedurally passable (i.e. acceptable 
and/or admissible; relatedly, see Handel, 1982: 43-45), irrespective of the (hitherto 
unspecified) particulars of their constitution. 135 One example of this exigency is 
presented in Extract 22, below; an exchange that precedes the excerpt adduced in 
Extract 20. 
 
Extract 22: EJBH_F1_01 
((A face-to-face interaction. Rachel has detailed the plot of the film “Me Before 
You” [T. Sharrock, 2016].)) 
Rac:      [Shou]ld he be allowed, to make that  47 
     decision in *it’s* (.) 48 
Amy:   .hh (0.2) Se[e↑] 49 
Rac:               [V ]ery intere[st    ]*ing.*= 50 
Amy:                             [(.tch)] 51 
Amy:   =.hhh (0.2) Like any big decision like that:.  52 
     (0.2) There are >gonna be< multiple (.)  53 
     perspect[ive ] for different= 54 
Rac:           [Yeah] 55 
Amy:   =(.) >↑different individual  56 
     circumstances.<=.hh[hh   ]= 57 
Rac:                      [Yeah.] 58 
 
134 Brown and Levinson’s (1987 [1978]: e.g. 19) term.  
135 On permitting ambiguities and misinterpretations to “pass” in interaction, see Schegloff 
(1984a: e.g. 50; 1997c: e.g. 37-38) and Wootton (1989: 254), respectively. 
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Amy:   =And like,(0.3) That’s the same for anything  59 
→ (↑I)=.hhh To m[e th ]u- (.) thuh (0.8) The=  60 
Rac:                 [(hh.)] 61 
Amy:   =interesting part is: (.) An:’ maybe the part  62 
     that should be concentrated on is that .hhh   63 
     (0.3) Like. (1.0) °*uh:m.*° (0.4) °m::°iddle  64 
     class:: (0.3) white (.)= 65 
Rac:   =hh[hh.] 66 
Amy:      [M:e]n: without disabili*ties*= 67 
Rac:   =Mh[m. 68 
Amy:      [.hhh (0.3) W:ouldn’t  (0.3) I don’t think  69 
     they’d have the same reaction if they ↓watched  70 
    (0.2) a film that was not meant to be (.)  71 
     documentary that wa[s ↑fi]ction.= 72 
Rac:                      [Yep. ] 73 
Rac:   =Yea[h.  74 
Amy:       [.hhh (.) And they saw a representation.  75 
      (0.2) that wasn’t (0.2) <true to thei[r,>] 76 
Rac:                                        [M  ]hm:. 77 
   (0.3)  78 
Amy:   Life.  79 
     (.) 80 
Amy:   They’d be like (.) Oh it’s a different. (0.2)  81 
     ↑Ju- (.) Just a dif[ferent] ↑thing .hhh (0.2) To= 82 
Rac:                      [°Yep° ] 83 
Amy:   =me¿ (0.3) Like, (0.2) the thing that makes the  84 
     difference (.) is firstly the minority *thing¿*= 85 
 
In the preceding talk, Rachel has introduced the film and situated it in terms of the 
then-ongoing debate, concerning end-of-life issues, that it precipitated. On the 
dénouement of Rachel’s telling, Amy volunteers what she found most ‘interesting’ (l. 
62) about the film; namely, that audiences of ‘°m::°iddle class:: (0.3) white (.) [((…))]  
[M:e]n: without disabili*ties*=’ (ls. 64-65 and 67) would have had responded 
differently had the film portrayed its issues in a different genre (ls. 69-72), and if it 
had not accurately (i.e. ‘<true to thei[r,>] [((…))] Life.’ [ls. 76 and 79] represented 
their experiences as members of this category (ls. 75-76 and 79). This is the local 
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interactional context in which the linguistically “classed” membership category  
(i.e. ‘°m::°iddle class::’ [ls. 64-65]) is produced.  
 
Unlike the pattern borne out over Extracts 15-21, this membership category is not 
produced by Amy by wedding it to some ontological domain retrospectively, 
concurrently nor prospectively. The focal membership category is (co-)produced, 
instead, as the inaugural component of Amy’s three-part list (ls. 64-65 and 67), 136 
without additional specifications from the categoriser. In this way, the listing is not 
designed so as to house discrete, listable components. It is geared, instead, to 
contribute to the delivery of a cumulative, global and/or overall categorisation (see 
Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3). Amy has produced a linguistically “classed” category, 
therefore, without further specifying its underlying ontology. Despite this, the 
category is treated, nonetheless, as sufficient and admissible, practically, by both 
Rachel and Amy. 
 
This unspecified production of linguistically “classed” categories recurs across my 
collection. Additional examples of this practice are emboldened across Extracts 23-
26. 
 
Extract 23: CallHome-eng-6071 
((A telephone call. Malcolm and Kate discuss a letter sent by Malcolm to Kate 
and, specifically, his use of euphemistic neologism “squanking”.)) 
Mal:    We are going to be published h. in some like  84 
     (.) Linguistic surv[ey.] 85 
Kat:                      [I  ] know I know I knuh.  86 
        hhh[h. 87 
Mal:       [The uses of squ↑anking among= 88 
Kat:    =↑Uh Huh [huh.     ] 89 
Mal: →           [Upper mid]dle class:: (.)  90 
     Cauc[Asian adults.] 91 
Kat:       [.hh Uhhuh    ] huh-hu[h 92 
Mal:                             [Hu hhh.93 
 
136 On the ‘programmatic relevance’ of this form, see Jefferson (1990: 66, italics in original). 
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Extract 24: EJBH_F1_02 
((A face-to-face interaction. A continuation of Extract 13. Ben, Charlie and 
Adam discuss a newspaper headline.))
Ben:                   [Oh there was an] (.) there  296 
     was an article that ehm. (.) apparently (0.2)  297 
→ if you’re: a w::white middle class:: straight  298 
     (0.8) ↑male. (0.6) then (0.2) you don’t get  299 
     to go to this lecture thing¿ 300 
     (1.3) 301 
Ada:   [Well °↓what-°What was it about.=hhh.=      302 
Cha:   [Is this what- from somein-is this something= 303 
Ada:   =  ] 304 
Cha:   =Su]san *told you about¿*=305 
 
Extract 25: SWB2353 
((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; 
specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.)) 
Bri:   [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2) 46 
     largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences 47 
   → because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle  48 
     class, White suburban home, 49 
     (0.2) 50 
Ali:   Uhuh, 51 
 
Extract 26: CTS28  
((A telephone call. Steve and Pam have been discussing pornography.)) 
Ste:                 [The usual female porn star  284 
     ye[ah co]mes= 285 
Pam:     [Uch: ] 286 
Ste: → =from like (.) a lower class background. 287 
Ste:   .hhh Erm has a lack of self-esteem and self- 288 
     respect. 289 
     (0.4) 290 
Pam:   [Yeah I could see that.] 291 
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In each extract, a linguistically “classed” category (e.g. ‘[Upper mid]dle class::’ 
[Extract 23: l. 90]; ‘middle class::’ [Extract 24: l. 298]; ‘middle class,’ [Extract 25: ls. 
48-49]) or description (i.e. ‘lower class background.’ [Ex. 26, l. 287]) is produced in 
a cumulative-category listing, and, in each case, they are not furnished with additional 
specifications of their ontologies. This omission, however, does not, deter their 
recipients; nor do they engender reparative operations. Like Rachel and Amy in 
Extract 22, the recipients simply treat these membership categories as sufficient in and 
for the here-and-now. They are treated, in this sense, as ‘stable’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 66, italics in original; see also, Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 519). In this way, 
cumulative-category listings offer a recurrent sequential environment in which the 
ontological foundations of linguistically “classed” categories are not set forth 
explicitly – that is, they are (co-)produced “enthymematically” – 137 and are not 
pursued by co-interlocutors subsequently. To borrow the phrase, they simply 
constitute one of their ‘silently tolerated inexactitudes’ (see Reichenbach, 1938: 7 in 
Pollner, 1979: 235).  
 
The reasons why these categories are treated as “passable” are innumerable. This 
could be attributable, for example, to the turn-design of these categories, and/or to 
their local pragmatic function. The recurring production of linguistically “classed” 
categories in either the first or second position of three-part lists might also, for 
example, diminish the import of a response (see, e.g., Kitzinger 2000: 181-188; 
Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 626). 138 Equally, the cumulative posture of listings 
might attenuate this relevance by ‘masking their specifics’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 79, 
italics in original), and depreciating the relevance of a response to the discrete 
components which, together, co-constitute the listing. 139 In short, there are a myriad 
of potentially explanatory factors which might account for why recipients do not 
problematise the (co-)production of such categories, in situ. Linguistically “classed” 
 
137 Coulter’s (e.g. 1973a: 128; 1979b: 186, fn. 32; 1982: 33, fn. 1) term. 
138 For examples of this non-terminal recurrence, see Extracts 22-26. 
139 For an example of an ‘itemized’ listing (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 78, italics in original), see 
Extract 13 (ls. 287-288). For additional examples of their “cumulative” and “itemized” 
production, see Nikander (2001: 80-81, ls. 21-23 and 30-31) and, potentially, Klein (2011: 
69), respectively. 
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categories thus offer insights concerning intersubjectivity; specifically, co-
interlocutors treat these categories as normatively admissible even when devoid of 
ontological fixtures. 
 
Of course, the production of linguistically “classed” categories does not ensure 
understanding, and there are occasions in which this intersubjective fabric ruptures, 
where such categories are treated as accountable and/or unwarranted. 140 Crucially, 
however, the analysis of linguistically “classed” categories also makes this exigency 
– that is, in which expressly “classed” categories are problematised – available for 
analysis. Indeed, where this has been investigated previously in EM/(M)CA research, 
this has involved analysts endowing linguistically non-“classed” membership 
categories with a “classed” relevance, ex cathedra. The analysis of linguistically 
“classed” categories, in contrast, affords analysts opportunities to identify occasions 
in which the foundations of “social class” become problematised, or interactionally 
“fatal”. 141 An example of one such occasion is depicted in Extract 27. 
 
Extract 27: UCDiscLab [Din22] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Dan, Ben, Chloe, Aaron and Frances 
are selecting a film to watch.)) 
Dan:   =What did we decided on¿ 16 
   (1.3) 17 
Ben:   Robin hood I think¿ 18 
   (0.8)  19 
Dan:   [>Jungle book or rob]in< hood¿ 20 
Chl:   [(            )] 21 
   (0.7)  22 
Dan:   For ↑Chloe. 23 
   (1.6) 24 
Ben:   JUNGLE BOOK. 25 
 
140 On this rarity, see, e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 58-59), Schutz (n.d. in H. Garfinkel, 1967: 
50), Wootton (1975: 19-20), Atkinson (1978: 81-82), Schegloff (1984a: 51-52) and Lynch 
(1993: 21). 
141 Term borrowed from Pollner (1987: e.g. 88, 106, 107, 131, italics in original) and 
Bergmann (1992: 157, my emphasis). 
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   (0.8) 26 
(?):   ((Clears throat.)) 27 
   (0.5) 28 
Chl:   Uhm. ↑No I don’t want Jungle book.= 29 
Dan:   =What do you want. 30 
   (0.5) 31 
Chl:   I want, (0.4) Robin hood.= 32 
Ben:   =I don’t think she- >she’s had these videos  33 
     and I’ve never watched all of them (the way  34 
     through) yet.< 35 
   (0.2) 36 
Ben:   >(But one of them).<= 37 
Fra: → =I like the upper class one that’s [me.]  38 
Aar:                                      [hh ]hh. 39 
     [Huh huh huh= 40 
Ben:   [What do you= 41 
Aar:   =huh  ] [huh huh huh]  42 
Ben:   =mean.] [Upper class]= 43 
Fra:   =H’YEAH. 44 
     (0.3) 45 
Ben:   What- (.) d’what is it, 46 
     (0.5)    47 
Fra: Þ [£The ki]nd that doesn’t smell at all.£= 48 
Aar:    [eh huh ] 49 
Ben:   =eh heh heh heh heh heh heh heh. 50 
     (0.7) 51 
Ben:   .hhhh (0.7) G’hhh. 52 
     (1.7) 53 
Fra:   BAH HAH HAH HAH- 54 
   (0.4) 55 
Ben:   What. 56 
   (0.2) 57 
Fra:   £Huh nothin’£ 58 
Ben:   What’s so funny go ah[ead an’ ↑say it.] 59 
Fra:                        [.hhh >Huh huh<  ]   60 
     £th(hh)- the surprised one.=[↑NO:.      ] 61 
Ben:                               [eh heh heh.] 62 
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     (0.3) 63 
    ((Background noise.)) 64 
Ben:   £Can’t you carry it on the surprise (   ).£ 65 
   (2.0) 66 
   ((Film score plays.)) 67 
 
The linguistically “classed” category in this extract is ‘the upper class one’ (l. 38). 
This is produced by Frances in an assessment-cum-self-identification, the referent of 
which is verbally undisclosed and unspecified. Holding this ambiguity in abeyance, 
however, it can be noted that this category parallels those exhibited in Extracts 15-21 
– and Extracts 20-21, specifically – whereby a linguistically “classed” category is 
serviced, retroactively, to instantiate a unique ontology of “social class”. In this case, 
the category is underpinned, for Frances, by the olfactory (i.e. “odourless”) criterion 
of “not-smelling-at-all” (l. 48; see Þ) – an ontology of “social class” that is not 
otherwise provided in the natural language in an expressly “classed” faculty. There 
are, therefore, clear parallels which connect this category with those in Extracts 15-
21. How this instance diverges, however, concerns the reception of this category by 
Frances’ co-interlocutors. In this instance, the category is not received 
unproblematically. Its ontology is, instead, pursued by Ben (i.e. ls. 41, 43 and 46), 
jocularly, through the “multiple” initiation of repair (see Schegloff et al., 1977: 369, 
fn. 15 in Egbert, 2004: 1471; differently, see also, Jefferson, 1985a: 436-438). This 
activity does not centre upon the referent of Frances’ assessment, but explicitly 
problematises what is designedly denoted by the linguistically “classed” category,  
‘the upper class one’ (l. 38). Thus, the category in Extract 27 is not treated as 
intersubjectively shared (cf. Extracts 15-21), but as an accountable absence, 
culminating in pursuit.  
 
Notable in this case is that Frances has not, hitherto, specified the ontology of her 
linguistically “classed” category. It is produced, here, instead, as a non-sequitur. It is 
proposed that this ontology appears to have been omitted as part of a designedly 
indeterminate reference; an activity evocative of Schenkein’s (1978b: 69) ‘Puzzle-
Pass-Solution-Comment action sequence’. The ‘Identity-Rich Puzzle’ (ibid.: 67, italics 
in original; see also, Stokoe, 2012a: 281), here, involves Frances’ self-identification 
with a linguistically “classed” category. In this case, given the cohort’s ongoing 
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activity of watching a film, the referent of Frances’ assessment (l. 38) is presumably 
made available scenically, perhaps ‘perceptually available’ (here, see Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 58, italics in original). In any case, by not explicating the ontology of the 
referred to category, or its referent, Frances effectively poses a puzzle to her co-
interlocutors. Accordingly, while Ben’s pursuit (ls. 41, 43 and 46) targets the 
referential ambit of the category – that is, what it denotes – it cooperates, more 
saliently, as an information solicit, furnishing a “go-ahead” for Frances’ “solution” 
and “punchline” (i.e. l. 48; see Þ). This instance, therefore, is a case in which a 
category that is designedly “classed” is not only serviced to encapsulate a unique 
ontology but is explicitly problematised in these terms. 142 
 
Extract 27 thus presents a case in which a linguistically “classed” category is contested 
by a co-interlocutor. In so doing, I have demonstrated that a further benefit of 
analysing linguistically “classed” categories are the insights they make available 
concerning intersubjectivity. By focusing on linguistically “classed” categories, I have 
argued that analysts can yield occasions in which the understanding of designedly 
“classed” membership categories break down. Notably, three additional benefits are 
made available through the analysis of linguistically “classed” categories. 
Specifically, I have shown that co-interlocutors employ these resources so as to 
construe “social class” for themselves (§4.6.1), in a myriad of ways, including 
theorisations that may not be anticipated by analysts, a priori, nor which are 
necessarily encapsulated with a “classed” valence within extant categories in the 
natural language. Further, I have shown that such ontologies are encapsulated in a 
variety of sequential positions (§4.6.1.1-§4.6.1.3) and that they are routinely 
understood even when they are not furnished or disclosed by their categorial 
progenitors. Lastly, I have shown that linguistically “classed” categories also make 
available occasions in which they are problematised by co-interlocutors, and the 
interactional occasions which precipitate and arise from this contingency. 
 
 
142 For an institutional example of this exigency, with a linguistically “classed” category, see 
Reynolds (2011: 416-418). The reader is encouraged to track this “interview-cum-
confrontation” (here, see Schegloff, 1988/1989; 1992a) independently. 
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4.7 Possibles  
The focus of this chapter, thus far, has been to canvass the hitherto neglected 
affordances of analysing “social class” through linguistically “classed” membership 
categories. This is an alternative point of departure from that adopted in previous 
EM/(M)CA research which has focussed, instead, on the analysis of comparatively 
linguistically non-“classed” categories; categories which do not underscore their 
“classed” relevance through their linguistic design (recall fn. 102). Having outlined 
three of the key benefits offered by this approach, the position of comparatively 
linguistically non-“classed” categories can be revisited. 
 
I do not propose in this thesis that linguistically non-“classed” categories, or 
descriptions, should be omitted from the purview of EM/(M)CA. To do so would 
effectively confine the remit of one’s analysis to those expectably rare occasions in 
which persons use the modifier “class” to accomplish this work. Consequently, this 
would expectably occlude a host of common-sense knowledges that are held about 
certain categories (recall fn. 123), in addition to divesting the capacity and tolerance 
of co-interlocutors not only for non-standard (e.g. Jefferson, 1983: 12), specious (e.g. 
Jefferson, 1981: 30) and/or erroneous formulations (e.g. Jefferson, 1974: 182), but 
also for designedly equivocal conduct (e.g. Schegloff et al., 1977: 375; Schegloff, 
1997a: 520; Stokoe, 2011: 111; 2015: 429; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 80). 143 The extent 
of this omission is captured by Robles and Kurylo (2017) in the following passage: 
  
“Thus when we hear ‘auto-mechanic’ we associate activities such as ‘doing an 
oil change’ and ‘performing engine repairs’. Similarly, if you say ‘I got my car 
fixed up the other day’ it cues the category ‘automechanic’. It may also, 
 
143 More general theoretical limitations also preclude such a move. For example, on the 
inexorable reliance on cultural knowledge, see R. Turner (1971: 177 in Atkinson and Drew, 
1979: 27; see also, ibid.: 234-235, fn. 9), Moerman (1972: 205), Bittner (1974 [1965]: e.g. 
70), Schegloff (1987a: 231, fn. 19) and Antaki (1998), inter alia. On the liminal boundary 
between the “professional” and “common-sense” domain, see R. Turner (1971: 177 in ten 
Have, 1999: 35), Rose (1960) and, differently, Giddens (1976: 79, 162). On the status of this 
knowledge in EM/(M)CA research, see Antaki and Widdicombe (1998b: 10) and Jayyusi 
(2014 [1984]: e.g. 80, 95, 105, 111, 114). 
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however, index other categories expected to overlap with that of automechanic 
– for example, ‘man’ or ‘working class’.” 
(Robles and Kurylo, 2017: 675, my emphasis) 
 
Again, this would restrict observations to linguistically “classed” categories, only, 
further bracketing a variety of interactional work in which members enact and/or 
orient towards “social class”, in some way, but do so inexplicitly/implicitly. It is not 
recommended, therefore, that such research desists, and where linguistically non- 
“classed” categories are simply filtered from EM/(M)CA, wholesale, but only that 
their previously held status in this literature, qua “bona-fide” 144 “classed” categories, 
requires qualification. I propose that instead of reifying these categories as immutably 
“classed” on occasions of use, and when refracted through some heuristic (e.g. 
“wealth”), analysts require compelling “talk-intrinsic” 145 evidence that they are 
serviced qua “classed” categories for co-interlocutors, locally. Where linguistically 
non-“classed” categories are construed, indirectly, in avowedly “classed” terms, for 
instance, satisfies this endogenous criterion. One illustrative occasion that can be 
analysed to this effect are in which linguistically “classed” categories are designedly 
interconnected with linguistically non- “classed” categories. Extract 20 presents one 
example of this practice vis-à-vis a normatively “occupational” category; a previous 
locus of “classed” inferences (e.g. W. Sharrock and Coleman, 1999: 21-22; M. H. 
Goodwin and Alim, 2010: 188-189; Robles and Kurylo, 2017: 675). 146  
 
Extract 20 (Reproduced): EJBH_F1_01 
((A face-to-face interaction. Amy is delivering a complaint-implicative telling 
about her father and his prejudices towards the unemployed.)) 
Amy:   [Like ↑de       ]gra[ded?   ]=.hhh (.) S:O,= 345 
Rac:                       [*Yeah.*] 346 
Amy:   =(0.6) I would have thought that that might have  347 
     made him realise::, (.) a little ↑bit (.) about  348 
 
144 H. Garfinkel’s (e.g. 1967: 57, fn. 8, my emphasis) term.  
145 Mandelbaum’s (1990/1991: e.g. 333, my emphasis) term. 
146 On the inferential properties of occupational categories, see, e.g., Sacks (e.g. 1974 [1972]: 
223, fn. 2; 1992, Vol. I: 46-47, 249-250, 578-579). 
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    his ↑prejudices? 349 
     (.) 350 
Amy:   [.hhh    ] (.) ↑Uhm:. (0.8) but it totally= 351 
Rac:   [Mhm hmm.] 352 
Amy:   =↑didn’t. 353 
   (.) 354 
Amy: → He’d ↑still=.hhh (.) >I mean the other thing<  355 
  *that he::* (.) *that ‘e* (.) totally (.) doesn’t  356 
  take into a↑ccount.=.hh (.) Is the fact *that-*  357 
  (.) *Yes:* he was unemployed.=.hh (0.2) but  358 
  because ↑he’s¿ (0.3) *like* fr::om. (0.2) °.tch  359 
  .hhh° (0.3) quite a sort of (.) privileged family  360 
  an’ his friends tend to be ↑more sort of (0.4)  361 													Þ			uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business]= 362 
Rac:                                      [<Mhm.>  ] 363 
Amy:   =owners and ↑things=.hh (.) that his:: (0.5)  364 
    friend who:. (0.5) has (.) busi*ness.* (.) .hh  365 
  (0.2) was able to like (.hh) (0.2) Ehm:. (0.2)  366 
     give him a- (.) you know create a job for ‘im in  367 
  his (0.3) business. So [he      ] wasn’t= 368 
Rac:                          [(°.tch°)] 369 
Amy:   =unemployed for that long¿=.hh[h  370 
Rac:                                 [.tch y[eah. 371 
Amy:         [‘cuz he had  372 
  ↑connections?=.hhh (0.3) Eh:m. (0.3) and he (.)  373 
  totally l- (.) like lost *th:at.* .hh (.) And  374 
  then (.) so the following *year* I was speaking  375 
  to him near christmas (.) ↑and .hh (0.3) You  376 
  know. (.) it was ↑christmas (.) ehm (.) and I  377 
  think they’re with. (.) I think there was like a  378 
  scheme ↓where. (0.4) uhm. (.) people who got  379 
  certain benefits could get like. (.) reduced (.)  380 
  pri[ce ] st[amps¿] 381 
 
As observed in §4.6.1.3, Extract 20 instances a case in which a linguistically “classed” 
category, ‘middle class’ (l. 362; see →), is explicitly interconnected with an avowedly 
occupational and generalised category, ‘[business] [((…))] owners and ↑things=’ (ls. 
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362 and 364; see Þ). Again, Amy has produced an extended telling concerning her 
father’s lack of reflexivity concerning his experience of redundancy and 
unemployment. Over the course of this telling, Amy has attributed her father’s ability 
to secure subsequent employment to his network of connections, and, specifically, as 
a result of their ‘middle class’ (l. 362) status. This is the linguistically category in focus 
in this extract. The linguistically non-“classed” category with which it is 
interconnected is produced immediately following this as Amy unpacks the 
linguistically category, analogically (i.e. ‘like’ [l. 362]; see Lerner, 1994: 24),  
by reference to the occupations of her father’s friends: ‘like (.) [business] [((…))] 
owners and ↑things’ (ls. 362 and 364). In this turn, Amy not only self-explicates the 
underlying ontology of the focal category, as observed above, but, in so doing, 
inferentially “classes” the linguistically non-“classed” category, prospectively, 
designating it as a category that is to be relevantly interpretable in a “classed” faculty. 
Thus, this extract furnishes an instance in which a linguistically non-“classed” 
category becomes formulable as “classed” by reference to its epiphenomenal 
connection with a linguistically “classed” category. 
 
Through a single-case, this section has shown that linguistically non-“classed’ 
categories (e.g. ‘[business] [((…))] owners and ↑things=’ [ls. 362 and 364]) can be 
situated in terms of “social class” (e.g. Extract 20), explicitly, via their 
interconnections with linguistically “classed” categories (e.g. ‘middle class’ [l. 362]). 
In summary, I have provided an indication of how linguistically non-“classed” 
categories can be connected, treated as indicative of and/or synonymous to 
linguistically “classed” categories. On this basis, there are good reasons for analysing 
linguistically non-“classed” categories, and to abandon such (co-)productions would 
not only be unduly constrictive, but would overlook a forum of co-interlocutors’ 
ontological work. However, it is worth clarifying, further, that linguistically non-
“classed” categories need not be anchored to linguistic instantiations to warrant their 
classification in this way. Alternatively, they could qualify as such, differently, if 
distinguished as possibly “classed” – akin to how Schegloff’s (1996c; 2006b) use of 
“possibles” has been deployed by Whitehead (2015: 387, fn. 1) and Stokoe (2015: 
429), for example. Specifically, they can be classified as possibly “classed”, when 
understood as categories that are uniquely privileged on the basis of some  
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talk-extrinsic conceptualisation of “social class” that is reliant upon ‘extratextual 
knowledge’ (Antaki, 1998: 77), to borrow the phrase: 
 
“The usage is not meant as a token of analytic uncertainty or hedging. 
Its analytic locus is not in the first instance the world of the author and reader, 
but the world of the parties to the interaction. To describe some utterance, for 
example, as “a possible invitation” (Sacks, 1992: I: 300-2; Schegloff, 1992a: 
xxvi-xxvii) or “a possible complaint” (Schegloff, 1988c: 120-2) is to claim that 
there is a describable practice of talk-in-interaction which is usable to do 
recognizable invitations or complaints (a claim which can be documented by 
exemplars of exchanges in which such utterances were so recognized by their 
recipients), and that the utterance now being described can be understood to 
have been produced by such a practice, and is thus analyzable as an invitation 
or as a complaint. This claim is made, and can be defended, independent of 
whether the actual recipient on this occasion has treated it as an invitation or 
not, and independent of whether the speaker can be shown to have produced it 
for recognition as such on this occasion. Such an analytic stance is required to 
provide resources for accounts of “failures” to recognize an utterance as an 
invitation or complaint, for in order to claim that a recipient failed to recognize 
it as such or respond to it as such, one must be able to show that it was 
recognizable as such, i.e., that it was “a possible X” - for the participants 
(Schegloff, 1995, frth). The analyst’s treatment of an utterance as “a possible 
X” is then grounded in a claim about its having such a status for the 
participants.” 
(Schegloff, 1996c: 116-117, fn. 8, italics in original) 
 
Thus, linguistically non-“classed” instantiations are not to be omitted from the 
purview of EM/(M)CA when they are not designedly connected with linguistically 
“classed” categories. After all, it is expectable that there are occasions in which 
members trade upon their hearability as “classed” to accomplish this work indirectly 
(here, see Stokoe, 2011: 111). Rather, it is simply qualified that unless these 
membership categories are oriented to as “classed”, locally, they are merely to be 
regarded as permissively “classed” on some specification. They can be proposed, in 
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other words, as a “possible hearing”. 147 Two examples of such qualifications can be 
found in EM/(M)CA literature (i.e. Klein, 2011: 69; Whitehead, 2011: 19, fn. 8). In 
the former, the “non-recognitional” (see Sacks and Schegloff, 1979) formulation of 
‘black girl from the inner city’ (Klein, 2011: 69) is observed, parenthetically, as a form 
‘(which maybe a proxy for socioeconomic class)’ (ibid.). In the latter, Whitehead 
(2011: 19, fn. 8, my emphasis) notes that the form of occupational identifications 
‘may’ implicate racial and “classed” relevancies. To consider them otherwise, as 
unmediated instantiations, would verge on undue leniency, or to what has been 
labelled in a different context, as a “promiscuous” analysis (see, e.g., Schegloff, 
1998b: 256; 2007b: 476). This characterisation is set forth by Schegloff (1992b) in the 
following passage: 
 
“In my view, Sacks abandoned the use of ‘category-bound activities’ because 
of an incipient ‘promiscuous’ use of them, i.e., an unelaborated invocation of 
some vernacularly based assertion (i.e., that some activity was bound to some 
category) as an element of an account on the investigator’s authority, without 
deriving from it any analytic pay-off other than the claimed account for the 
data which motivated its introduction in the first place.” 
(Schegloff, 1992b: xlii) 
 
To read “classed” implicature onto membership categories when this is not made 
relevant by co-interlocutors would qualify, in this sense, as promiscuous. After all, 
there are an indefinitely extensible array of connotations which could be (relevantly) 
inferred, furnishing the grounds for indeterminacy. To dismiss such categories, 
however, would thereby expectably omit a variety of interactional work in which 
persons enact and/or orient to “social class”, in some way, but conduct this work 
inexplicitly, in ways that are not accountably “classed”. The role of EM/(M)CA 
research, after all, is not to attempt to assuage or alleviate this indexicality but is, 
instead, to eventuate, as Atkinson (1978: 183) writes, ‘members’ methods for 
repairing indexical particulars’ (see also, Stokoe, 2012[a]: n.p.g. in Hofstetter and 
Stokoe, 2015: 729). Linguistically non-“classed” categories, therefore, may be 
 
147 R. Watson’s (1974: 97) phrase. 
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described as “possibles” to this effect; categories for which there is a reasonable  
basis, for the analyst, to adjudicate them as “classed”, but for which evidence 
endogenous to the data is unavailable. 
 
4.8 Chapter summary 
The focus of this chapter has concerned “classed” membership categories, and their 
adjudication in EM/(M)CA research. The chapter began with a review of the 
traditional EM/(M)CA solution to this problem. I demonstrated that when one selects 
the proxies of “social class”, ex cathedra, they may accrue a diverse gamut of 
linguistically non-“classed” categories (§4.4; see Table 5); categories describable as 
“classed” when refracted through a particular prism (e.g. “wealth”). This approach 
was recognised to have a multitude of affordances; not the least of which was 
potentiating a coherent dialogue with FA research (here, see R. Watson, 1994: 177; 
see also, §7.2.3). This benefit notwithstanding, however, this approach was shown  
to be variously limiting and, fundamentally, defeasible (see §4.5). Theoretically, the 
conceptualisations of “social class” that are processed by co-interlocutors, in situ, can 
disengage with the concept as prescribed by analysts. This approach leaves the 
potential, therefore, for local defeasance (see Extract 10). Accordingly, it is on this 
basis that I have proposed an alternative point of departure for the respecification of 
“social class” in EM/(M)CA.  
 
The crux of my proposed alternative centres upon the analysis of linguistically 
“classed” forms; categories which announce their “classed” valence linguistically 
through their categorial design. The remainder of this chapter has detailed the 
prospective benefits of this approach and has concentrated on three affordances. The 
first concerned the matter of “agency”. I have shown that the availability of 
linguistically “classed” membership categories in the natural language provides a 
means for analysts to rehabilitate the onus of ontological work from analysts – with 
whom it has formerly resided – to co-interlocutors. I have proposed that these co-
productions furnish co-interlocutors with a resource by which to (dis)avow the 
relevance of “social class” for themselves, a matter previously shouldered by analysts 
(§4.4). The second affordance concerned “ontology”. I have shown that linguistically 
“classed” categories are serviced by co-interlocutors in various sequential positions 
(§4.6.1) to institutionalise an indefinitely expansive array of avowedly “classed” 
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ontologies (see §4.6.1.4). Notably, this includes conceptualisations of “social class” 
which might go unanticipated by analysts, contradict aprioristic theorisations and/or 
which might not even be encapsulated within the taken-for-granted remit of extant 
category-concepts within the natural language – at least in a recognisably “classed” 
faculty. Lastly, my third observation concerned “intersubjectivity”. Linguistically 
“classed” categories, I have shown, are routinely treated as sufficient for co-
interlocutors even on those occasions in which they do not self-explicate their 
underlying ontology (see §4.6.2). In so doing, they simultaneously confer access to 
those occasions in which co-interlocutors problematise such productions. 
 
These three observations, I propose, form the major empirical contributions of this 
chapter. The chapter concluded with a conceptual qualification. This concerned the 
residual status of linguistically non-“classed” categories; the exclusive locus of prior 
EM/(M)CA research. It was clarified, in this section, that the prioritisation of 
linguistically “classed” categories is not to forsake linguistically non-“classed” 
alternatives. This approach, I have proposed, need not be zero-sum, forbidding the 
analysis of designedly inexplicit resources (e.g. §4.7). Instead, two operations have 
been outlined that can be used to assimilate linguistically non-“classed”  
categories. The first was empirical. Analysts, for example, could focalise occasions  
in which co-interlocutors intertwine linguistically “classed” categories with 
linguistically non-“classed” instantiations. The second, in contrast, represents a 
rhetorical resource. On the occasions in which a membership category can be 
demarcated as “classed”, for analysts, according to some bases, but for which talk-
intrinsic evidence is deficient, such categories could be positioned as possibly 
“classed” instantiations. The footing of these resources could be construed, in other 
words, as categories that might be enacted by co-interlocutors in a “classed” tenor 
when submitted to particular readings – readings for which the co-interlocutors, 
themselves, neither ratify nor demonstrably disavow. 
 
To conclude, this chapter has proposed an alternative approach from which 
EM/(M)CA research on “social class” can depart. In this chapter, I have followed  
the suggestions of prior EM/(M)CA research (e.g. Whitehead, 2012) and proceeded 
by way of analysis. This has centred on the empirico-theoretic affordances of my 
proposed alternative. This chapter has thus attempted to carve a stable foothold from 
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which the EM/(M)CA analysis of “social class” can commence. In Chapter 5, I 
operationalise the framework established in this chapter to analyse formulations of 
“place”; a second recurring resource for which “social class” is mobilised in  
ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction.
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Chapter 5 – Place references 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It was shown in the previous chapter that “social class” can be made relevant by  
co-interlocutors through identifications and attributions of explicitly formulated 
“classed” categories. This chapter is devoted to a second practice that can make 
“social class” relevant, recurrently, in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction;  
namely, “references to place”. In this chapter, this practice is introduced as a 
multifaceted interactional resource that is (co-)produced by co-interlocutors to  
make “social class” demonstrably relevant – or at least permissibly, defeasibly  
and expectably salient – in some moment. The chapter begins with a review of  
how references to locations have been investigated previously in EM/(M)CA  
research. Drawing on a collection of naturalistic data examples, the remainder of  
the chapter demonstrates three interrelated, and hitherto un-explicated observations. 
 
(1) Co-interlocutors orient to the possession of a ‘common sense geography’ 
(here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 85; 1972b: 102), one that is organisable, at 
varying degrees of granularity (e.g. bars; cities; districts; villages, etc.), in 
terms of “social class”.  
(2) Co-interlocutors render this geography hearable/analysable as “classed” 
through various operations (e.g. “characterisations”; “allusions”; “co-
selections”; “intentional misidentifications”); interactional practices which 
instantiate the relevance of this device at differing degrees of explicitness and 
accountability. 
(3) Co-interlocutors can relevance “social class” through references to locations 
that are not mobilised purely in the service of referring, thereby further 
confirming Schegloff’s (1972a: 81; 1972b: 97) suspicion that ‘formulating 
locations can be of help in understanding seemingly quite unrelated 
conversational practices’. 
 
This chapter substantiates each of these observations. The first, however – as a 
comparatively substantive concern – is illustrated en passant; this is not pursued 
181 
explicitly but retrieved summarily. The chapter then concludes with a summary of 
each of my key findings. 
 
5.2 EM/(M)CA research 
References to place feature in EM/(M)CA literature in three recurrent capacities.  
 
(1) Selection: How are formulations of place selected in talk-in-interaction? 
(2) Social action: For what practical purposes are formulations of place produced? 
(3) Practices: How are formulations of place configured in talk-in-interaction? 
 
The focus of this chapter crystallises around the latter literature on “practices” in 
particular. My focus here concerns how vocalised formulations of place are 
constructed by co-interlocutors; 148 specifically, how such references are used to 
instantiate the relevance of “social class”. However, as this domain of inquiry 
intersects with the problematics of both “selection” and “social action” – as 
substantiated below – an abbreviated review of each strand of research will prove 
explicative. 
 
5.2.1 On selection 
All descriptions are, irremediably, selections. This proposition was introduced, 
initially, in Chapter 2 (§2.2.1), as the “problem of description” – or the ‘etcetera’ 
problem (Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91), inter alia. The extension of this problematic to 
formulations of place represents the central contribution of the first body of 
EM/(M)CA research, above (see Schegloff, 1972a: 80; 1972b: 96). Focal to this 
literature, specifically, are the criteria with respect to which such references are 
selected, and the lines of reasoning – or communicative competencies – which 
underlie their selection. This problematic has been shown to obtain to locative 
references in two capacities. 
 
 
148 The research reviewed here is confined to vocal references only. This reflects the 
constitution of my collection. A comparative review of embodied practices (e.g. Enfield, 
2013: 449) – qua ‘locationals’ (here, see Schegloff, 1984b: 282, 296, fn. 10) – and 
cartographic renderings of settings (e.g. Psathas, 1979), transcends the limits of space.  
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The first is generic. Locational formulations are positioned to be analogous to all 
objects of description (e.g. members) insofar as they too are liable to descriptive 
regress, relentlessly (see Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91). In other words, howsoever a 
location is categorised, for some practical purposes – and with whatever degree of 
(in)certitude, (in)exactitude, (in)sincerity, etc. – there concurrently co-exist an 
indefinitely extendable array of alternative formulations of that self-same referent  
(see also, Schegloff, 1991: 52). The result of this, as Moerman (1968b: 160) writes in 
another context, is that ‘the “truth” or “objective correctness” of an identification is 
never sufficient to explain its use’ (see §2.2.1; recall fn. 74). Formulations of locations 
are, in this respect, describable as “selections”, generically. In other words, they  
are equally susceptible to the “problem of description” and are relativised accordingly. 
 
The second is comparatively particular. This specialised dimension has been 
described by Enfield (2013: 451) as the ‘fractal’ constituency of place references. 
Formulations of locations, as objects of description, are unique in this respect, 
inasmuch as they can be constructed to ‘contain other places’ (ibid., italics in original). 
Accordingly, such formulations can not only be described in an infinite number of 
ways, theoretically, but they also permit constructions at endless degrees of 
geographical “granularity” (here, see Schegloff, 2000a: 715; see also, Schegloff, 
1972a: 81; 1972b: 97). This problematic, as outlined by Enfield (2013) obtains 
uniquely to locational formulations. The problem of description for this object is, 
therefore, twofold, where the latter compounds the former and represents a unique 
capacity in which references to place are describable as “selections”.   
 
These problematics have culminated in EM/(M)CA research on why particular 
formulations of locations are selected in talk-in-interaction, addressing both how 
locations are formulated, initially, as such, and reformulated. In the former, for 
example, Schegloff (1972a: 83; 1972b: 99) has demonstrated that the selection of 
locational formulations indexes a sensitivity towards, contingency upon, and 
appreciation of, three ‘orders of considerations’. These include: (1) the locations of 
co-interlocutors (i.e. “Location analysis”); (2) the categorial identities with which 
interactants are ascribed by use of particular formulations (i.e. “Membership 
analysis”); and (3), the topics and/or activities in/to which particular formulations 
have been selected to cohere (i.e. “Topic or Activity Analysis”). Conversely, in the 
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latter, Kitzinger, Lerner, Zinken, Wilkinson, Kevoe-Feldman and Ellis (2013) and 
Nattrass, Watermeyer, Robson and Penn (2017) have distinguished the logics 
according to which formulations of place are reformulated. The particulars of these 
analyses transcend the limits of space. It will suffice to note only that the status of 
place references, qua “selections”, has furnished a preliminary area of inquiry in 
EM/(M)CA research.   
 
5.2.2 On social action 
The predominant modality in which locational formulations have featured in 
EM/(M)CA research pertains to their use in the production of social action. In 
EM/(M)CA research on locational formulations, this has been described as a 
‘functional orientation’ (e.g. Auburn and Barnes, 2006: 45). This research focalises 
the range of social actions and activities for which the (co-)production – or the relevant 
non-production (e.g. Bergmann, 1992: 153-154) – of place references are used to 
effectuate. A comprehensive review of this literature also transcends the limits of 
space. It can be noted summarily, only, that locational formulations have been 
observed in a vast range of social actions. Inter alia, this includes accounts of/for 
conduct (e.g. Lynch, 1985: 244-245; Silverman, 1994: 438-440; McCabe and Stokoe, 
2004; Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 615-616, 636, fn. 6; Whitehead, 2013: 58; 2015: 
382, 387, fn. 3), assertions (e.g. Pomerantz, 1989: 107), challenges (see Pomerantz, 
1986: 226), complaints (see W. Sharrock and R. Turner, 1978: 183-184; Jefferson, 
1996: 40, 60, fn. 26; Barnes, 2000: 108-126; Stokoe and Wallwork, 2003; Barnes, 
Auburn and Lea, 2004; Whitehead, 2013: 59-60), identifications (e.g. Zimmerman, 
1992: 46; Hester and Fitzgerald, 1999: 180-182; Glenn, 2003: 145), insults (see Stokoe 
and Edwards, 2007: 337, 356-357), jokes (e.g. Coulter, 1973a: 142, fn. 3), puns (e.g. 
Jefferson, 1996: 17), preliminaries (e.g. Schegloff, 1980: 114), repair (e.g. Schegloff, 
1979b: 274; 1997a: 517-518; Kitzinger, Shaw and Toerien, 2012: 122, fn. 2) and 
storytellings (see Dingemanse, Rossi and Floyd, 2017; e.g. Jefferson, 1996: 23; 
Schegloff, 2007a: 238); specifically, to precipitate (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 760), 
furnish the tellability (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 13-15), recognisability (see Sidnell, 
2010: 179-181), and to organise the hearability of the latter activity, as such (see 
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Sacks, 1986: 132-134; J. R. E. Lee, 1987: 29-30; Lerner, 1992: 263). 149 Formulations 
of place, in this regard, like membership categories (recall §4.2), are not only 
susceptible to descriptive regress, but they also furnish a resource for a vast array of 
interactional work. 
 
5.2.3 On practices 
The final predominant way in which formulations of place have been analysed in 
EM/(M)CA research are the forms in which they are (co-)produced in talk-in-
interaction; that is, the practices in which they feature and are configured. This area 
of inquiry, whilst central, has not garnered equal attention to the study of “social 
action” (e.g. Kitzinger et al., 2013: 44). Two notable investigations, here, are 
Schegloff (1972a; 1972b), on “locational formulations”, reviewed in §5.2.1, and 
Psathas and Henslin (1967: 425) on “direction following” (here, see also, Psathas, 
1968: 515-517; 1979; 1986a; 1986b) in ‘the “radio-dispatched order”’. These 
investigations cohere with respect to the attention they award to co-interlocutors’ 
locative practices; that is, how references to place are formulated in talk-in-
interaction. These vocabularies, so delineated, are summarised in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Formulations of place 
Schegloff (1972a) Psathas and Henslin (1967) 
 
Relational terms  
 
 
e.g. ‘“downstairs,” “in 
front,” “across the 
street,”, etc.’ (ibid.: 88) 
 
Part of town 
(i.e. PT) 
e.g. ‘Clayton, 
Wellston, Ladue, 
Maplewood, etc.’ 
(ibid.: 430) 
Geographical 
Terms 
(i.e. G Terms) 
e.g. ‘street address (2903 
Main Street) and 
Street name 
and number  
(i.e. SNN) 
e.g. ‘22 South 
Euclid’  
(ibid.: 432) 
 
149 The purview of my review is constrained to singular actions only. Note that locational 
formulations also feature in orientations to topics (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 753-754, 758-761; 
here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 96-106; 1972b: 117-129) and in the production of “double-
barreled” (here, see Schegloff, 2007a: 76; Kitzinger et al., 2013: 48-50) social actions  
(e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 294-298; Jefferson and Schenkein, 1977: 99, fn. 4). 
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latitude-longitude 
specifications’ (ibid.: 97) 
Relation to 
members (i.e. Rm) 
e.g. ‘“John’s place,” 
“Al’s house,” “Dr. 
Brown’s office”’  
(ibid.: 97) 
Street name, 
intersection 
(i.e. SNI) 
e.g. ‘California 
and Clark […] at 
Leland’s bar’ 
(ibid.: 432). 
Relation to 
Landmark 
(i.e. R1) 
 
 
e.g. ‘“Three doors from 
the corner,” “three 
blocks after the traffic 
signal,” “the last street 
before the shopping 
center,” “behind”’  
(ibid.: 100) 
Name of 
place 
(i.e. NP1) 
e.g. ‘Chase 
(hotel)’  
(ibid.: 432). 
Course of action 
places 
e.g. ‘“where they leave 
the garbage”’ (ibid.: 101) 
Features of 
place 
(i.e. FP1) 
e.g. ‘5589 
Pershing […] at 
the garage’. 
(ibid.: 432) 
Place names 
(i.e. Rn) 
e.g. ‘“Bloomingdale’s”’ 
(ibid.: 101) 
 
 
The priority awarded to practices, in these investigations, distinguishes Schegloff 
(1972a; 1972b) and Psathas and Henslin (1967) in EM/(M)CA, where, in the main, 
these practices have not been “tracked” (see fn. 27), systematically, forming a 
subsidiary or an orthogonal focus to social action, only. One example of such a 
relegated focus has involved the analysis of how locational references themselves 
come to be categorised. 150 Whitehead and Lerner (2009: 616), for example, 
distinguish the practice of “asymmetrical contrastive pairs”, where a locational 
formulation that is configured categorially (e.g. ‘one is (down) like in the black 
section’ [ibid.: 615]; i.e. “race”) transforms another reference – one that is not 
formulated in commensurate terms (i.e. ‘a hotel’ [ibid.]) – such that it is to be 
 
150 This is related, but distinct of their ascriptive operation; that is, where the categorial 
incumbencies – or the ‘discourse identities’ (Zimmerman, 1992: 45; 1998: e.g. 90) – of 
speakers are co-implicated through their conduct (e.g. Coulter, 1990: 198-200; Eglin and 
Hester, 1999: 202; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 36; see also, Twer, 1972: 354-355; Egbert, 2004). 
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relevantly hearable in a relational capacity (e.g. ‘not black’ [ibid.]). This practice, 
elaborated below (see §5.5.3), is one resource that can be used to endow place 
references with categorial relevancies, including those pertaining to “race” (e.g. 
Whitehead, 2007: 42, 44, fn. 11), “social class” (e.g. J. Lee, 2016: 14), and their 
intersections (e.g. Whitehead, 2013: 57-58, 59-60). Nonetheless, this area of 
investigation has not formed the concentrated focus of EM/(M)CA research 
independently. 
 
5.3 My focus 
This chapter takes up this mantle. My focus concerns the practices used by co-
interlocutors to “class” locations. This is an object of considerable sociological 
scrutiny, 151 but marginal EM/(M)CA research. 152 This attention to practices is 
governed by the warrant articulated in §1.7.2; namely, before the praxiological 
functions of “classed” orientations are extricated, the methodical practices that are 
employed to accomplish this work, recurrently, require exposition. Like Chapter 4 
(§4.6.1), some of these practices revolve around the social actions for which they are 
(co-/re-)produced. These are recognised where appropriate. Nonetheless, a principled 
focus on “social action” will be held in abeyance until Chapter 6. The object of 
 
151 The present confines of space preclude a serious review of this research. Three lines of 
inquiry can be noted, only. This includes (1) how “classed” incumbents feel attached (e.g. 
Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2005a; 2005b; Bott, 1971: n.p.g. in Savage, 2008: 597-598), 
protected (e.g. Charlesworth, 2000: 221-222) and entrapped (e.g. Bourdieu, 1999a; 1999b; 
1999c; 2008 [1962]: Part 1: Ch. 2, Ch. 4; Part 3: Ch. 2; Charlesworth, 2000: 8, 67, 97-100, 
210-211; Wacquant, 2008: e.g. 46, 171) by locations; (2) how individuals are categorised into 
“social classes” by their locations (e.g. Burrows and Gane, 2006: e.g. 805-808; Parker et al., 
2007); and (3), how representations of spaces are “classed” (e.g. Reay, 1999: 98, 100; M. Holt 
and Griffin, 2005: 256-257; Skeggs, 2005: 55; Back, 2015: 10). 
152 Notably, interactions have been adduced in which locations are (co-)produced in 
linguistically (non-)“classed” terms (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol: II: 143, 386-387; McHoul and R. 
Watson, 1984: 292-293, 297; Stokoe and Smithson, 2001: 256; Ogden, 2004: 48-49; 
Reynolds, 2011: 416; Robles, 2016: 96-97). Such references have also appeared within 
“ethnographic allusions” (see §2.3.3), hypothetical cases (e.g. Speier, 1973: 186) and in 
instances in which “classed” categorisations of locations were expectable, but were not 
produced by co-interlocutors, in situ (e.g. Myers and Lampropoulou, 2013: 342, 344). 
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interest, here, centres upon the interactional practices that are serviced to “class” 
locations in talk-in-interaction, and whereby “social class” is instantiated through 
these references. 
 
5.4 Practices 
This section addresses the interactional practices employed by co-interlocutors to 
instantiate the relevance of “social class” when referring to locations in ordinary 
interactions. Primal, here, is a distinction articulated by Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 462, 758-
759) and Schegloff (1972a: 81-82; 1972b: 98-99), between two forms of place 
reference. The first refer to those occasions in which references to place function 
relevantly in the service of “referring”. The second, in contrast, refer to those 
employed to accomplish other forms of interactional work. Extracts 28 and 29 
illustrate this distinction (see →).
 
Extract 28: CallHome-eng-4610  
((A telephone call. Abby has been on the phone with Bradley. The latter has 
since passed the phone to David. The interaction is joined following a 
“compressed” call-opening.)) 153 
Dav:   [Where are] you an’ [‘ow’d you got a free= 111 
Abb:   [°↑Huhuh,°]         [Huh.=.hhhhhh= 112 
Dav:   =call.] 113 
Abb:   =     ]  114 
   (.) 115 
Dav:   [(↓Tell me] about [it.)] 116 
Abb: → [↑I’M     ]     [£I  ]’m in the Alnicks£. 117 
 
Extract 29: EJBH_F4_12 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ray, George and Harry are playing 
cards outside a café-cum-bar in Towerview.))
Har:   It’s the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I’ve ever= 104 
Ray:              [.hhh     ]   [If I’m not back in= 105 
 
153 On “compression devices” and “foreshortened call beginnings”, see Schegloff (e.g. 1986: 
130-132; 2007a: 89) and Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 169), respectively. 
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Har:   =seen.°] 106 
Ray: =      ] ten minutes, (0.4) send he(h)lp. 107 
Chu[↑huh.] 108 
   
((Five lines omitted.)) 
 
Ray:   Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you’ve  114 
→ s(h)ee(h)n.=Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class  115 
  Towerview thing you’ve seen in your life. 116 
Geo:   ↑Huh huh huh. 117 
 
In Extract 28, Abby’s reference to ‘the Alnicks£.’ (l. 117) typifies the former 
operation. The reference functions relevantly, in this case, to accomplish referring, 
forming a “type-conforming” (Schegloff, 2007a: 78; see also, Stivers and Heritage, 
2001: 169), albeit non-contiguous (see Sacks, 1987 [1973]: 58, 60), response to 
David’s “wh-interrogative” (i.e. l. 111; see Schegloff, 2002a: 297-298; see also, 
Laurier, 2001: 496-499). This type of reference will be referred to, hereinafter, 
following Schegloff (1972a: 81; 1972b: 97, my emphasis), as a “locational 
formulation”. Conversely, in Extract 29, Ray’s reference to the location of 
‘Towerview’ (l. 116) does not function analogously in an exclusively locative 
capacity. Instead, it represents a ‘non-place formulation’, or ‘non-locational 
formulation’ (Schegloff, 1972a: 82; 1972b: 98-99), furnishing a candidate, un-
explicated account of the activity about which Harry has previously complained (e.g. 
ls. 104 and 106). To distinguish this operation from the former, this practice will be 
referred to as a “place term”. 
 
5.5 Locational formulations 
The initial focus of this chapter addresses the former practice of “locational 
formulations” (i.e. Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b). My focus concerns how these 
constructions are demarcated as “classed” through the production of linguistically 
(non-)“classed” terms. Specifically, this section details four resources employed 
recurrently, by co-interlocutors, whereby this relevance is instantiated; namely, 
“characterisations” (see Extracts 25, 30, 31 and 32), “allusions” (see Extracts 28, 33 
and 34), “co-selections” (see Extracts 28, 25, 35 and 33) and “intentional 
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misidentifications” (see Extracts 36, 37 and 38). In so doing, it is shown that the 
“classed” relevance of “locational formulations” can be accomplished variously – and 
with a considerable degree of flexibility and greater or lesser degrees of explicitness. 
In the interests of brevity, each analysis zeroes in on the focal practice. Non-focal 
interactional particulars are disattended and glossed. The counterpart to this 
investigation, regarding “place terms”, is then outlined (i.e. §5.7). 
 
5.5.1 Characterisations  
The most overt and direct mechanism that is employed to “class” locational 
formulations in my collection is the production of designedly “classed” 
“characterisations”. On these occasions, a locational formulation is produced and 
categorised by its progenitor in “classed” terms. Broadly, this practice can occur 
directly or indirectly. In the former, co-interlocutors classify their locations in 
linguistically (non-)“classed” terms, positioning “social class” as a property of these 
locations straightforwardly through a “classed” description thereof. The second 
operation, in contrast, functions comparatively indirectly. On these occasions, the 
locations themselves are not classified in “classed” terms, but are constructed 
inferentially, as such, by reference to the “classed” composition of the referred to 
location(s). These two forms of “classed” characterisations are described in this 
section in turn. 
 
5.5.1.1 “Classed” descriptions  
The description of locational formulations in “classed” terms is a straightforward 
resource whereby the relevance of “social class”, as a device, can be instantiated. 
Extracts 25 and 30 present two variants of this practice. In both cases, the co-
interlocutor who produces the locational formulation also produces the “classed” 
characterisation thereof (see →). Extract 25 presents a first linguistically “classed” 
version of this operation.  
 
Extract 25 (Reproduced): SWB2353 
((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; 
specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.)) 
Ali:   Uh=They’re encouraged to do that (0.2) .hhh 28 
  missionary work (.) .hhh  an’ I bel- I really 29 
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  believe that the people that do that h. (0.9)  30 
  Are:: (0.2) better people an’ are make our  31 
  [society better.] 32 
Bri:   [You know I-    ] I really ↑agree with you. 33 
   (0.3) 34 
Bri:   Uhm. (0.3) .tch (0.2) I’uh (0.2) though I’ve  35 
  never done that myself, I-I’m (.) was a (0.2) 36 
  basically an education major when I graduated  37 
  from college, (0.2) .hh (.) an’ I accepted a  38 
  ↑Job, (0.2) that at the time was jus’ (0.2)  39 
  slightly above the Poverty level to teach  40 
  (0.6) to uhm (.) .tch (0.2) very Rural (0.6)  41 
        children in a very Low income district. (0.8)  42 
  and I (0.2) sp:ent a year teaching there.  43 
  (0.2) 44 
Ali:   [Uhuh,            ] 45 
Bri:   [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2) 46 
largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences 47 
→ because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class, 48 
White suburban home, 49 
   (0.2) 50 
Ali:   Uhuh, 51 
   (.) 52 
Bri: And I Did It (0.2) Uhm. (0.6) For one reason I 53 
(won this) (.) I was (.) working on Masters’ 54 
degree so I wanted to stay close to where I was 55 
working on a Masters’ degree.=.hhh (0.2) But also 56 
be↑cause: I just thought it would be interesting 57 
to live someplace else (.) so totally different 58 
then my own (.) ↑upbringing.  59 
 
Focal here is Brian’s reference to his ‘home,’ (l. 49); the location in which he was 
raised (see ls. 56-59). This formulation is classified by Brian, in linguistically 
“classed” terms, through a direct description of this location. In this case, this is 
produced as part of a “cumulative” categorial description (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 
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Ch. 3): ‘a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White suburban home,’ (ls. 48-49). 154 This 
description incorporates a linguistically “classed” descriptor as a medial list 
component; namely, ‘middle class,’ (l. 48). Brian’s ‘home,’ (l. 49) is characterised, 
accordingly, as designedly “(middle) classed”, in a cumulative and contributory 
respect. This is a direct mechanism whereby Brian’s formulation is depicted as 
avowedly “classed”; where the location is pronounced explicitly in linguistically 
“classed” terms. 155 This practice appears, accordingly, as an overt mechanism used 
by co-interlocutors to “class” locational formulations. 
 
Extract 30 presents a linguistically non-“classed” example of this practice in action.    
 
Extract 30: CABNC [KBB_38] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Sue and Terry co-deliver a storytelling 
to Anne and Dennis.)) 156
Sue:   ↑Ooh you know that teapot we had on our welsh  1 
  dresser. 2 
  (0.2) 3 
Ann:   Yeah¿ 4 
  (0.4) 5 
Sue:   Some man [came] round.=Well (.) came round= 6 
Ter:            [Oh. ]  7 
Sue:   =earlier in the ↑year we sold him °*bits.*° 8 
  (0.9) 9 
Ann:   [(°Oh.°)] 10 
Ter:   [Aye.   ] he'd (come rou-)] 11 
Sue:   [TEN poun                 ]ds. 12 
  (0.7) 13 
Ann:   Ten ↑pound [(t-) that] [old] tea[pot.] 14 
Ter:              [Fer::    ] [( )]    [No. ] 15 
  (0.2) 16 
Ter:   She- (.) ↑ that, you know, [ten (0.2)= 17 
 
154 On “cumulative-category lists” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3), recall §4.6.2.  
155 For an additional linguistically “classed” example, see Stokoe and Smithson (2001: 256). 
156 On the “elaboration” of storytellings by consociates, see Lerner (1992: 263-264). 
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Sue:                              [I remember.=  18 
Ter:   =pounds,] 19 
Sue:   =       ]  20 
Sue:   It didn't really match (.) the things on our  21 
  Welsh dresser. He said, I'll [give you] ten=  22 
Ter:                                [°Mm.°   ] 23 
Sue:   =pounds for *that.* 24 
  (0.6) 25 
Ter:   °Mm.° 26 
  (0.4) 27 
Sue:   °So [I said°] (.)=  28 
Ann:       [°↑hm°  ] 29 
Sue:   =you might [as° well,      ] 30 
Den:              [Might have Been] Worth A  31 
  THOUSAND. 32 
Sue:   ↑Hhhh. £D(hh)oubt [it.£  ]  huh [huh.= 33 
Ann:                     [>(  )<]      [Do you= 34 
Sue:   =  ] 35 
Ann:   =wa]tch the [antique]= 36 
Ter:               [Well I-] 37 
Ann:   =ro[adshow.]   38 
Sue:      [Yes.   ]= 39 
(?):   =[°(                )°] 40 
Den:    [Antiques [↓Roadshow?] 41 
Ter:              [I ↑think- ] I think what decided him  42 
  though I says, (0.2) funny enough I says there were  43 
  one just like this at Harrick (0.2) .hhh  44 
  and I didn't (.) ↑qualify where it was (0.2)  45 
  but it (0.2) he latched on to it imm- it's  46 
→ ↓er:: (0.4) °*a- a-*° posh place you know  47 
  [Harrick ] one of [these]= 48 
Den:   [°M[hm.° ]        [°mm.°] 49 
Ann:      [Yeah.] 50 
Ter:   =(0.4) histori[cal. ] 51 
Sue:                 [Yeah.]  52 
  (.) 53 
Ter:   .hhh 54 
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Den:   Mhm[hmm.]  55 
Ter:      [an  ]d only like a village but (0.2) ‘ter  56 
  [(.) very]= 57 
Sue:   [Yeah.   ]=  58 
Ter:   =old’n (0.2) .hhh I said there one in antique  59 
  shop  (0.3) exactly like that but I said, but  60 
  it were (.) cracked (.) and they wanted  61 
  twenty six ↑pound for it.  62 
  (0.2) 63 
Ann:   ↑Mm[:.] 64 
Ter:      [I ] said, I don't know whether (0.2) 65 
  it's, they've sold it. (.) As soon as I said  66 
  that he (.) [said I'll= 67 
Sue:               [He went in 68 
  anyway                ]=  69 
Ter:   =give you ten [pound. ] 70 
Den:                 [Hah hah] 71 
Sue:   =and [I thought we mi]ght=  72 
Den:        [hah hah.       ] 73 
Sue:   =as well have ten (.) [pounds be]cause .h= 74 
Ann:                          [Yeah,    ]  75 
Sue:   =(.) eh- (0.2) It Was (0.2) we've Got (.) 76 
  >too many bits on the Welsh dresser [anyway.] 77 
 
The locational formulation in focus, here, is ‘Harrick’ (ls. 44 and 48), produced by 
Terry; what is positioned, subsequently, as a location resembling a ‘village’ (l. 56). 
This formulation is produced by Terry in his co-telling of a story, with Sue, about a 
non-present party who purchased an errant (i.e. out-of-place; e.g. ls. 21 and 76-77) 
teapot from them. It features within this telling as the location in which Terry 
encountered the same item, albeit ‘cracked’ (l. 61), and of which he informed the 
prospective buyer of its price (i.e. ‘twenty six ↑pound’ [l. 62]); a purportedly strategic 
manoeuvre. 157  
 
157 Specifically, this formulation is deployed to qualify that Terry was aware of the 
possibly “classed” status of this location when this was recalled to the prospective 
buyer under the aegis of a topical “coincidence” (i.e. ‘I says, (0.2) funny enough’ [l. 
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Like Extract 25, this location is characterised as “classed” in a directly formulated 
assessment by Terry. Unlike in Extract 25, however, in which the location is 
incorporated within a cumulative listing, ‘Harrick’ (ls. 44 and 48) is classified, 
initially, using a linguistically non-“classed” description, only; that is, as a ‘posh 
place’ (l. 47). While the nature of the location is then progressively (re)specified by 
Terry, as a canonically (i.e. ‘one of [these]=’ [l. 48]; here, see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 
80) historical location (ls. 51 and 59) – one that approximates a ‘village’ (l. 56) – its 
possibly “classed” relevance remains formulated directly upon its initial point of 
production. 158    
 
Extracts 25 and 30 thus present two cases in which locational formulations are 
characterised directly in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms. In Extract 25, this 
involved the linguistically “classed” description, ‘middle class,’ (l. 48). This was 
produced in a cumulative listing, by Brian, contrasting this with the location in which 
he later worked. In Extract 30, in contrast, the possibly “classed” descriptor, ‘posh 
place’ (l. 47), was ascribed by Terry. Extracts 25 and 30 both then involve a co-
interlocutor directly characterising a locational formulation in terms that could be 
considered relevantly “classed”. Describing locations directly in “classed” terms 
appears, therefore, to furnish a resource whereby the relevance of “social class” is 
asserted directly.   
 
 
 
 
43]; here, see Kitzinger et al., 2012: 122, fn. 2). His orientation to this locational formulation 
in his reported interaction is constructed, in this respect, as a designedly intentional disclosure. 
It portrays Terry as deliberately making available the possibly “classed” relevance of this 
location to a party whom he had appraised, successfully, qua ‘knowing recipient’, to borrow 
the expression (here, see Goodwin, 1979: 100, italics in original; see also, Lerner, 1992: 250); 
that is, one who knows how to inspect this locational formulation appropriately upon the 
occasion of its (co-)production (relatedly, see Schegloff, 1972a: 91-92, 115; 1972b: 111, 130). 
It is in this capacity that the reference is depicted by Terry qua stratagem. 
158 On formulations of “classed” collectives, see §7.4.2 and fn. 267. 
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5.5.1.2 “Classed” composition 
The “classed” descriptions in Extracts 25 and 30 have centred on the locational 
formulations themselves. They are described as “classed” directly in this respect. A 
comparatively indirect resource that achieves comparable work involves “classing”  
a component that is comprised within, and/or which is epiphenomenal of the  
referred to location. Descriptions of inhabitants – and/or the persons positioned to 
‘own’ locations (here, see McHoul and R. Watson, 1984: 297) – is one resource used 
to this effect. 159 A linguistically “classed” example of this practice has been 
encountered in Extract 17. Here, the “classed” anatomy of Peru was self-explicated  
by John (ls. 418, 420, 422, 424, 428, 430, 432, 434, 436-437 and 439) as a competitive 
rendering (cf. ls. 415, 417 and 419) that was assimilated by Adam, subsequently  
(see ls. 440-441 and 443). Two further examples of this work are considered below,  
where a co-interlocutor “classes” a location (see →) by categorising its populace in 
linguistically (non-)“classed” terms (see Þ). 160 Locational formulations are 
constructed as “classed”, in this way, through references to constituent categories. 
Extracts 31 and 32 present a linguistic and a linguistically non-“classed” version of 
this practice, respectively.  
 
Extract 31: UCDiscLab [Ccon1a] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Eric, Derek and Chloe are discussing 
the works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky.)) 
Eri:   You know what [his ↑point] ↓though is: °that= 24 
Chl:                 [Mm:.      ] 25 
Eri:   =everybody is like that.° 26 
  (0.5) 27 
(?):   .tch .hhh= 28 
Eri:   =[His point was to] make you f:eel like that= 29 
 
159 Relatedly, see W. Sharrock (1974). See also, §7.4.1. 
160 For linguistically non-“classed” examples of this practice, see Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 386-
387) and Robles (2016: 96-97). For linguistically “classed” cases, see McHoul and R. Watson 
(1984: 292-293, 297) and Reynolds (2011: 416). For a related practice within FA research, 
see M. Holt and Griffin (2005: 253-255). On the relevant absence of linguistically non-
“classed” occupants, see Extract 35 and fn. 167.  
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Chl:   =[↑No::.          ] 30 
Eri:   =then [make you see¿] °god [you are° ] 31 
Chl:         [He ↑thinks   ]      [He stings] on  32 
  some people much wor=↑He hates the French:. 33 
  (0.5) 34 
Chl:   He zings. °Doesn’t [he ↑talk] 35 
Eri:                      [Yah he  ] you know what  36 
  he [does= 37 
Chl:      [zings on= 38 
Eri:   =because.] He’s- [e’s He zings   ] [ON THE=  39 
Chl:   =French  ]       [much more often] [HE ( )= 40 
Eri:   =FREN]CH only becau- (.) he doesn’t really= 41 
Chl:   =    ] 42 
Eri:   =zing on the French. .hhh He zings on the  43 
  Russian intelle- intelligentsia.  44 
  (0.3) 45 
Eri:   ↓Who:=See you [gotta realise what was going= 46 
Chl:                 [<He started speaking 47 
Eri:   =on at the time. [There  ] [was    ] a lot=  48 
Chl:             [French>] [(     )] 49 
Der:                              [(Yeah.)]  50 
Eri:   =of shit going on at the time. 51 
  (0.4) 52 
Der:   [You see-     ] 53 
Eri:   [(Hate) stuff.] 54 
  (0.2) 55 
Eri:   That ↓the right at the (  )¿ there was  56 
→ like (0.6) there’s always been two ↓classes  57 														Þ in Russia. Always. And the intelligentsia  58 
  (0.5) just sh:it on (.) >the normal  59 
  Russians.< They never spoke Russian. 60 
  (0.8) 61 
Eri:   The Russian (°the uh° / (0.4)) that’s ‘cuz  62 
  they: imported like (0.2) one this- (.) their  63 
  Tsars and ever ↑since then (0.3) 64 
Chl:   °Mm hmm.°= 65 
Eri:   =There wa- They had this German Tsar who >w- 66 
 197 
  w- we know< would always French or German but  67 
  would never speak ↑Russian.=[One of them= 68 
Chl:                      [°That’s true.°= 69 
Eri:   =didn’t] even know their ↑language.= 70 
Chl:   =      ] 71 
Chl:   =I know. 72 
  (0.4) 73 
Eri:   So they’ve always had this (0.2) like (0.3)  74 
  complete (.) dichotomy in the Russian people  75 
  who have never understood¿ 76 
  (0.6) 77 
  ((Banging.)) 78 
  (0.2) 79 
Eri:   °You [↓know.°] 80 
 
The focal locational formulation is ‘Russia’ (l. 58). This is produced by Eric as he 
distinguishes – specifically, “formulates” (i.e. ‘You know what [his ↑point] ↓though 
is:’ [l. 24]; see H. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; Heritage and R. Watson, 1979)  161 – the 
central point of criticism in Dostoyevsky’s oeuvre; namely, ‘the Russian intelle- 
intelligentsia.’ (ls. 43-44). Reference to this location is made as Eric accounts for his 
assertion by invoking the socio-historical context in which Dostoyevsky was situated 
(e.g. ls. 46, 48, 51 and 54); what is subsequently transformed into a designedly 
immortal assertion (e.g. ‘always’ [l. 57]; ‘Always’ [l. 58]) assertion. It is in the 
elaboration of this context in which Eric “classes” Russia by articulating the  
bipartite “classed” topography of this location: ‘there’s always been two ↓classes in 
Russia. Always.’ (ls. 57-58). 162  
 
The two “social classes” disaggregated by Eric in this description include ‘the 
intelligentsia’ (l. 58) and ‘>the normal Russians.<’ (ls. 59-60). These categories are 
depicted as the two “classes” of which this location consists. ‘Russia’ (l. 58), as a 
 
161 On this construction, see Jalbert (1984: 32) and Drew (2003a). 
162 For formulations of “social class” as a “two-set” (Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 47-48) 
device, see fn. 42 and §7.3.3. On the “temporal” implications of this formulation, see 
§7.3.2. 
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locational formulation, is thus construed as “classed” indirectly. It is not categorised 
as such through some “classed” description, or by evoking its “classed” connotations 
or relevancies (cf. §5.5.1.1). This relationship is explicated by Eric, instead, as he 
outlines the endogenous “classed” systematics of this location, disaggregating the two 
constituent membership categories which together compose (and exhaust) this 
taxonomy. 
 
A cognate example of this practice is shown in Extract 32. However, in this case, 
reference is made to a single “classed” membership category that occupies this 
location, only; not to the complete “classed” topography thereof (cf. Extract 17; 
Extract 31). This is produced by Pam in her characterisation of ‘Barley’ (l. 169); an 
institute of higher education.   
 
Extract 32: CTS05 
((A telephone call. Pam and Steve have just discussed their preferences for 
public transport.))
Pam:   I’m going to get the bus to town when I go to 164 
  college. 165 
  (1.0) 166 
Ste:   Eh? 167 
Pam:   I’ll be getting the bus to town when I go to  168 
→ college.<I got got a letter off Barley this  169 
  morning. 170 
Ste:   Oh yeah 171 
  (.) 172 
Ste:   Saying what. 173 
Pam:   Saying er:m .hhh hhhh did I want to come and  174 
  erm .hhh  175 
  to the open evenings.  176 
Ste:   .hhh When’s that. 177 
  (0.6) 178 
Pam:   When.= 179 
Ste:   =Yeah. 180 
Pam:   I don’t know. I’m not going to open  181 
  ((Yawns.)) I don’t want to go there now ‘cuz  182 
 199 
															Þ	(0.6) ((Yawns.)) Apparently it’s full of  183 
  scallies.  184 
  (0.8) 185 
Pam:   ↑An’::d= 186 
Ste:   =>[I wouldn’t-] I don’t know¿ .Hhhhhh= 187 
Pam:     [Appa-      ] 188 
Pam:   =in my course there was like (.) 189 
 
The membership “classed” category in focus in this extract is the linguistically non-
“classed” term, ‘scallies.’ (l. 184). 163 This is produced by Pam as she explicitly 
accounts (‘‘cuz’ [l. 182]) for why she will not attend an open-event at ‘Barley’ (l. 169). 
The category features within this account as newly-acquired (i.e. ‘now’ [l. 182]) 
second-hand knowledge (i.e. ‘Apparently’ [l. 183]) of the location’s “classed” 
ecology, and regarding its predominant (i.e. ‘full of’ [l. 183]) “classed” grouping, 
specifically: ‘Apparently it’s full of scallies.’ (ls. 183-184). 164 Thus, ‘Barley’ (l. 169) 
is positioned as possibly “classed” in a vicarious manner. Like Extracts 17 and 31,  
this is accomplished not through a directly formulated “classed” characterisation of 
the location, but comparatively indirectly through reference to its “classed” categorial 
constituency. 
 
In this case, Pam’s reference takes a different form to the categories adduced in 
Extracts 17 and 31. These locations, it will be recalled, have been designated in 
“classed” terms through reference to designedly comprehensive “classed” schema; 
that is, where all the occupants of these locations are designedly subsumed; 
specifically, as a trichotomy (i.e. Extract 17; viz. “no money” [ls. 415, 417 and 419]; 
‘a growing middle [((…))] class’ (ls. 434 and 436); “lots of money” [ls. 422 and 428]) 
 
163 This category refers to ‘working class, young, white, unemployed men’ (Jackson, 
2011a: 103; fn. 36). For further information, see Stockill and Kitzinger (2007: 235,  
fn. 3). 
164 For further references to a categorial-majority within a setting, see Extract 20  
(ls. 296-297 and 299) and Extract 37 (ls. 23-24). For an example that pertains to 
settings as a unit of analysis, see Extract 40 (ls. 23-25). Relatedly, concerning 
categorial-density, see Extract 38 (l. 264). 
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and a dichotomy (i.e. Extract 31; viz. ‘the intelligentsia’ [l. 58]; ‘>the normal 
Russians.<’ [ls. 59-60]), respectively. In these cases, therefore, all the categories 
which designedly compose the device (i.e. “social class”) are adduced; that is, 
articulated. The device is positioned, accordingly, such that it encapsulates all 
members of the population comprised (recall fn. 26 and fn. 98). Moreover, these 
groupings are positioned as those which are “generated” 165 by the locations from 
which they are derived and positioned as are unique in this respect. 
 
In Extract 32, in contrast, the “classed” reference takes a different form. The category, 
‘scallies.’ (l. 184), in this extract, is positioned only as the modal, free-floating 
category that purportedly (qua “hearsay” [see Lerner, 1992: 251]) inheres to this 
location. It is not situated, conversely, as the exclusive/homogenous category, nor 
situated as part of a broader taxonomy of “classed” categories. Pam does not, for 
example, proposedly classify all of the occupants of this location, and thereby cast 
“social class”, as such, as a referentially totalising device (here, see §7.3.4). 
Furthermore, it is produced in a reference that does not stipulate the relationship 
between this category and the focal location; nor claim referential exhaustion. It is 
positioned only as a predominant category (i.e. ‘full of’ [l. 183]) – not one that is 
necessarily tied/bound and/or generated thereby. These differences separate the 
membership category deployed by Pam from those in Extracts 17 and 31. 
Nevertheless, the work that is enacted by reference to this group approximates: 
‘Barley’ (l. 169) is designated as “classed” through reference to the designedly 
prevalent status of this category. 
 
Locational formulations are not “classed”, then, only by direct characterisation in 
linguistically (non-)“classed” terms. Rather, a comparatively inexplicit resource that 
can be used to this effect involves orienting to the “classed” composition of the 
referred to location(s). For Extracts 17 and 31, for example, these constitutions were 
arrayed exhaustively, whereby a complete “classed” system was “distributionalised”, 
166 in situ. Alternatively, as illustrated by Extract 32, co-interlocutors can employ 
 
165 Relatedly, see R. Turner (1970: n.p.g. [EJBH: 184] in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 37). 
166 Sacks’ (1992: n.p.g. [EJBH: Vol. II: 422] in Drew and E. Holt, 1998: 498-499) term. 
 201 
single “classed” membership categories to this effect; in this case, the purportedly 
prevalent, endemic category, ‘scallies’ (l. 184). Locational formulations can in this 
way be “classed” indirectly through reference to their designedly “classed” 
constituents. 167  
 
 
 
167 Extracts 31 and 32 offer cases in which this work is accomplished by references to 
linguistically (non-)“classed” membership categories (i.e. ‘the intelligentsia’ [l. 58; Extract 
31], ‘>the normal Russians.<’ [ls. 59-60; Extract 31]; ‘scallies.’ [l. 184; Extract 32]) which 
proposedly occupy (and/or dwell at) these locations (e.g. ‘there’s always been two ↓classes in 
Russia.’ [ls. 57-58; Extract 31]; ‘Apparently it’s full of scallies.’ [ls. 183-184; Extract 32). 
However, notice that this practice can also revolve around the relevant absence of 
linguistically (non-)“classed” categories. In Extract 35, for example, it is the normative 
inoccupancy of ‘scallies’ (l. 424) in the location of ‘(West Bar)’ (ls. 423-424) that 
accomplishes this work. For a related example, see Ogden (2004: 48-49). 
Note that this practice also obtains for relationships between the incumbents of 
“classed” membership categories and locations, in addition to locations and alternative forms 
of “classed” constituents. Examples of both of variations can be observed in Extract 33, vis-
à-vis the locational formulation, ‘The ↑Keys¿’ (l. 59). The former, produced by Ruth, trades 
upon the ‘category-bound obligations and rights’ (R. Watson, 1978 in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 
35; see Potter, 1996: 140-142; see §7.4.1) of a possibly “classed” (i.e. ‘=Really posh’ [l. 80]) 
non-present party (i.e. ‘Our boss’ [l. 76]) to designate this setting as the site for ‘work drinks.’ 
(l. 71). Conversely, in the latter, Faye orients towards the potentially “classed” (i.e. ‘↑So 
fancy.’ [l. 91]) cosmetics (i.e. ‘↑beauty products [l. 93]) that are available at this location (i.e. 
‘They’ve got really fancy ↑beauty products in the bathrooms and everything.’ [ls. 93-94]).  
Note that Faye’s orientation to “classed” objects in a location has already been seen 
in Extract 30 during Terry’s reported sale. In this case, the teapot is positioned as an object 
that was also for sale at ‘Harrick’ (l. 44). It is positioned, accordingly, as a type of object 
constitutive of this setting. Terry’s disclosure, however, unlike Faye’s (cf. Extract 33; ls. 93-
94), is not hearable such that it directly “classes” this location. Instead, it trades upon the 
potential for his prospective buyer to position Terry’s teapot as an object that was “in-stock” 
at a location that is recognisably “classed” (i.e. ‘posh place’ [l. 47]) to motivate a sale 
(relatedly, see Pinch and Clark, 1986: 180). The forms and relationships between locations 
and designedly “classed” constituents are, therefore, diverse and can be exploited by co-
interlocutors for a range of interactional work. 
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5.5.2 Allusions 
A sister practice to characterising a location in terms of “social class”, upon its 
production, belongs to the recipients of locational formulations. Upon production, 
recipients can draw linguistically (non-)“classed” allusions (see →) about/from the 
focal location (see Þ). This practice is distinguished from characterisations as their 
(possibly) “classed” relevance is not established by the progenitor of the locational 
formulation; instead, it is extracted as an allusion by a co-interlocutor. Extracts 28, 33 
and 34 present three examples of this practice. 168 In each, the allusions produced 
invoke the linguistically non-“classed” status of the named locational formulation; 
they are describable as possibly “classed” in this respect.  
 
Extract 28 (Reproduced): CallHome-eng-4610  
((A telephone call. Abby has been on the phone with Bradley. The latter has 
since passed the phone to David. The interaction is joined following a 
“compressed” call-opening [see fn. 153].)) 
Dav:   [Where are] you an’ [‘ow’d you got a free= 111 
Abb:   [°↑Huhuh,°]         [Huh.=.hhhhhh= 112 
Dav:   =call.] 113 
Abb:   =     ]  114 
   (.) 115 
Dav:   [(↓Tell me] about [it.)] 116 
Abb: Þ [↑I’M     ]       [£I  ]’m in the Alnicks£. 117 
   (.) 118 
Dav:   ↑H’yeah? 119 
   (0.3) 120 
Abb:   Eh-  121 
Dav:   W[hich on]e. 122 
Abb:    [I’m-   ] 123 
   (0.4) 124 
Abb: Þ Uhm. (0.4) Actually I’m in (.) Roustam. 125 
Dav:   [(   )] 126 
Abb: Þ [Which] is between:. (.) >United Alnick and 127 
   North Alnick I guess. 128 
 
168 For a linguistically “classed” example, see Reynolds (2011: 416). 
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Dav: → That sounds enormously Posh:. 129 
Abb:   It’s- (.) .hhh It’s super Posh.=Here I Am  130 
   going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks. My 131 
   summer is just filled with luxury. 132 
   (0.2) 133 
Dav:   Soun[ds ↑wonderfu][l.  ] 134 
Abb:       [hhhh.       ][>↑hu]h ↑huh ↑HUH< 135 
 
The locational formulation in focus here is that which is produced initially as ‘the 
Alnicks£.’ (l. 117), by Abby. Subsequently, this reference is reformulated over the 
course of this sequence into a finer (i.e. ‘Roustam’ [l. 125]) and then a broadened (i.e. 
‘[which] is between:. (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ [ls. 127-128]; 
here, see Lerner et al., 2012: 209-210; Kitzinger et al., 2013: 45) degree of 
geographical “granularity” (see Schegloff, 2000a). The former follows a claim of 
recognition – or a ‘newsmark’ (see Jefferson, 1981a: 62-66 in Heritage, 1984b: 340, 
fn. 13; i.e. ‘↑H’yeah?’ [l. 119]) – and then a display of recognition, from David (i.e. 
‘W[hich on]e.’ [l. 122]). 169 The latter, by contrast, is an unsolicited incremental 
expansion (here, see Schegloff, 2016 [2001]; Ford, Fox and S. Thompson, 2002b) in 
the form of an “intersectional” (Psathas and Henslin, 1967: 432) or “relational” 
construction (Schegloff, 1972a: 88, 98, 102; 1972b: 106, 119, 124; i.e. ‘[which] is 
between:. (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ [ls. 127-128]). 
 
Like the references to place produced in Extracts 25, 30, 31 and 32, this reference is 
serviced qua “locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b); that is, in the 
service of referring. Unique to this extract, however, is that the “classed” relevance of 
this location is not ascribed by its progenitor, Abby, upon its points of production. 
Neither in Abby’s initial formulation (i.e. l. 117), nor her subsequent reformulations 
(i.e. ls. 125 and 127-128), are “classed” relevancies endowed explicitly. 170 The 
 
169 On “claimed” and “displayed” recognition vis-à-vis locational formulations, see 
Heritage (2007).  
170 This is not to say, however, that Abby’s locational formulations are devoid of 
notable productional and structural features. Abby’s initial formulation (l. 117), for 
example, is delivered as non-standard through its increased amplitude and elevated 
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linguistically non-“classed” inference that is extracted about this location is 
instantiated, instead, by her co-interlocutor, David, in an unspecified (i.e. ‘That’ [l. 
129]) allusion that is drawn in response to Abby’s turn: ‘That sounds enormously 
Posh:.’ (l. 129). 171 
 
The locus of this allusion is designedly equivocal in David’s turn. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the possibly “classed” status of Abby’s formulation(s) is proffered by her 
recipient, David; positioned as an allusion that is drawn about/from some unspecified 
component(s) thereof. In this case, David’s allusion is subsequently ratified by Abby 
(cf. Schegloff, 1996a) and, further, upgraded (see Ogden, 2006: 1760). This is marked 
as Abby recycles David’s linguistically non-“classed” superlative (i.e. ‘Posh:.’ [l. 
129]) – previously used in an evidentially mitigated formulation (i.e. ‘sounds’ [l. 129]) 
– and upgrades the degree (i.e. ‘super’ [l. 130]) to which it is classifiable as such: ‘It’s- 
(.) .hhh It’s super Posh.’ (l. 130). 172 
 
Extract 33 presents a second example of this practice. 
 
pitch (i.e. ‘[↑I’M]’ [l. 117]); in addition to the use of “smile-voice” (i.e. ‘[£I  ]’m in the 
Alnicks£.’ [l. 117]). The first two features are particularly notable as recurring features of 
“good-news” announcements (e.g. Freese and Maynard, 1998: 198). 
Abby also orients to the salience of her initial formulation as procedurally 
indispensable. She withdraws from simultaneous speech (see Schegloff, 2000b) and “self-
retrieves” (Jefferson, 2004d: 50-51; see also, Local, Auer and Drew, 2010: 139-143) her turn-
beginning (i.e. ‘[£I  ]’m’ [l. 117]) at a point of David’s projected completion (i.e. l. 116; see 
Jefferson, 1984b; Drew, 2009). Abby’s initial announcement is thereby preserved as 
relevantly retainable (see Schegloff, 2004: 121). 
What remains relevantly missing, however, is a specification of the import of these 
productional features by Abby, endogenously; such as, for example, by way of an explicitly 
“classed” characterisation (see §5.5.1).  
171 It is unclear, for instance, whether this refers to Abby’s formulation, in toto, to one of her 
three locational formulations (viz. [1] ‘in the Alnicks£.’ [l. 117]; [2] ‘in (.) Roustam’ [l. 125]; 
or [3] ‘between:. (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ [ls. 127-128]), or to some 
combination thereof. 
172 On lexical gradations of “social class” (e.g. ‘enormously Posh:.’ [l. 129]; ‘super Posh.’ [l. 
130]), see §7.3.3. 
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Extract 33: EJBH_F4_11 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Faye, Harry and Ruth are finishing a 
meal.))
Fay:   =I really like it in here. 38 
   (0.5) 39 
Fay:   .tch (0.5) So much nicer than the other pubs.  40 
   (1.5) 41 
Fay:   I like the atmosphere. 42 
  (.) 43 
Fay:   It feels nice.  44 
   (1.1) 45 
Fay:   >And I like the food.< 46 
   (1.3) 47 
Fay:   And I feel like everything’s quite (0.2) a 48 
  bit more reasonable.  49 
   (5.0) 50 
(?):   .Hhhh 51 
   (2.3) 52 
Har: Þ I like The Keys. 53 
   (0.9) 54 
Rut:   °↑Really.°= 55 
Fay:   =Yeah::. *It* feels a bit hostile. 56 
   (1.3) 57 
Rut:   >Who’s hostile¿<= 58 
Fay: Þ =Have you ever been in The ↑Keys¿ 59 
   (1.4) 60 
Rut:   Y::es:, (0.4) Yeah. 61 
   (0.2) 62 
Rut:   That’s the one on the corner isn’t it¿ 63 
   (0.6) 64 
Fay:   °↑Yeah.°= 65 
Rut: → =>Jus’ that ‘cuz it’s-< (0.5) Slightly ↑Swanky. 66 
   (0.2) 67 
Fay:   Yeah::. *I* feel a bit out of place. 68 
Rut:   Yeah. 69 
   (1.2) 70 
Rut:   I used to go there (.) for work drinks. 71 
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  (0.2) 72 
Rut:   When I worked but- (0.5) 73 
Fay:   °Yeah.° 74 
   (0.3) 75 
Rut:   Our boss was a nob. 76 
   (0.3) 77 
Rut:   >And he was< (0.7) 78 
Fay:   Yeah.= 79 
Rut:   =Really posh ‘nd he Hhh.= 80 
Fay:   =Uh Huh huh ↑Huh .hhhh I went there for a  81 
  (0.6) after a funeral. (0.5) and it was jus’  82 
  really like. (0.5) with all these pictures of  83 
  this person and it was like.     84 
       (0.5) 85 
Rut:   N’:: ye[ah.] 86 
Fay:          [Sa ]d.  87 
   (0.2) 88 
Fay:   *But ye*ah. 89 
   (0.5) 90 
Fay:   ↑So fancy. 91 
   (0.9) 92 
Fay:   They’ve got really fancy ↑beauty products in  93 
  The bathrooms and everything. 94 
   (0.5) 95 
Rut:   Mhm::, 96 
 
The locational formulation in focus here is ‘The Keys’ (l. 53), a local restaurant and 
bar. After its initial production by Harry (l. 53), this formulation is reproduced by Faye 
(l. 59) after Ruth has initiated repair (i.e. ‘>Who’s hostile¿<=’; l. 58) on Faye’s 
foregoing assessment (i.e. l. 56). In her previous turn, Faye has produced a negatively-
valenced assessment of this location in response to Harry (i.e. ‘=Yeah::. *It* feels a 
bit hostile.’ [l. 56]). After recognition of this location is claimed (l. 61; see fn. 169) 
and then displayed by Ruth – the latter through a ‘relation to landmark’ (see Schegloff, 
1972a: 100; 1972b: 122; see also, Schegloff, 1979b: 274; 1996a: 182; Nattrass et al., 
2017) reformulation – Ruth draws the focal, potentially “classed” inference: ‘=>Jus’ 
that ‘cuz it’s-< (0.5) Slightly ↑Swanky.’ (l. 66). This allusion centres upon the 
 207 
designedly marginal (i.e. ‘Slightly’ [l. 66]), non-linguistically “classed” status of  
“The Keys” (i.e. ‘Slightly ↑Swanky.’ [l. 66]). Accordingly, it operates to nominate  
this device as the salient dimension in order to proposedly account (i.e. ‘‘cuz’ [l. 66]) 
for Faye’s negatively-valenced assessment (i.e. l. 56); one that begets agreement  
from Faye (l. 68). 
 
Extract 33 thus presents a second case in which the potentially “classed” relevance of 
a locational formulation is produced responsively by a co-interlocutor as an 
“allusion”. Also notable in this case is that the practice is followed by successive 
orientations from Ruth (ls. 71, 73, 76, 78 and 80) and Faye (ls. 91 and 93-94) to 
possibly “classed” constituents of the focal location (see fn. 167). Ruth and Faye, in 
this way, differently reaffirm the “classed” relevance of this location through 
subsequent orientations.  
 
A final example of a possibly “classed” allusion is produced in Extract 34. 
 
Extract 34: UCDiscLab [Lcon2] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Angela, Keith and Karen have been 
discussing rich people from M.A.))
Ang:       [My roommate] is from M.A. 933 
   (0.3) 934 
 
((Eight lines omitted. Angela’s roommate is named.)) 
 
Ang:   She’s from (0.2) North something¿ 943 
   (.) 944 
Kei:   Northdrobe¿ 945 
   (0.2) 946 
Kar:   Northdrive. 947 
   (0.3) 948 
Kei:   Northdrive.= 949 
Ang: Þ =Yeah North*drive.* 950 
   (0.6) 951 
Kei:   NorthDrive, 952 
   (0.3) 953 
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Ang:   N’Yeah. 954 
   (0.2) 955 
Kei:   That’s where M.T. is. 956 
   (0.6) 957 
Ang:   Yea::h, 958 
   (0.5) 959 
Kei:   That’s where all the (0.2) Brick >lanes 960 
   °people are.°< 961 
   (0.8) 962 
Ang:   Ye:ah¿ 963 
   (1.7) 964 
Kei: →  [(She) must] be really °↑rich then.° 965 
Ang:    [(An-)     ] 966 
   (0.8) 967 
Kei: → °She’s got ↑Rocks if she lives up there.° 968 
   (1.5) 969 
Ang:   I think her- (0.2) her parents: were well  970 
   off. 971 
Kar:   [°Mhm.°]972 
 
The locational formulation of interest here is ‘North*drive.*’ (l. 950); a 
particularisation of the broader location (i.e. ‘M.A.’ [l. 933]) in which Angela’s 
roommate has been located. This location is partially (i.e. ‘North something¿’ [l. 943]) 
introduced by Angela and subsequently derived (ls. 947 and 949), confirmed (l. 950) 
and reconfirmed (l. 954), collaboratively, over the course of a word-search (ls. 945-
954). This location begets a series of responsive allusions drawn by Keith. The first 
invokes a locational formulation (l. 956); it discriminates an institution (i.e. ‘M.T.’ [l. 
956]) that is also located in this setting. The second, by contrast, centres around 
personhood (ls. 960-961). Keith refers to the population that is designedly 
accommodated at this location (i.e. ‘Brick >lanes °people’ [ls. 960-961]). Keith’s third 
and fourth allusions then provide two possibly “classed” upshots, concerning 
personhood, that are designedly (i.e. ‘then’ [l. 965]; ‘up there’ [l. 968]) derived from 
this location; namely, ‘[(She) must] be really °↑rich then.°’ (l. 965) and ‘°She’s got 
↑Rocks if she lives up there.°’ (l. 968). The subject of these allusions is Angela’s 
‘roommate’ (l. 933), who is positioned to have hailed from this location. This non-
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present party is positioned, accordingly, by the production of ‘then’ (l. 965; e.g. 
Schegloff, 1996a: 197), and through the “locational pro-term”, ‘there.’ (l. 968; see 
Schegloff, 1972a: 87; 1972b: 105), as “wealthy”; a dimension that could represent a 
possible orientation to “social class”. The potentially “classed” status of this location 
is therefore articulated, on this occasion, by Keith, through two “classed” allusions 
(i.e. ls. 965 and 968); inferences which yield weak agreement from Angela, the 
progenitor (ls. 970-971). 
 
Allusions thus pose a second resource that could be employed to articulate the 
“classed” relevance of a locational formulation. This differs from “classed” 
characterisations insofar as the practice is not enacted by the progenitor of the 
locational formulation. They are (co-)produced, instead, by recipients. Akin 
“characterisations” (see §5.5.1), however, allusions can be employed to “class” 
locational formulations variously. In the cases adduced, these have pertained to an 
undisclosed aspect of a locational formulation (e.g. Extract 28; see fn. 171); to the 
“classed” status of the named location (e.g. Extract 33; recall §5.5.1.1); and by 
referring to the occupiers of a location (e.g. Extract 34; recall §5.5.1.2). The 
production of “classed” allusions is in this way a pliable resource that is used by 
recipients to construct another’s formulation as (possibly) “classed”. In the next 
section, a comparatively inexplicit mechanism that is employed to accomplish 
comparable work is introduced. 
 
5.5.3 Co-selections 
The two preceding sections focussed on how single locational formulations come to 
be “classed” in talk-in-interaction. What has been held in abeyance, however, are the 
implications and inferential entailments of these ascriptions for other formulations 
(co-)produced in the interaction. In this section, I demonstrate that the inferential 
apparatus is available; one evocative of the practice of “asymmetrical contrastive 
pairs” (e.g. Whitehead and Lerner, 2009), introduced in §2.4.2.2 and §5.2.3. 
Specifically, I demonstrate that once a locational formulation has been classified in 
terms of “social class” – such as by a “characterisation” (§5.5.1), or an “allusion” 
(§5.5.2) – this can render another formulation – or a member (e.g. Extract 33) – 
hearable in corresponding terms (qua “co-selection”). This operation, I show, can 
operate prospectively (§5.5.3.1) and retrospectively (§5.5.3.2). Referents can be 
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“classed” before or after the co-production of the locational formulation that is 
“classed”. I show that this practice can ascribe the same categorisation applied to the 
first locational formulation (e.g. Extract 28) or can attribute a different category 
derived from this device (e.g. Extract 25, 35 and 33). For clarity, this apparatus is 
bifurcated into prospective and retrospective co-selections.  
 
5.5.3.1 Prospective co-selections 
The co-selections of “classed” locational formulations can have a prospective 
operation. On these occasions, a locational formulation is constructed as “classed” 
(see Þ), such as through an allusion (§5.5.2; e.g. Extract 28). The subsequent 
production of another locational formulation is then rendered hearable in the same 
terms (see →). Various modalities can be serviced in order to perdure the relevance 
of “social class” between formulations. This includes, but is not limited to, turn- and 
locational-design, and word- and locational-selection. Extract 28, introduced above, 
illustrates these operations. 
 
Extract 28 (Reproduced): CallHome-eng-4610 
((A telephone call. The interaction is joined following a ‘conversation restart’. 
Abby, the caller, has introduced her location “pre-emptively”.)) 173  
Bra:   How is it? 72 
  (0.3) 73 
Abb:   .hh It’s-= 74 
Bra:   =How are the Alnick. 75 
  (0.5) 76 
Abb:   It’s Fab. Hh. (0.3) It’s [Fabou.       ] 77 
Bra:                            [I’ve never be]en there. 78 
  (0.4) 79 
Abb:   ↑HUH? 80 
  (0.7) 81 
Bra:   When did you ↑get there.= 82 
Abb:   =.hh (0.5) Uh:. I think we came out Sunday. 83 
 
173 On “conversation restarts”, see Jefferson (1984a: 193, italics in original; 1988: 
436). On “pre-emption” techniques, see, e.g., Schegloff (1986: 117, 133-144).  
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  (0.5) 84 
Bra:   Uhuh. 85 
  (0.7) 86 
Abb:   (.hhh) We came back from California on  87 
  Saturday, (.) Stayed in Queens for one  88 
  night, (.) and came out sunday. 89 
   (1.1) 90 
  ((0.5 / Baby with Abby cries.)) 91 
Abb:   °tch.=.h[h° 92 
Bra:           [Where’d you stay in ↑Queens. 93 
  (0.8) 94 
Abb:   WHAT¿ 95 
  (1.4) 96 
Bra:   Where’d you stay in ↑Qu[eens¿ 97 
Abb:                          [At Sarah and  98 
  Tim’s house. 99 
  (0.7) 100 
Bra:   ↓Uhuh. 101 
 
((Nine lines omitted. Bradley passes the phone to David. A “compressed” call-
opening ensues [see fn. 153].)) 
 
Dav:   [Where are] you an’ [‘ow’d you got a free= 111 
Abb:   [°↑Huhuh,°]         [Huh.=.hhhhhh= 112 
Dav:   =call.] 113 
Abb:   =     ]  114 
   (.) 115 
Dav:   [(↓Tell me] about [it.)] 116 
Abb:   [↑I’M     ]       [£I  ]’m in the Alnicks£. 117 
   (.) 118 
Dav:   ↑H’yeah? 119 
   (0.3) 120 
Abb:   Eh-  121 
Dav:   W[hich on]e. 122 
Abb:    [I’m-   ] 123 
   (0.4) 124 
Abb:    Uhm. (0.4) Actually I’m in (.) Roustam. 125 
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Dav:   [(   )] 126 
Abb:   [Which] is between:. (.) >United Alnick and  127 
   North Alnick I guess. 128 
Dav: Þ That sounds enormously Posh:. 129 
Abb: → It’s- (.) .hhh It’s super Posh.=Here I Am  130 
   going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks. My 131 
   summer is just filled with luxury. 132 
   (0.2) 133 
Dav:   Soun[ds ↑wonderfu][l.  ] 134 
Abb:       [hhhh.       ][>↑hu]h ↑huh ↑HUH< 135 
 
Extract 28 has been parsed previously in §5.5.2 with respect to the “classed” allusion 
drawn by David (l. 129) concerning the “classed” relevance of some unspecified 
aspect of Abby’s formulation of her current location. Focal here is Abby’s “rushed 
through” (see Schegloff, 1987c: 78-79) continuation after aligning with David’s 
“classed” allusion: ‘=Here I Am going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks’ (ls. 130-
131). My summer is just filled with luxury.’ (ls. 130-132). In her continuation, Abby 
connects the previously established “classed” location (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 129]) – 
which has been analysed by David in linguistically non-“classed” terms, as sounding 
‘enormously Posh:.’ (l. 129), and reformulated, by Abby, as ‘super Posh’ (l. 130) – to 
a second location, ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131); an extension that can be heard to contribute 
towards the “bragging”, or the ‘[n]ame-dropping’ (Schegloff, 1972a: 81, 91; 1972b: 
97, 110) function of the turn. 
 
It is my claim, in this extract, that this second formulation (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]) 
is not merely hearable as a co-member of the same classification (i.e. ‘super Posh’ [l. 
130]) that was ascribed to the first locational formulation (i.e. ‘the Alnicks [l. 117]) 
by Abby, 174 but that it is demonstrably formulated as such. Crucial for such a hearing 
is the design of Abby’s ‘summary assessment’ (here, see Jefferson, 1984a: 211): 
 
174 This can be reached, in the first instance, by using the “consistency rule” (e.g. 
Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 239; 1972: 34; 1974 [1972]: 219). Vis-à-vis locational 
formulations, see Schegloff (1972a: 102; 1972b: 124) and McHoul and R. Watson 
(1984: 296-297). 
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‘=Here I Am going from S:acra↓mento to the Alnicks. My summer is just filled with 
luxury.’ (ls. 130-132). 
 
In the first instance, this work is conveyed overtly by way of turn design: Abby 
explicitly classifies having travelled from (i.e. ‘going from’ [l. 131]) 175 one location 
to the other in the same possibly “classed” terms: ‘My summer is just filled with 
luxury.’ (ls. 131-130). Note, however, that aspects of word-selection, specifically, 
contribute towards this work. The stressed verb ‘filled’ (l. 132), for example, as the 
past participle of the ‘measure term’ (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 322-324), “fill”, 
indexes the designedly persisting relevance of this device. Similarly, Abby’s selection 
of the temporal (i.e. seasonal) formulation, ‘summer’ (l. 132), as a designedly 
extensive, self-attentive (i.e. ‘My’ [l. 131]; see C. Raymond and White, 2017: 117-
118) designation, accomplishes comparable work, extending the relevance of the first 
locational formulation to the second. 
 
This work is also accomplished comparatively covertly; in this case, through the 
selection of the two locational formulations (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 117]; ‘S:acra↓mento’ 
[l. 131]) and, further, by virtue of their selected formulations. These dimensions can 
be underscored through reference to Abby’s prior-to-switchboard conversation with 
her original co-interlocutor, Bradley, in which she has had occasion (i.e. l. 82) to detail 
her journey to the “the Alnicks”. 176 In this instance, Abby recalls leaving ‘California 
on Saturday’ (l. 87) after staying ‘in Queens for one night’ (ls. 88-89), at ‘At Sarah 
and Tim’s house.’ (ls. 98-99); a location selected in lieu of a different, mutually-known 
non-present party – ‘Jerry’s’ (omitted from transcript). In her subsequent interaction 
with David, however, this journey is reconstructed differently. Two notable 
transformations have taken place. 
 
The first concerns locational selection. In her “second telling” (see fn. 200), with 
David, reference to “Queens” (howsoever formulated; e.g., ls., 93 and 98-99), as an 
 
175 On ‘verbs of movement’, see Psathas (1986a: 88, italics in original; 1986b: 238, my 
emphasis). On ‘crossconversation’ analysis, see Jefferson (1985: 442-451). 
176 On such ‘histor[ies] of recent movement’, see Schegloff (1972a: 88; 1972b: 106).   
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intermediary – even a ‘transitional’ (see Schegloff, 1972a: 100; 1972b: 122) location 
– is “dispensed” 177 with, wholesale: ‘=Here I Am going from S:acra↓mento to the 
Alnicks. My summer is just filled with luxury.’ (ls. 130-132). This elision is 
consequential. Specifically, it is on this basis that Abby can be considered to have 
selected the locational formulation of ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131) as her relevant point of 
departure. It would have been equally correct, for example, to have substituted 
‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131) with “Queens”; the location that is temporalised, by Abby, as 
the more proximate point of departure for their journey (see ls. 88-89). The production 
of ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131), in this sense, can be distinguished ‘non-trivially’ (see 
Schegloff, 2007a: 19), and in a ‘strong sense’, 178 as a selection; that is, inasmuch as 
its production is not determined by virtue of Abby (et al.) having only departed from 
this location. 179 I propose, instead, that this formulation has been singled out from 
amongst alternative ‘vacation place terms’ (Schegloff, 1972a: 83; 1972b: 99) to cohere 
with the “classed” terms that David has previously analysed (l. 129) – and by which 
Abby has subsequently upgraded (l. 130) – some unspecified dimension of Abby’s 
first locational formulation (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 117]; recall fn. 171).   
 
The second order of transformation concerns turn-design. Two conversions are 
notable here: (1) ‘California’ (l. 87) to ‘S:acra↓mento’ (l. 131); and (2) ‘Roustam’ (l. 
125) to ‘the Alnicks.’ (l. 131). The first is derived from a comparison with Abby’s 
initial interaction, with Bradley (i.e. ‘California’ [l. 87]), to her subsequent 
conversation with David (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]). The second, in contrast, is a 
disparity that is drawn internally from within Abby’s exchange with David. In the 
preceding talk, Abby has respecified her initially formulated location (i.e. ‘the 
Alnicks’ [l. 117]) to ‘Roustam’ (l. 125), a location that is constructed relationally; 
namely, ‘[Which] is between:. (.) >United Alnick and North Alnick I guess.’ (ls. 127-
128). In the focal turn, however, Abby can be seen to reselect the non-minimal 
locational formulation of ‘the Alnicks’ (l. 131); a formulation for which David has 
previously solicited a respecification (i.e. l. 122). What is notable about this selection 
 
177 Schegloff’s (2004: e.g. 99) term. 
178 Jefferson’s (1972: 319, my emphasis) phrase.  
179 On such ‘secondary starting points’, see Psathas (1986b: 240, italics in original). 
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is that Abby departs from the structural preference for using minimised referential 
forms (i.e. ‘Roustam’ [l. 125]) when possible (see Sacks and Schegloff, 1979: 16-18; 
Schegloff, 1996d: 464; see also, Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 146-149; Schegloff, 1996b: 20). 
Abby’s selection of ‘the Alnicks.’ (l. 131), over ‘Roustam’ (l. 125), thus designedly 
flaunts this preference, reemploying (see l. 117) what has been previously uncovered, 
by David (i.e. l. 122) – and amended, retroactively, by Abby (i.e. ‘Actually’ [l. 125]; 
see Clift, 2001: 266-270) – as an “exaggerated”, or designedly extravagant, 
locational formulation. 180  
 
In Abby’s summary assessment, therefore, two locational reformulations are 
committed. Again, the bases underlying their selection is not self-explicated, in situ, 
and remain equivocal. Nonetheless, it is at least permissible that these formulations 
are selected to cohere with the interactional work accomplished through the turn to 
which they contribute (see Kitzinger et al., 2013: 46-48). In this case, I propose that it 
positions the second formulation (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]), inexplicitly, in the 
same terms (i.e. “classed”) as those which have been ascribed to the first (i.e. ‘the 
Alnicks’ [l. 117]) comparatively explicitly (e.g. ‘enormously Posh:.’ [l. 129]; ‘super 
Posh.’ [l. 130]). Thus, Extract 28 provides a case in which a subsequent locational 
formulation (i.e. ‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]) is positioned as a co-selection by way of 
turn- and locational-design and word- and locational-selection; specifically, it is 
constituted as a co-member of the same type of location as an earlier, possibly 
“classed” destination (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 131]).  
 
5.5.3.2 Retrospective co-selections 
Locational formulations can also be co-selected as “classed” retrospectively. On these 
occasions, a locational formulation is (co-)produced which is not construed as 
“classed” (see →). Through reference to a subsequent formulation, however (see Þ) 
– one that is understandable as “classed” – the initial formulation is then 
retrospectively recast, accordingly. An inverse directionality to the “prospective” 
operation is, therefore, available. Two examples of this operation have been 
 
180 On the production of “exaggerations”, see Schegloff (1972a: 86-87; 1972b: 104-105), 
Lynch (1985: 270-271, fn. 17) and Drew (1987: 231; 2003b). 
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encountered already, but focussed-off, in Extracts 25 and 33. These instances  
are substantiated in this section and interleaved with an additional example  
(i.e. Extract 35).  
 
Extract 25 (Reproduced): SWB2353 
((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; 
specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.)) 
Ali:   Uh=They’re encouraged to do that (0.2) .hhh 28 
  missionary work (.) .hhh  an’ I bel- I really 29 
  believe that the people that do that h. (0.9)  30 
  Are:: (0.2) better people an’ are make our  31 
  [society better.] 32 
Bri:   [You know I-    ] I really ↑agree with you. 33 
   (0.3) 34 
Bri:   Uhm. (0.3) .tch (0.2) I’uh (0.2) though I’ve  35 
  never done that myself, I-I’m (.) was a (0.2) 36 
  basically an education major when I graduated  37 
  from college, (0.2) .hh (.) an’ I accepted a  38 
  ↑Job, (0.2) that at the time was jus’ (0.2)  39 
  slightly above the Poverty level to teach  40 
  (0.6) to uhm (.) .tch (0.2) very Rural (0.6)  41 
→ children in a very Low income district. (0.8)  42 
  and I (0.2) sp:ent a year teaching there.  43 
  (0.2) 44 
Ali:   [Uhuh,            ] 45 
Bri:   [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2)  46 
  largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences 47 
Þ	because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class, 48 
White suburban home, 49 
   (0.2) 50 
Ali:   Uhuh, 51 
   (.) 52 
Bri: And I Did It (0.2) Uhm. (0.6) For one reason I (won 53 
this) (.) I was (.) working on Masters’ degree so 54 
I wanted to stay close to where I was working on a 55 
Masters’ degree.=.hhh (0.2) But also be↑cause: I 56 
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just thought it would be interesting to live 57 
someplace else (.) so totally different then my 58 
own (.) ↑upbringing.  59 
(.) 60 
Ali:   Mhmhuh:¿ 61 
Bri:   An’ I- it ↑Change::d, hh. (0.5) it probably  62 
  changed my (.) political view:s, it changed my  63 
  understanding of the world around d’me, 64 
  (0.5)  65 
Ali:   Uhuh¿= 66 
Bri:   =And uh I think uhm, (0.7) °mpt°=in fact I-if I  67 
  Had to do it all again. (.) uh I’ve you know I-  68 
  AFTER that you   know I you never think of it    69 
  ↑because, .hhh (0.2) I guess because, (.) I paid  70 
  for all of my college education myself, (0.3) .hh  71 
  I never thought about (0.6) doing that because I  72 
  had all of these college loans. (0.2) I’had to  73 
  start paying ↑back. 74 
 
In my previous analysis of Extract 25 (§5.5.1.1), this exchange has been examined 
purely for Brian’s linguistically “classed” characterisation of his home: ‘a nice:: (0.7) 
middle class, White suburban home,’ (ls. 48-49). What has been comparatively 
neglected is the classificatory work that is accomplished, retrospectively, through this 
formulation, upon its production. In the just-preceding talk, Brian has referred to a 
previous locational formulation: ‘a very Low income district.’ (l. 42); the location 
Brian began working in after graduation (ls. 34-43). This locational formulation, 
unlike the latter (i.e. ls. 48-49), is not positioned explicitly in terms of “social class” 
upon its production. This category is, instead, situated in terms of “income” (i.e. ‘Low 
income’ [l. 42]). In this respect, it is describable as possibly “classed”, only. Upon the 
production of the latter formulation, however, this location is then recast, 
retrospectively, in corresponding “classed” terms. In this instance, this operation 
trades upon the action of “accounting” for which the second, linguistically “classed” 
formulation (i.e. ‘a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White suburban home,’ [ls. 48-49]), is 
mobilised.  
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This locational formulation is serviced as Brian accounts for why his experience 
teaching in the former location qualified as a formative experience: ‘one of my (0.2) 
largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences’ (ls. 46-47; see also, ls. 62-64). Brian’s 
description of the latter category is thus evoked to furnish these designedly 
“enlightening” grounds. As acknowledged above, what is focal here is that this 
characterisation invokes the linguistically “classed” descriptor, ‘middle class,’ (l. 48). 
Accordingly, this rendering makes available how the earlier locational formulation is 
to be analysed, retroactively. In this case, these terms are not self-explicated by Brian. 
The former location (i.e. ‘a very Low income district.’ [l. 42]) is simply positioned 
contrastively, in antithetical terms to the latter (i.e. ‘a nice:: (0.7) middle class, White 
suburban home,’ [ls. 48-49]). In other words, it designates that the first locational 
formulation (i.e. ‘a very Low income district.’ [l. 42]) was not correspondingly 
classifiable as ‘middle class,’ (l. 48) insofar as this very classification, for Brian, 
contributes towards the edifying nature of this experience. 181 Extract 25, as such, 
demonstrates that the apparatus of “co-selection” also functions retroactively to re-
construe how a preceding locational formulation (i.e. ‘a very Low income district.’ [l. 
42]) was classified upon its production. 
 
Extract 35 presents a further example of this practice in action. The locations in focus 
in this extract are those of ‘Liverpool’ (ls. 417 and 420) and ‘(West Bar)’ (ls. 423-
424); a city and a nightclub, respectively. Like Extract 25, the former locational 
formulation is not designedly “classed” by its progenitor, Pam, at its point of 
production; rather, it is only subsequently rendered hearable, as such, through the 
production of the latter. In this instance, the latter is not “classed” directly by a 
“characterisation” (cf. §5.5.1.1; e.g. Extract 25), but through reference to a 
constitutively “classed” group (i.e. ‘scallies’ [l. 424]; recall §5.5.1.2) – and their 
relevant absence, specifically (see fn. 167). 
 
 
181 Termed ‘relativity’ (Schegloff, 1992b: xxxiv), this property is addressed by Sacks (1992: 
Vol. I: 45) within his discussion of ‘perspective’. For review, see §2.3.4 and §7.3.3. In this 
case, this inference is subsequently explicated by Brian: ‘(.) so totally different then my own 
(.) ↑upbringing.’ (ls. 58-59); ‘it probably changed my (.) political view:s, it changed my 
understanding of the world around d’me,’ (ls. 62-64). 
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Extract 35: CTS16 
((A telephone call. Pam has recalled an unsuccessful night out to Steve.))
Ste:   .hhhh Yeah. So. Yeah sounds a bit of a  407 
  rubbish night really. Doe’n’ it. 408 
Pam:   Yeah. Oh it rea[lly was  ] 409 
Ste:                  [Well well] we’ll have to go  410 
  out like I said. [(                        )] 411 
Pam:                    [Yeah. I want to Man.      ]  412 
  I want to. 413 
  (0.6) 414 
Pam:   .hh hhhhh .hh [For some] reason I don’t want= 415 
Ste:                 [(     ) ] 416 
Pam: → =to go out round Liverpool.  417 
Ste:   I just- yeah. What? 418 
Pam:   hhh S’noth- for some reason though (0.8)  419 
→ Liverpool does not appeal to me anymore. 420 
  (0.6) 421 
Ste:   Yeah 422 
Pam: Þ But hhh I suppose it’s alright in (West  423 
  Bar) in that you you don’t get any scallies  424 
      in there. .hhh But- oh no right hhh  425 
  ((Swallows.)) there was uhm .hh there was  426 
  like these sort of older men on the dance  427 
  floor. And stuff like that. And there was one  428 
  guy who had no ea:rs. And he [was like     ]  429 
Ste:                                [(No/Had) what]430 
 
At the point at which the first locational formulation (i.e. ‘Liverpool’ [ls. 417 and 420]) 
is produced by Pam, this is not positioned in “classed” terms – linguistically or non-
linguistically. It is produced (ls. 415 and 417) and reproduced (ls. 419-420) purely as 
a location that she does not wish to continue (i.e. ‘anymore’ [l. 420]) frequenting. The 
reason for this is formulated as unknown and/or unattributable (i.e. ‘[For some] 
reason’ [l. 415]); it is repositioned simply as a location that has lost its former ‘appeal’ 
(ls. 419-420). In this case, it is possible that the formulation contributes towards an 
‘inability’ account (see Drew, 1984: 129; see also, Heritage, 1984[a]: 269-274 in 
Clayman, 2002: 235) occasioned by Steve’s designedly non-initial (i.e. ‘like I said’ 
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[ls. 410-411]) proposal. This initial formulation is then followed by Pam’s reference 
to a second location: ‘But hhh I suppose it’s alright in (West Bar) in that you you don’t 
get any scallies in there.’ (ls. 423-425). It is this subsequent locational formulation, I 
propose, which endows Pam’s first formulation, ‘Liverpool’ (ls. 417 and 420), 
retrospectively, with a “classed” relevance.  
 
Like Extract 25, this formulation is constructed by Pam in “classed” terms. In this 
case, this is accomplished not by a “classed” description, but through reference to a 
regionally specific linguistically non-“classed” membership category; namely, 
‘scallies’ (l. 424; recall fn. 163). Specifically, this is formulated indirectly in this 
extract. The location is “classed” not through reference to the purported incumbency 
of members of this category in this location (cf. Extracts 17, 31 and 32), but by the 
relevant absence, thereof. This is produced as Pam accounts for her positively-
valenced assessment of this location. Thus, it is Pam’s selection of this category, as a 
notable absence, that positions it as a normative category in ‘Liverpool’ (ls. 417 and 
420). The use of this category in Pam’s account for her positive assessment of this 
locational formulation thus functions relevantly as a qualification of her foregoing 
assessment (i.e. ls. 415 and 417). In other words, Pam discriminates that which she 
has said about Liverpool does not obtain to ‘(West Bar)’ (ls. 423-424) – a location 
subsumed within Liverpool – for this reason. As such, by nominating the absence of 
this group, Pam positions the presence of ‘scallies’ (l. 424) indirectly in this location 
and deploys this as a possibly contributing factor for why the appeal of the first 
locational formulation has decayed (see ls. 419-420). Like Extract 25, therefore, this 
retrospective co-selection trades upon the activity of accounting for which this latter 
is produced.  
 
Extracts 25 and 35 are thus two cases in which this operation functions to assign 
“classed” hearings to locational formulations that have been produced by the 
progenitors of the latter category in “classed” terms. Before moving on, it is worth 
noting that this retrospective operation can also operate to classify co-interlocutors, 
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comparably. Extract 33, introduced above (§5.5.2), furnishes one example of this 
contingency. 182 
 
Extract 33 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_11 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Faye, Harry and Ruth are finishing a 
meal.))
Fay:   =I really like it in here. 38 
   (0.5) 39 
Fay:   .tch (0.5) So much nicer than the other pubs.  40 
   (1.5) 41 
Fay:   I like the atmosphere. 42 
  (.) 43 
Fay:   It feels nice.  44 
   (1.1) 45 
Fay:   >And I like the food.< 46 
   (1.3) 47 
Fay:   And I feel like everything’s quite (0.2) a 48 
  bit more reasonable.  49 
   (5.0) 50 
(?):   .Hhhh 51 
   (2.3) 52 
Har: → I like The Keys. 53 
   (0.9) 54 
Rut:   °↑Really.°= 55 
Fay:   =Yeah::. *It* feels a bit hostile. 56 
 
182 For a second, related example, see Extract 36. Holly, in this instance, disaffiliates with 
Emily’s designedly idiosyncratic formulation (see fn. 192) of the searched for location as ‘the 
posh shop’ (ls. 24-25), reformulating the relevant dimension of the shop as a ‘select second 
shop [((…))] in’t it really’ (ls. 27 and 29). Holly, in so doing, avoids agreeing with Emily’s 
classification of the shop as ‘posh’ (l. 25), and so effaces the possibly “classed” relevance of 
this formulation. Holly thereby further avoids aligning with Emily and so jointly occupying 
her implied position as someone that is classified in different terms than those which are 
ascribed to the ‘shop’ (l. 25); that is, someone for whom its ‘posh’ (l. 25) status qualifies it as 
distinctive (i.e. ‘[Yeah no] I call it the posh shop’ [ls. 24-25]).  
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   (1.3) 57 
Rut:   >Who’s hostile¿<= 58 
Fay: → =Have you ever been in The ↑Keys¿ 59 
   (1.4) 60 
Rut:   Y::es:, (0.4) Yeah. 61 
   (0.2) 62 
Rut:   That’s the one on the corner isn’t it¿ 63 
   (0.6) 64 
Fay:   °↑Yeah.°= 65 
Rut: Þ =>Jus’ that ‘cuz it’s-< (0.5) Slightly ↑Swanky. 66 
   (0.2) 67 
Fay:   Yeah::. *I* feel a bit out of place. 68 
Rut:   Yeah. 69 
   (1.2) 70 
Rut:   I used to go there (.) for work drinks. 71 
  (0.2) 72 
Rut:   When I worked but- (0.5) 73 
Fay:   °Yeah.° 74 
   (0.3) 75 
Rut:   Our boss was a nob. 76 
   (0.3) 77 
Rut:   >And he was< (0.7) 78 
Fay:   Yeah.= 79 
Rut:   =Really posh ‘nd he Hhh.= 80 
Fay:   =Uh Huh huh ↑Huh .hhhh I went there for a  81 
  (0.6) after a funeral. (0.5) and it was jus’  82 
  really like. (0.5) with all these pictures of  83 
  this person and it was like.     84 
       (0.5) 85 
Rut:   N’:: ye[ah.] 86 
Fay:          [Sa ]d.  87 
   (0.2) 88 
Fay:   *But ye*ah. 89 
   (0.5) 90 
Fay:   ↑So fancy. 91 
   (0.9) 92 
Fay:   They’ve got really fancy ↑beauty products in  93 
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  The bathrooms and everything. 94 
   (0.5) 95 
Rut:   Mhm::, 96 
 
Previously focal in this extract was the linguistically non-“classed” allusion (i.e. 
‘Slightly ↑Swanky.’ [l. 66]) drawn by Ruth about the locational formulation, ‘The 
↑Keys¿’ (l. 59). Relevant now is the function for which this allusion is extracted, and 
the retrospective implicature thereof. In this case, the allusion is drawn as a candidate 
explanation for Faye’s foregoing categorisation of this location as ‘a bit hostile’ (l. 
56). In this respect, Ruth nominates this device to account for Faye’s perceived (i.e. 
‘feels’ [l. 56]) hostility. Accordingly, it is my claim, in this extract, that this 
categorisation also functions to co-select a category, previously produced, also in 
“classed” terms. Unlike Extracts 25 and 35, however, in which prior locational 
formulations are “classed”, this case extends instead to personhood. Specifically, it is 
by virtue of Ruth’s classification that Faye is positioned, here, as relevantly 
classifiable in a way that is incongruent to how this location is classified (i.e. ‘Slightly 
↑Swanky.’ [l. 66]). This is provided through the action of Ruth’s turn where the 
“classed” description is levied – and later corroborated (see l. 68) – as an explanation 
for Faye’s negatively-valenced assessment thereof. Like Extracts 28, 25 and 35, Ruth, 
in this instance, does not articulate exactly how Faye is positioned vis-à-vis the 
“classed” status ascribed to this location. It is made available, however, only 
inferentially: Faye is simply proposedly incongruent, for Ruth, by virtue of her 
“classed” status; an incongruity that is subsequently affirmed by Faye – albeit in non-
“classed” terms: ‘Yeah::. *I* feel a bit out of place.’ (l. 68). 183 
 
The apparatus of “co-selections” is thus a flexible interactional resource. This section 
has canvassed a bilateral directionality for this practice. Extract 28 has introduced the 
prospective operation, where the production of a “classed” locational formulation 
renders a subsequent formulation hearable in corresponding (i.e. “classed”) terms. 
Extracts 25, 35 and 33 then introduced the inverse, retrospective operation. On these 
occasions, a locational formulation, or a co-interlocutor, is constructed in non-
“classed” terms. This formulation is then recast, as such, through the production of a 
 
183 Relatedly, on locational improprieties, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 172-174). 
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recognisably “classed” formulation. This resource has been shown to be available for 
a range of locations designed as “classed”, including those “characterised” (§5.5.1) 
directly (e.g. Extract 25) and indirectly (e.g. Extract 35) and those produced through 
“classed” “allusions” (§5.5.2; e.g. Extracts 28 and 33). Lastly, a number of resources 
have also been introduced which sustain the relevance of “social class” across 
locational formulations. This includes the social action of “accounting” (e.g. Extracts 
25, 35 and 33) in addition to turn and locational design and word and locational 
selection (e.g. Extract 28). Presumably, these methods do not exhaust the resources 
that can be employed in order to accomplish “classed” co-selections. 184 Again, 
however, it will suffice it to illustrate, only, the diverse availabilities of this practice 
in action. 
 
5.5.4 Intentional misidentifications 
The focus of this chapter, so far, has been occupied with the practices employed to 
“class” locational formulations in talk-in-interaction. A matter that has remained 
focussed-off, until this stage, are whether these formulations are, descriptively, 
correct. Rather, as addressed in Chapters 2 (§2.2.1) and 4 (§4.3), this matter is 
immaterial, in the first instance. Focal, instead, are how locations come to be 
“classed”, and the social actions for which these practices are serviced, in situ. The 
matter of correspondent correctness (recall fn. 74) – i.e., whether the forms of 
locational formulations correspond with that which is intendedly denoted – is 
positioned as an area of interest only when this dimension is made relevant by co-
interlocutors. One example of this exigency has been encountered previously in 
Extract 28 (e.g. §5.5.3.1). It will be recalled, in this case, that a named locational 
formulation (i.e. ‘the Alnicks’ [l. 131]) was re-selected (i.e. l. 129) from an array of 
equally correct alternative renderings previously produced (e.g. ‘Queens’ [l. 88]; 
‘Sarah and Tim’s house’ [ls. 98-99]; not at ‘Jerry’s’ [omitted from transcript], 
‘Roustam’ [l. 125]). Specifically, Abby re-invoked a form that has since been 
established (e.g. l. 122) as an exaggerated, non-recognitional description (i.e. ‘the 
Alnicks’ [l. 131]). This selection, it was argued, was mobilised in the service of 
 
184 See Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 141, fn. 1), for example, in which a non-“classed” example of 
this practice is accomplished through a ‘gist preserving error’ (ibid.: 143, italics in original). 
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endowing a second, subsequently produced locational formulation (i.e. 
‘S:acra↓mento’ [l. 131]) such that it was hearable/analysable in the same “classed” 
terms.  
 
In this section, I focus on a comparatively explicit variation of this practice. Like 
Extract 28 (‘the Alnicks’ [l. 131]), this involves designedly “misidentifying” a 
correspondently correct version of a locational formulation – or by “punning” on it 
(see →). Specifically, it involves referring to a location such that the reference is 
recognisable for its recipient, but that the reference is, in some way, recognisably 
erroneous, and where the nature of the designedly recognisable error accomplishes 
more than simply referring, in this case occasioning and privileging a “classed” 
hearing (relatedly, see fn. 252). This practice will be referred to hereafter as 
“intentional misidentifications”. 185 This phenomenon has been acknowledged 
previously in EM/(M)CA texts vis-à-vis locational formulations (e.g. Schegloff, 
1972a: 432, fn. 15; 1972b: 129, fn. 12); it has not, however, garnered attention as an 
ascriptive categorial resource. In this section, I focus on those occasions in which 
locational formulations are explicitly assigned a “classed” valence through their 
misidentification. Two variations of this practice occur in my dataset; namely, 
substitutions (e.g. Extract 36) and modifications (e.g. Extract 38). In the former, the 
relevance of “social class” is instantiated by supplanting a known-in-common and 
non-“classed” formulation with one that attests to the relevance of “social class” in its 
naming. In the second, comparable work is accomplished but through the modification 
of a non-“classed” locational formulation such that it includes a linguistically non-
 
185 This term is also inherited from Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 417-426, 544-546, 675-684; 1970, 
Part 3: 50) and Moerman and Sacks (1996 [1971]: 185) on the use of “address terms” (here, 
see also Schegloff, 1996d: 472, fn. 5) in “second insults/insult returns” (for review, see 
Coulter, 1995b: 331). On related phenomena, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 84) on ‘teaching actors 
to learn to make an error’; Schegloff (1984a: 45; 2007a: 29) on “intentional 
misunderstandings” and on ‘intendedly incorrect identification[s]’ (Schegloff, 1979a: 31); 
Ziferstein (1972: 89) on turns-at-talk that are ‘intendedly so mis-hearable’; Glenn (2003: 60) 
on being ‘playfully incorrect’; and Burke (1935/1954: n.p.g. in R. Watson, 1992a: 4) on 
‘planned misnomers’. For published examples, see Wacquant (2004: 175, 246, fn. 8) and H. 
S. Thompson (2005 [1973]: 361-362, 397, 399, fn. 1) for references to persons and locations. 
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“classed” category. In both cases, therefore, the salience of “social class” is rendered 
explicit (cf. Extract 28) by designedly altering – even manipulating – the format of a 
referentially sufficient, non-“classed” formulation. Extracts 36 and 38 exemplify these 
subtypes, respectively. 
 
Extract 36: CABNC [KCG_15] 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Holly recounts a number of her 
activities to Emily.))
  (1.5) 1 
Hol:   °Tah Emily.° 2 
  ((Baby cries.)) 3 
  (2.0) 4 
Hol:   Went and took Ed out didn't we.=Give him a  5 
  bit of a wal::k. 6 
  (0.2)  7 
Emi:   You've been for a ↑walk eh, h[hh. ] 8 
Hol:                                [Mm w]e went in  9 
  that- (0.8) we went and got me ↑barm:: cakes  10 
  and a bit of- (1.2) a few veg and that (1.4)  11 
  went>↑Oh I bought (.) (  )- Jessica a little set  12 
  (.) <of er: easter instead> of an Eas::ter egg. 13 
  (0.4) 14 
Hol:   ↑It's quite nice, I got it from that shop  15 
  (0.8) You know erm (0.3) 16 
Emi:   °Mhm:.°= 17 
Hol:   =Next to Louis and ↓Fith. 18 
  (0.6) 19 
Emi:   °*Oh yea[h¿*° 20 
Hol:           [er::= 21 
Emi:    =[(↑           )] 22 
Hol:     [What's it call]ed.=[°(   )°] 23 
Emi: →                       [Yeah no] I call it 24 
  the posh shop. 25 
  (0.5) 26 
Hol:   Yeah:.=it's- [it’s ↑like        ] a select= 27 
Emi:                [((Clears throat.))] 28 
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Hol:   =second shop in't [it really but uh] 29 
Emi:                     [↓Yeah: but uh   ] huh 30 
  (0.3) 31 
Hol:   I mean [↑s:ome-         ] 32 
Emi:          [£about a hundred] times [dearer.£] 33 
Hol:                                   [Yeah::. ] 34 
  (0.2) 35 
Hol:   But I mean, (0.3) <the stuff is cheaper  36 
  compared to what you pay [to other shop.>] 37 
Emi:                            [°Hm:::.°       ] 38 
 
In this extract, Holly and Emily are collaborating in a search for the name of a ‘shop’ 
(l. 15) from which Holly has purchased a gift for ‘Jessica’ (l. 12) – a non-present party 
(ls. 11-13). This location is specified, by Holly, initially, in a ‘relation to landmark’ 
formulation (i.e. “R1”; Schegloff, 1972a: 100; 1972b: 122), ‘Next to Louis and ↓Fith.’ 
(l. 18); a construction that yields an incipient display of recognition from Emily  
(l. 20; here, see Heritage, 1998: 292). It is as Holly further pursues the name of this 
location (i.e. ‘[What's it call]ed.’ [l. 23]) that Emily proffers the designedly 
idiosyncratic (i.e. ‘I call it’ [l. 24]) non-linguistically “classed” formulation: ‘[Yeah 
no   ] I call it the posh shop.’ (ls. 24-25).   
 
It is through the form of this reference that the hitherto undisclosed “classed” (i.e. ‘the 
posh shop’ [l. 25]) relevance of location is asserted by Emily. Like Extracts 25 and 30 
in §5.5.1.1, this is accomplished by the inclusion of a linguistically non-“classed” 
descriptor (i.e. ‘posh’ [l. 25]). In this instance, however, the term is not used merely 
as a description of this location (cf. §5.5.1.1); nor by which to characterise a 
population that is relevantly subsumed therein (cf. §5.5.2.2), or notably exempt 
therefrom (cf. Extract 35; recall fn. 167). It is positioned, by Emily, instead, as its 
designedly salient factor, as the operative basis from which it is distinguished from 
other co-class members (i.e. “shops”). In this case, this is produced by using a ‘the X’ 
formulation (here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 97; 1972b: 117), where the linguistically non-
“classed” descriptor (i.e. ‘posh’ [l. 25]) prepends (i.e. precedes) the ‘place-category’ 
(see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 36; i.e. ‘shop.’ [l. 25]). The relevance of “social class” is 
therefore asserted through the name awarded to this formulation. 
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This named formulation is oriented to by Emily not as the formulation sought-after by 
Holly, but as an alternative, designedly idiosyncratic formulation. Specifically, upon 
its point of production, Emily disqualifies herself from the search-in-progress (i.e. 
‘[Yeah no ]’ [l. 24]) and produces this formulation as an “alternative recognitional” 
(see Stivers, 2007) to that which is pursued by Holly. It is in this respect that this 
instance represents a form of “intentional misidentification”, where the linguistically 
non-“classed” (i.e. ‘posh’ [l. 25]) formulation is produced by Emily explicitly as a 
substitute for the mutually-known (e.g. l. 20), sought-after (e.g. l. 23), and as yet 
unnamed formulation that is collectively unavailable. 186 This operation therefore 
represents a more explicit version of the practice comprised in Extract 28, where the 
formulation of ‘Roustam’ (l. 125) was replaced, by Abby, with ‘the Alnicks’ (l. 131).  
 
The substitution of a formulation – named (e.g. Extract 28) or unnamed (e.g. Extract 
36) – with an intentionally mis-designed form therefore represents a highly explicit 
resource by which the relevance of “social class” can be asserted, where the salient 
feature is self-explicated in its naming, and is not left inexplicit, nor implicated by 
inference. Notably, however, this practice also represents a generic resource whereby 
the relevance of other devices can be co-implicated. For illustrative purposes, a 
cognate example of this practice is adduced in Extract 37 vis-à-vis “gender” and 
“stage-of-life”. 
 
Extract 37: CLACIA 187 
((A face-to-face interaction. Dianne and Clacia are “reminiscing together” 188 
about college.)) 
Cla:   Y’know when we were at the first semester we  1 
  were there an (‘er) (0.6) °down at the hotel  2 
  we had (a) nympho↓maniac which was (really a)  3 
  (  ).° 4 
 
186 On the ‘momentary non-recognition’ of locational formulations, see Schegloff (1972a: 94; 
1972b: 114). 
187 See fn. 85. My thanks to Professor C. Goodwin and Professor M. H. Goodwin for allowing 
me to include this extract.  
188 Lerner’s (2002: 238-239, my emphasis) phrase. 
 229 
  (0.5) 5 
Dia:   >Oh there [were always-<] [(0.4)]=  6 
Cla:             [(Drawing) ↑gu] [ys   ]= 7 
Dia:   =[>↑dozens of ↑tho:↓   ]se. 8 
Cla:   =[back to their ↑roo:m.] 9 
  (.) 10 
Dia:   (.hh) [(Had ↓‘em-)] 11 
Cla:         [Oh ↑re     ]ally¿≥They had only one  12 
  (gal) at the halls °and she was (real awful  13 
  ↑bad).≥She was (n)-< (0.2) not there very 14 
  ↓long. 15 
  (0.4) 16 
 
((1 minute, 3 seconds omitted.)) 
 
Dia:   £We used to do some£ really awful things  17 
  Though to some really things though to >some  18 
  of the girls< i- (.) in the <hotel:> >you  19 
→ know we used to call it  Menopause  20 
  £↑Manor↑£  21 
  (0.2) 22 
Dia:   A’hem (((Clears throat.)) >°Because of all  23 
  the old ladies.°< 24 
  (0.8) 25 
Dia:   .tch £↑And£ (.) we’d get on the elevator and  26 
  we’d be s:m:oking awa::y you know. Like  27 
  ((coughs)) .hh So we used to take smoke and  28 
  blow it £in front of their >fa:ces< an’  29 
  (0.8) 30 
Dia:   M(h)y o(h)n(h)e roommate °she was (very)  31 
  (ba:d) >(she really was).< (0.2) Used to  32 
  knock on door:s and these little old ladies  33 
  would open SHH-SHH-SHH £An(h)d she’d 34 
  squirt them a(h)l(h)[l(h)]  35 
Cla:                       [O   ]h [*g  ] [od::.*] 36 
Dia:                               [↑Huh] [↑hah  ] 37 
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  ↑hah .hhh 38 
 
Clacia and Dianne are reminiscing about their time in college and their 
accommodation, specifically; what has been referred to, by Clacia, as ‘the hotel’ (l. 
02). Talk on this topic is then suspended as a third-party, temporarily joins the dyad 
(omitted from transcript). Following their departure (omitted from transcript), Dianne 
re-topicalises this location – using the same recognitional construction (i.e. ‘the 
<hotel:>’ [l. 19]) – as she launches an unsolicited confession of lamentable (e.g. ‘really 
a:wful’ [l. 17]) collective “misdeed” 189  to which she contributed (e.g. ‘£We’ [l. 17]) 
in this location (see ls. 17-20). It follows the initiation of this admission that  
Dianne reformulates her previous locational formulation (i.e. ‘the <hotel:>’ [l. 19]) 
into a designedly “misidentified” form; namely, ‘Menopause £↑Manor↑£’ (ls. 20-21). 
 
The design of this reformulation bears resemblances to the formulation of ‘the posh 
shop’ (l. 25) in Extract 36. In both cases, a locational formulation is substituted for a 
reference that indexes categorial relevancies through its designedly misidentified 
formulation. In Extract 36, the referent of this ascription was cast as temporarily 
unavailable (see fn. 186), and the reformulation is positioned as a designedly 
idiosyncratic, self-explanatory substitution (i.e. Extract 36: ‘I call it’ [l. 24]); one that 
is upheld contemporarily, and which endowed the hitherto unnamed location with a 
possibly “classed” relevance. In Extract 37, by contrast, this misidentification is 
positioned as a historical substitution (i.e. ‘£We used to’ [l. 17]) of the previously 
referred to locational formulation (i.e. ‘the <hotel:>’ [l. 19]) a reformulation that is 
deployed by a collectivity (e.g. ‘£We’ [l. 17]; see also, §7.4.2). In this case, this is 
produced not to actuate “social class”, but a ‘hybrid’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 55) 
categorisation of “stage-of-life” and “gender” (i.e. ‘old ladies’ [ls. 24 and 33]); a 
device that is made available in Dianne’s explicitly formulated account (i.e. 
‘>°Because of all the old ladies.°<’ [ls. 23-24]). 
 
While this example does not then co-implicate the relevance of “social class”, it 
nevertheless parallels the practice deployed by Emily (ls. 24-25) in Extract 36. 
 
189 Term borrowed from Jefferson (1985a) and Bergen and Stivers (2013). 
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Extracts 36 and 37 therefore present two differently explicit examples of 
misidentifications. In both instances, these are presented as substitutions, where a 
location – unnamed (i.e. Extract 36) or named (i.e. Extract 37) – is substituted with a 
designedly incorrect reference; the form of which attests to the relevant identity  
of the location. In the next example, Extract 38, a slight modification of this  
practice is presented.  
 
Extract 38: EJBH_F4_26 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Oliver, Harry, Ray, Jenny and Faye  
are discussing their local town, Towerview.))
Oli:   There’s not really any ↑c:rime::. 146 
  (2.9) 147 
Oli:   You know- you know that (0.9) fairly pleasant  148 
  *it is.*=°there’s not a lot of problems:  149 
  like. you know.° 150 
  (0.6) 151 
Oli: We’re away from ↑like. (0.7) If you’re in a big 152 
city (an’ you) (0.9) you’re Much more likely to be 153 
like yeah you probably shouldn’t walk down that 154 
(0.2) stree::t.=You know li(h)ke (.) ‘cuz it’s 155 
really late at night. (0.6) whereas you don’t 156 
really get that here.=You can walk around (1.2) 157 
here at like at (elev-) (0.3) twelve one o’clock 158 
in the morning you know where like (4.8) that’s my 159 
↑story.= 160 
Har:   =>There isn’t really a rough end of  161 
  Towerview. 162 
   (1.4) 163 
Har:   £Or is that just Bamwich.£ 164 
   (1.0) 165 
Ray:   ↓Mhm huh huh huh.= 166 
Har:   =Ch’huh::.= 167 
Jen:   =I ↓dunno. [Near like the Goat        ]head= 168 
Oli:     [°There’s not a rough end.°] 169 
Jen:   =and *stuff.*170 
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((Seventy-six lines omitted.)) 
 
  (1.3) 247 
Jen:   .tch (0.4) To be fair where (w-) (0.4) like  248 
  down my road (.) is not pretty. 249 
   (1.4) 250 
Jen: → Scally Alley¿ 251 
   (0.4) 252 
Ray:   £hhh. huh.£ 253 
   (0.3) 254 
Fay:   Huh huh ↑huh °huh°= 255 
Oli:   =Nah:. 256 
   (0.3) 257 
Ray:   °Nuh:.°= 258 
Oli: =But it is still like a nice- (0.2) Nice (up for 259 
state), it’s got the gree:n and stuff at (.) the 260 
top of the road.= 261 
Jen:   =See it’s rea- it’s just your neighbours. 262 
   (0.4) 263 
Jen:   Like half of them are (drug) ↑dealers.  264 
   (1.4) 265 
Oli:   ↓Hmm::.=↑Hm. 266 
   (0.7) 267 
Oli:   °*Yeah.*°268 
 
The co-interlocutors in this extract have been discussing the town of ‘Towerview’ (l. 
163) and its purlieus (e.g. ‘Bamwich.’ [l. 165]); specifically, whether there is a ‘rough 
end of Towerview’ (ls. 162-163). After a candidate area has been proposed by Jenny 
(i.e. ‘[Near like the Goat]head and *stuff.*’ [ls. 169 and 171]), and which has been 
discussed by the co-interlocutors (omitted from transcript), a “lapse” is engendered (l. 
247; here, see Sacks et al., 1974: 714-715). It is in the termination of this silence that 
Jenny produces a sequence-initiating (i.e. ‘tch.’ [l. 248]; see M. Wright, 2011), 
independently formulated (i.e. ‘To be fair’ [l. 248]; see Edwards and Fasulo, 2006) 
and self-depreciative (i.e. ‘down my road (.) is not pretty.’ [ls. 248-249]; see 
Pomerantz, 1975: Ch. 4; 1984: 77-78) “delayed reply” (see Hoey, 2017: 57-58). This 
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takes the form of an assessment of the area in which Jenny lives in Towerview: ‘.tch 
(0.4) To be fair where (w-) (0.4) like down my road (.) is not pretty.’ (ls. 248-249). 
 
This location is produced, here, in a “relation to members” format (i.e. “Rm”; see 
Schegloff, 1972a: 97; 1972b: 117): ‘down my road’ (l. 249). Following an extended 
silence (l. 250), however – a potential harbinger of a dispreferred response (e.g. 
Pomerantz, 1975: 104-106; Schegloff, 2007a: 67-68; see also, Sacks, 1987 [1973]: 64) 
– Jenny then respecifies this Rm formulation geographically, as a ‘G term’ (see 
Schegloff, 1972a: 99; 1972b: 120): ‘Scally Alley¿’ (l. 251). This is a reversal of the 
preference observed by Schegloff (1972a: 99; 1972b: 120) for the use of “Rm” 
formulations over “G-terms”. The reason for this reconstruction is unclear. It is 
conceivable, for instance, that it is produced in the service of securing audience 
recognition (see Kitzinger et al., 2013: 45-46). Alternatively, it could function as a 
‘resumption’ of Jenny’s self-depreciative assessment (ls. 248-249), treating her 
tellable as known-in-common (here, see Pomerantz, 1975: 106-109). This 
notwithstanding, it is the construction of this locational reformulation which is  
in focus in this extract.  
 
Prima facie, this reformulation parallels Extract 36, where a linguistically non-
“classed” term (i.e. ‘Scally’ [l. 251]) is integrated into what is designed as a 
substitution for a correspondently correct formulation; in this case, for example, the 
“Rm” construction, ‘down my road’ (l. 249). Furthermore, the outcome of this 
reformulation is such that it endows the substituted location with a possibly “classed” 
relevance. Thus, the extract parallels Extracts 36 and 37 whereby comparable 
categorial work is accomplished through a designedly mis-referred formulation. 
Conservatively, therefore, Extract 38 offers a third example of an intentional 
misidentification that is delivered by way of substitution. In this case, however, it is 
by virtue of exogenous ethnographic knowledge that this reformulation achieves 
comparable interactional ends but differs procedurally. Specifically, I claim that the 
misidentification here operates by way of modifying a formulation of this location of 
correspondent correctness. My awareness of this difference centres around the 
location to which Jenny refers, and of the formal “G-term”: “Scalene Alley”. 
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To qualify, this locational formulation is not produced by Jenny in the remainder of 
the interaction – nor in the “EJBH corpus” (see §3.4.2), more broadly. Instead, just as 
Jenny formulates this reference as common-knowledge for her co-interlocutors – i.e., 
by virtue of using the “Rm” formulation (l. 249) – it is known exogenously to denote 
this consensual “G-term”, and therefore to represent a manipulation thereof. In this 
case, through wider ethnographic knowledge, it is known that there is no location 
within ‘Towerview’ (l. 162) that is referred to as ‘Scally Alley’ (l. 251). Rather, this 
is known to be a sobriquet – a pun or play on words for which its recognisability, as 
such, trades upon the known-in-common status of the correspondently correct street-
name, “Scalene Alley”. The subtleties of Jenny’s recalibration (i.e. ‘Scally Alley¿’ [l. 
251]) can therefore be further appreciated when this awareness is accommodated. 
Specifically, such a knowing makes it possible differentiate this “intentional 
misidentification” from the two substitutions adduced above (cf. Extracts 36 and 37). 
 
In the first instance, ‘Scally Alley¿’ (l. 251) is distinctive as but a partial substitution. 
In this case, Jenny appears to replace the correspondently correct odonym (i.e. 
“Scalene”) with the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘Scally’ (l. 251), whilst at 
the same time retaining the correspondently correct ‘place-category’ (Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 36), ‘Alley’ (l. 251). The relevance of “social class” appears to be integrated, 
in this way, through a comparable replacement operation, substituting one aspect of 
the correspondently correct formulation with a category that resonates, for the author, 
with “social class”. How ‘Scally Alley¿’ (l. 251) operates as an intentional 
misidentification is initially distinctive, therefore, due to Jenny’s partial preservation 
of the correspondently correct formulation. This contrasts the two preceding cases 
which are either designed as complete substitutions (i.e. Extract 36), or which are 
knowable to the author only as such (i.e. Extract 37).  
 
Furthermore, Jenny’s misidentification, in Extract 38, is also notable provided the 
form of the substituted category, ‘Scally’ (l. 251), itself. The category selected by 
Jenny, is differentiated from those in Extract 36 and 37 as it appears to trade upon a 
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“sound-relationship” 190 with the correspondently correct formulation, “Scalene 
Alley”. Specifically, the mis-referred form is constituted through a combination of the 
first syllable of the first word (i.e. “Scalene”; ‘Sca’ [l. 251]) and the second syllable 
of the second (i.e. “Alley”; ‘ley’ [l. 251]). Together, these combine to form the 
linguistically non-“classed” category – and “portmanteau” (here, see Carroll, 1998 
[1872/1898]: 187, my emphasis) – ‘Scally’ (l. 251). 191 Jenny’s misidentification in 
this way is distinctive of the two preceding substitutions insofar as it represents a 
modification of a correspondently correct version. In this case, the modification has 
an apparently acoustic genealogy, whereby the correct “G-term” (i.e. “Scalene”) is 
modified by synthesising the constituent components of a correspondently correct 
version. 192 
 
Jenny’s locational misidentification, ‘Scally Alley¿’ (l. 251), is therefore unique 
procedurally. Unlike Extracts 28, 36 and 37, it does not involve the replacement of  
a correspondently-correct formulation (i.e. “Scalene Alley”) in its entirety. Instead, 
 
190 See Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 261, fn. 1, 265, 291-293, 303-309, 318-325, 340-344) and 
Jefferson (1996). See also, §7.4.2. 
191 On related phenomena, see Jefferson (1996: 26-28) on ‘Fractured Idioms’, Whitehead and 
Lerner (2009: 623, 637, fn. 15) on ‘Spoonerisms’, and McHoul (1978: 203) on ‘phonetic 
parallelism’ vis-à-vis “place names”. 
192 To qualify, the origin(s) of this category is not self-explicated, in situ. It is notable, 
however, that the formulation is delivered as self-explanatory. Jenny, for example, neither 
positions herself directly as the “author” (here, see Goffman, 1981: 124-157 in Clayman, 
1992: 164-165) of the formulation, nor accounts for it. This contrasts the misidentifications 
produced by Emily and Dianne in Extracts 36 (i.e. ‘the posh shop’ [l. 25]) and 37 (i.e. 
‘Menopause £↑Manor↑£’ [ls. 20-21]), respectively. The former, it will be recalled, was 
positioned as designedly idiosyncratic (i.e. ‘I call it the posh shop.’ [ls. 24-25]), and was 
accounted for subsequently (see fn. 117) insofar as the shop is positioned as ‘[£about a 
hundred] times [dearer.£]’ (l. 33) than a ‘select [((…))] second shop’ (ls. 27 and 29).  
Similarly, in Extract 37, ‘Menopause £↑Manor↑£’ (ls. 20-21) is positioned to have been 
derived and employed by a collective (i.e. ‘>you know we used to call it’ [ls. 19-20]). The 
reasoning in this case is predicated by Dianne on the categorial-majority (recall fn. 164)  
within the focal setting: ‘>°Because of all the old ladies.<’ (ls. 23-24). 
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Jenny replaces the street-name, with a linguistically non-“classed” category (i.e. 
‘Scally’ [l. 251]) only. This construction is also further differentiated insofar as the 
linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘Scally’ (l. 251), appears to represent a 
modification of the correspondently-correct version; specifically, one derived through 
the acoustic possibilities that are made available through the correspondently-correct 
form (i.e. “Sca-ley”); what is oriented to by Jenny, through her misidentification, as 
known-in-common in the here-and-now. Extract 38 thus provides a variation of the 
operation employed in Extracts 36 and 37. This section has, therefore, provided a non-
exhaustive overview of a hitherto neglected family of practices that instantiate  
the “classed” relevance of locational formulations directly in/through their misnaming. 
 
5.6 Summary 
This section has explicated some of the practices employed by co-interlocutors 
whereby “locational formulations” (Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b) are rendered hearable 
as relevantly “classed”. Four practices have been discriminated in this chapter; 
namely, characterisations (§5.5.1), allusions (§5.5.2), co-selections (§5.5.3) and 
intentional misidentifications (§5.5.4). Accordingly, this section has attended to the 
first objective of my chapter, identifying a range of recurrent practices in ordinary 
interaction that are used by co-interlocutors to demonstrably “class” locational 
formulations more or less explicitly, as such. The next section of this chapter 
complements and extends this focus. Here, I show how co-interlocutors reflexively 
mobilise references to place that are not prosecuted relevantly in the service of 
referring; that is, qua “place terms” (recall §5.3). The focus of this section thus 
concerns the metonymic function of locative references, and how they can be 
mobilised to instantiate the relevance of “social class”, specifically. 
 
5.7 Place terms 
Place terms have long been recognised as “inference-rich” (see fn. 123 and fn. 217) 
referents for a diverse array of referential work. This capacity is taken to its acme in 
environments in which their (co-)production not merely makes available such 
implicature, to recipients, but functions referentially as a substitute for this work. 
Extant EM/(M)CA research, for example, has distinguished a number of such 
metonymic accomplishments (e.g. Zimmerman, 1966: 277; Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 519; 
Schegloff, 1972a: 82; 1972b: 99; 2000c: 229). With respect to place terms, 
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specifically, documented uses include indexing activities (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 
462, 758-759; Schegloff, 1972a: 81-82; 1972b: 98-99; Jayyusi 2014 [1984]: 174) and 
social identities. 193 The latter, for instance, includes indications of “deviance” (e.g. 
Hester, 1992: 174, fn. 6), “ethnicity” (e.g. Wilkinson, 2011: 86, 90-91), “indigeneity” 
(e.g. Sacks, n.d., p.c. in Goffman, 1963: 130, fn. 9; Schegloff 1972a: 88-89; 1972b: 
107-108; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 248, fn. 8), “occupations” (e.g. Suttles, 1968: 46, 
100 in Schegloff, 1972a: 432, fn. 5; 1972b: 98, fn. 5), “promiscuity” (e.g. Silverman, 
1994: 438-440), 194 “race” (e.g. Whitehead, 2015: 381-382), “religiosity” (e.g. Drew, 
1978: 9) and “stages of life” (e.g. Schegloff, 1972a: 81-82; 1972b: 98), inter alia. 195 
Place terms have been canvassed as a generic metonymic resource, in this respect; as 
a practice that can be used to configure a wide array of identities, inexplicitly, for a 
range of social actions. 196 In this section, I show the availability of this resource for 
specifying the relevance of “social class”; a dimension of identity that has been 
consigned to parenthetical remarks only vis-à-vis this resource (e.g. Klein, 2011: 69). 
I show that this can be accomplished both in conjunction with the production of 
linguistically (non-)“classed” terms (§5.7.1) and, speculatively, independently, 
without combination with these components (§5.7.2). On both occasions, this work  
is accomplished, differently, in the environment of “cumulative-category listings”  
(see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3; recall §4.6.2).  
 
5.7.1 Conjunctive production 
When produced alongside (non-)linguistic instantiations of “social class”, place terms 
function relevantly in a reflexive, “particularising” faculty. On these occasions, they 
do not operate, perforce, to instantiate the relevance of “social class”. Rather, they 
 
193 For recognition in FA research, see Skeggs (2004: 50, 112, 113, 163). 
194 My gratitude to Dr Rebecca Clift (p.c.) for bringing this paper to my attention. 
195 Places references can also be accomplished by employing this resource. On the use of 
references to persons, see, e.g., Psathas (1968: 516), Psathas and Henslin (1967: 430, fn. 13, 
437, 440), Zimmerman (1992: 47) and Stokoe (2015: 437). Differently, see Rose (p.c. [1994] 
in R. Watson, 1998: 207) on ‘the Goffmanizing of the world’. On temporal and spatial 
references, see Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 518-519; Vol. II: 396). 
196 This includes accusations (see Drew, 1978; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 105-135) and 
explanations (e.g. Silverman, 1994: 438-440), inter alia. 
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indicate that these components should be understood – or stratified – through what is 
denoted by these place terms. In effect, they circumscribe the referential remit of the 
other items, co-listed. In this respect, they perform an ‘elaborative role’ (Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 80), distinguishing how the linguistically (non-)“classed” category with  
which the place term is co-produced should be understood on this occasion. Extract 
29 presents a single linguistically “classed” (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]) example of 
this practice (see →). 197 
 
Extract 29 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_12 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ray, George and Harry are playing 
cards outside a café-cum-bar in Towerview.))
Ray:   If I- If [I buy you a drink would you drink]= 87 
Geo:            [((Shuffles.))                    ]  88 
Ray:   =it.   89 
Geo:   Yeah::¿ 90 
  (0.2) 91 
Ray:   What do you want. 92 
  (0.6) 93 
Geo:   Uh::: another ↑Ghost ↑ship would be great¿ 94 
  (1.2) 95 
Har:   C’d you get me another ↑wate[r. 96 
Geo:                               [((Shuffles.))= 97 
   =(0.5)] 98 
Geo:   =     ] 99 
Har:   I ↓can’t (0.2) get through the dancing  100 
  again.=I almost cried °when I went through 101 
  the [(third) time°. ] 102 
Ray:       [Is it pretty in]tense in there¿ 103 
Har:   It’s the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I’ve ever= 104 
Ray:              [.hhh     ]   [If I’m not back in=     105 
Har:   =seen.°] 106 
Ray:   =      ] ten minutes, (0.4) send he(h)lp. 107 
 
197 For a linguistically non-“classed” version in which the possibly “classed” category (i.e. 
‘Yuppie’ [l. 80]) does not precede (cf. Extract 29), but follows, the focal place term (i.e. 
‘Lansing’ [l. 78]), see Extract 41.  
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  Chu[↑huh.] 108 
Geo:      [↑Huh ] ↑Ha ↑Ha ↑Ha. £We’ll go in the(h)re  109 
  and he’s like-£ 110 
  (0.7) 111 
Har:   It’s impressive. 112 
  (0.5) 113 
Ray:   Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you’ve  114 
→ s(h)ee(h)n.=Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class  115 
  Towerview thing you’ve seen in your life. 116 
Geo:   ↑Huh huh huh. 117 
  (0.6) 118 
Ray:   S::[weet (good lord.)] 119 
Geo:      [((Shuffles.))    ] It is, (0.2) Glorious.  120 
  (5.7) 121 
 
The listing in focus here is produced by Ray (ls. 114-116). Previously, Harry has 
requested that Ray gets him another glass of water from the bar (l. 96). This request is 
accounted for by Harry’s reported inability (i.e. ‘I ↓can’t’ [l. 100]) to do so; this is 
attributed to the dancing at the bar and, specifically, as a result of his intolerance 
thereof (see ls. 100-102, 104 and 106). It is following a second, comparatively 
moderate assessment of this dancing, from Harry (l. 112), that Ray proffers his own 
characterisation of this activity: ‘Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you’ve 
s(h)ee(h)n.=’ (ls. 114-115). This initial characterisation, by Ray, proposes the ‘m::idle 
aged’ (l. 114) quality of this activity as its relevantly complainable dimension. Upon 
completion, however, Ray reformulates this characterisation by way of inserting a 
“specificatory” (see Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011: 72-77), ‘reference recalibration’ 
(Lerner et al., 2012: 196) repair: ‘=Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class Towerview thing 
you’ve seen in your life.’ (ls. 115-116). It is this repaired formulation that furnishes 
the focal cumulative-category three-part listing in this extract.   
 
This repaired listing is composed of three categories: ‘middle ↑aged middle ↓class 
Towerview thing’ (ls. 115-116). The first two are avowed components and comprise 
references to the devices from which they are drawn; namely, “age” (i.e. ‘middle 
↑aged’ [l. 115]) and “social class” (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]), respectively. The 
function of the terminal list-component (i.e. ‘Towerview thing’ [l. 116]), however, is 
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comparatively equivocal. Theoretically, this could perform an indefinitely extensible 
array of referential work. This could include anything from locating to generalising. 
198 However, I propose, that this component contributes to this list in a relevantly 
particularising faculty; that is, to specify the two preceding list components (i.e. 
‘middle ↑aged middle ↓class’ [l. 115]) according to what can be said, for these 
recipients, about the location of ‘Towerview’ (l. 116). The place term therefore 
specifies the relevancies of both “age” and “social class”. 199 In this case, this is 
accomplished by virtue of immediately following the production of a linguistically 
“classed” description (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]). 
 
Extract 29 therefore instances a single-case in which a place term specifies the 
relevance of a linguistically “classed” description in the service of complaint-
implicative conduct (relatedly, see §6.5.1). The relevance of “social class”, in this 
instance, is actuated through Ray’s reference to a linguistically (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 
115]) “classed” description, initially. The place term, ‘Towerview’ (l. 116), then 
operates to preserve – and, further, to particularise – the relevance of this device. 
Place terms, in this respect, are a versatile interactional resource that can be employed 
in order to delimit possibly “classed” relevancies. 
 
5.7.2 Independent production 
The delimiting function of place terms is not limited to their production following  
the linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations. A more radical, economical, albeit 
speculative operation instead involves the (co-)production of place terms 
independently, without linguistically (non-)“classed” components. Place terms, in this 
capacity, still function to specify the relevance of “social class” according to the places 
to which they refer – and for how these places are to be understood by/for their 
recipients. They are unique, however, insofar as they inaugurate this relevance upon 
their production, and they do not specify a linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiation 
(e.g. Extract 29: ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]). Only a single-case of this practice was 
 
198 On the former, see Wilkinson and Weatherall (2011: 72-73). On the latter, see Atkinson 
(1984a: 57-58), Jefferson (1990: 65-68; 1996: 46), Drew (1992: 496) and Lerner (1994: 22). 
199 Relatedly, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 80-81).  
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observed in my collection that resonated with this possible work; this is presented in 
Extract 39 (see →). 
 
Extract 39: EJBH_F1_02 
((A continuation of Extracts 13 and 24. The discussion of a newspaper headline 
precipitates a topically coherent “second telling” from Adam.)) 200 
Ben:   [*↓No::.*=if you,] 344 
Cha:   [No- well no     ]  345 
  (0.4) 346 
Ben:   [(Fair) enough.]   347 
Cha:   [I wouldn’t (si]t) thr[ough that      ]  348 
Ada:   [.hhh          ]      [Yeah I got an e]mail    349 
  from ((Company name.)) which was like to ev-    350 
  All the interns which was promoting their  351 
  like (0.2) diversity programme.  352 
  (0.2) 353 
Ada:   And I was like [↓ah well] I can’t- (0.2)=  354 
Ben:                  [Woo:,   ] 355 
Ada:   =>and it was like [oh-      ] 356 
Ben:                     [They have] a ↑dance  357 
  [group.] 358 
(?):   [°.hhh°] 359 
  (0.2) 360 
Ada:   Eh’heh Huh ↑huh huh= 361 
Ben:   =HEH H(HH)UH HER [HER .HHH .Hh        ] 362 
Ada:                    [That’s a terrible du]de.  363 
  [£Th(h)at’s aw(hh)ful.£] 364 
Ben:   [UH HER Hah hah.Hhh    ] hee hee [.hhh h]h.= 365 
Ada:                                    [.hhh  ] 366 
Ben:   =.hh h. Hhh. 367 
  (0.2)   368 
Ben:   <Eh [huh huh heh ]heh> ↑ha ha ha >°ha ha ha=  369 
Ada:       [°*Oh wow:.*°] 370 
 
200 See, e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 3-16), Jefferson (1978a) and Mandelbaum (2013: 505),  
for review. 
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Ben:   =ha ha°<=.hhh= 371 
Ada:   =.Hhh h.=Her:: >I’m not even gonna finish my  372 
  £story.£=heh[Heh heh hehheh][.h’huh      ] 373 
Cha:               [Eh Heh heh heh][heh heh     ]= 374 
Ben:                               [TUH Hee Heh.] 375 
Cha:   =[heh.   ].hhhh= 376 
Ada:   =[.Hh huh] 377 
Ben:   =[£Go on::,£]=[((Company name.))¿ 378 
Ada:    [.hhhh     ] [H:uh. 379 
  (0.5) 380 
Ada:   *Uh::.* (0.7)  Anyway, (0.3)  381 
Ben:   ↑H[EE::.     ] 382 
Ada:     [Yeah they-] They just promoted <this  383 
  thing.>=>and it was like< you could only join if  384 
  you’re (0.4) (>*uh*<) *like* (0.4) from a diverse385 
   (0.2) background.=[and I was *like*]  386 
Ben:                     [Are you gend    ]er fluid now  387 
  then,  388 
  (0.6) 389 
Ada:   No that doesn’t count as a diverse back*ground.* 390 
  (0.4) 391 
Ben:   ↑That’s kinda *diverse.*= 392 
Ada:   =That’s not a diverse background.=it doesn’t  393 
  change your [ethnicity.          ] 394 
Ben:               [>Oh I didn’t realise] it was  395 
  [about background<]= 396 
Cha:   [.Hhhh            ] 397 
Ben:   =>I thought you just wan-I thought *that like*  398 
  [((Company name.)) were hyping their ↓diversity.  399 
Ada:   [↑No::.    400 
  (0.2) 401 
Ada:   Oh: they- no they wanted diversity in terms of 402 
  (0.2) like (0.7) *↓err:m* either black or  403 
  chinese: studen- No not chinese they w- >they  404 
  how-< they were happy with their levels of 405 
  chinese °wh°= 406 
Cha:   =°hm[::°] 407 
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Ada:       [qui]te high I thi[nk.= 408 
Ben:                         [>.hh .hh< °h]oo hoo hoo= 409 
Cha:                         [°.tch’kay.° ] 410 
Ben:   =hoo hoo°=[.↑HHhhh,          ] 411 
Ada:             [uh- >No honestly i]t’s like (0.2) 412 
Ben:   [((Sniffs.))= 413 
Ada:   [*ah-*  414 
Ada:   =They only- (.) they were only= recruiting  415 
  s[pecif      ]ic. 416 
(?):    [((Coughs.))] 417 
  (0.4) 418 
Ben:   °What are you *then.*° 419 
  (0.7) 420 
Ada:   ↓What (0.3) £white male british.£ 421 
  (0.6) 422 
Ben: → [°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°                        ] 423 
  [((Delivered with “Received pronunciation”.))] 424 
  (0.3) 425 
Ben:   [°(Likky] lik[ky)° 426 
Ada:   [Yeah.  ]    [So I don’t fit into any (0.4)  427 
  ethnic= 428 
Ben:   =Hhh[hh.  ] 429 
Ada:       [(mh-)] Like- (0.4)  430 
Ben:   Useless Adam.  431 
  (0.5) 432 
Ada:   Background do ↑I °it’s° (0.7) They wante- They  433 
  were looking for specific (0.9) uh::m. (0.5)  434 
  ↓backgrounds. 435 
  (0.4) 436 
Ada:   And I think they wanted.  437 
  (0.3) 438 
Ben:   I feel so disadvantaged right [now.   ] 439 
 
The extract is joined as Adam delivers a storytelling about the ‘diversity programme.’ 
(l. 352) hosted at his place of work. At a number of points over the course of the telling, 
the “progressivity” (see Schegloff, 2007a: 14-16) of this activity is vitiated by iterative 
interjections produced by Ben (e.g., ls., 355, 357-358, 382, 387-388, 392, 409, 411 
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and 419). One “heckle” 201 that has been “stabilised” (see Jefferson, 1984a: 202; 
Schegloff, 1988/1989: 236; relatedly, see also, Schegloff, 1992e: 214), topically, 
concerning the nature of “diversity” (e.g. ls. 387-388), culminates as Adam specifies 
the eligibility criteria for the programme (ls. 412 and 415-416). This engenders a 
designedly responsive (‘*then.*°’ [l. 419]) inquiry, from Ben, targeting Adam’s 
identity: ‘°What are you *then.*°’ (l. 419). Adam’s response to this query is produced 
in the form of a challenging (i.e. ‘↓What’ [l. 421]) self-categorisation produced over 
the course of a cumulative-category listing: ‘↓What (0.3) £white male british.£’ (l. 
421). It is in response to this self-identification that the focal place term, 
‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423), is produced by Ben.  
 
The interactional work accomplished by this place term is equivocal. It can be noted 
only that it is treated, by Adam, such that it reinforces his expressed ineligibility for 
the diversity programme (see ls. 427-428 and 430). Multiple interpretations, therefore, 
obtain. It might be produced as “re-formulation” (e.g. Heritage and R. Watson, 1979), 
for example, of the sum of Adam’s previously listed components. Alternatively, it 
could be produced in the service of “other-correction” (here, see Schegloff et al., 
1977), targeting some ostensibly troubling component(s) of Adam’s listing. 
Conversely, it could even furnish a claim of categorial ‘precedence’ (e.g. Jayyusi, 
2014 [1984]: 23, 70, 137, italics in original; see also, fn. 254), addressing some 
relevantly withheld component of Adam’s listing. These notwithstanding, the most 
persuasive hearing, in this case, is of (additive) ‘List Assimilation” (see Jefferson, 
1990: 81-89). The place term, in this usage, is audibly appended to Adam’s prior 
listing (i.e. l. 421) as a numerically fourth component. Nonetheless, even when it is 
heard in this capacity, its operative referential work remains unclear. 
 
It is my proposal, in this extract, that Ben’s production of ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 
423) operates in relevantly “classed” faculty in the service of a “tease” – or a 
“wisecrack” (see Schegloff, 1980: 104; 1988: 126; 2000b: 28). 202 The place term 
functions, in this sense, metonymically: It is produced not in a relevantly locative 
 
201 See, e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 286-288) and Atkinson (1984a: e.g. 58), differently. 
202 On teasing, see §6.6. 
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capacity but, instead, to potentially index Adam’s saliently “classed” identity 
(howsoever characterised), and to adjoin this to the previously completed listing (i.e. 
l. 421); one that does not expressly refer to this device. 203 To be sure, this proposed 
function is not calibrated, as such, in linguistically (non-)“classed” terms, before  
(cf. Extract 29: ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]), during or following its production; nor, 
equally, is it received in these terms by Adam. For this reason, this “classed” operation 
will be considered a speculative “possible”, only. The claim that this term operates to 
instantiate and particularise the relevance of “social class” turns centrally upon my 
knowledge ‘as another Member’ – to again borrow Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 42) phrase. 
More precisely, it trades upon my knowing that this connotation can obtain, 
standardly, for references to this place. Features are observable, therefore, which 
privilege this possibility, but this analysis cannot be established for this cohort 
conclusively. 
 
The form of the place term, ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423), contributes to this 
hearing. Whether or not it is heard in terms of “social class”, it is notable that the 
reference is not formulated grammatically in a straightforwardly locative capacity; 
that is qua ‘reference […] simpliciter’ (Schegloff, 1996d: 440, italics in original). The 
production of a demonym (i.e. “Cantabrigian”), 204 geographical specification (e.g. 
“Cambridgeshire resident”), 205 or vicariously through reference to biographical ties 
(e.g. “With family in Cambridgeshire”), for example, would index locational work 
explicitly, marking Adam’s indigenous membership vis-à-vis this location. In any 
such alternative, ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423) would be expressly advanced as 
Adam’s base location, indicating locational membership. The production of 
‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423) independently, however, as a free-floating 
ascription, like Adam’s previous listed components (i.e. ‘£white male british.£’ [l. 
421]) – and like that of ‘Towerview’ (l. 116) in Extract 29 – permits alternative 
 
203 On the “economy rule” see Sacks (1972: 34-35). Relatedly, on the preference for 
“minimization”, vis-à-vis list-construction (cf. Sacks and Schegloff, 1979: 16-17), see  
Lerner (1994: 22-23). 
204 See, e.g., ‘New Jersey*ans.’ and ‘Alabamians’ (Extract 42: ls. 8-9 and 16, respectively).  
205 See, e.g., ‘Brick >lanes °people’ (Extract 34: ls. 960-961) and “Lancashire lass”  
(see Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2007: 215-218). 
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metonymic hearings. “Social class”, as one device that is not incorporated within 
Adams’ self-identification (i.e. l. 421), represents one such candidate hearing. 
 
The productional features of this turn-at-talk are promising for such a hearing. Two 
notable components include Ben’s delivery, sotto voce, in addition to his use of 
“received pronunciation” (hereafter, RP). These two features differently resonate with 
“social class” as device. As outlined in Chapter 7 (§7.3.5), for example, the former 
appears to be a recurring productional feature in the ascription of “classed” 
membership categories, whereby they are treated, designedly, as “delicates” (see 
Lerner, 2013: 96-97). Conversely, the latter embodies a resource that has traditionally 
resonated with the actuation of “classed” identities in preceding research (e.g. 
Rampton, 2006 in Spencer, Clegg and Stackhouse, 2013: 130; see also, Kerswill, 
2007: 51, 53). While the relevant feature of Ben’s reference therefore goes without 
specification in this extract, two productional features are available which resonate 
with a hearing of ‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ (l. 423) in a potentially “classed” faculty. 
It is at least possible, therefore, that the use of place terms offers a resource to stylise 
“social class”, “off-record” (see fn. 134). 
 
In summary, Extract 39 supplies a speculative case in which a place term (i.e. 
‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ [l. 423]) is produced in lieu of a “classed” membership 
category. The place term, in this respect, likely performs a metonymic function: 
Potentially, it actuates the relevance of “social class” inexplicitly. This differs from 
Extract 29, where comparable work was rendered observable through the initial 
production of a linguistically “classed” category (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 115]), and 
where the place term produced specified the remit of this term. In Extract 39, in 
contrast, a linguistically “classed” component is omitted. For this reason, it is 
considered a speculative hearing. Nonetheless, for those for whom this “classed” 
operation is resonant, and acceptable, such an isolated production may also perform a 
particularising function. This is provided for by the place term itself. It delimits that 
“social class” is to be understood howsoever the place term should delineate it for 
these co-interlocutors. Uniquely, however, this relevance is not merely particularised 
by the place term produced, but it instantiates the relevance of this device in its own 
right. While this goes without explicit acknowledgement amidst Extract 39, it could 
represent a possible illustration of this work. 
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5.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has addressed two objectives directly. Firstly, I have introduced how co-
interlocutors in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction formulate locational 
formulations as “classed”. Four practices were canvassed to this effect: (1) 
characterisations (§5.5.1); (2) allusions (§5.5.2); (3) co-selections (§5.5.3); and (4), 
intentional misidentifications (§5.5.4). These practices have each been explicated as 
resources that can “class” locational formulations in the service of various practical 
purposes. As Extract 37 illustrated, vis-à-vis “stage-of-life” and “gender”, these 
practices are not necessarily unique to the device of “social class”. Instead, it is 
permissible – if not, indeed, expectable – that these practices represent generic 
resources that can be prosecuted to actuate the relevance of other devices (see, e.g., 
fn. 185). This warrants a systematic and independent empirical inquiry. This chapter 
has thus first concentrated on the explication of these four practices.  
 
The second focus of this chapter concerned the “metonymic” use of place terms (see 
§5.7). On these occasions, references to place were not produced relevantly in the 
service of referring (qua locational formulations). I have proposed that their function 
was, instead, to instantiate and particularise the relevance of “social class”. This 
practice has been shown in previous EM/(M)CA research to obtain for an array of 
devices. In the latter portion of this chapter, I have extended this function to “social 
class”. In the cases adduced, co-interlocutors produce place terms in “cumulative-
category listings” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3) by which to particularise the 
relevance of “social class”. In the first type, these listings comprised linguistically 
(non-)“classed” components in their own right (i.e. Extract 29). The second species, 
by contrast, represent speculative cases in which this work could be produced without 
additional linguistically (non-)“classed” components (i.e. Extract 39). References to 
place have thus been introduced as practices which can be “classed” in various ways 
– qua “locational formulations” (§5.5) – but also as resources that may potentially 
instantiate the relevance “social class” in their own right – qua “place terms” (§5.7). 
 
The combination of these objectives, I propose, has also contributed towards an 
understanding of the ‘common sense geography’ (here, see Schegloff, 1972a: 85; 
1972b: 102) of “social class”; an implicit, underlying objective this chapter (recall 
§5.1). The data adduced have shown that the practices canvassed here operate at 
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various degrees of geographical granularity. Inter alia, extracts are comprised 
references to bars (e.g. Extract 33), clubs (e.g. Extract 35), colleges (e.g. Extracts 32), 
college accommodation (e.g. Extract 37), shops (e.g. Extract 36); neighbourhoods 
(e.g. Extract 34); streets (e.g. Extracts 38); towns (e.g. Extract 29); villages (e.g. 
Extract 28 and 30); districts (e.g. Extract 25); cities (e.g. Extracts 28 and 35), counties 
(e.g. Extract 39) and countries (e.g. Extracts 17 and 31). To reuse Enfield’s (2013: 
451) term, place references thus furnish a ‘fractal’ resource; specifically, one that 
could be serviced to instantiate the relevance of “social class” variously.  
Co-interlocutors, in so doing, exhibit an exquisite common-sense “classed” 
geography. The next chapter develops this finding further, reflecting on social  
actions for which these geographies, in addition to the production of membership 
categories, are mobilised recurrently.  
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Chapter 6 – Social Action 
  
6.1 Introduction 
The two preceding chapters have pertained to the first objective of this thesis, 
specifically. These have addressed how “social class” can be treated as recognisable 
for EM/(M)CA research and introduced two interactional practices that occasion 
“social class”, recurrently, within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction; namely, 
“membership categories” (Chapter 4) and “references to place” (Chapter 5). This  
final empirical chapter turns now to the second objective of this thesis; one that  
has been intentionally focussed-off previously. This concerns the recurring lines  
of social action for which these practices are employed in ordinary forms of  
talk-in-interaction. My focus in this chapter, specifically, regards how linguistically 
(non-)“classed” orientations are employed in order to account for components of  
three recurrent social actions; namely, “assessments”, “complaints” and “teases”.  
In these instances, “social class” is treated as a or the salient basis upon which  
an activity is positioned as “assessable”, “complainable” and “teasable”, respectively. 
The chapter concludes by reflecting on the novel observations that are furnished  
by this analysis. 
 
6.2 The pragmatics of social identity  
It has been acknowledged repeatedly across the preceding chapters that the central 
focus of CA research crystallises around the analysis of “social action”. 206 This has 
been referred to as the ‘activity focus’ (see Drew and Heritage, 1992: 17, italics in 
original) of CA. It denotes that when co-interlocutors are engaged in talk-in-
interaction, they are not simply considered to be ‘language idling’, as Wittgenstein 
(n.d. [EJBH: 1968 [1953]: §132] in Drew, 2005: 74) writes, but are, instead, 
irremediably, “doing things”; 207 even through the apparent minutiae of their situated 
conduct (recall fn. 89). This programmatic concern translates empirically in CA 
research into a focus on how the constitutive components of talk-in-interaction are 
serviced in order to accomplish species of social action, activity and interactional 
 
206 Recall §1.7.2, §2.2.2, §3.2.1, §4.2 and §5.2.2. 
207 Austin’s (1975 [1962]) phrase. 
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project (see fn. 62). The activity of “categorisation”, as one such constitutive 
component, has therefore been subsumed in CA research, accordingly.  
 
As Rapley (2012: 326) writes, ‘doing categorization, be it directly and/or indirectly, 
is a central resource for members’ social orders of action’. This empirical attitude 
towards categorisation has been exhibited consistently across CA research since 
Sacks’ (e.g. 1967: Ch. 6; 1972: 57-58; 1974 [1972]: 222-223; 1992, Vol. I: 585-586) 
earliest studies of social interaction. Furthermore, it is also to this end that, as 
Schegloff (2005c: 474) notes, the analysis of membership categories in talk-in-
interaction should not be detached from the practical purposes for which they are 
recruited. As acknowledged in Chapter 4 (§4.2) and Chapter 5 (§5.2.2), this approach 
to the analysis of categories constitutes the predominant locus of/for EM/(M)CA 
research on social identity (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998a), and serves as the 
central heuristic that has mediated CA research into categorisation (e.g. Edwards, 
1991). This has been referred to as ‘the ‘reflexive co-determination’ (Schegloff, 
2007a:473) of action and membership’ (Butler and Fitzgerald, 2010: 2463). As 
reviewed in Chapter 2 (i.e. §2.4.2), extant EM/(M)CA research on “social class” 
exhibits a clear commitment to this approach.  
 
Prior CA research has identified linguistically non-“classed” categorisations to be 
produced in the service of a range of social actions. This has included the production 
of ‘storytelling[s]’, ‘[d]escriptions’, ‘bragging’ and ‘assessments’ (e.g. M. H. 
Goodwin, 2006: 29), negative appraisals (e.g. J. Lee, 2016), self-identifications (e.g. 
West and Fenstermaker, 2002), insult-exchange sequences (e.g. Evaldsson, 2005; M. 
H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010) and ‘complaining, accounting, answering, disagreeing, 
joking and so on’ (Whitehead, 2013: 61). 208 Some of these actions have been 
observed, similarly, in data adduced across Chapters 4 and 5. Examples of these 
 
208 Examples can also be found when linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations are not  
the focus of the research. For an example of a linguistically non-“classed” description in a 
“complaint”, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 60, l. 5, 184-185, l. 5, 242, fn. 34, l. 5). For 
linguistically “classed” categorisations in an “accusation” and “negative assessments”, see 
Dersley and Wootton (2000: 404, fn. 5, ls. 10-11) and Nikander (2001: 80-81, ls. 21-23 and 
30-31), respectively. 
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actions have been acknowledged, where (co-)implicated, but have not formed the 
express focus of my inquiry. This analysis has, instead, been “doubly displaced” 209 
by two preliminary problematics. These concerned how “social class” can be analysed 
in EM/(M)CA research (i.e. Chapter 4) and the recurrent practices used by co-
interlocutors during which linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations are  
(co-)implicated (i.e. Chapters 4 and 5).  
 
This chapter recovers this focus on social action. My attention, here, is directed to 
how orientations to “social class” are employed within three recurrent activities; 
namely, “assessments”, “complaints” and “teases”. For each, I show how that 
linguistically (non-)“classed” orientations serve as a resource for co-interlocutors in 
accounts of/for an array of phenomena, thereby furnishing an accountable resource. 
Furthermore, I demonstrate that like other aspects of social identity (e.g. “race”; see 
Stokoe and Edwards, 2007: 343), their (co-)production recurs in a stable set of 
sequential positions. 
 
6.3 Accounts 
How individuals account for aspects of conduct embodies a longstanding locus of 
classical sociological theorising (e.g. C. W. Mills, 1940; Scott and Lyman, 1968) and 
research (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay, 1982; Mulkay and Gilbert, 1982), and one 
enshrined as a focal dimension within the EM/(M)CA tradition (e.g. H. Garfinkel, 
1967: Ch. 1; see Leiter, 1980: Ch. 6; Heritage, 1984a: Ch. 6; Lynch, 1993: 14-15). As 
Heritage (1988: 128, 138-141) and J. Robinson (2016: e.g. 2) have distinguished, two 
interrelated senses of “accounting” inhere to this programme. The first relates to 
“accountability” as a structure or institution that undergirds, and which is exposed 
through, talk-in-interaction. It refers, broadly, to the expectation of/for the 
intelligibility and the mutual comprehensibility of conduct. The second sense, in 
contrast, refers to the production of situated “accounts” in talk-in-interaction; 
occasions in which co-interlocutors engage in explanatory work, accounting for 
conduct.   
 
 
209 To borrow Schegloff’s (1980: 106) phrase. 
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It is this latter dimension that forms the focus of this chapter, where accounts are 
analysed as a recurrent property of talk-in-interaction. Previously, this activity has 
been investigated in EM (e.g. Sacks, 1967: Ch. 6; Coulter, 1975; Pollner, 1987: Ch. 
2), CA (e.g. Moerman, 1972: 172-180; Heritage, 1988) and MCA research (e.g. 
McCabe and Stokoe, 2004). Inter alia, this has addressed the position (e.g. Waring, 
2007), composition (e.g. Pomerantz, 1986: 222; Wooffitt, 1992: Ch. 6; Parry, 2013) 
and distribution (e.g. Antaki, 1994: Ch. 5; Heritage, 1988: 136) of accounts in various 
social actions within ordinary (e.g. Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977: 205; Bolden and 
J. Robinson, 2011) and institutional forms of talk-in-interaction (e.g. Sacks, 1992, 
Vol. I: e.g. 4-6; Firth, 1995). Research has also addressed how identities become 
enlisted into this activity (for review, see Sacks, 1974: n.p.g. in Antaki, 1998: 79; 
Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 1; Hester, 2000). This has included how identities, as 
occasioned by and inferred from descriptions, are (co-)produced in accounts (e.g. 
McCabe and Stokoe, 2004: 608-610, 611-617; Silverman, 1994: 433-435, 436, 438, 
440-442), and how membership categories are employed to accomplish this work 
explicitly (e.g. Maynard, 1984: Ch. 6; Silverman, 1994: 435; Hester, 2000: 220; 
Whitehead and Lerner, 2009: 615-616, 618-621, 631-632; Stokoe, 2010: 63-70) and 
tacitly (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: e.g. 37; Kitzinger, 2005a: 493-494). 
 
My focus in this chapter extends from this latter tradition of research, concerning 
social identity. I am interested, specifically, in how orientations to “social class” figure 
in accounts of/for recurring social actions and, more exactly, how the practices 
canvassed in Chapters 4 and 5 are enlisted to accomplish this work. In my corpus, 
linguistically (non-)“classed” membership categorisations and references to place 
were observed recurrently within accounting sequences for various action-types. The 
three foremost actions will be considered here; namely, “assessments”, “complaints” 
and “teases”. The sections that follow introduce how co-interlocutors employ “social 
class” as a sequenced and explanatory resource in/for each of these actions. I 
demonstrate, in so doing, that while used in diverse activities, the two practices are 
homogenous with respect to their explanatory function. 
 
6.4 Assessments  
Assessing conduct is a ubiquitous activity in talk-in-interaction and forms an 
established focus of EM/(M)CA inquiry. Previous CA research, for example, has 
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investigated the vocal (e.g. Ogden, 2006) and non-vocal (e.g. Ruusuvuori and 
Peräkylä, 2009; see also, Heritage, 2002: 222-223, fn. 22) aspects of their delivery. 
The latter literature, for example, has investigated their turn-designs (e.g. Pomerantz, 
1975; 1984), directionalities (e.g. Antaki, 2002), second-order functions (e.g. Shaw, 
Potter and Hepburn, 2015: e.g. 329-335), solicitations (e.g. Pomerantz, 1975: 13-14), 
sequential structures (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1986: 209-214), epistemic contextures (e.g. 
Heritage, 2002; 2011b: 169-171; Heritage and G. Raymond, 2005) and preference 
organisation (e.g. Pomerantz, 1984), inter alia, in addition to the responses they 
precipitate (e.g. Heritage, 2002). My focus in this section concerns vocal “evaluative 
assessments” (see Antaki, 1994: 82). Centrally, I am concerned with accounts of/for 
assessments which involve orientations to “social class”; where the terms of an 
assessment (see →) are accounted for through the orientation produced (see Þ). In 
my collection, these accounts are exclusively self-initiated (cf. Bolden and J. 
Robinson, 2011), and the assessments (co-)implicate a range of referents. Locations 
and non-present persons are, notably, modal, and the status of the latter is considered 
further below (§6.5.4). An example of this practice has been seen already, albeit 
abbreviatedly, in Extract 12. The sequence is reproduced here more fully. 
 
Extract 12 (Reproduced) – CallHome-eng-4705 
((A telephone call. Alice and Karen are discussing Alice’s meeting with the 
mutually-known non-present party, Alannah.)) 
Ali:   .hhh But ↑let me just tell you a little bit  22 
  about <↑Alan*nah.*> 23 
  (0.2) 24 
Ali:   An[d I want- ] 25 
Kar:     [Al↑ri:ght.] 26 
  (0.6) 27 
Ali:   Because. (0.6) She (.) call::ed.  28 
  (0.7) 29 
Ali:   And (.) at that point she didn’t mail me l- your  30 
       letter. 31 
   (0.2) 32 
Ali:   >You know.< Sh[e  ]: (0.3) could have mailed it. 33 
Kar:                 [Hm-] 34 
   (0.3) 35 
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Ali:   But she (.) uhm waited and wanted to give it to  36 
  me ↑personally. 37 
  (0.2)  38 
Ali:   .hhh But- (0.9) So I didn’t know ↑who she was. 39 
   (0.5) 40 
Ali:   You know because,  41 
   (0.2) 42 
Kar:   M:h[m¿     ] 43 
Ali:      [I didn’t,] (.) read your ↑letter. 44 
   (0.2) 45 
Ali:   >’Cuz I didn’t ↑have it.<= 46 
Kar:   =Mhm. 47 
   (0.4) 48 
Ali:   But anyway she explained that she had met you at  49 
  the <Ce:ntering Prayer Retreat.> 50 
Kar:   °Mhm.° 51 
  (0.8) 52 
Ali:   An:::d ah:::. (0.7) She invited us (0.2) over to  53 
  her ↑home. 54 
   (0.5) 55 
Ali: →  And it’s a <ver:y nice> (0.4) you know (0.5) 56 
     Þ she‘s (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class:.  57 
   (0.3) 58 
Kar:   .h= 59 
Ali:   =You kno[w.] 60 
Kar:           [M ]:hm.  61 
  (.) 62 
Ali: → And so her- she has a lovely ↓home an’ (0.3) she  63 
  has a swimming pool a[n’]  64 
Kar:                        [↑H]::m:. 65 
   (0.2) 66 
Ali:   Uh:::m. (0.3) >H’you know we had a really nice  67 
  (0.2) day we went< (0.2) *er::* (0.2) you know we  68 
  got here around eleven o’clock in the morning and  69 
  we stayed till about three or four? 70 
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Karen and Alice have begun discussing their mutual-friend, and non-present party, 
Alannah, with whom Alice has recently become acquainted. The focal instantiation of 
“social class” is produced as Alice halts what is adumbrated as a “high-grade” 210 
assessment of Alannah’s home (i.e. ‘And it’s a <ver:y nice>’ [l. 56]) and ascribes her, 
instead, into a linguistically “classed” category: ‘you know (0.5) she’s (0.6) kind of 
from the Wealthy Class:.’ (ls. 56-57). Continuing, Alice then repurposes her “classed” 
categorisation of Alannah (i.e. ‘And so’ [l. 63]) as an explanation for Alannah’s 
possession of ‘a lovely ↓home’ (l. 63), and for her since-upgraded (cf. ‘<ver:y nice>’ 
[l. 56]) assessment thereof (ls. 63-64; see Antaki, 1994: 82). Alannah’s proposed 
incumbency within a linguistically “classed” membership category is thus first 
produced within a locational-assessment-cum-categorisation, by Alice, retreating 
from the delivery of what has been projected as an assessment of her home  
(i.e. ‘And it’s a <ver:y nice>’ [l. 56]). This classification is then mobilised, by Alice, 
retroactively, following its production, to account for Alannah’s ‘lovely ↓home’  
(l. 63) – an action that is possibly projected, here, by virtue of its incipient  
suspension (ls. 56-57).  
 
This excerpt offers an initial example in which a co-interlocutor marshals a non-
present party’s linguistically “classed” status (i.e. ‘she‘s (0.6) kind of from the 
Wealthy Class:.’ [l. 57]) to account for their evaluative assessment. In this case, this 
“accounting” work is conveyed explicitly. This conducted overtly through the details 
of Alice’s turn-design (i.e. ‘And so’ [l. 63]) and by virtue of retroactively inserting 
(see Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011) Alice’s categorisation. Through so doing, Alice 
indicates that it is the “classed” status of Alannah that furnishes the consequential 
pretext, for Alice – and instructively, for Karen – against which Alice’s positively-
valenced assessment of Alannah’s home (e.g. ‘a lovely ↓home’ [l. 63]) should be 
understood. Alice’s invocation of Alannah’s linguistically “classed” status is, 
therefore, positioned such that it accounts for Alice’s incipient (i.e. l. 56) and then  
later recalibrated (i.e. l. 63) assessment of Alannah’s “possessable”. 211 
 
 
210 Antaki’s (2002) term. 
211 Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 382-388) term.  
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This practice of accounting for an assessment by way of a “classed” categorisation is 
recurrent across my collection. Routinely, these unfold over two sequential positions: 
pre-positioned and post-positioned. In the former, co-interlocutors repurpose a 
linguistically “classed” categorisation that has already been produced in their 
preceding turn-at-talk, and then invoke this as the relevant inferential backdrop against 
which the subsequent production of an evaluative assessment can be understood. This 
sequencing is classified as “pre-positioned” insofar as linguistically “classed” 
categorisations (see Þ) are produced before their function, as an account for a 
forthcoming assessment, is put “on-record” (see →; see fn. 134). In this vein, the 
practice is somewhat akin to “retro-sequences” (see Schegloff, 2007a: Ch. 11) 
inasmuch as they ‘retroactively locate something else as the first element of the 
sequence of which the retro-object is the second, although it was not such a “source” 
until the retro-object targeted it as such’ (Schegloff, 2005c: 460). Extract 12 has 
offered a clear illustration of this sequencing. In this case, the activity of accounting 
is initiated, explicitly, only after Alice has ascribed Alannah into a linguistically 
“classed” category (i.e. ls. 56-57). This classification, once produced, is then pre-
positioned, retrospectively, such that it supplies the relevant context against which a 
previously suspended assessment (i.e. ‘And it’s a <ver:y nice>’ [l. 56]), now 
subsequently produced (i.e. ls. 63-64), can/should be understood. 
 
A cognate example of this practice can be observed in Extract 40. In this case, the 
referent classified is not a linguistically “classed” category (cf. Extract 12), but a 
“locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b). While no instances of this 
practice were observed within ordinary talk, Extract 40, an indicative institutional 
example, illustrates this exigency. This excerpt is taken from a call between Jane and 
Charles. Jane is representative of a course for which Charles is a prospective student. 
The linguistically “classed” formulation in focus is produced by Jane in an extended 
(e.g. ‘And’ [l. 23]) response to Charles’ question (see ls. 1-2), concerning whether 
accommodation is located onsite. 
 
Extract 40: CallHome-eng-6313 
((A telephone call. Jane is a representative of an educational course in 
Guanajuato for which Charles is a prospective applicant.)) 
Cha:   ↓And::. (0.3) uh- are the accommodations there on  1 
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  ↑premises or::.= 2 
Jan:   =No. (.) .hh .tch. ↑We:: ↑we offer several  3 
  options. th- >The ↑Vast majority of our students  4 
  take (.) host family homes.=.hhhh a(hhh.)s’uh.  5 
  (0.5) the way to go when they're here in  6 
  Guanajua*to.*=.hhh They pay. (0.3) *uh::m.* A  7 
  base price of eleven dollars a day, and that  8 
  includes a private room.  9 
  (0.5) 10 
Jan:   ↑An::d uhm. (1.6) Full breakfast.  11 
  (0.3) 12 
Jan:   And it may or may not include a private bath it    13 
  really depends on each family.=We tell the    14 
  students that (0.2) it's not a hotel it's- it’s  15 
  a- it's a home. 16 
   (.) 17 
Jan:   .hhh[hh 18 
Cha:       [M’huh.= 19 
Jan:   =An::’ the idea isn't so much for luxury it's  20 
  more for:, (0.6) uhm¿ (1.0) really communicating  21 
  with people and >to getting to< know::: the 22 
     Þ culture by way of the people. .hhh (0.2) And >the  23 
  vast majority of the homes are upper middle  24 
→ class< to: lower upper class, they're very nice  25 
  homes and they're families that we've (0.2)  26 
  worked with for years. hh. .hhh (.) Uhm::. if a  27 
  student wishes (.) Other me:als:. (.) with the  28 
  host family, (0.3) for an additional ↑four  29 
  dollars a day the student can have comida >which  30 
  is the large midday meal.< 31 
   (0.5) 32 
Cha:   Mhm¿= 33 
Jan:   =An’::. you can eat (.) very very well in  34 
  Guanajuato on four dollars? 35 
 
Like Extract 12 (ls. 56-57), the linguistically “classed” classification, in this extract, 
is produced initially as a classification in its own right: ‘And >the vast majority of the 
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homes are upper middle class< to: lower upper class,’ (ls. 23-25). This classification 
is complete upon its point of production. It is not produced, in this moment, for 
example, as an account for an assessment that has been produced previously; such as, 
for example, for why this accommodation ‘isn’t so much for luxury’ (l. 20), 212 but 
facilitative of cultural transmission (e.g. ls. 20-23). To reapply Jefferson’s (e.g. 2004 
[1975]: 55, my emphasis) phrase, Jane’s categorisation is instead produced “in the 
clear”. However, like Alice’s categorisation of Alannah in Extract 12 (i.e. ls. 56-57), 
this categorisation is then pre-positioned, retroactively, by Jane, to account for a 
positively-valenced assessment of this referent: ‘they’re very nice homes and they’re 
families that we’ve (0.2) worked with for years.’ (ls. 25-27). 
 
Akin to Extract 12, therefore, a linguistically “classed” categorisation – in this case, 
of a “locational formulation” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b), ‘the homes’ (l. 24) – is 
first produced. Retroactively, this is then demonstrably repurposed by its progenitor 
to contribute the relevant grounds for a subsequent assessment. Extract 40 therefore 
aligns with Extract 12 in this respect. Although, in this case, Jane’s “classed” 
categorisation furnishes the basis for an account for a positively-valenced assessment 
of the same referent (cf. Extract 12), the account for which is not tied, explicitly, to 
her previously “classed” classification (cf. Extract 12: l. 63); rather, like her prior 
“gist” formulation (see Heritage and R. Watson, 1979; ls. 14-16), this is rendered 
hearable, as such, through its contiguous production. This type of account is in this 
sense describable as an ‘account-containing sequence’ (Parry, 2013: 115); one that 
accomplishes the work of accounting positionally, without marking that which is 
being accounted for with an ‘explanatory connective’ (ibid.: 106). 
 
Extracts 12 and 40 thus provide cases in which a “classed” category and locational 
formulation, respectively, are produced qua categorisations, and are then repositioned, 
by the same co-interlocutor, such that they account for the assessment, subsequently 
produced. Notably, the inverse of this sequencing also occurs across my dataset. On 
these occasions, an evaluative assessment is first produced which does not, upon its 
point of its production, co-implicate nor intersect with “social class”. This assessment 
 
212 On “litotes”, see Bergmann (1992: 148-151). Relatedly, see Drew (2006: 69). 
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is then accounted for by virtue of the “classed” status of a person and/or location. This 
sequencing will be referred to as post-positioning, to this effect. 213 Extract 25, 
previously adduced, illustrates this operation. 
 
Extract 25 (Reproduced): SWB2353 
((A telephone call. Alice and Brian are discussing American foreign policy; 
specifically, the benefits and consequences of missionisation.)) 
Ali:   Uh=They’re encouraged to do that (0.2) .hhh 28 
  missionary work (.) .hhh  an’ I bel- I really 29 
  believe that the people that do that h. (0.9)  30 
  Are:: (0.2) better people an’ are make our  31 
  [society better.] 32 
Bri:   [You know I-    ] I really ↑agree with you. 33 
   (0.3) 34 
Bri:   Uhm. (0.3) .tch (0.2) I’uh (0.2) though I’ve  35 
  never done that myself, I-I’m (.) was a (0.2) 36 
  basically an education major when I graduated  37 
  from college, (0.2) .hh (.) an’ I accepted a  38 
  ↑Job, (0.2) that at the time was jus’ (0.2)  39 
  slightly above the Poverty level to teach  40 
  (0.6) to uhm (.) .tch (0.2) very Rural (0.6)  41 
        children in a very Low income district. (0.8)  42 
  and I (0.2) sp:ent a year teaching there.  43 
  (0.2) 44 
Ali:   [Uhuh,              ] 45 
Bri: Þ [And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2) 46 
largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences 47 
→ because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class, 48 
White suburban home, 49 
   (0.2) 50 
Ali:   Uhuh, 51 
   (.) 52 
 
213 This is unrelated to Schegloff’s (1979b: 273, my emphasis) reparative sense of “post-
positioning”. 
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Bri: And I Did It (0.2) Uhm. (0.6) For one reason I (won 53 
this) (.) I was (.) working on Masters’ degree so 54 
I wanted to stay close to where I was working on a 55 
Masters’ degree.=.hhh (0.2) But also be↑cause: I 56 
just thought it would be interesting to live 57 
someplace else (.) so totally different then my 58 
own (.) ↑upbringing.  59 
   (.) 60 
Ali:   Mhmhuh:¿ 61 
Bri:   An’ I- it ↑Change::d, hh. (0.5) it probably   62 
changed my (.) political view:s, it changed my 63 
understanding of the world around d’me, (0.5)  64 
Ali:   Uhuh¿= 65 
Bri:   =And uh I think uhm, (0.7) °mpt°=in fact i-if I  66 
        Had to do it all again. (.) uh I’ve you know I-  67 
  AFTER that you know I you never think of it  68 
  ↑because, .hhh (0.2) I guess because, (.) I paid  69 
  for all of my college education myself, (0.3) .hh  70 
  I never thought about (0.6) doing that because I  71 
  had all of these college loans. (0.2) I’had to  72 
  start paying ↑back. 73 
 
The extract begins as Alice proffers several reasons for why she considers public 
service worthwhile (e.g. ls. 28-32). After expressing his agreement (l. 33), Brian 
recalls a comparable experience (ls. 35-43); namely, teaching rural children ‘in a very 
Low income district’ (l. 42). After a slight gap (l. 44), and whilst overlapping a  
go-ahead, from Alice (l. 45), Brian produces an evaluative assessment of his 
experience: ‘[And I think it wa]s Probably one of my (0.2) largest (0.2) eye opening:: 
(.) experiences’ (ls. 46-47). Contiguously, Brian explicitly (i.e. ‘because’ [l. 48]) 
accounts for the enlightening quality of this experience (recall fn. 181) over a 
“cumulative” (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3; recall §4.6.2) characterisation (see 
§5.5.1.1) of his ‘home,’ (l. 49): ‘because I come from a nice:: (0.7) middle class,  
White suburban home,’ (ls. 48-49). 
 
As outlined in §5.5.1.1, this characterisation functions accumulatively. Notable for 
current purpose is that it includes reference to a linguistically “classed” categorisation, 
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‘middle class’ (l. 48), in list-medial position. For this reason, Extract 25 provides an 
example of a post-positioned account: Brian first produces an evaluative assessment 
which bears no explicit reference to “social class” (ls. 46-47). However, this “classed” 
relevance is then co-implicated through the explanatory design of Brian’s subsequent 
account (ls. 47-48). The account, in this instance, therefore, postdates the production 
of the evaluative assessment. This differs from Extracts 12 and 40 in which “social 
class” was first made relevant (qua categorisation) before mobilising the terms of this 
categorisation in the service of an account. The account produced in this extract is, 
therefore, contrastively, post-positioned.  
 
A similar example of this practice, using a linguistically non-“classed” and a 
linguistically “classed” category can be observed in Extract 06; tabulated previously 
in Chapter 4 (see Table 5). This extract is a multi-party, face-to-face interaction 
conducted between Faye, Ruth, Oliver and Harry. Prior to this extract, the interaction 
has “schismed” (see Sacks et al., 1974: 713-714; Schegloff, 1995b: 32) into two  
dyads: Oliver and Harry, and Faye and Ruth. The interaction between the  
latter is focal here. In this instance, both the evaluative assessment and  
post-positioned account is produced by Faye as she responds to Ruth’s  
foregoing assessment (see ls. 50, 52 and 54) of the non-present third-party,  
Elijah Stocks; a mutually-known acquaintance with whom Ruth has recently 
reconnected.  
 
Extract 06 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_32 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ruth recalls an encounter with a 
mutually-known non-present party, Elijah, to Faye.))
Rut:   >He’s like an [estate agent in Leaves¿<= 38 
Oli:         [(↓‘Bout to count a square of=  39 
Rut:   =      ] 40 
Oli:   =spaghe] £he had [no id(h)ea¿£]=  41 
Fay:                    [↑Really:,   ]= 42 
Rut:   =Yeah. 43 
  (.)        44 
Oli:   £Let me <te(hh)ll you£ [about]= 45 
Rut:          [Erm. ]= 46 
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Oli:   =[°that.°]= 47 
Rut   =[↑the-  ]= 48 
Har:   =Go on [then.] 49 
Rut:      [Like¿] 50 
   (0.2) 51 
Rut:   Pleasant. 52 
   (0.6) 53 
Rut:   >As well*:,<* 54 
   (0.3) 55 
(?):   (.tch)= 56 
Fay: Þ =It’s just [↑sad ‘cuz he bullied at= 57 
Oli:               [(<The case for the thing¿>)=  58 
Fay:   =Tower]view school= 59 
Oli:   =     ] 60 
Fay: → =[°‘cuz like° (0.4) commo*n.*] 61 
Oli:    [Spent about a’ hour   (prat][tering= 62 
  [(0.4)= 63 
Oli:   =around)  with  <s]= 64 
   =                 ]= 65 
Oli:   =[paghett      ][i:>    ][trying to= 66 
Fay: →  [But then he came][to Herrying][ton (  )=  67 
Rut:          [↑Really.   ] 68 
Oli:   =make it <↓square> for £the c(hh)ase.£  69 
Fay:   =and he got (bullied) <£because he  70 
  was£> (.) *posh.* (.)  71 
Har:   Mhm::[:. 72 
Oli:    [.£Hh[hh£    ] 73 
Rut:         [°↑Elij ]ah [Stocks° ↓common.= 74 
Oli:                         [(Tried spent *a*=  75 
Rut:   =     ] 76 
Oli:   =↓who)][le °day*::.*°]= 77 
Fay:          [<↑I know::.> ] 78 
Oli:   =Essent[ially just (               = 79 
Rut:          [(Don’t think ↑there’s (.)  = 80 
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Fay:         [(Loves (.) ↑anything) [(but)= 81 
                                [(( RP. )) 82 
Oli:   =        )¿] 83 
Rut:   =anything-)] 84 
Fay:   =doe       ]sn’t have boat.]  85 
   =          ]           86 
 
Faye responds to Ruth’s assessment with a designedly affiliative, although, to this 
point, unelaborated assessment: ‘=It’s just [↑sad’ (i.e. l. 57). Like that produced by 
Brian, in Extract 25 (ls. 46-47), this assessment is not overtly interconnected, by Faye, 
to “social class”. Instead, this is only then instantiated as Faye contiguously and 
explicitly (‘‘cuz’ [l. 61]) accounts for this assessment: ‘=It’s just [↑sad ‘cuz he bullied 
at [((…))] Tower]view school [((..))] [°‘cuz like° (0.4) commo*n.*] [((…))] [But then 
he came][to Herrying][ton (  ) [((…))] and he got (bullied) <£because he  was£>] (.) 
*posh.* (.)’ (ls. 57, 59, 61, 67 and 70-71). 
 
Faye’s account trades upon the lamentable and ironic status of Elijah during school. 
This is a state to which direct access can be claimed, whereas Elijah’s present status, 
by contrast, is one to which Ruth alone has been privy (relatedly, see C. Goodwin, 
1996: 370-371; Heritage, 2011b: 168-169). Specifically, Elijah is assessed to have 
been regrettably and differently “out-of-place” within his two schools (see ls. 57, 59, 
61, 67 and 70-71; recall fn. 183). This irony is formulated by Faye in potentially 
“classed” terms through the categorisation of Elijah into designedly contrastive, 
relativised and locatively disjunctive linguistically non-“classed” categories (i.e. 
‘commo*n.*’ [l. 61]; *posh.*’ [l. 71]). 
 
Faye, therefore, like Brian in Extract 25, produces an assessment of a referent (i.e. a 
non-present party) which is not formulated in “classed” terms. However, Faye then 
leverages the possibly “classed” status of the focal referent in the service of a post-
positioned account for her assessment. Extract 06 thus parallels Extract 25, in this 
respect; it is an example in which the linguistically non-“classed” status of a referent 
is mobilised to account for an assessment previously produced. 
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6.4.1 Summary 
Extracts 12, 40, 25 and 06 have provided examples in which linguistically  
(non-)“classed” orientations to “social class” are produced in the service of self-
initiated accounts that are produced for “evaluative assessments” (Antaki, 1994: 82). 
Two sequences over which these accounts are (co-)produced have been illustrated in 
this section: pre-positioning and post-positioning. Extracts 12 and 40 have illustrated 
the former. In these cases, the linguistically (non-)“classed” status of a membership 
category and locational formulation are established independently by co-interlocutors. 
This status is then retrieved as the salient inferential backdrop against which an 
evaluative assessment of a referent (i.e. the same or different) is, subsequently, 
predicated. The positions in which the accounts are (co-)produced are, in this sense, 
pre-positioned. Extracts 25 and 06 then illustrated the post-positioned operation. 
These two cases have shown how linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations of 
locations and membership categories are mobilised in the service of accounting for 
evaluative assessments, previously produced. These differ from Extracts 12 and 40 
insofar as they postdate the (co-)production of the assessments for which they account. 
This sequencing is characterised as post-positioned, on this basis. This section has 
therefore indicated how linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations are utilised 
recurrently in two sequential positions to account for the production of evaluative 
assessments. What remains to be considered, however, is why linguistically  
(non-)“classed” statuses are mobilised in order to accomplish this work. This  
warrants independent discussion. 
 
6.4.2 Discursus  
To a considerable extent, why “social class” is incorporated into unsolicited 
accountings for evaluative assessments is laid bare, by co-interlocutors, endogenously, 
through the very business of accounting. Co-interlocutors, in this sense, explain why 
they have invoked a linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisation through the very 
terms of their account. In Extract 12, for example, Alice’s invocation of Alannah’s 
linguistically “classed” status is mobilised to account for her possession of ‘a lovely 
↓home’ (l. 63). Thus, the reason for which Alannah’s linguistically “classed” status 
(i.e. ‘she’s (0.6) kind of from the Wealthy Class:.’ [l. 57]) is discriminated here, as 
opposed to some other dimension (recall §2.2.1), is, therefore, explained to some 
extent, through the social action for which it is enlisted. In other words, for Alice, in 
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this moment, “social class”, and, specifically, Alannah’s inherited status within ‘the 
Wealthy Class:.’ (l. 57), is treated such that it accounts for her possession of these 
objects. 
 
This type of internal reasoning for the use of “social class” obtains similarly for 
Extracts 40, 25 and 06, where, again, the reason for which “social class” is actuated, 
in some capacity, can be explained by reference to the phenomena for which they are 
enlisted to account. In some cases, however, while co-interlocutors nominate 
linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations to account for various phenomena, they 
do not disclose why “social class” is invoked in order to accomplish this work 
uniquely; that is, as opposed to some alternative device (e.g. “gender”). 214 Extract 12, 
again, furnishes a clear example of this exigency. In this case, Alice, through the 
details of her turn-design (i.e. ‘And so’ [l. 63]), and by virtue of its retroactive 
placement (see Wilkinson and Weatherall, 2011), indicates that the linguistically 
“classed” status of Alannah furnishes the operative reason, for her recipient, Karen, 
against which Alice’s positively-valenced evaluative assessment of Alannah’s home 
(l. 63) should be understood. What is not explicated by Alice, however, over this 
sequence, is why Alannah’s linguistically “classed” status qualifies as explanatory on 
this occasion. Instead, this is left as taken-for-granted, viable in its own right and, 
presumably, known-in-common.  
 
Extracts 25 and 06, on the other hand, provide instances in which this reasoning is 
explicated to a greater extent. In Extract 25, for example, Brian invokes his 
linguistically “classed” identity as one-of-many accumulative reasons that account 
adequately for why working in ‘a very Low income district.’ (l. 421) qualifies as one 
of his ‘largest (0.2) eye opening:: (.) experiences’ (l. 47). The reason for which “social 
class” is invoked here, then, inter alia, is explicitly accounted for through the terms of 
his assessment; that is, the “classed” status of his home is positioned to furnish the 
basis for Brian’s evaluative assessment. A similar case can be seen in Extract 06. In 
this case, the “classed” status of Elijah is treated, by Ruth and Faye, as the operative 
 
214 On this form of ‘contrastive explanation’, see A. Garfinkel (1981 in Pilnick, 2004: 459, 
my emphasis).  
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explanatory feature for why he was differently out-of-place at the two institutions 
named. Why “social class” is discriminated in this telling, as opposed to some other 
(in)correct dimension of personhood, is thus made explicit through the very terms of 
this assessment. Co-interlocutors can, therefore, not only disclose that “social class” 
confers the relevant explanatory resource by which to account for phenomena at 
varying degrees of explicitness, but that they can also mark why it qualifies as 
explanatory in the same terms, and at greater or lesser degrees of explicitness.  
 
The consequentiality of invoking “social class” in the service of accounting for 
evaluative assessments is, therefore, determined locally on each occasion of use. 
Expectably, this entertains an indefinite extendibility; presumably it can be used to 
align with whatever domains are required in accordance with the practical purposes  
of co-interlocutors. However, the recurrent invocation of “social class” in the service 
of positively-valenced evaluative assessments, across Extracts 12, 40, 25 and 06, is 
notable and contrasts with the actions of complaining (§6.5) and teasing (§6.6) for 
which this identity is also invoked in an explanatory capacity. 
 
6.5 Complaints 
The second social action in which co-interlocutors routinely mobilised linguistically 
“classed” categorisations as an explanatory resource is the delivery of complaints. 
Complaints, like accounts, have long formed an object of EM/(M)CA scrutiny and 
have been analysed both in ordinary (e.g. Schegloff, 1988: 119-131) and institutional 
interactions (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 60, 184-185, 242, fn. 34). This research 
has disaggregated their subtypes (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 597-600; Vol. II: 311; 
Sharrock and R. Turner, 1978: 179; Coulter, 1990: 194-195; Mandelbaum, 1991/1992; 
Jefferson, 1996: 60, fn. 26; Dersley and Wootton, 2000: 380; Ogden, 2010: 84-88, 92-
96; G. Raymond, 2018: 84, fn. 11), constitutive components (e.g. Jefferson, 1978b: 
136; Pomerantz, 1986: 220-221, 227-228, 228-229, fn. 2; Drew and E. Holt, 1988; 
Schegloff, 1988: e.g. 121; Lerner, 1996: 254-255; Lerner and Takagi, 1999: 55-56;  
E. Holt, 2000: 435-439; Edwards, 2005: 9; Schegloff, 2005c; Edwards and Fasulo, 
2006: 359; Bolden and J. Robinson, 2011: 99, 113-114; Maynard, 2013; Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 77-78), division of labour (e.g. Sacks, 1970, Part 2: 35-36, 39; Drew and 
Walker, 2009), placement (e.g. J. Robinson, 1998: 110-111), recognisability (e.g. 
Sacks, 1970, Part 2: 37; R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 205-212; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 
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31-32; Clift, 2007: 124-126, 149; Ogden, 2010: 83) and the different responses they 
occasion, in situ (e.g. Sacks, 1970, Part 2: 38, 40-41; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 49-
51; Heritage and R. Watson, 1979: 140; Schegloff, 1980: 136; Schegloff, 1984a: 34; 
1988: 122; 124-125; 2007a: 14, 61, 160; Drew, 1987: 238, 252, fn. 13). 
 
Like “assessing” (§6.4), “complaining” is also an activity that has been investigated 
in past EM/(M)CA research into social identity (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 44-45). 
One locus of this research has been the production of membership categories. 
Complaints have been investigated in relation to categories indicative of “age” (e.g. 
Jefferson, 1996: 23-25, 60, fn. 26), “heterosexuality” (e.g. Land and Kitzinger, 2005: 
397), “ethnicity” and “race” (e.g. R. Watson, 1974; Stokoe and Edwards, 2007), inter 
alia (e.g. R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 205-212; Wootton, 1989: 251-252). Complaints 
have also been identified, heretofore, in past EM/(M)CA research on “social class”. 
This has included the analysis of linguistically “classed” (e.g. Dersley and Wootton, 
2000: 404, fn. 5) and non-“classed” categories (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 60, 
184-185, 242, fn. 34; Whitehead, 2013: 52-54; Stokoe, 2015: 439). The sub-sections 
that follow therefore develops existing EM/(M)CA research, situating how and where 
co-interlocutors mobilise linguistically (non-)“classed” identities to account for 
complainable conduct. The focal distinction advanced in this section pertains to 
whether “social class” is nominated to account for the complainable directly, or 
employed to account for an epiphenomenal component, thereof, and employed 
comparatively indirectly. This use was observed across two forms of complaints; 
namely, those produced in response to transgressions enacted by co-present co-
interlocutors (see Dersley and Wootton, 2000; Edwards, 2005), and those produced in 
response to “talk-extrinsic” (recall fn. 145) matters and/or non-present parties  
(see Drew, 1998; Stokoe and Edwards, 2007; Drew and Walker, 2009). Following 
Edwards (2005: 6, italics in original), these will be termed ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
complaints, respectively. 215 
 
 
 
215 For the use of comparable distinctions, see Dersley and Wootton (2000: 380) on 
“complaints”, and Heritage and C. Raymond (2016: 6) on “apologies”.  
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6.5.1 Accounting for complainability 
The “classed” implicature of an activity and/or event is routinely treated, by co-
interlocutors, as the explanatory basis for the “complainability” of some state-of-
affairs. Instantiations of “social class”, on such occasions, are positioned by co-
interlocutors (qua “complainants”) such that they account for why a tellable qualifies 
as relevantly complainable, in some moment. To qualify, “classed” identities are not 
necessarily that which is being complained about on these occasions. Instead, the 
device is invoked to justify the bases in respect to which a tellable is treatable qua 
complainable (see →). A clear example of this work has been seen previously in 
Extract 19, reproduced below. As introduced in Chapter 4 (§4.6.1.2), this fragment 
features the delivery of a “direct complaint” (see Edwards, 2005) by Samuel. For 
context, Simon and Samuel have reached the final round of betting in a “hand” of 
poker, and Simon, who is positioned as “last-to-act”, has “checked” (l. 13). Vis-à-vis 
game-relevancies, this makes relevant that Samuel announces his own “hand”;  
an obligation that is fulfilled promptly: ‘[Got a ]ce:.’ (l. 15). 
 
Extract 19 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_34 
((A face-to-face interaction. Samuel, Tim, Luke, Simon, Nick and David are 
playing “Texas hold ‘em”.))
Tim:   (Got / And) a great mix lined up >↓Luke.< 6 
   (0.9) 7 
Tim:   >Do you know what you’re [doing.<] 8 
Sam:                            [Check. ] 9 
   (0.5) 10 
(?):   °(   )-°= 11 
Luk:   =Y[eah   ] on Facebook= 12 
Sim:     [Check.] 13 
Luk:   =↑li[(h)ve.] 14 
Sam:       [Got a ]ce:. 15 
   (2.3)  16 
(?):   ((Sniffs.)) 17 
   (0.6) 18 
(?):   ((Clears throat.)) 19 
   (0.2) 20 
(?):   ((Sniffs.))= 21 
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(?):    =.hhhhHH[HH.    ] 22 
Luk:            [↑OH::::] 23 
   (0.4) 24 
(?):   °hhhhh.°  25 
   (1.0) 26 
Sam:   I got ace:.  27 
   (0.3) 28 
Nic:   [<That you: said.             ] 29 
Sam: → [He’s was- just gonna put me d]own as working  30 
     ↑class inne.  31 
   (0.2) 32 
Nic:   £Hy(h)eah.£ 33 
Sam:   °Fuck.° ((Whispered.)) 34 
Nic:   I heard that [as well and I did think that= 35 
Sam:       [(.hhhhh  / hhhhh. ) Tim.= 36 
Nic:   =straight away.] 37 
Sam:   =              ] 38 
   (0.4) 39 
Tim:   £S(h)am.£ 40 
   (0.4) 41 
Sam:   I’m so sorry audi°en° (    ) ((Trails off.))  42 
(?):   .hhh= 43 
Nic:   =°Nothing wrong with being working class Sam.° 44 
   (0.5) 45 
Sam:   .hhh (0.4) I got ↓ace:. 46 
   (1.6) 47 
Nic:   °Tim identified himself as working° CLASS,  48 
   (0.4) 49 
Sam:   Should’a said I Ace.50 
 
It is the syntax of Samuel’s announcement (i.e. l. 15) that forms the locus of his 
ensuing complaint in this extract. Following this announcement, and after producing 
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(what is designed as) a repetition, thereof (i.e. l. 27), 216 Samuel orients to the 
“inference rich” 217 status of the semantic content of his turn-design and to the 
categorial, ascriptive upshot that is proposedly generated, thereby: ‘[He’s was- just 
gonna put me d]own as working ↑class inne.’ (ls. 30-31).  
 
Samuel, in this turn, anticipates that his announcement will furnish a basis for the 
researcher, who is co-present, to classify him as ‘working ↑class’ (ls. 30-31); an 
inference, and anxiety, that is endorsed by Nick (ls. 35 and 37). It is this upshot that is 
marked as the focus of/for Samuel’s complaint; an activity that is put “on-record” 
through his negatively-valenced “response cry” (l. 34; see also, Ogden, 2010: 85, 86, 
93; Lerner, 2013: 96-97). 218 Samuel, therefore, is not complaining about being 
identifiable, for the researcher, as “working class”, per se, but that he has rather 
proposedly, and regrettably, divulged his classificatory potential, as such, and thereby 
exposed its prior “concealment” (here, see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 69). 219 It is, then, 
Samuel’s predicted allocation into this membership category, that is treated as the 
operative basis for which this constitutes a complainable, and which expectably 
eventuates his subsequent apology (i.e. l. 42; see Heritage and C. Raymond,  
2016: 8-9). 220 
 
This phenomenon, of accounting for a complainable through a “classed” 
categorisation, was observed recurrently across my collection. In the case of Extract 
24, this was invoked by Samuel as the singular explanatory component of/for his 
complaint-in-progress. More recurrently, however, “social class” was invoked as  
one-of-many-contributing-factors. On these occasions, a “classed” categorisation is 
mobilised by a complainant, alongside others, under the auspices of either a 
‘cumulative’ or ‘itemized’ three-part listing (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: Ch. 3, for 
 
216 This practice is evocative to repeating a repairable (see fn. 106). Relatedly, see Glenn 
(2003: 132-141) on the preservation and renewal of errors vis-à-vis ‘verb tense’ (ibid.: 132).  
217 Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 40; see also, Schegloff, 2007b: 469) phrase. Relatedly, see fn. 123. 
218 Goffman’s (1981) term. 
219 On ‘revelatory matters’, see Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 68, italics in original). 
220 See also, fn. 126. 
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review). Examples of both of these lists are presented in Extracts 41 and 13, 
respectively. 
 
Extract 41 – SWB2830 
((A telephone call. Meg and Tina have been discussing television 
programmes.))
Tin:   [°>ch- Oh that’s ↑funny.<°] 44 
Meg:   [And now I’m tryin        ]g to think of ↓the  45 
  only other (.) [Show I watch.] 46 
Tin:                  [.hhhh I-     ] (.) [↑Seen ]  47 
Meg:                                      [(ing.)] 48 
  (.) 49 
Tin:   Cheers probably five ↑times.=An’ i’ve (.)  50 
  seen, (.) .hhhh Uhm. (0.3) Cros. (.) ↑Cosby  51 
  show probably ten times, 52 
   (.) 53 
Meg:   YEA::h=I don’t even [into] ↑Cosby. 54 
Tin:                       [HHH.] 55 
   (0.3) 56 
Meg:   (↑Elliot love) (.) probably uh. (.) ↓I’ve  57 
  seen Cheers more than that I hate to admit    58 
  but- (0.2) 59 
Tin:   °↑Uhuh¿ h.° 60 
   (0.2) 61 
Meg:   UH:[::↓M::.          ] 62 
Tin:      [That’s pretty ↓co]o::l I like (.) ↓that  63 
  whenever I ↑watch it. h. 64 
   (0.3) 65 
Meg:   Cheers¿ 66 
  (.) 67 
Meg:   ↑Yea:h? I thought it was a good. (.) >I’ve  68 
  actually been to that bar in Lansing.<=↑It’s a  69 
  ni- ‘ou know it’ (I thought) a pretty funny 70 
  [show.    ] 71 
Tin:   [Oh you ha]ve¿ 72 
Meg:   ↑Yea:h. 73 
Tin:   ↓Yeah I've heard [it’s >prett]y cool,< 74 
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Meg:                    [Kind of a- ] 75 
   (0.4) 76 
Meg: → It’s just a you know over price (0.3) *uh*  77 
  (.) uh h.↑HUH .hhh (0.4) [downtow]n Lansing = 78 
Tin:                            [Yeah.  ] 79 
Meg:   =Yuppie you know.= 80 
Tin:   =Yeah.= 81 
Meg:   =↑Tourist attraction. 82 
   (0.5) 83 
Meg:   ↑I’m trying to think what else is on.  84 
  [*I*know it]’s like, (0.2) 85 
Tin:   [ch:::.    ] 86 
 
Extract 13 (Reproduced): EJBH_F1_02 
((A face-to-face interaction. Ben, Charlie and Adam have been discussing their 
family homes.)) 
Ada:   So [how many] living rooms do you have.  258 
Ben:      [We got  ] 259 
  (0.2) 260 
Ada:   Th[ree¿ ]=↑eight, 261 
(?):     [°two°] 262 
  (0.6) 263 
Cha:   Eh h(h)eh  264 
  [heh Heh heh heh heh.hhh                ] 265 
Ada:   [Huh ↑Heh .Hhh hh.                      ]  266 
Ben:   [He’s ↑got- he’s ↑got- he’s ↑got two boa]ts  267 
  [like that’s enough £l(h)i(h)ke.£hhhh] 268 
Ada:   [↑Heh heh heh.                       ]  269 
  .Hhhh (0.2)  270 
(?):   .hhhh= 271 
Ben:   ((Coughs.))=Isn’t this thing about like class  272 
  or some s:hit.= 273 
Ada:   =[Yeah= 274 
Ben:    [(    ) 275 
Ada:   =I kno[w.] 276 
Cha:         [Ye]ah heh heh huh £(    )£.  ] 277 
Ben:         [Heh Huh .hh .hh £(is i(h)t)£.]=.HH’heh  278 
 273 
  h[eh..hh                      ] 279 
Ada:    [I thought I may as well give] him some  280 
  useful infor[mation.         ] 281 
Ben:               [We’re ↑sort of- ] (.) We’re 282 
  [sort  of   cat]egorising ourselves right= 283 
Cha:   [No: I haven’t-] 284 
Ben:   =↓here.   285 
  (0.3) 286 
Ben:   Middle class, (.) ↓Middle class. (.) ↑middle  287 
  class, °*like-*°= 288 
Ada:   =↑Wh:↑ite, (.) [middle *↓class.*       ] 289 
Ben:                  [Te hee hee [.hh        ]  290 
Cha:                              [uh ↑Heh heh]  291 
Ben:   =hh   ]= 292 
Cha:   =↓huh.] 293 
Ben:   =[hh     ] 294 
Ada:    [£Congra]tulations.£ [You’ve ticked. ] 295 
Ben: →                       [Oh there was an] (.)  296 
  there was an article that ehm. (.) apparently  297 
  (0.2) if you’re: a w::white middle class::  298 
  straight (0.8) ↑male. (0.6) then (0.2) you  299 
  don’t get to go to this lecture thing¿ 300 
  (1.3) 301 
Ada:   [Well °↓what-° What was it about.=hhh.= 302 
Cha:   [Is this what- from somein-is this something=  303 
Ada:   =  ] 304 
Cha:   =Su]san *told you about¿*= 305 
Ben:   =No no no. This was uhm (.) some stupid  306 
  thi:ng. 307 
  (.) 308 
Ada:   Eh heh ↑heh. Hhh=£It’s only  309 
  stu[pid because we’re not= 310 
Cha:      [Uh’hh.=↑.Hhhh:= 311 
Ada:   =invite][d.£=Heh huh huh .hhh    ] 312 
Cha:   =      ][huh huh D(hh)jeh’huh .hh] Fuck  313 
  £there.£=>huh [huh huh< .H]hh 314 
Ada:                 [.HHhh hh.  ] 315 
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  (0.9) 316 
Ada:   £What was it about.£  317 
  (0.3) 318 
Ada:   *Though.* 319 
  (0.5) 320 
Ben:   I ↑dunno. 321 
  (0.2) 322 
Ben:   ((Company name.)) (       ) lectures ban ↓straight  323 
  white men.=eh °huh huh,° 324 
  (0.2) 325 
Cha:   Ok[ay::,] 326 
Ada:     [Well.] Yeah ‘cuz we’re already incredibly  327 
  advantaged so I don’t really (0.6) mind that  328 
  I’m not invit[ed.] 329 
Cha:                [We ]ll no but it’s a bit of a  330 
  dick move. 331 
  (.) 332 
Cha:   [If ↑they-        ] 333 
Ada:   [Yeah[::.=hey-    ] 334 
Ben:        [You still sh]ould [really like.     ] 335 
Cha:                           [>Trying to-<>yeah]  336 
  exactly.< And= 337 
Ada:   =Y[ou probably sh- you shouldn’t ex] 338 
Cha:     [↑preach- preach equal           ]ity  339 
  [you gotta use like] 340 
Ada:   [No you can’t      ]exclude people ↑but (0.5)  341 
  I wouldn’t a gone anyway so. 342 
  (0.3) 343 
Ben:   [*↓No::.*=if you,] 344 
Cha:   [No- well no     ]  345 
  (0.4) 346 
Ben:   [(Fair) enough.]   347 
Cha:   [I wouldn’t (si]t) thr[ough that      ]  348 
Ada:   [.hhh          ]      [Yeah I got an e]mail    349 
  from ((Company name.)) which was like to ev-    350 
  All the interns which was promoting their  351 
  like (0.2) diversity programme.  352 
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Like Extract 19, Extracts 41 and 13 present two cases in which an initial (or first) 
complaint is co-produced in which the complainant attributes the complainability of 
some phenomenon to its linguistically non-“classed” (i.e. ‘Yuppie’ [l. 80]) or 
linguistically “classed” (i.e. ‘middle class::’ [l. 298]) status. In Extract 41, the 
complaint delivered by Meg pertains to the previously topicalised (e.g. l. 72) bar in 
‘Lansing.’ (l. 69). In Extract 13, by contrast, following a ‘two-on-one tease’ (here, see 
Glenn, 2003: 97-98) of Charlie – one framed explicitly in terms of “social class”  
(ls. 272-273) – Ben issues a designedly “disjunctive” (l. 296; see Jefferson, 1978a: 
221; see Heritage, 1984b) complaint concerning the alienation of a particular socio-
demographic from an event.  
 
The complainability of these tellings is formulated variously. In Extract 41, this is 
rendered hearable through its production in response to Tina’s positively-valenced, 
and designedly ‘mediated’ (see Heritage and G. Raymond, 2005: 17) assessment of 
this location, and by aggregating the linguistically non-“classed” category, ‘Yuppie’ 
(l. 80), with the possible complainables ‘over price’ (l. 77) and ‘↑Tourist attraction.’ 
(l. 82; relatedly, see McCabe and Stokoe, 2004: 613-617). In Extract 13, in contrast, 
the category ‘middle class::’ (l. 298) is positioned – at least temporarily (cf. ls. 323-
324) – as one of the grounds for Ben’s complaint as it is a basis according to which 
the group is segregated (perhaps persecuted): ‘you don’t get to go to this lecture 
thing¿’ (ls. 299-300). Both of these cases therefore parallel Extract 19, inasmuch as 
they are sequentially first complaints that are predicated, by their complainants, on 
linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations; in this case, these turn on the 
linguistically non-“classed” status of a location, in Extract 41 (i.e. ‘that bar in 
Lansing.’ [l. 69]), and a linguistically “classed” membership category in Extract 13 
(i.e. ‘middle class::’ [l. 298]). 
 
These extracts differ from Extract 24, however, insofar as the linguistically “classed” 
categorisations are not produced as independent explanations but are positioned as 
one-of-several contributing factors which provides for the complainability of this 
referent. In Extract 41, for example, the linguistically non-“classed” category, 
‘Yuppie’ (l. 80), is produced as part of a cumulative listing, where it collocates with 
the classifications ‘over price’ (l. 77), ‘=↑Tourist attraction.’ (l. 82) to account for the 
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complainable status of this location. Similarly, in Extract 13, ‘middle class::’ (l. 298) 
is also constructed as one-of-many contributing factors. In this case, however, the 
linguistically “classed” category is not part of an explanatory ‘gestalt’ (Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 78, italics in original) but produced within an “itemized” listing, as Ben 
invokes additional prohibited dimensions of socio-demographic status, including 
“race” (‘w::white’ [l. 298]), “heterosexuality”, (‘straight’ [l. 299]) and “gender” 
(‘↑male’ [l. 299]).  
 
Extracts 41 and 13 therefore show that linguistically (non-)“classed” categorisations 
can be invoked independently (i.e. Extract 19), or collectively (i.e. Extracts 41 and 
13), to account for complainable conduct in “direct” (i.e. Extract 19) and “indirect” 
(i.e. Extracts 41 and 13) complaints (see Edwards, 2005). Finally, it is notable that this 
explanatory work was also accomplished not only by original complainants, but also 
by co-complainants. In this exigency, a recipient of an indirectly designed complaint-
in-progress (see →) either proposes the relevance of “social class” to account for a 
complaint that has been articulated, previously, by another co-interlocutor, or 
introduces “social class” to escalate a complaint beyond the terms of its initial telling 
(see Þ). 221 Extract 29, introduced previously in §5.4 and §5.7.1, offers a clear 
example of this practice. 
 
221 Additional examples of this work have been introduced in Extracts 33 and 21. The former 
presents an example of a touched-off case. Ruth follows Faye’s initial complaint, regarding 
“The Keys” (see l. 56), with a locatively occasioned (i.e. l. 71) – albeit incumbent-focussed 
(§5.5.1.2) – linguistically non-“classed” (i.e. ‘Really posh’ [l. 80]) complaint (see ls. 71, 73, 
76, 78 and 80); one that is projected to concern the behaviour of her erstwhile boss. However, 
the complaint is subsequently “aborted” (see Schegloff, 2013: 52-55), “deleted” (see 
Jefferson, 1985a: 459; Schegloff, 1992e: 210), “lost” (see Ziferstein, 1972: 82-85), or “quit” 
(see Schegloff, 1997b: 176); displaced by virtue of  Faye’s differently organised telling (see 
ls. 81-84 and 87).  
In Extract 21, Luke’s linguistically “classed” (i.e. ‘upper [((…))] class’ [ls. 107 and 
109]) complaint does not commence a touched-off second (recall fn. 200) but designedly 
“laminates” (see Goffman, 1974: 82, 156-157 in C. Goodwin, 1979: 116, fn. 13) upon Owen’s 
antecedent (e.g. ls. 99-101; here, see Drew and Walker, 2009). It will be recalled that this 
concerns the ‘trajectory of incumbency’ (Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 66, italics in original) for 
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Extract 29 (Reproduced): EJBH_F4_12 
((A face-to-face interaction; audio-only. Ray, George and Harry are playing cards 
outside a café-cum-bar in Towerview.))
Ray:   If I- If [I buy you a drink would you drink]= 87 
Geo:            [((Shuffles.))                    ]  88 
Ray:   =it.   89 
Geo:   Yeah::¿ 90 
  (0.2) 91 
Ray:   What do you want. 92 
  (0.6) 93 
Geo:   Uh::: another ↑Ghost ↑ship would be great¿ 94 
  (1.2) 95 
Har:   C’d you get me another ↑wate[r. 96 
Geo:                               [((Shuffles.))= 97 
   =(0.5)] 98 
Geo:   =     ] 99 
Har: → I ↓can’t (0.2) get through the dancing  100 
  again.=I almost cried °when I went through 101 
  the [(third) time°. ] 102 
Ray:       [Is it pretty in]tense in there¿ 103 
Har:   It’s the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I’ve ever= 104 
Ray:              [.hhh     ]   [If I’m not back in=     105 
Har:   =seen.°] 106 
Ray:   =      ] ten minutes, (0.4) send he(h)lp. 107 
  Chu[↑huh.] 108 
Geo:      [↑Huh ] ↑Ha ↑Ha ↑Ha. £We’ll go in the(h)re  109 
  and he’s like-£ 110 
 
students reading ‘political science’ (l. 73) and/or ‘liberal arts’ (l. 87) and the exploitative 
implications that obtain for students of the natural sciences (e.g. ls. 81 and 83). In this case, 
Luke (qua co-complainant) assents to (ls. 79 and 95) and bolsters (e.g. ls. 99-101, 104-105, 
107 and 109) Owen’s previously subsided (e.g. l. 95; see Drew and E. Holt, 1998) “safe” 
complaint (here, see, e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 597-600). 
 Extracts 33 and 21 therefore provide two cases that are related to the exigency 
examined in Extract 29. Note, however, that in neither extract do co-complainants service 
“classed” categorisations in the service of accounting. Extract 29 is unique in this respect. 
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  (0.7) 111 
Har:   It’s impressive. 112 
  (0.5) 113 
Ray:   Is it the most m::iddle aged thing you’ve  114 
     Þ s(h)ee(h)n.=Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class  115 
  Towerview thing you’ve seen in your life. 116 
Geo:   ↑Huh huh huh. 117 
  (0.6) 118 
Ray:   S::[weet (good lord.)] 119 
Geo:      [((Shuffles.))    ] It is, (0.2) Glorious.  120 
  (5.7) 121 
 
As seen in §5.4 and §5.7.1, the initial complaint in this extract, delivered by Harry, 
targets the dancing occurring in the bar. This complaint is first hinted-at through 
Harry’s production of a complaint-implicative, ‘inability’ account (i.e. ls. 100-102; 
see, e.g., Drew, 1984: 129); one volunteered after producing a high-entitlement 
request (l. 96; here, see Curl and Drew, 2008) for Ray to bring him another glass of 
water: ‘I ↓can’t (0.2) get through the dancing again.=I almost cried °when I went 
through the [(third) time°. ]’ (ls. 100-102). Following an inquiry from Ray (l. 103), 
Harry’s complaint is made explicit through his “extreme-case” (Pomerantz, 1986: 
220-221, 227-228, 228-229, fn. 2) formulated, and expletive-imbricated, “non-
conforming” (Raymond, 2003), “transformative answer” (see Stivers and Hayashi, 
2010): ‘It’s the fu[cking wor]st [°thing I’ve ever [((…))] seen.°]’ (ls. 104 and 106). 
Harry’s complaint is, at this point, put “on-record” (recall fn. 134). Notable, in this 
case, is that this has not intersected with “social class” directly. For example, neither 
in his comparatively “hard” (ls. 100-102, 104 and 106) nor “weak” formulations  
(l. 112) has Harry made recourse to this device a means of accounting for its 
complainability. Harry’s complaint, therefore, differs from Extracts 19, 41 and 13, 
insofar as it is neither lodged nor accounted for, by its original complainant, in 
“classed” terms.  
 
Extract 29 is, instead, unique insofar as this “classed” relevance is only subsequently 
installed by Harry’s co-interlocutor, Ray, as he escalates and affiliates with Harry’s 
designedly complete (e.g. l. 112; here, see Jefferson, 1984a: 211) complaint: ‘Is it the 
most m::iddle aged thing you’ve s(h)ee(h)n.= Like middle ↑aged middle ↓class 
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Towerview thing you’ve seen in your life.’ (ls. 114-116). This turn, as analysed in 
§5.7.1, is produced following an affiliative (see Stivers, 2008) and jocular (see 
Schegloff, 1996c: 94-95) receipt from Ray (ls. 105 and 107), and George (ls. 109-
110), to Harry’s telling, and after a tempered rendering of the original complaint, by 
Harry (l. 112), has been produced. It is here that Harry’s original complaint is then 
recast. Ray, here, preserves the magnitude of Harry’s complaint – that is, “of-things-
Harry-has-ever-seen” – but substitutes the previous axis (i.e. ‘the fu[cking wor]st 
[°thing’ [l. 104]) with one constructed in both linguistically (i.e. ‘middle ↓class’ [l. 
115]) and, potentially, metonymic (i.e. ‘Towerview thing’ [l. 116]) “classed” terms.  
 
How Ray’s characterisation implicates “social class” has been excavated previously 
in Chapter 5 (i.e. §5.7.1). It will suffice to add, only, that Ray’s characterisation is 
hearable, in this regard, such that it proposedly accounts for Harry’s foregoing 
complaint. This is conveyed in two respects. The first is comparatively innocuous: 
Ray’s characterisation is hearable such that it could serve purely as a candidate 
understanding. If accepted, Ray, in this respect, poses a hearing that is supportive of 
Harry’s complaint, but which is alternatively formed; in this case, trading upon 
categorial grounds. On the more insidious reading, however, Ben’s categorisation 
could, equally, elucidate that which Ben understands to be the unsaid dimension of 
Harry’s complaint; namely, that which has occasioned, underlies and proposedly 
accounts for its production. Harry’s initial complaint is at risk of discovery, to this 
effect, as a “cover” (relatedly, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 592, italics in original), or 
‘surrogate complaint’ (Jefferson, 1996: 60, fn. 26, italics in original); a complaint 
precipitated, relevantly, in ways other than those which have been volunteered 
explicitly. 222  
 
Extracts 19, 41, 13 and 29 have demonstrated, therefore, that “classed” categorisations 
are invoked by co-interlocutors, routinely, to account for a diverse array of 
complainable objects in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. Substantively, this 
includes the discovered incumbency of a co-interlocutor in a “classed” membership 
category (i.e. Extract 19) and the “classed” status of a location (i.e. Extract 41), 
 
222 On this practice, see §6.5.4. Relatedly, on categorial revelations, recall fn. 219. 
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amongst other “classed” ineligibilities (i.e. Extract 13) and activities (i.e. Extract 29). 
Furthermore, this activity has been enacted, observably, with various productional 
differences. “Classed” categorisations have been produced, for example, both as a 
singular explanatory resource (i.e. Extract 19) in addition to but one of many 
contributing factors in “itemized” (i.e. Extract 13), “cumulative” (i.e. Extract 41) and 
“elaborative” (i.e. Extract 29) listings. Finally, this activity has been observably 
enacted when differently distributed amongst complainants. This has included their 
production in sequentially initial/first complaints (see Extract 19, 41 and 13), and by 
co-complainants in the escalation of a forerunner (e.g. Extract 29; see also, fn. 221). 
Categorisations of “social class”, as such, represent a variegated interactional resource 
for accounting for complaints. These differences notwithstanding, however, Extracts 
19, 41, 13 and 29 are fundamentally homologous insofar as co-interlocutors position 
the “classed” status of a referent as a/the avowed (i.e. Extracts 19, 41 and 13), or 
proposed reason (i.e. Extract 29) for which a complaint is co-produced, and upon 
which it is predicated. They are framed explicitly, as such, as complaints about 
“classed” identities, in this respect. 
 
6.5.2 Accounting and complainability  
A second recurrent capacity in which “classed” orientations feature in complaints are 
to classify a constitutive component of a complaint-in-progress. In these cases, 
complainants do not mark the “classed” status of a referent as a/the reason for its 
constitution qua complainable; they intercalate it, instead, as a/the dimension that 
accounts for a designedly ancillary aspect of the complaint. The explicitly explanatory 
use of “social class” is thereby moderated, offset, or distanciated to this effect. It is 
configured such that it accounts for some part of the complaint (see →), but it is not 
catalysed as the dimension that has expressly encouraged the telling (cf. §6.5.1). It 
will be recalled that an example of this practice has been seen in Extract 21, within 
Luke’s extension of Owen’s complaint. The “classed” membership category (i.e. 
‘up]per [((…))] class’ [ls. 107 and 109]), on this occasion, was employed not to 
account for Luke’s complaint, per se, concerning the “distribution of power”, 223 but 
to self-explicate the nature of the category, ‘government [people’ (l. 107). It is not 
 
223 Weber’s (1978b: 926) phrase. 
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employed not to account for the complainable, but to sidelight and explain an 
epiphenomenal component thereof. Extracts 20 and 42 provide two further 
illustrations of this practice. 
 
Extract 20 (Reproduced): EJBH_F1_01 
((A face-to-face interaction. Amy is delivering a complaint-implicative telling 
about her father and his prejudices towards the unemployed.)) 
Amy:   =Yeah, (.) But do you know what it’s weird ‘cuz  256 
     like we’re talking about how (.) .hhh (0.2)    257 
    ↑ehm:: ((Voice wavers.)) (1.1) °.tch° (0.3) Like  258 
    how <experience:> (.) is a way of (.)  259 
  under[↑standing.    ] 260 
Rac:        [°.tch° *Yeah.*] 261 
     (.) 262 
Amy:    And like broadening your view on the [*↑world*]= 263 
Rac:                                         [Mhm.    ] 264 
Amy:   =.hhh (0.2) But ↑like- (0.4)  265 
   ((Distortion. / Knocking. / (0.2) ))  266 
   (.) 267 
Amy:   It doesn’t seem ↑to work like that everyone¿ hh.  268 
     (0.3)  269 
Amy:   .hh[h][(.) li]ke (0.4) I mean my ↓Da::d. (0.7) I=  270 
Rac:      [N][o:    ] 271 
Amy:   =don’t- (hh./ ((Sighs.))) (0.3) I don’t have much  272 
     to do with *my Dad* 273 
     (.)  274 
Rac:   Mhm hmm.= 275 
 
((Eighteen lines omitted. Amy details her father’s political, racial and regional 
allegiances.)) 
 
   (0.4) 294 
Amy:   Erm. (0.2) (.tch) I don’t ↑think (0.3) he knows  295 
     to many people who are.=.hhh (0.2) like Asian  296 
     which is the main= 297 
Rac:   =Mm hm[m. ] 298 
282 
Amy:         [Eth]nic minority in our area?=.hhh (0.2) 299 
     Uhm. (0.4) An’- (.) And also ↑he::. (0.2) doesn’t    300 
     (.) really know or didn’t really °know many    301 
     people° who (were / are) on ↑benefits? 302 
   (.) 303 
Amy:   .hhh (.) So I *↓thought ↑that-* (.) His: (.) Uhm.  304 
     (0.4) that his: (0.6) °c:(hh.)°rappy, horrible.  305 
     .hhh (.) like (0.2) narrow minded atti*tude.*  306 
     (0.2) were to do with not knowing those  307 
     peo[ple¿ ] 308 
Rac:      [Yeah.] 309 
Amy:   And not having that ↑experience (.) .tch .hhh  310 
     (0.3) ↑BUT. hh. (0.6) .tch (.) .hh ↑he was (.)  311 
     ehm::. (.) .tch .hh (0.2) he got made re↑dundant, 312 
   (.) 313 
Amy:   From his job,=He’d done the same job from school.  314 
     (.) .hhh [for like (.) t]wenty odd years (.) And=  315 
Rac:            [Mhm hmm.      ] 316 
Amy:   =then. .hhh (.) came into work one day and found  317 
     that ↑he:: (0.6) there’s a letter saying >↑he’d  318 
     been made redundant?< 319 
   (0.4)  320 
Amy:   .hh[hh    ] 321 
Rac:      [.tch (.)] °God.° 322 
   (.) 323 
Amy:   Uh::m. (.) And so ↑he:: (.) had to go through the  324 
     whole ↑thing of like having .hhh (0.2) ↑Uhm::.  325 
     (0.4) >Being on jobseeker’s allowance  326 
     [and having] to< sign on and= 327 
Rac:   [°Mhm hmm.°] 328 
Amy:    =and things¿=[.hhh] Which he used to talk about= 329 
Rac:                [Yeah] 330 
Amy:   =f:eeling really degraded, (.) ↑doing  331 
     [and] [(0.2) li]ke it was= 332 
Rac:   [Mh ] [m hmm   ] 333 
Amy:   =demeaning and *that-*=.hh (0.2) he::. (0.2) ‘cuz  334 
     as far as >he’s concerned like he’s< (.) paid  335 
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     into a system:. and [there][fore he] sh:ould↑=  336 
Rac:                       [.tch ][*Yeah.*] 337 
Amy:   =(.) .hh (0.2) be able to get stuff. (.) out of  338 
     it without (.) being¿=.hh (0.2) without (.)  339 
     being.=°s- tre-° (.) °t-° being made to feel. 340 
     (.) 341 
Rac:   m’Yeah. 342 
   (.) 343 
Rac:   >B[ad about *it.*<] 344 
Amy:     [Like ↑de       ]gra[ded?   ]=.hhh (.) S:O,= 345 
Rac:       [*Yeah.*] 346 
Amy:   =(0.6) I would have thought that that might have  347 
     made him realise::, (.) a little ↑bit (.) about  348 
     his ↑prejudices? 349 
     (.) 350 
Amy:   [.hhh    ] (.) ↑Uhm:. (0.8) but it totally= 351 
Rac:   [Mhm hmm.] 352 
Amy:   =↑didn’t. 353 
   (.) 354 
Amy: → He’d ↑still=.hhh (.) >I mean the other thing<  355 
  *that he::* (.) *that ‘e* (.) totally (.) doesn’t  356 
  take into a↑ccount.=.hh (.) Is the fact *that-*  357 
  (.) *Yes:* he was unemployed.=.hh (0.2) but    358 
  because ↑he’s¿ (0.3) *like* fr::om. (0.2) °.tch   359 
  .hhh° (0.3) quite a sort of (.) privileged family   360 
  an’ his friends tend to be ↑more sort of (0.4)		361 
  uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business]= 362 
Rac:                                      [<Mhm.>  ] 363 
Amy:   =owners and ↑things=.hh (.) that his:: (0.5)  364 
     friend who:. (0.5) has (.) busi*ness.* (.) .hh  365 
     (0.2) was able to like (.hh) (0.2) Ehm:. (0.2)  366 
  give him a- (.) you know create a job for ‘im in  367 
     his (0.3) business. So [he      ] wasn’t= 368 
Rac:                          [(°.tch°)] 369 
Amy:   =unemployed for that long¿=.hh[h  370 
Rac:                                 [.tch y[eah. 371 
Amy:         [‘cuz he had  372 
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  ↑connections?=.hhh (0.3) Eh:m. (0.3) and he (.)  373 
  totally l- (.) like lost *th:at.* .hh (.) And  374 
  then (.) so the following *year* I was speaking  375 
  to him near christmas (.) ↑and .hh (0.3) You  376 
  know. (.) it was ↑christmas (.) ehm (.) and I  377 
  think they’re with. (.) I think there was like a  378 
  scheme ↓where. (0.4) uhm. (.) people who got  379 
  certain benefits could get like. (.) reduced (.)  380 
  pri[ce ] st[amps¿] 381 
Rac:      [.hh]   [(y)  ]YES:: 382 
  (0.2) 383 
Amy:   .tch .h[hh 384 
Rac:      [°*Yeah*°= 385 
Amy:   =And ↑he was ↓like (0.4) ↑proper:. .hh (0.2)  386 
  given ↑out about how. (0.2) [You know.] 387 
Rac:                               [↑Really. ] 388 
   (0.2) 389 
Amy:   That was like really ↑wrong that is jus::  390 
  SCROUNGES £and t(h)hings like that and how they  391 
  just get so much ↑given and stuff¿£=.hhh (.)  392 
  [And I’m like .hhhh         ] 393 
Rac:   [Even though ↑he’d >been it<] 394 
  (.) 395 
Rac:   ↑Ooh:. 396 
  (0.2) 397 
Amy:   I’m like for fuck’s sake. Do you not remem-  398 
  eh.=.hh (.)  [eh ( )] JUST CAN’T YOU MAKE THE= 399 
Rac:                [Yeah. ] 400 
Amy:   =↑LINK.= 401 
Rac:   =.hhh Yeah.= 402 
Amy:   =Uhm:, (0.4) But *’e* didn’t. 403 
   (.) 404 
Amy:   °And° (hh.) (0.5) 405 
   ((Knocking.)) 406 
   (0.2) 407 
Amy:   °Mhm.°  408 
   (0.2) 409 
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Amy:   °.tch° I dunno but (0.2) [so I] [don’t know]= 410 
Rac:      [.tch] [↑Yeah.    ] 411 
Amy:   =↑how. .hhh (0.8) When s:ome of us like really  412 
  look like really take on our experien*ces* 413 
  =[.hhh ] (.) Uh:m:. (0.6) [and really↑-=    414 
Rac:    [Yeah.]                  [°Doesn’t >for= 415 
Amy:   = ][hhh.   ] 416 
Rac:   =e][veryone]::.<° 417 
  (0.3) 418 
Amy:   ↑Uh (.) >an’ ‘e-<=’cuz ‘e’s:t he’s really?  419 
  ↑clever. He’s a [really in]telligent Ma:n.=.hhh= 420 
Rac:                   [Yeah.    ] 421 
Amy:   =(0.6) but jus’ (1.1) 422 
Amy:   So::. (0.5) tunnel ↑vision (though). 423 
  (0.4) 424 
Rac:   .tch ↑Ye:ah. 425 
  (0.6) 426 
Amy:   °Anyway.° 427 
 
The category in focus in this extract is ‘middle class’ (l. 362). Amy’s complaint-
implicative telling, in this extract, has been introduced previously in Chapter 4 
(§4.6.1.3 and §4.7). It will be recalled that the focal transgression on which this 
activity turns, pertains to what might be glossed as Amy’s father’s lack of reflexivity: 
His purported inability to transform experience into understanding. The nature of this 
complaint has been projected in the preface of Amy’s extended telling (i.e. l. 268; 
recall fn. 128; see also, Edwards, 2005: 9), and is later recapitulated in her 
collaboratively eventuated story ‘exit’ (ls. 412-414 and 423; see Jefferson, 1978a: 
237). The complaint, itself, trades upon two illustrations of this infraction as 
committed by her father. 
 
In the first instance, Amy has complained that her father did not become cognisant of 
his ‘↑prejudices?’ (l. 349) towards persons ‘on ↑benefits’ (ls. 299-302) after being 
made redundant (ls. 310-312, 314-315, 317-319), and after experiencing a period of 
unemployment, himself (ls. 324-327, 329, 331-332, 334-336 and 345). Her father’s 
complainable beliefs were, instead, reaffirmed, for Amy, when he subsequently 
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inveighed against a welfare initiative to support benefit claimants (ls. 374-381); a 
category for which he constitutes a former member – or ex-incumbent (see §7.3.2). 
His former (i.e. pre-redundancy) attitude was thereby demonstrably upheld, for Amy, 
in so doing; an attitude, concerning which, Amy has previously complained (ls. 304-
308, 386-387, 390-393, 398-399, 401 and 403). 
 
In the second instance, Amy cuts-off what is projected as an exposition of her 
complaint (i.e. ‘He’d ↑still=’ [l. 355]), and, “sequence-jumping” (see Schegloff, 2013: 
56-59), parenthetically overlays, and so compounds, her father’s prior transgression. 
The focus here pertains to her father’s continuing (i.e. ‘doesn’t’ [l. 356]) ignorance 
regarding the ameliorative processes that were involved in terminating his 
unemployment. 224 Specifically, he is positioned by Amy such that he fails to recall 
(i.e. ‘lost’ [l. 374]; ‘Do you not remem- eh.’ [l. 398]) that his status as unemployed 
was qualified, both experientially (e.g. ls. 358-362 and 364-368), and temporally  
(i.e. ‘So [he] wasn’t [((…))] unemployed for that long¿=.hh[h’ [ls. 368 and 370]),  
by virtue of his avowedly “classed” (i.e. ‘middle class’ [l. 362]) social network; a 
member of which was not merely able to ‘give him’ (l. 367) a job, but, rather, 
generatively, ‘create’ (l. 367) him a position (ls. 355-362, 364-368, 370 and 372-373). 
 
Amy’s complaint-implicative telling, in this extract, thus crystallises around her 
father’s obduracy; the hypocrisy of not recalibrating his beliefs despite enduring the 
complained experience himself (i.e. unemployment), and, furthermore, despite 
qualifying as “privileged” vis-à-vis the mechanisms employed to terminated the 
corresponding categorial incumbency (i.e. unemployed) about which he now 
complains (i.e., ls., 314-315, 317-319, 345, 347-349, 351-353, 355, 398-399, 401, 
419-420 and 422). 225 Amy’s grievance, in this extract, is not, therefore, accounted for 
through the production of a “classed” categorisation. Instead, it addresses Amy’s 
father’s conduct its own terms. Nevertheless, it is notable that a “classed” 
classification is still co-implicated, by Amy, as an explanatory resource in order to 
 
224 On the extensible potential of tense shifts, see §7.3.2. See also, fn. 216. 
225 On “hypocrites”, see R. Watson (1997b: 86-87).  
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account for some hitherto un-explicated component that is epiphenomenal of her 
complaint-in-progress. 
 
The “classed” categorisation, in this case, is produced to characterise the type of 
people with whom her father was generally (i.e. ‘tend to be’ [l. 361]) and 
predominantly (i.e. ‘↑more sort of’ [l. 361]) connected and, by implication, the  
party that was equipped to appoint him: ‘an’ his friends tend to be ↑more sort of  
(0.4) uhm. (.) middle class and like (.) [business] [((…))] owners and ↑things=’  
(ls. 361-362 and 364). Amy’s complaint is not then positioned such that it is  
about “social class”, thematically, nor that it is produced in the service of  
accounting for her complaint, directly. Rather, the classification is designedly 
orthogonal to this telling; it is produced to account for how this second instantiation 
of hypocrisy (i.e. “not-remembering-that-his-experience-of-unemployment-was-
qualified”) was potentiated. 226 
 
A second example of this work, this time featuring a linguistically non-“classed” 
categorisation, is displayed in Extract 42. This extract is joined as Joe produces a 
sequentially “second story” (recall fn. 200); one that echoes the structure of his co-
interlocutor’s (i.e. Laura’s) initial telling. Glossed, this story concerns the stance 
assumed by a non-present party (cum “complainee”), Melissa, vis-à-vis Alabama, a 
location that has been self-avowed by Laura (i.e. l. 14), in her telling, and what  
has been educed (cf. ‘↑Birmingham’ [l. 96]) and announced by Joe’s reported  
co-interlocutor, Melissa (i.e. l. 98), as their shared point of origin. 227 
 
Extract 42: CallFriend-eng-6974 
((A telephone call. Laura and Joe deliver a pair of related storytellings.)) 
  (3.0) 1 
Lau:   °↑Actually.° 2 
  (2.3) 3 
Lau:   ↑I know what I was gonna tell you-.hhh (0.3)  4 
  we were *i-* when we were in ↑line::. 5 
 
226 On the structural basis of comparable accusations, see Smith (1978: 41-42). 
227 On “place of origin” formulations, see Atkinson and Drew (1979: 248, fn. 8). 
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  (0.8) 6 
Lau:   ((Swallows.)) Outside of ((Cinema name.)) we  7 
  were-(0.5) standing in front of two New  8 
  Jersey*ans.*hh. (0.5) and of course (.) they  9 
  automatically ask where we’re from¿ 10 
   (1.3) 11 
Lau:   £When they- when they£ (0.2) (he-) hear us  12 
  talking you know and (0.4) we said from  13 
  Alabama an’ (0.5) and the guy said that he  14 
  recognised: our accent(s)¿=He had worked  15 
  (0.3) some with Alabamians (0.5) ↑up- (0.4)  16 
  they had come up to Trenton (0.2) .hhh for  17 
  some kind of (0.4) financing class  18 
  [or some]thing. 19 
Joe:   [Mhmhm. ] 20 
  (0.2) 21 
Lau:   .hhhhh ↑an’ uhm. (0.6) Wh= we were talking  22 
     about how Slow we tal*k.* (0.5) and we  23 
  ↑realised ↓why northern people talk so fast¿ 24 
  (0.2) 25 
Joe:   (Wl’)↓Why. 26 
  (0.4) 27 
Lau:   It’s because when you’re trying to give 28 
  someone directions. (0.2) >You have to tell  29 
  them real quick-< 30 
  (0.4) 31 
Lau:   Hhhhh.huh y(h)ou kn(h)ow. 32 
  (0.7) 33 
Lau:   .HHhh and in the (0.2) ↑sou- you know. (0.2)  34 
  being ↑southern, (0.2) we’re Talking real  35 
  °↑slow:° when we’re telling them (0.3) turn  36 
  ↑right¿ (0.8) Hee-hh. £but it takes us so  37 
  long to say it that they’ve missed though  38 
  d(h)on’we tell ‘em£. 39 
   (0.2) 40 
Joe:   £M::n’↑kay£¿ 41 
   (0.2) 42 
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Lau:   £Someone (.) *f[igur]ed out£¿* 43 
(J):                  [hhh.] 44 
  (0.2) 45 
Joe:   hhh. (0.4) On my flight to:. (.) ↑Spain I  46 
  was’re was this old lady from Colorado. (0.2)  47 
  .hhh <that was going over for a weddi*ng and*  48 
  she was big golfer *an’- ↑an’* .hhh (0.4) So  49 
  we started talking about, (0.2) I mean she  50 
  was °jus’-° she had a lot to *↑sa::y.* 51 
   (0.5) 52 
Joe:   *I [mean. She would   ] not be qui::et.* 53 
Lau:      [Mh:hhh. >↑huh huh<] 54 
  (0.3) 55 
Lau:   ↑Huh ↓hu[h- 56 
Joe:           [Once I got’er *↑star:ted.* 57 
   (.) 58 
Joe:   .hhh (0.2) But anyway, (.) Uhm¿ (0.4) .hhhh  59 
  It was neat talking to ‘er.=I mean she had  60 
  played ↓golf. (0.3) (°*m’huh m’huh*°) Pretty  61 
  much. (0.2) I mean *uhm.* (.) ↑well in Europe  62 
     in England, (0.2) *and* (.) in ↑Australia:’(I  63 
  mean) (.) b-=all over the States. (0.2)  64 
  t’Pine ↓Valley you know¿ 65 
  (.) 66 
Joe: → .hhhh (0.3) I mean she’s just (.) one of 67 
  these.=(* *) (0.3) wealthy old people that  68 
  live in Colo↓ra*do.* 69 
  (0.4) 70 
Lau:   ↑Right, 71 
  (0.6) 72 
Joe:   mh=.hhhhh (0.2) And ↓uhm. (.) I mean I  73 
      thought she was really nice.=*an’  74 
  everything.*=and then one-once we ↑land and  75 
  I’m down at (0.3) *uhm,* (0.5) The- (0.3)  76 
  *uhm,* Sh:uttle, (0.8) *uhm.* (1.2) ↑de↓*pot*    77 
  I guess (0.3) .hhh (0.2) waiting for *uh:m*  78 
  >the shuttle to come pick me up and taken me      79 
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  to the hotel,<=She’s walking by, .hhh (0.3)  80 
  And ↑uh- (0.8) She had her golf *clubs* and  81 
  all this *↓stuff.* (0.4) And uhm, (0.4) .hhh    82 
  (0.6) I mean she came ↑By: an’ (0.3) kind*a*  83 
  hugged me and said here are my golf clubs and  84 
  I said well good luck and play well and she  85 
  goes (.) thank you and she said uhm. (0.7)  86 
  .hhhh (0.7) *Uhm::,* (0.5) if you’re ever  87 
  in=hhh.Hm Hm *Col*or↓ado Springs or wherever  88 
  it was=If you’re ever in Colo↑rado (.) .hhhh  89 
  (0.2) We’re. the ↑Jakobs. (0.2) you know.  90 
  (0.4) Melissa an’ Gavin¿ (0.4) .hhhh ↑Call me  91 
  an’- an’ (.) *oh I’d l-* you know I’d love to  92 
  play or ↑whatever and I’m *just like* yeah  93 
  ↑right and so I sai- Well I should have given  94 
  you some information if you’re *over in*  95 
  ↑Birmingham. (.) .hhh (0.5) ↑you should call  96 
  ↑Me to *↓play* (0.2) .hhhh (0.5) and she  97 
  ↓goes Alabama no ↑I don’t think so. 98 
   (0.3) 99 
Joe:   Hhhh.=Hh. 100 
  (0.3) 101 
Lau:   £HHhh.=.h[h£ 102 
Joe:            [And I was like well what would make  103 
  you- What would make you think then that I  104 
  would come to Colorado.= 105 
Lau:   =Oh really¿ 106 
   (.) 107 
Lau:   We’ve been there before.= 108 
Joe:   =*Aye exact↑ly.* [I mean she just] got= 109 
Lau:                    [Well then-     ] 110 
Joe:   =through say- I mean an’, she Started when we  111 
  °*↓w-*° jus’ (.) conversation started, (.)  112 
  .hhh (0.2) she said she was from eh- from  113 
  Colorado where everything’s (.) ↑Fake. 114 
   (1.2) 115 
Joe:   *So [I mean, I ‘o]n’t ↓kno[w.* 116 
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Lau:       [(an’ then  )]       [An’ then: you’re 117 
  >talking ab[out<]  118 
Joe:              [An  ]d ob[viously      ] she= 119 
Lau:                        [(Why) people¿] 120 
Joe:   =right because then .hhh (0.2) her  121 
hospitality and her uh .hhhhh (0.5) °*↓no-*° (0.8) 122 
her c(hh.)ourteous. (0.4) courteo*usness* I 123 
gue:ss¿ (0.8) was Fake as *↓well::.* 124 
  (0.3) 125 
Lau:   ↑Ri:ght. 126 
Joe:   (An’) That pisse*d me ↓off::.* 127 
 
In this extract, Joe’s telling begins as an innocuous story about a chance interaction 
with a hitherto unknown party, Melissa (l. 91); a co-passenger aboard Joe’s flight. 
Melissa is positioned in this telling, initially, in comparable terms to the dyad 
encountered by Laura: Melissa, like Laura’s unnamed co-interlocutors (e.g. ‘New 
Jersey*ans’ [ls. 8-9]), is situated, by Joe, to live in a different state – in this case, 
Colorado (ls. 69, 88, 105 and 114). Moreover, similarly to Laura (e.g. ‘we were in 
↑line::’ [l. 5]’ ‘Outside of ((Cinema name.))’ [l. 7]), Melissa is reportedly happened 
upon, by Joe, whilst engaged in a disconnected activity (i.e. ‘On my flight to:. (.) 
↑Spain’ [l. 46]) outside of his home state (i.e. Alabama). Thus, Joe’s telling 
commences as a homologue to Laura’s in two these respects. However, the 
architecture and valence of Joe’s telling subsequently transforms as he recalls his 
parting exchange with Melissa. 
 
Here, Joe recalls having tendered a locationally-circumscribed and activity-bound 
invitation, to Melissa; namely, to join Joe for golf (i.e. ‘to *↓play*’ [l. 97]) if she is 
ever in ‘↑Birmingham’ (l. 96). This is a designed (e.g. ls. 94-96) reciprocation of 
Melissa’s own prior invitation vis-à-vis ‘*Col*or↓ado Springs’ (l. 88). Melissa, 
however, does not accept Joe’s invitation, 228 and, instead, effectively dismisses the 
possibility of its fulfilment, citing geographical grounds: ‘and she ↓goes Alabama no 
 
228 On “ostensible invitations”, see Isaacs and Clark (1990).  
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↑I don’t think so.’ (ls. 97-98). 229 It is this snub – or ‘verbal squelch’ (Drew, 1998: 
303, italics in original; here, see also, Sacks, 1978: 264) – that forms the initial 
transgression upon which Joe’s initial impression of Melissa is subsequently retuned 
qua complainable. 
 
Like Amy in Extract 20, however, Joe’s complaint is then further overlaid as he 
protests the hypocrisy of Melissa’s infraction. Melissa is positioned, in this case, to 
have only “just” (ls. 109 and 112; see D. Lee, 1987: 388-393) characterised her 
avowed (e.g. ls. 88-89 and 114) and reported (e.g. ls. 47, 69, 105 and 114) point of 
origin (i.e. Colorado) in terms of complete inauthenticity: ‘where everything’s (.) 
↑Fake.’ (l. 114). Accordingly, for Joe, Melissa’s dismissive response to his reciprocal 
invitation functions to verify her characterisation of this location (recall §5.5.1.1)  
by virtue of Melissa’s categorial status as an indigenous incumbent: ‘[An  ]d 
ob[viously] she [((…))] right because then .hhh (0.2) her hospitality and her uh .hhhhh 
(0.5) °*↓no-*° (0.8) her c(hh.)ourteous. (0.4) courteo*usness* I gue:ss¿ (0.8) was  
Fake as *↓well::.*’ (ls. 119 and 121-124). 230 
 
Joe’s telling thereby develops, in this respect, into a distinctive “Story-Complaint” 
(recall fn. 127); the direction of which has only been hinted at previously (e.g. ‘I 
thought’ [ls. 73-74]; here, see Jefferson, 2004c). Furthermore, this departs from the 
dénouement of Laura’s telling, in which the dyad encountered collaborate (e.g. ‘we’ 
[l. 23]) with Laura in a jovial characterisation (i.e. ls. 22-24, 28-30, 32 and 46-47) of 
Laura’s locational membership (i.e. ‘being ↑southern,’ [l. 35]). Extract 42 is therefore 
evocative of Extract 20 insofar as the complainable dimension of the telling is 
predicated upon the objectionable-cum-hypocritical behaviour of a reported, non-
present party. As such, it contrasts the excerpts in §6.5.1, in which a “classed” 
categorisation was utilised in an explanatory capacity for complainability. 
Nevertheless, Extract 42 displays an affinity with Extract 20 insofar as the 
 
229 For a linguistically non-“classed” locational reformulation at a “broader” degree of 
granularity, see Extract 28 (l. 131). 
230 On this practice, see §5.5.1.2. 
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linguistically non-“classed” categorisation is produced by Joe to account for some 
orthogonal component of his complaint. 
 
The possibly “classed” ascription, in this case, is produced by Joe to categorise the 
complainee directly (cf. Extract 20): ‘.hhhh (0.3) I mean she’s just (.) one of these.=(* 
*) (0.3) wealthy old people that live in Colo↓ra*do.*’ (ls. 67-69). Again, like Extract 
20, this categorisation is produced in the service of an account, but not one of/for the 
focal complainable. In this instance, it is produced in the service of accounting for the 
non-present party’s ability to golf in various locations (ls. 60-65). This activity has 
been referred to previously, and it is positioned as a category-bound/tied component 
to this effect. Accordingly, it aligns with Extract 20, insofar as it accounts for a 
subsidiary dimension of Joe’s complaint; although in this case it is delivered in  
post-position and not as a pre-positioned account (recall §6.4). Nonetheless, the 
explanatory work to which it contributes approximates. 
 
Extracts 20 and 42 are, therefore, analogous. In both cases, a “classed” categorisation 
is produced by the teller (i.e. Amy and Joe, respectively) to categorise members 
involved in the events related to the complainable. In Extract 20, a linguistically 
categorisation (i.e. ‘middle class’ [l. 362]) was ascribed to Amy’s father’s ‘friends’ (l. 
361), and in Extract 42, a linguistically non-“classed” categorisation (i.e. ‘one of 
these.=(* *) (0.3) wealthy old people that live in Colo↓ra*do.*’ [ls. 67-69]) was 
accorded to the complainee. In both cases, these ascriptions are employed in a 
designedly explanatory capacity not to account for a complainable, per se, but to 
account for some epiphenomenal component. In Extract 20, this was produced to 
account for how Amy’s father’s ‘friends’ (l. 361) were able to generate him a job, 
post-redundancy, and in Extract 42, to account for the activity of golfing, in different 
continents, as undertaken by the complainee (see ls. 60-65). Neither complaint, 
therefore, is constructed such that it is see-able, for story-recipients, as complaining 
about “social class” (cf. §6.5.1). Incumbents of the “classed” categorisations are, 
instead, implicated into this activity, orthogonally, in accounts of/for epiphenomenal 
components of complaints.  
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6.5.3 Summary 
This section has introduced how “classed” categorisations are enlisted in the 
production of direct (e.g. Extract 19) and indirect complaints (e.g. Extracts 41, 13, 29, 
20 and 42). Two recurrent capacities in which these categorisations are integrated have 
been introduced. Firstly, these have been shown to figure, focally, as a (e.g. Extracts 
41, 20, 29, 20 and 42) or the (e.g. Extract 19) resource employed to account for the 
complainability of some state of affairs by the original complainant (i.e. Extracts 41, 
13, 20 and 42) or co-complainant (i.e. Extract 29). Secondly, “classed” categorisations 
were then shown to feature not as the heuristic with respect to which the tellable 
qualifies qua complainable, but where it is invoked to account for a constitutive 
component of the complaint-in-progress (see Extracts 20 and 42). “Social class”, on 
these occasions, was implicated into the production of complaints not as their ‘first 
order of business’ – as Stokoe and Edwards (2007: 367) put it – but feature, instead, 
as an ancillary account, or as an “extra kick”. 231 “Classed” categorisations therefore 
feature in complaints in two different capacities. The implicature of both are deserving 
of further exploration. 
 
6.5.4 Discursus 
It will be recalled that in the former collection, “classed” statuses were accepted by 
co-interlocutors as a legitimate dimension about which they can, justifiably, complain 
(e.g. Extracts 41, 13 and 29), and/or levy in order to account for diverse species of 
complainables (e.g. Extracts 20 and 42). In the latter collection, however, the 
complaint-in-progress is not interconnected with/to “social class” – nor is it 
‘aggravated’ or ‘displaced’, thereby; exigencies examined by Schegloff (2005c: 453) 
and Edwards (2005: 16-19), respectively. The “classed” identities invoked are, 
instead, disconnected from the terms of initial complaint and, consequently, “de-
economized” (here, see Sacks, 1978: 257). They share parallels, as such, with what 
Whitehead and Lerner (2009: 625-632) have referred to as the (seemingly) 
“gratuitous” production of “racial” categories, and intersects with Stokoe and 
Edwards’ (2007: 345-355, 367) observations regarding the non-first production of 
“ethnic” and “racial” categories in the delivery of institutional complaints.  
 
231 Schegloff’s (2005c: 465; cf. Jefferson, Sacks and Schegloff, 1987: 196, fn. 23) term. 
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However, in my collection, these classifications neither uncover the relevance of a 
hitherto “invisible” membership category (cf. Whitehead and Lerner, 2009), nor 
function to exonerate complainants from the position of persons who are motivated to 
complain about categorial statuses (cf. Stokoe and Edwards, 2007). They appear, 
instead, almost incidental to the complaint-in-progress. Nevertheless, they remain 
incorporated. In Extracts 20 and 42, their production is even unsolicited; the matter 
for which they account has not been problematised nor pursued by complaint-
recipients. The complainants, on these occasions, therefore, instantiate the relevance 
of “classed” identities, but they neither attribute nor explain the complainable by 
referring to this status. The reasoning that underlies their production thus remains 
equivocal. 
 
Candidate explanations for this recurrence are theoretically innumerable, and it is 
expectable that the collection of further cases will prove explicative in this regard 
(recall §3.3.3). In the interim, however, the function of these accounts encourages 
speculation. It is at least possible, for example, that it contributes to the work of 
accounting indirectly. Such instances could be described as ‘surrogate complaint[s]’ 
(see Jefferson, 1996: 60, fn. 26, italics in original; recall fn. 222), to this effect; 
complaints that are formed explicitly concerning non-“classed” matters (e.g. 
“hypocrisies”; see fn. 225), but which shroud the “classed” nature of its 
complainability – and, thus, attenuate the relevance of the set of membership 
categories that are co-implicated by/for the complainant (e.g. “classist”, “elitist”, 
“snobbish”, etc.). 
 
Of course, this analysis remains indeterminate for my collection. Furthermore, as 
outlined in Chapter 4, such an attribution, without evidence, would verge upon an 
ironic manoeuvre. It is notable, however, that my collection, like Jefferson’s (1996: 
23, 60, fn. 26) racial example (i.e. ‘he’s a [colored] guy’ [ibid.: 23]), includes the 
production of membership categorisations. The device of “social class”, in this 
instance, is, therefore, actuated by the complainant, and it is not “suppressed” (recall 
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fn. 108) wholesale. 232 It is possible, as a result, that the categorisation might be 
implicated to this effect. After all, it is difficult to imagine exactly how one might 
deliver an indirect complaint concerning “social class” without disclosing the device. 
Indeed, it will be recalled from Chapter 4 (e.g. §4.3) that the constitution of “social 
class”, in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction, remains in flux; the indexicality of 
which provides for its traction as an interactional resource. The resulting bind into 
which the complainant finds themselves thrust, therefore, is to ensure that such a 
“classed” hearing is made available for their recipient and is not supplanted by an 
equally viable alternative hearing. 233 To put “social class” on record explicitly, 
therefore, but still indirectly, may offer a solution for this interactional dilemma. 
 
Theoretically, therefore, it is possible that complaints can be designed to involve 
“classed” identities as an explanatory resource, and these can be formulated more or 
less clearly. The boundaries of this exposition, however, remain unclear. I have 
operated upon the premise that such components represent a potential locus of order 
(recall §3.2.1). Future EM/(M)CA research, however, could interrogate this 
assumption more rigorously. 
  
6.6 Teases 
The previous section introduced “classed” categorisations as an explanatory resource 
in the production of complaints; both direct and indirect. The latter form was modal 
across my collection. Instances of the former, by contrast, in which “classed” 
categorisations were ascribed to co-present co-interlocutors were, curiously, absent. 
Speaking theoretically, such an omission is unsurprising. To complain about 
something that can be accounted for by reference to “social class”, explicitly, leaves 
complainants vulnerable to attributions of discrimination (e.g. ‘classis[m]’ [Kitzinger, 
2005a: 479], ‘class oppression’ [West and Zimmerman, 1995b: 508], to borrow the 
terms). There are, in this sense, “moral” impediments which expectably discourage 
this type of ascriptive work. Furthermore, were a co-interlocutor to account for a 
complainable through the invocation of another’s putatively “classed” conduct, the 
 
232 See also, Jefferson (1996: 8, 18, 20, 24 and 39), Schegloff (2005a) and Lerner (2013: 107). 
233 On the problem of description, see, e.g., §2.2.1, §3.2.2, §3.4.1.2, §4.6.2 and §5.2.1. 
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complainee is positioned such that they can dispute the constitution of “social class” 
and/or the derivative category into which they are ascribed. What “social class” is, 
after all, as outlined in Chapter 4, is a “live issue”; one that can be contested and 
negotiated by co-interlocutors, in situ. For these reasons, it is unsurprising that  
co-interlocutors do not account for the complainable conduct of co-interlocutors in 
terms of “social class” explicitly. 
 
One social action, however, in which the “classed” statuses of co-interlocutors are 
deployed in an explanatory capacity are teases. Akin to assessments and complaints, 
“teases” have long formed the focus of EM/(M)CA inquiry. Notable research in this 
tradition has canvassed their form (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 666; Vol. II: 99-100, 278-
279; Glenn, 1995: 45, 48; Hopper, 1995: 58-59, 62-68, 69, fn. 1; Lerner, 2003: 197, 
fn. 5; Margutti, 2007: 644-648; Schegloff, 2007a: 29; Kendrick, 2015: 182-183; 
Artamonova, 2018), recognisability (e.g. Drew, 1987: 230-232; Schegloff, 1998b: 
252, fn. 17), sequelae (e.g. Drew, 1987: 232-243; Lerner, 1992: 254; Hopper, 1995: 
58-68; Margutti, 2007: 649; Haugh and Pillet-Shore, 2018: 255), the alternative 
responses they occasion (e.g. Drew, 1987; Hopper, 1995: 59-60; Haugh and Pillet-
Shore, 2017: 260-264) in addition to their social functions (e.g. Drew, 1987: 250; 
Haugh and Pillet-Shore, 2018: 260; Artamonova, 2018: 19). Furthermore, teases have 
been recognised, similarly, as a resource used routinely in the service of ascribing 
(e.g. Antaki, 1998: 77-80; D. Day, 1998: 158-161; Artamonova, 2018), forming (e.g. 
Jackson, 2011b: 35) and performing (e.g. Rintel, 2015: 130-131, 141-148) social 
identities.  
 
“Classed” identities have yet to be investigated in relation to this activity in 
EM/(M)CA research. 234 In this section, I show that co-interlocutors ascribe “classed” 
categorisations to their co-interlocutors to account for both designedly dis-affiliative 
(e.g. Extract 43) and affiliative (e.g. Extract 44) teasings. 235 An example of the former, 
 
234 See Clift (1999: 543) for a discussion of a candidate case. For FA research, see Willis 
(1977: 29-34, 55, 96-97; 2001) on teasing by members of the “working class” and, differently, 
review Hollingworth and Williams (2009: 474-475) on ‘mockery’ in ‘class distinction work’. 
235 An example of this practice was presented in Extract 11. Here, Ellen was ascribed an 
linguistically non-“classed” description (i.e. ‘common’ [l. 14]) and then classified into an 
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as produced through a “place term” (i.e. “‘[°Cambridgesh*ire:.*°]’ [l. 423]) has been 
considered in depth in Extract 39. It will be recalled, in this case, that the place term 
permitted a potentially “classed” metonymic hearing, adding to a list of socio-
demographic dimensions with respect to which Adam is classifiable. In this section, I 
limit my focus to extended examples of this practice as they are made available 
through the ascription of “classed” categories (see →). Extract 43, a telephone call 
between Ellie and Sarah, presents an initial example of this exigency.
Extract 43 – CTS08  
((A telephone call. Ellie and Sarah are discussing their holiday plans for the 
upcoming year.))
Sar:   [Are you gonna come] ski:ing with me next= 1 
Ell:   [(                )] 2 
Sar:   =year huh huh 3 
  (0.4) 4 
Ell:   I’ll have to pay though. I don’t have any  5 
  money to me pay with. 6 
  (0.5) 7 
Sar:   No:::: 8 
    (0.8) 9 
Sar:   I don’t think it will happen anyway because  10 
  they never take me on holiday 11 
Ell:   Huh huh 12 
  (2.3) 13 
Ell:   Oh well if I c- if I start saving no:w (0.5)  14 
  I’ll go on holiday in the summer. 15 
  (0.5) 16 
Ell:   When I’m ((age omitted)). huh huh huh 17 
 
iteratively formulated linguistically “classed” category (i.e. ‘(You sure are ↓l:ow.)’ [l. 20]; 
‘You’re jus’ (.) lower class ( ) [l. 24]; ‘<*low:er::.*>=’ [l. 28]), by Mike, owing to her 
“disattention” (see Mandelbaum, 1991/1992); specifically, her refusal to speak (i.e. ‘talk’ [l. 
8]) with Mike qua allegiant of the Conservative Party (here, see Heritage and R. Watson, 
1979: 140); a refusal that operates here, quite literally, as a “generative paradox” (à la Sacks, 
1992, Vol. I: 422). 
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Sar:   Huh huh huh 18 
Ell:   I’ll be there like woo: huh huh 19 
Sar:   Huh huh huh 20 
Ell:   I’ll go for like two weeks or something. 21 
  (0.7) 22 
Ell:   I’ll be celebrating finishing year eleven as  23 
  well. 24 
    (0.9) 25 
Ell:   That’ll be go[od. 26 
Sar:                [I can’t believe we’re going  27 
  into year ten 28 
  (.) 29 
Ell:   Pardon? 30 
Sar:   I can’t believe we’re going into year ten 31 
Ell:   I know 32 
Sar:   And since when do you use that word 33 
  (1.7) 34 
Ell:   Year ten 35 
  (.) 36 
Sar:   Huh n(hh)o .hhh 37 
  (.) 38 
Ell:   What you on about 39 
  (0.3) 40 
Sar:   .HHH Then you normally just go what or eh and  41 
  you went (.) pardon? huh huh .hhhh hhhhhh 42 
Ell:   I sometimes say tha::t. I’ve just started  43 
  saying it. I don’t know why 44 
  (1.7) 45 
Sar: → You decided to be a posh mosher huh huh huh  46 
  huh 47 
Ell:   Huh huh huh .hhhhh that’s quite funny. 48 
  (0.8) 49 
Sar:   [What?      ] 50 
Ell:   [Huh huh huh] huh .HHHHH 51 
  (7.2) 52 
Ell:   You don’t have to be posh just because you  53 
  don’t (0.2) talk like a scruff. 54 
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  (0.9) 55 
Sar:   Yeah. I know. 56 
  (1.1) 57 
Ell:   You can just be a nice mosh (     ) 58 
    (1.9) 59 
Sar:   You talk really quiet. 60 
 
The tease in this extract, produced by Sarah, crystallises around Ellie’s selection of 
the “open class repair initiator” (hereafter, OCRI; see Drew, 1997) ‘Pardon?’ (l. 30). 
236 This repair initiator has been produced by Ellie in this extract as she orients to 
Sarah’s display of disbelief (ls. 27-28) as troublesome, infelicitous and/or 
inauspicious, in some way. After Sarah acquiesces to Ellie’s repair initiation (l. 31), 
Sarah then appends (‘And’ [l. 33]) a tease-implicative inquiry that concerns and, 
explicitly, topicalises (see Schegloff, 2007a: 155), an unspecified aspect of Ellie’s 
lexical choice: ‘And since when do you use that word’ (l. 33). This inquiry yields a 
designedly solemn, ‘po-faced response’ (see Drew, 1987: 251, fn. 3) from Ellie, who 
disattends to its tease-implicative valence by responding seriously, proffering a 
candidate troublesource, ‘Year ten’ (l. 35; see Schegloff et al., 1977: 363).  
 
This candidate is demurred by Sarah, who preserves the tease-implicative valence of 
her inquiry through imbricated laughter: ‘Huh n(hh)o .hhh’ (l. 37; see Jefferson, 
1985b: 28-29). It is here that Sarah then explicitly problematises Ellie’s choice of 
repair initiator (i.e. ‘Pardon?’ [l. 30]), putting the tease on-record: ‘.HHH Then you 
normally just go what or eh and you went (.) pardon? huh huh .hhhh hhhhhh’ (ls. 41-
42). In this turn, Sarah contrasts the repair-initiators that are employed by Ellie, 
normatively (i.e. ‘what or eh’ [l. 41]), with what is cast as her comparably deviant 
selection on this occasion (‘and you went (.) pardon?’ [ls. 41-42]). Sarah orients to 
these practices (e.g. ‘what’ [l. 41] and ‘eh’ [l. 41]) as co-class members (i.e. “Ellie’s-
normative-forms-of-OCRI”), but not as “symmetrical alternatives”. 237 This 
differentiation is disputed by Ellie who furnishes three consecutive accounts for her 
 
236 On the use of other-initiated repair (see Schegloff, 1997a; 2000c) in categorial and 
relational work, see Egbert (2004) and J. Robinson (2006), respectively. 
237 Schegloff and Sacks’ (1973: 314 in Schegloff, 2007a: 59) phrase. 
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lexical choice (ls. 43-44). It is positioned as a resource that she does employ 
occasionally (i.e. ‘I sometimes say tha::t.’ [l. 43]); repositioned as a new acquisition 
(i.e. ‘I’ve just started saying it.’ [ls. 43-44]); and, finally, cast as a practice for which 
she cannot account adequately (i.e. ‘I don’t know why’ [l. 44]; see Bolden and J. 
Robinson, 2011: 105). 238 
 
These accounts are challenged by Sarah. Sarah counter-proposes that it is neither a 
practice that Ellie uses intermittently (cf. ls. 43-44), nor, indeed, that it has been 
serviced here unknowingly (cf. l. 44). Ellie’s OCRI is positioned, instead, as a 
categorial resource that has been employed intentionally (e.g. ‘decided’ [l. 46]; see, 
e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 161-162, 698-699; Heritage, 1988: 136-137; Schegloff, 
1988: 124; 2002b: 331; Drew, 1998: 298; here, see also, Smith, 1978: 40-41), by 
Sarah, in a foiled attempt to design herself as an incumbent of a ‘hybrid’ (Jayyusi, 
2014 [1984]: 55), linguistically non-“classed” membership category; namely,  
‘a posh mosher’ (l. 46). 239 Sarah orients to Ellie’s OCRI (l. 30), in effect, inferentially, 
as a category-bound/tied component, or as a/the constitutive dimension thereof. 240  
 
In this case, it is unclear whether, for Sarah, this performance is regarded as an 
appropriate enactment, and/or a successful stylisation; where Ellie is treated, 
accordingly, as a “bona-fide” (see fn. 144) or ‘genuine member’ (here, see Jayyusi, 
2014 [1984]: 51, italics in original) – or, simply, as successfully ‘passing’ as such 
(here, see H. Garfinkel, 1967: 137, italics in original). Conversely, on an alternative 
hearing, Ellie’s conduct is treated as “fraudulent” (Goffman, 1951: e.g. 296-301) 
and/or ‘subversive’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 120); as a pretence, “hoax” (differently, 
see W. Sharrock and R. Turner, 1978: 185) or form of ‘social misrepresentation’ (see 
Goffman, 1963: 82). Sarah is thus cast, accordingly, as a “phoney” (see Sacks, 1992, 
 
238 On ‘rehearsed “carelessness”’, see H. Garfinkel (1967: 172). 
239 As Jackson (2011b: 36, fn. 5) notes: ‘A mosher is a UK term for a member of a youth 
culture that involves dancing (or ‘head-banging’) to rock/punk music and often dressing in 
dark clothes.’ Note also the “sound-relationship” (recall fn. 190) here with ‘posh’ (l. 46). I 
owe this observation to Professor Jenny Mandelbaum (p.c.). 
240 On the use of “pardon” in the indication of ‘formality or distance’, see Schegloff (2005c: 
468; see also, ibid.: 473). 
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Vol. I: 580; Sudnow, 1965: 269; H. Garfinkel, 1967: 163; Drew, 1987: 246), 241 and 
“degraded” (see H. Garfinkel, 1956) from the portrayed (or feigned) incumbency, 
thereby. This ambiguity notwithstanding, Sarah’s tease centres, nevertheless, on the 
generative implicature of Ellie’s word-selection, and its interpretation, by/for Sarah, 
as ‘hinting at an identification’ (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 580; see also, ibid.: 595; 
Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 223; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 100). 
 
Extract 43 therefore supplies one initial example in which the “classed” implicature 
of a co-interlocutor’s co-present activity – the production of the OCRI, ‘Pardon?’ (l. 
30) – explicitly furnishes the basis for a dis-affiliative tease. A contrastive and more 
affiliative example of this action is captured in Extract 44. 
 
Extract 44 – CallHome-eng-6071 
((A telephone call. A continuation from Extract 23. Kate and Malcolm are 
discussing Kate’s possible involvement with a here-unnamed non-present 
third-party.))
Mal:   [.hhh] £O:[kay:.£      ] 183 
Kat:   [.hhh]    [I- ↑I have a]feeling he does have  184 
  an interest in me ‘cuz he’s >always-< (.)  185 
  pulling my hair and rubbing my shoulders and  186 
    looking straight into my eyes.= ↑He may just  187 
  be a flirty *↓type* so we’ll find *↓out.* 188 
   (0.2)  189 
Kat:   [.hh] 190 
Mal:   [Y  ]ou (sh)ould jus’ ↓do him: get it out of 191 
  your sy*stem.* 192 
  (0.3) 193 
Kat:   I mean the ↑thing is is that (.) I- (.) I’m a  194 
  woman with (.) ↓cl:ass even though I’m  195 
 
241 Categories which accommodate such forms of (im-)personation include, e.g., “con-
persons” (here, see Zimmerman, 1966: 230), “finks” (see Sacks, 1979 [1966]: 12; see also, 
ibid.: 14, fn. 1; 1992, Vol. I: 400), “frauds”, “imposters” (see Atkinson, 1976: n.p.g. in 
Atkinson, 1979: 270; Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 96) and “wannabes”, inter alia. 
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  basically a- (.) an ani£mal hh[h. like a= 196 
Mal:                                 [hh(hh)h.= 197 
Kat:   =Pi][:g.£ ].h[h    ]h >(h) [I’m li]ke [.hh ]=  198 
Mal:   =  ][°hah°]  [°hah°]       [Hah   ]   [↑hah] 199 
Kat:   =[h    ] ↑just= 200 
Mal:    [°Hah°]  201 
Mal:   =°hah hah°= 202 
Kat:   =[↑ju ]st  203 
Mal:    [hah°] 204 
Mal: → £CLASSY ↓ch[ick.£] 205 
Kat:              [drip.]= 206 
Mal:   =°hah° [°huh° [°hah° ↑hah °h[ah° 207 
Kat:          [.hh   [.hhh         [.hhh £Just is  208 
  like y(hh.)ou know .hh (.) don’t talk (0.2)  209 
  ↑jus’ hhh.£ 210 
  (0.5) 211 
Kat:   .hhhh (.) £I’m a [↑nut.£       ] 212 
Mal: →                  [(ch’)You’re a] woman with 213 
  class.  214 
  (.) 215 
Mal:   Mmhmm¿ 216 
  (.) 217 
Mal:   [hh.] 218 
Kat:   [Ah ]a’righ[t. 219 
Mal:              [<£↑OKAY.> HHh[hhh       ]h. 220 
Kat:                            [°(Classy)°] 221 
  (0.3) 222 
Mal:   °hu[h huh°] 223 
Kat:      [h. .hh]hhh (0.2) [↑I (.) am::.       ] 224 
Mal:                        [So wait. (.) I ↑gue]ss:  225 
  (.) I’ll start (.) r:eally working from the  226 
  eighth.227 
 
This interaction is re-joined as Kate rejects Malcom’s previously resisted, and sexually 
allusive, “just”-formulated advising (ls. 191-192; see Holmes et al., 2017), casting 
herself “defensively” (i.e. ‘I mean’ [l. 194]; see Maynard, 2013), “self-depreciatively” 
(see Pomerantz, 1975: Ch. 4), and “elaborately” (see Drew, 1987: 235-243, 250), as 
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an incumbent of a designedly exculpatory category: ‘I’m a woman with (.) ↓cl:ass 
even though I’m basically a- (.) an ani£mal hh[h. like a [((…))] Pi][:g.£].’ (ls. 194-196 
and 198). This classification is treated, through Kate’s continuation, post-self-
depreciation (i.e. ‘like a [((…))] Pi][:g.£].’ [ls. 196 and 198]), as a class of ‘matters 
already established and accepted between the parties’ (Pomerantz, 1975: 107). 
However, more focal, for current purpose, is that Kate’s incumbency in the 
linguistically “classed” category is treated by Kate (ls. 196, 198 and 200), and 
Malcolm (ls. 199, 201-202, 204 and 207), qua laughable (see Pomerantz, 1975: 107-
109; Glenn, 1995: 45; 2003: 113), but incommensurable with Malcolm’s proposed 
‘course of future action’ (i.e. ls. 191-192; here, see Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 368). It is 
here, as Kate projects a further self-characterisation (see ls. 198, 200 and 203), 242 that 
Malcolm initiates the focal teasing. 
 
Compared with Extract 43, the nature of this teasing is comparatively inexplicit. At a 
gloss, Malcolm indicates that the manner in which Kate has self-identified is, in some 
respects, flawed. This is accomplished in this sequence through the consecutive 
ascription of Kate into linguistically “classed” membership categories; a practice seen 
previously in Mike’s teasing in Extract 11 (ls. 13-14, 20, 24 and 28; see fn. 235). The 
first iteration of this activity begins in an “anticipatory completion” (see Lerner, 1991: 
444-446; 2004b: 247-249) as Malcolm ascribes Kate into the linguistically “classed” 
category of a ‘£CLASSY ↓ch[ick.£]’ (l. 205). 243 This is a ‘hybrid’ (Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: 55) ascription, or “formulation” (e.g. Heritage and R. Watson, 1979), of her 
own, comparatively “over-built” 244 self-avowal (i.e. ls. 194-195). A second ascription 
then occurs following Kate’s designedly jocular “insanity ascription” (i.e. l. 212; see 
R. Turner, 1974 [1970]; Coulter, 1973a; 1975; Smith, 1974). Kate is newly ascribed, 
by Malcolm, here, into a second linguistically “classed” membership category: 
‘[(ch’)You’re a] woman with class.’ (ls. 213-214; recall fn. 106). In this formulation, 
the avowed relevance of “social class” is preserved, not dispensed; it simply reverts 
from a “category-constitutive” (i.e. l. 205; Jayyusi, 1984 [2014]: 35) phenomenon, 
 
242 On this “post-overlap hitch”, see Livingston (1987: 67-72). Relatedly, see Schegloff 
(2000b: 17-18). 
243 On “subversive” and/or “nonserious” completions, see Lerner (1994: 27). 
244 See Atkinson and Drew (1979: 263-264, fn. 10).  
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back to the “category-bound/tied” (ls. 213-214) formulation advanced by Kate  
(see ls. 194-195). 
 
These ascriptions work to account for the teasable component in this extract; namely, 
Kate’s potentially serious identification within the linguistically “classed” category ‘a 
woman with (.) ↓cl:ass’ (ls. 194-195). Extract 44, in this vein, parallels Extract 43, 
offering a second case in which a teasing is attributed, by the teaser, to hinge on the 
linguistically “classed” incumbency of the ridiculed party. In this case, this identity is 
not one that has been educed from Kate’s situated conduct (cf. Extract 43) but is self-
avowed (i.e. ls. 194-195). This case also differs from Extract 43 as the tease is 
produced in a designedly “affiliative” context. The teased-party, in this case, self-
positions as a “butt” (see Glenn, 1995: 45; 2003: 113, italics in original), and a 
modification of the teased identity is even appreciated by Kate (i.e. l. 221; see Glenn, 
1995: 54; 2003: 131), sotto voce. This contrasts with the previous teases which are 
responded to seriously (here, see Drew, 1987), denied (cf. Extract 43: ls. 53-54; see 
D. Day, 1998; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1998), treated as self-validating (e.g. Extract 
39: ls. 427-438), or which occasion recriminations (cf. Extract 11: l. 129; see Sacks, 
1992, Vol. I: 40-48; Coulter, 1995b: 331; see also, see Glenn, 2003: 126-127).   
 
6.6.1 Summary  
Extracts 43 and 44 therefore present cases in which co-interlocutors mobilise a 
linguistically non-“classed” and a linguistically “classed” formulation of a co-
interlocutor’s (qua “tease-recipient”) “classed” identity, respectively, in order to 
account for tease deliveries. In Extract 43, the category of ‘posh mosher’ (l. 46) was 
ascribed to Ellie for producing the OCRI, ‘Pardon?’ (l. 30). In Extract 44, Kate was 
ascribed the categories of a ‘£CLASSY ↓ch[ick.£]’ (l. 205) and ‘a] woman with class.’ 
(ls. 213-214) on the basis of her self-depreciative categorisation (ls. 194-196 and 198). 
Extracts 43 and 44 thus present two cases in which a co-interlocutor (qua teaser) 
delivers a tease that is accounted for by reference to the “classed” identity of a co-
interlocutor. This identity has been made “behaviourally available” (recall fn. 47); 
implicated (e.g. Extract 43) and/or avowed (e.g. Extract 44). The ascription of 
“classed” identities appears, in this way, as a constitutive property involved in 
accounting for teases. Drew’s (1987: 243) observation, that teases can be serviced  
to attribute ‘deviant action/categories’, therefore resonates. 
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6.7 Chapter summary 
The two empirical chapters that preceded have addressed how “social class” is 
rendered see-able and analysable for EM/(M)CA research. In this chapter, I have 
operationalised the practices described in Chapters 4 and 5 to investigate the 
pragmatics of linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations. This is a focus that has 
been acknowledged, but not focalised, across the previous chapters. In this chapter,  
I have shown that the practices introduced in Chapters 4 and 5, of membership 
categories (Extracts 12, 06, 19, 13, 20, 42, 43 and 44), locational formulations (i.e. 
Extracts 40, 25, 41), and place terms (i.e. Extracts 29 and 39), are serviced to 
accomplish explanatory work in a range of social actions. Recurrently, these included 
evaluative assessments (§6.4), complaints (§6.5) and teases (§6.6).  
 
With respect to assessments, I have shown that this work has a sequenced production; 
namely, pre-positioning (see Extract 12 and 40) and post-positioning (see Extract 25 
and 06). For “complaints”, I have distinguished their production as a (e.g. Extracts 41, 
20, 29 and 42) and the (e.g. Extract 19) explanatory resource; their use in accounting 
for direct (e.g. Extract 19) and indirect complaints (i.e. Extracts 41, 13, 29, 20 and 
42); their production by either the original complainant (i.e. Extracts 41, 20, 42, 19 
and 33) or by a co-complainant (i.e. Extract 29); and their use to account for a 
complaint wholesale (i.e. Extracts 41, 19, 13 and 29), or for some subsidiary aspect 
thereof (i.e. Extracts 20 and 42). Finally, for “teases”, I have demonstrated that the 
linguistically (non-)“classed” status of the teased-party is routinely mobilised to 
account for the teasable nature of a tellable-in-progress. Their production in affiliative 
(see Extract 44) and disaffiliative teases (e.g. Extract 43) were differentiated in this 
section. 
 
The practices canvassed in Chapters 4 and 5 have therefore been introduced as a 
flexible interactional resource; one that co-interlocutors can mobilise, routinely, to 
account for a variety of social actions in a number of sequential positions. As 
acknowledged previously, in Chapter 2, existing EM/(M)CA research conducted in 
institutional settings (see §2.5.1) has upheld this focus consistently; however, it has 
accommodated linguistically non-“classed” orientations exclusively (see §2.5.2). 
Minimally, therefore, this chapter furnishes a novel contribution by extending this 
purview to “ordinary talk” and, further, by analysing linguistically “classed” 
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instantiations; occasions in which co-interlocutors themselves avow “classed” 
relevancies. Furthermore, this chapter also offers an important contribution to the 
study of how social identities are (co-)produced across social actions, while at the 
same time remaining attentive to their sequenced production. A contribution is 
therefore made to the growing body of EM/(M)CA literature that upholds this  
dual focus (for review, see Whitehead, 2012: 338).  
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Chapter 7 – Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter begins with a summary of the foremost contributions of this thesis. For 
continuity, these are situated in relation to the three research questions introduced in 
Chapter 1. The second section outlines a notable omission from my research. Five 
directions for future EM/(M)CA inquiries are then outlined which redress this 
omission. These areas of analysis have been partially prefigured by my inquiry but 
have not formed an abiding focus. A section dedicated to the limitations of my 
research then follows, in which I address empirical and conceptual omissions. I 
conclude with a summary of my research and of the status of “social class” for 
EM/(M)CA research more broadly.  
 
7.2 Summary of findings 
The novel findings of this thesis have been presented, predominantly, over Chapters 
4, 5 and 6; my three empirical chapters. These have attended to the first two of my 
three research questions directly (recall §1.7.1); namely: 
 
(1) How is “social class” conceptualised and reflexively rendered see-able and 
accountable by and for co-interlocutors?  
(2) Which social actions, activities and interactional projects are accomplished, 
recurrently, when co-interlocutors make “social class” demonstrably 
relevant?  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 have addressed my first research question, concerning the 
interactional practices employed by co-interlocutors which make “social class” 
relevant. Chapter 6 then recovered my second question, concerning social action. 
These chapters have each yielded a number of novel empirical findings. For a 
complete review, my respective chapter summaries should be consulted. The sub-
sections that follow provide an abbreviated review of key contributions, only, for 
economy. 
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My third research question, I propose, while comparatively focussed-off, has been 
addressed through the sum of these contributions: 
 
(3) What can EM/(M)CA contribute to sociological investigations of “social 
class”? 
 
Notable contributions to this effect have been outlined programmatically across 
Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 has provided the methodological terms of this 
contribution. Illustrative empirical contributions have then been documented over 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. A summary of these different contributions are recapitulated 
below. 
 
7.2.1 Interactional practices 
My first question concerned how “social class” is conceptualised within talk-in-
interaction and, with it, how members’ conceptualisations can be observed, in situ. 
This research question, I have claimed, represents a prerequisite for the analysis of 
“social class”. Before the practical activities for which “classed” orientations are 
mobilised can be pursued, it is necessary to first adjudicate what qualifies as an 
orientation towards “social class”. My first research question targeted this concern; 
one that has been addressed in this thesis explicitly over Chapters 4 and 5. Two 
families of interactional practices have been introduced in these chapters. These 
involve the ascription of “classed” membership categories (i.e. Chapter 4) and 
“classed” references to place (i.e. Chapter 5). 
 
Chapter 4 began by distinguishing “social class” from other dimensions of social 
identity; aspects that have formed a more recurrent locus of EM/(M)CA research 
(§4.3). The procedures used in extant EM/(M)CA research (see §2.4) to analyse 
“social class” were introduced (§4.4). Using “wealth” as an illustrative ontology, I 
indicated the empirical “defeasibility” of the prevailing procedure (§4.5): When 
analysts define “social class” on behalf of co-interlocutors, they not merely risk 
stipulating its relevance when it is not demonstrably imparted, in situ, but they also 
risk encountering deviant cases. This can include instances in which co-interlocutors 
construe “social class” differently – even in ways that can explicitly contradict 
definitions nominated by analysts, a priori. The remainder of this chapter made a  
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case for the initial focus on the ascription of linguistically “classed” categories  
(e.g. “middle class”), specifically.  
 
Three of the key affordances of this approach were then introduced; specifically, 
“agency”, “ontology” and “intersubjectivity”. Respectively, I demonstrated that 
linguistically “classed” categories afford members “agency” to determine how “social 
class” is conceptualised in moments of their avowed use (see §4.6.1.4). This differed 
from the analysis of linguistically non-“classed” categories (e.g. “rich”) which permit 
comparable forms of ontological work, but which are not set forth in avowedly 
“classed” terms. Their adjudication as relevantly “classed” relies instead on the 
determinations made by analysts, ex cathedra. Secondly, I proposed that linguistically 
“classed” categories can be configured by co-interlocutors to afford their recipients 
access to the operative ontologies which demonstrably underpin expressly “classed” 
membership categories (see §4.6.1). This ontological work was shown to be 
accomplished at various sequential positions and to accommodate a diverse, and a 
potentially indefinitely extendable repertoire of designedly “classed” theorisations. 
Lastly, I demonstrated that the analysis of linguistically “classed” occasions furnishes 
important observations for “intersubjectivity” (see §4.6.2). It was shown that while 
“social class” can be defined by co-interlocutors in a myriad of ways, they routinely 
remain understandable. Even when linguistically “classed” categorisations were not 
self-explicated, they were not expressly problematised on this basis. Instead, such 
occasions were motivated pragmatically, troubled by virtue of their praxiological 
functions, and not as a by-product of referential inadequacy. The chapter then 
concluded by reconciling the status of linguistically non-“classed” categorisations 
(i.e. §4.7); the exclusive focus of preceding EM/(M)CA research regarding “social 
class” (see Chapter 2). The notion of “possibles” (see Schegloff, 1996c) was 
introduced in this section to accommodate the analysis of these occasions but to 
distinguish them from avowed orientations. 
 
Chapter 4, in so doing, has provided a focussed investigation of my first research 
question, concerning how “social class” is conceptualised and made witnessable by 
co-interlocutors in talk-in-interaction. The chapter has canvassed a recurrent 
interactional practice employed by co-interlocutors in ordinary talk; namely, the 
ascription of linguistically “classed” membership categories. This was identified as a 
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recurrent practice whereby “social class” comes to be occasioned within ordinary 
forms of talk-in-interaction. The chapter extracted a number of novel empirical 
features of this practice in addition to proposing conceptual and methodological 
recommendations for EM/(M)CA research. The distinction between linguistically 
“classed” and linguistically non-“classed” orientations, for example, has formed the 
central architecture around which the remainder of the thesis has been organised.  
Not only has this been upheld across Chapters 5 and 6, but it also furnishes a basis  
for cumulative, reproducible EM/(M)CA research. In this vein, Chapter 4 has 
addressed my first research question; a contribution furthered by Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 introduced a second family of practices which renders “social class” see-
able in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction; specifically, “classed” references to 
place. Two species of this practice were introduced. The first concerned “classed” 
categorisations of “locational formulations” (see Schegloff, 1972a; 1972b); references 
to place that are (co-)produced in the service of referring. Five practices that were 
employed to situate such references in “classed” terms were introduced: 
“characterisations” (§5.5.1), “allusions” (§5.5.2), “co-selections” (§5.5.3) – both 
“prospective” (§5.5.3.1) and “retrospective” (§5.5.3.2) – and “intentional 
misidentifications” (§5.5.4). By so doing, it was shown that the “classed” 
categorisations of locations are a recurring resource in ordinary forms of talk-in-
interaction whereby “social class” is occasioned, made see-able and, therefore, 
accountable. The second species of place reference was the production of “place 
terms”; references to place that are (co-)produced in an alternative metonymic 
capacity. Locations, I claimed, are not merely a resource that can be “classed” by  
co-interlocutors but can also actuate the relevance of the device in its own right.  
 
Chapter 5 coheres with Chapter 4, in this vein, in contribution to my first research 
question, concerning the practices that occasion and make observable and/or 
accountable “social class”. Most notably, it has been shown that co-interlocutors 
possess an extensive range of practices which relevance of “social class” through 
locational formulations, and/or can actuate “classed” relevancies in their own right 
through the production of place terms. References to place thus accompany the 
production of “classed” membership categories as a second family of practices in 
which “social class” is oriented to within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 have, therefore, designedly addressed my first research question.  
It has been this analysis which has provided the basis for subsequent focus on social 
action; my second concern. 
 
7.2.2 Social actions 
As I have outlined in Chapter 3 (§3.2.1), a key commitment that underpins CA 
research is its ‘activity focus’ (Drew and Heritage, 1992: 17, italics in original). Focal 
here are the “pragmatics” of talk-in-interaction; the work for which constituent 
components are mobilised on occasions of their use. This dimension of inquiry was 
introduced in Chapters 3 (§3.2.1) and 6 (§6.2) not only as a central focus of CA 
research, generally, but as the predominant heuristic assumed by foregoing CA 
research in order to investigate “categorisations” and orientations to “social class”, 
specifically (see §2.4). This focus has been acknowledged across my analyses in 
Chapters 4 and 5, iteratively. However, a concentrated praxiological analysis was 
offset by my focus on interactional practices; a prerequisite for this investigation 
(§1.7.2). Only in Chapter 6, after interactional practices were detailed, was social 
action then retrieved. 
 
The specific focus of Chapter 6 concerned the activities for which the families of 
practices introduced across Chapters 4 and 5 were mobilised. Three social actions 
were disaggregated across this chapter; viz. “evaluative assessments” (§6.4), 
“complaints” (§6.5) and “teases” (§6.6). As I have qualified, these activities did not 
exhaust the nature of the work for which the practices outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 
were employed; instead, they simply represent three recurring activities across my 
dataset in which orientations to “classed” identities were employed consistently. In 
this case, the activities cohered insofar as “classed” orientations operated in a 
relevantly explanatory capacity within each activity. “Classed” orientations were 
produced to account for how some state-of-affairs could be treated as a relevantly 
“assessable”, “complainable” and “teasable” object – or to account for some 
component that is configured as designedly epiphenomenal, thereof (e.g. §6.5.2).  
To summarise, Chapter 6 has introduced “social class” as a resource for social  
action, highlighting its use in the service of accounting within ordinary forms of  
talk-in-interaction.  
 
 313 
My second research question has in this way been addressed in Chapter 6 most 
explicitly. I have shown that when co-interlocutors service linguistically  
(non-)“classed” orientations, they are neither “language idling”, 245 nor are they 
invested in abstract “ontological work”. 246 Instead, the purposes for which they are 
mobilised are, fundamentally, mundane, situated and practical. This is not only with 
respect to the practices upon which this work is predicated, but also their praxiological 
utility. As outlined in Chapter 6, the activity of “accounting” (see §6.3) represents a 
central function of this work and obtains across heterogenous action-types. 
Presumably, however, “social class” is not limited to this function. The analysis of its 
use in additional, potentially variegated even unanticipated social actions (here, see, 
e.g., Sacks, 1984a: 22; Schegloff, 1996a; Clift, 2012: 71; Sidnell, 2017; G. Raymond, 
2018: 75-81) therefore pends the commitment of future EM/(M)CA research. 
 
7.2.3 Sociology  
My third research question concerned the contributions that are posed by EM/(M)CA 
research for the sociological forms of “class-analysis”. Unlike the two previous 
research questions, my contributions here have not been addressed in a dedicated 
empirical chapter. My contribution, I propose, is, instead, comparatively pervasive, 
and is addressed through this thesis qua gestalt.  
 
Chapters 1 and 2, for example, have set forth the terms of this contribution 
programmatically. Chapter 1 demonstrated that sociological and sociolinguistic 
research has consistently omitted the study of three areas of inquiry that are 
accommodated through EM/(M)CA uniquely. The study of talk-in-interaction; 
occasions in which individuals (qua co-interlocutors) define “social class” for 
themselves; and in which “classed” identities are made relevant by individuals, 
represent three foci of EM/(M)CA, but are omitted from FA traditions of “class-
analysis”. Chapter 2 articulated the potential contributions of EM/(M)CA research 
through reference to its unique approach towards social identity. The collection of 
insights that have been anticipated (i.e. §2.3.4), and/or gleaned (i.e. §2.4), through 
 
245 Wittgenstein’s (n.d. [EJBH: 1968 [1953]: §132] in Drew, 2005: 74) phrase. Recall §6.2. 
246 Rose’s (1967: 138) phrase. Recall fn. 56. 
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prior EM/(M)CA research were here reviewed and the terms of my contributions 
adumbrated (i.e. §2.5.3).  
 
Chapter 3 outlined further novel contributions that are provided for through the 
EM/(M)CA approach and with respect to its unique set of methodological 
commitments. I demonstrated that the use of CA and MCA not merely offers the 
means to study the domain of talk-in-interaction rigorously (see §3.3), through a 
coherent set of underlying commitments (see §3.2.1), but that it also affords a 
reproducible, empirical apparatus that can be used to gauge how co-interlocutors 
define “social class” for themselves, and thus whereby “participatory relevance” can 
be adjudicated. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 presented the results of this operationalisation, 
illustrating the potential insights that can be gleaned through this strand of empirical 
research. I have shown, in so doing, that the EM/(M)CA apparatus can be used to 
identify how “social class” is theorised (e.g. Chapter 4), formulated (e.g. Chapters 4 
and 5) and employed (e.g. Chapter 6) within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction.  
 
The contributions posed by EM/(M)CA research for sociological “class-analysis” 
have therefore been made available programmatically (see Chapters 1-2), 
methodologically (see Chapter 3) and realised empirically (see Chapters 4-6). It is 
worth qualifying, however, that the exact nature of this contribution remains, 
irremediably, perspectival, and will be relativised according to the commitments 
valorised by sociological readerships. The primacy that is assigned to “social 
interaction”, for example, is one expectable axis along which import could be 
processed differently. As it is upheld in this thesis, for example, talk-in-interaction 
could be understood to represent a/the primary form of human sociality, and a 
constitutive domain that underlies the organisational properties of social life (see 
§3.2.1). Submitted to such reading, the (co-/re-)production of “classed” identities 
would be understood, accordingly, to undergird sociality as a primary resource. 
Alternatively, when positioned differently, my analysis could, theoretically, be 
situated simply as an extension of FA sociological research; as a qualitative 
exploration of “classed” orientations in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. For 
readers so inclined, my analysis could be reconciled as a progressively granular 
specification of existing research conducted in the domain of everyday life  
(see §1.6.1).   
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In this case, I have aligned with the former reading; a “radical” as opposed to an 
‘incorporationist’ (R. Watson, 1994: 177; see also, Eglin and Hester, 1999: 197) 
interpretation. Nonetheless, I trust to have shown that the novelty of my thesis does 
not rely upon such a reading. Whether readers share my perspective – or simply 
assimilate EM/(M)CA as a(nother) form of “micro-analysis” (recall fn. 89) – 
EM/(M)CA nevertheless offers a valuable, novel resource that can be employed in 
order to examine “social class” in talk-in-interaction. In either case, I trust to have 
distinguished EM/(M)CA as neglected form of “class-analysis”; one that has been 
employed on only a handful of occasions (§2.4), exclusively on interactions in 
perspicuous, institutional settings (§2.5.1), and with a sole focus on linguistically non-
“classed” orientations (§2.5.2). To whichever interpretation the reader subscribes, 
therefore, does not diminish its novelty, it simply configures it differently and affords 
an opportunity to commence an oft-neglected dialogue between EM/(M)CA and  
FA research (here, see Goffman 1980 in Verhoeven, 1993 [1980]: 345; Schegloff in 
Čmerjková and Prevignano, 2003: 27; relatedly, see Sudnow, 1978: 153-154; 
Maynard and Clayman, 2018: 128). 247 In this respect, EM/(M)CA is available for 
“class-analysis” and is an approach that betokens a number of diverse, potentially 
hitherto unanticipated observations.  
 
7.2.4 Summary 
The three research questions set forth at the outset of my inquiry have thus been 
addressed across Chapters 1-6. Inter alia, I have demonstrated that “social class” is 
occasioned through a recurring set of practices in ordinary talk; two of which have 
been focalised in Chapters 4 and 5. These practices, I have shown, are mobilised in 
the service of an array of social actions within Chapter 6. My focus, here, has 
crystallised around their use in “accounting” across a range of action-types. It is on 
the basis of this analysis, qua gestalt, that this thesis has illustrated the potential of 
EM/(M)CA as a distinctive, hitherto underutilised approach that is available for 
 
247 On the availability of such a dialogue, see, e.g., Maynard (1984: 13), Pollner (1987: xvi), 
Schegloff (2005b: 457, 475) and Maynard and Clayman (2018). On sequencing, see, e.g., 
Sacks (1990 [1963]: 89-90, fn. 8; see also, Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 41-42). 
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“class-analysis”. This contribution has been articulated in programmatic, 
methodological and empirical terms. On this basis, I have proposed that EM/(M)CA 
represents a novel and productive domain for sociological research regardless of 
whether a “radical” or an “incorporationist” (see R. Watson, 1994: 177) interpretation 
of this thesis is preferred. 
 
7.3 Future research 
My three research questions have, therefore, been explored. However, this is not to 
say that the EM/(M)CA respecification of “social class” research has been fully 
realised, nor that this research is without enduring omissions. Several prospective 
projects that could be taken up elsewhere have been interwoven into my analysis, to 
this effect. This has included, for example, EM/(M)CA positions on representative 
research and generalisability (§3.4.1.2; §5.7, respectively) and the analysis of non-
vocal practices (§3.3.1; fn. 69) and intersectionality (§2.4.2.2; fn. 112) as they pertain 
to “social class”, specifically. In the subsections that follow, I choose to salvage only 
those novel “threads” 248 that have been occasioned by my research, uniquely. The 
four areas highlighted above, for example, have each been situated in terms of 
EM/(M)CA research in authoritative expositions (e.g. Peräkylä, 2011; Gobo, 2008; 
M. H. Goodwin and Alim, 2010; Whitehead, 2013, respectively). Thus, while the 
EM/(M)CA positions, thereon, have not been situated vis-à-vis “social class”, 
specifically, the thrust of these standpoints, I propose, obtains readily. I therefore 
refrain from further engagement to avoid repetition.  
 
In this section, I restrict my remit to orientations to “social class”. As clarified in 
Chapter 4 (§4.4), this is but one medium that can be used to investigate “social class” 
in EM/(M)CA research. An alternative line, for example, acknowledged previously, 
would involve analysing enactments of “social class” – and/or “social classes”. The 
effectuation of “received pronunciation” (RP), for example, is one possible oral 
resource that could be analysed to this effect (here, see Extracts 06 and 39). 
Enactments of “social class/es” are, therefore, available for future EM/(M)CA 
research. However, as this focus contrasts the prevailing scope of my thesis, 
 
248 Mandelbaum’s (1991/1992: 109) term.  
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concerning orientations, I confine my remit here accordingly, for the sake of 
continuity. 
 
My purview here will be limited to five lines of inquiry that arise from my analysis 
directly and that are interconnected as constitutive components of “classed” 
orientations. This dimension has been selected as it has not been pursued in detail in 
this thesis. While it formed the focus of my research in Chapter 4, concerning 
“ontology”, further inquiries were not pursued. The five lines of inquiry that follow 
have therefore been selected to respond to a deficiency of the present research. 
Respectively, these concern: (1) how “classed” membership categories are cast as 
available by co-interlocutors (§7.3.1); (2) how they are temporalised (§7.3.2), (3) 
organised (§7.3.3) and (4) distributed (§7.3.4); and (5) the delicacy with which 
orientations are (co-)produced (see §7.3.5). For completeness, and fidelity, each 
candidate line of inquiry is connected back to extracts cited previously into which 
indicative cases are smuggled; a practice borrowed from previous EM/(M)CA 
research (e.g. Schegloff et al., 1977: 366, fn. 11). While these extracts cannot be not 
reproduced here, in the interests of space, they remain eligible for repeated,  
re-examinations at the discretion, and patience, of the reader. 
 
7.3.1 Availability 
How “social class” is theorised by co-interlocutors, in situ, has formed the focus of 
Chapter 4. A related line of inquiry that has not been addressed explicitly, however, 
concerns the bases by reference to which co-interlocutors come to derive and 
credential “classed” memberships. This relates to “availability” (see Jayyusi, 2014 
[1984]: Ch. 2); that is, how “classed” identities are produced by co-interlocutors to 
index how these categories have been derived. It will be recalled from Chapter 2 
(§2.3.4) that this dimension has been recognised in previous “propaedeutic 
commentaries” on “social class”. “Classed” identities have been oriented to as both 
those which are ‘perceptually available’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 74, italics in 
original; e.g. H. Garfinkel, 1967: 119; Schegloff, 1972a: 91; 1972b: 111; Sacks, 1992, 
Vol. II: 122; West and Fenstermaker, 1995a: 26-27; Pascale, 2007: 80, 84-85; see also, 
Wieder 1974b: 167, fn. 11), in addition to those treated as ‘behaviourally available’ 
(Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 74, my emphasis), such as through aspects of situated and 
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reported conduct (see, e.g., Sacks, 1988/1989: 53; 1992, Vol. I: 742; Vol. II: 122;  
M. H. Goodwin, 2006: 183-186). 
 
These two species of availability, as canvassed by Jayyusi (2014 [1984]), have not 
been focalised in this thesis. Examples of cases in which co-interlocutors orient 
towards these categories in corresponding terms, however, can be found enclosed. 
Instances of the latter, concerning ‘[b]ehavioural availability’ (ibid.: 73, italics in 
original) are predominant within my collection. Endogenously, regarding co-
interlocutors’ conduct, this included the selection of OCRIs (see Extract 43), 
infelicitous syntax (see Extract 19), and the purposive reticence of co-interlocutors 
(see Extract 11). Conversely, exogenously, concerning non-present parties, this 
included (forms of) ownership (i.e. Extract 12), language (e.g. Extract 18), 
occupational status (e.g. Extract 16), and (an absence of) odour (e.g. Extract 27). 
Future EM/(M)CA research, therefore, could address the study of such categorial 
insignia, and how these are oriented to by co-interlocutors. This represents a line of 
inquiry in its own right, but it could also be furthered through a praxiological 
investigation of the work for which availabilities are put by co-interlocutors  
(e.g. “accounting”; see Chapter 6).  
 
Future EM/(M)CA research could progress this line of analysis, identifying the 
common bases by reference to which “social class” is made available, and the social 
actions/activities for which availabilities (e.g. perceptual, behavioural, etc.) are 
serviced, in situ. Together, these would make available a number of comparatively 
nuanced areas for future analysis. Concerning “perceptual availabilities”, for 
example, a candidate investigation concerns whether co-interlocutors treat “social 
class” as a device that is made see-able directly through their orientations, and/or 
whether it is positioned as mediated (e.g. derived, inferred) vicariously through some 
directly observable set of corresponding indicators (e.g. “wealth”/“homelessness”, 
etc.). 249 Equally, concerning “behavioural availabilities”, subsequent research might 
 
249 For comparable distinctions, see Jayyusi’s (2014 [1984]: 68) contrast between “stage-of-
life” membership and natural “age”, where the former is available ‘on sight’, while the latter 
is ‘assignable or disclosable’. Relatedly, see also Sudnow (1979: Ch. 21) on “hearing” and 
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investigate how availabilities come to be preserved in, and/or policed by co-
interlocutors (see, e.g., Sacks, 1979 [1966]; 1992, Vol. II: 118-119). Examples of 
status incongruities, for example – or forms of ‘social misrepresentation’ (Goffman, 
1963: 82) – have been encountered in Extracts 19 and 43. Samuel and Ellie, in  
these cases, were differently classified as persons who mis-represented themselves in 
possibly “classed” terms. In both cases, they are cast as revelations betrayed 
communicatively (recall fn. 219); namely, infelicitous syntax and non-standard 
reparative conduct, respectively. Whether investigated in their own right, therefore,  
or for their practical uses, the constitution of “classed” availabilities represents  
an expectably profitable area for future EM/(M)CA research. 
 
7.3.2 Temporality 
A second line of inquiry for future EM/(M)CA research concerns the temporal 
dimensions of “classed” incumbencies. This component has been considered in 
programmatic terms only within this thesis. The FA research reviewed in Chapter 1, 
it will be recalled, has treated “classed” identities, recurrently, as enduring statuses. 
This has been achieved by operationalising the concept as a veritable “threshold 
phenomenon” (see Schegloff, 1991: 62; 1992a: 127, italics in original); a status that 
can be ascribed to members upon their fulfilment of conditions that have been 
nominated by analysts. EM/(M)CA research, in contrast, has respecified this 
approach. As outlined in Chapter 2 (§2.2.1) and 3 (§3.2.1), social identities are not 
treated by default as “omnirelevant” 250 incumbencies; instead, they represent 
contingent properties that are occasioned and made relevant over the course of 
determinate sequences of conduct. This is the procedural, programmatic sense in 
which the temporal components of social identity have been accommodated in this 
research. What has been comparatively neglected are those occasions in which 
“classed” statuses are temporalised by co-interlocutors, in situ. Like the study of 
categorial “availabilities” (§7.3.1), this represents a further area of inquiry for 
EM/(M)CA exploration. 
 
“listening”. On different “knowables”, generally, see Labov and Fanshel (1977: e.g. 62), 
Pomerantz (1980: 187-191) and Heritage (2012a: 4). 
250 See Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 515, italics in original). 
 320 
  
One initial line of prospective inquiry, for example, could investigate how 
temporalities are built into the (co-)production of linguistically (non-)“classed” 
categorisations. Some categories, after all, can be delimited by co-interlocutors as 
transient statuses. Illustrative examples of this work include “action-” or “event-
consequent/specific/tied categories” (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: e.g. 62, 66, 115, 261, 
fn. 7). These membership categories are tied to and/or generated by temporally 
bounded activities, and/or which are particularised to certain characterological or 
epistemic domains (here, see §7.4.1). Alternatively, “classed” incumbencies may be 
cast as comparatively durable, lasting and ‘stable’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 66, 
italics in original; see also, Zimmerman and Pollner, 1974 [1970]: 97; Sacks, 1992, 
Vol. I: 519); that is, for example, amplified, stabilised and/or tenured, as a 
‘transportable identity’ (see Zimmerman, 1998: 91) and/or ‘indefeasible status’ (see 
Coulter, 1973a: 158). An example of this is Eric’s orientation to the constituent 
“classed” categories which compose ‘Russia’ (l. 58) in Extract 31. In this case, the 
categories that populate this location (§5.5.1.2) are cast as eternal both adverbially 
(i.e. ‘always’ [l. 57], ‘Always’ [l. 58]) and through use of the ‘historical present’ (i.e. 
‘And the intelligentsia (0.5) just sh:it on (.) >the normal Russians.<’ [ls. 58-60]; here, 
see Edwards and Fasulo, 2006: 360). Co-interlocutors, therefore, are equipped with 
resources to delimit temporal incumbencies. How “classed” categories become 
temporalised differently (e.g. eternalised), therefore, represents a further area of 
possible inquiry. The practices employed to this effect, in addition to the nature  
their practical import, await description (e.g. G. Raymond and Heritage, 2006: 700). 
 
Two further lines of inquiry that have been touched-off within this thesis concern 
forms of ‘incumbency entry’ (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 57, 66), and how “classed” 
identities are avowedly “dispensed” (recall fn. 177), exited and/or terminated by 
members. One indicative distinction for the former, for example, concerns being 
“locatable in” or “coming from” “classed” categorisations. Three variations of this 
formulation have been encountered in this thesis, but which have been otherwise 
disattended. This includes the constructions of “growing up in” (e.g. Extract 05) 
“classed” settings, being “conceived by” avowedly “classed” incumbents” (e.g. 
Extract 14); and “coming from” “classed” locations (e.g. Extracts 25, 28 and 34) and 
groups (e.g. Extracts 12; see also, Extract 20). These formulations are markedly offset, 
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and differ from comparatively direct, unmediated ascriptions in which parties are cast 
directly as incumbents of “classed” categories (cf., e.g., Extract 16). 251 However, 
whether this distinction translates pragmatically, in which mediated and unmediated 
categorisations are employed in different species of interactional work, awaits 
EM/(M)CA research. 252 A related distinction that pends inquiry relates to whether 
“classed” categories are constructed to be statuses that can be exited, ceded and/or 
treated as ‘erasable’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 61; see also, Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 262, 
fn. 18), or whether they are cast as obdurate and/or everlasting. Both accession and 
secession from “classed” categories, after all, is provided for through terms in the 
natural language (e.g. “parvenu”; “nouveau riche”). How these categories are 
employed in situ, however, remain unexplored.  
 
7.3.3 Organisation 
A third potential area for future EM/(M)CA research concerns the structural 
organisation of “classed” membership categories. This component, like the 
dimensions of availability and temporality, have been addressed previously in my 
analysis, but not focalised. Two design features of “classed” categories have been 
noted, in particular. The first concerns how incumbents can be “partitioned” (see 
Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 590; see also, ibid., Vol. II: 110). It was recognised in Chapter 2 
(recall fn. 42), for example, that “classed” categories could be formulated as what 
Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 47) has referred to as a ‘two-set class’ device. Examples of this 
configuration recur across this thesis (e.g. Extracts 02, 06 and 31). 253 Extract 31, for 
example, renders this explicitly. Eric, in this case, through the division of  
‘the intelligentsia’ (l. 58) and ‘>the normal Russians.<’ (ls. 59-60) in avowedly 
“classed” terms (i.e. ‘two ↓classes’ [l. 57]), formulates this relationship explicitly as a 
 
251 This division is evocative of Linton’s (1938 in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 58) distinction 
between ‘acquired’ and ‘ascribed’ statuses. 
252 Intuitively, it is possible that distinctions function as resource for distanciations – or for 
accomplishing “role distance” (see Goffman, 1972 [1961b]: e.g. 95). They may operate as 
“modifiers” (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 44-45) in this respect: occasioning whilst 
simultaneously liberating the population described from the inferences that are normatively 
associable with the category of persons from which they are divorced. 
253 On the persistence of “two-set” constructions, see Ossowski (1963: 33-37, 87). 
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‘dichotomy’ (l. 75), and the constitutive categories, subsumed, are polarised, 
accordingly, as a “contrastive pair” (here, see Atkinson, 1984a: 73-82, 130, 154-157).  
 
A second organisational feature relates to the composition of “social class”. It was 
recognised in Chapter 4, for example, that linguistically “classed” categories 
frequently contain a hierarchical, ordinal design; cast explicitly as ‘positioned 
categories’ (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 585, italics in original; see also, Sacks, 1974 
[1972]: 222). 254 This is marked, for example, by the (co-)production of categories that 
are composed of ‘measure terms’ (e.g. ‘lower class.’ [Extract 11: l. 24]; ‘Middle class’ 
[Extract 13: l. 287], ‘upper middle ↑Cla:ss’ [Extract 16: l. 129]; ‘lower upper class,’  
[ Extract 40: l. 25]; ‘upper cla:ss>’ [Extract 18: l. 167]), to modify Sacks’ (1992, Vol. 
II: e.g. 322, my emphasis) phrase. Alternatively, such as in the production of 
linguistically non-“classed” categories and descriptions, these gradations can be 
accomplished lexically. The descriptions ‘pretty high Class’ (Extract 17: l. 441), 
‘Slightly ↑Swanky’ (Extract 33: l. 66), ‘↑more sort of (0.4) uhm. (.) middle class’ 
(Extract 20: ls. 361-362), ‘really fancy’ (Extract 33: l. 93), ‘↑So fancy’ (Extract 33:  
l. 91), ‘Really posh’ (Extract 33: l. 80), ‘enormously Posh:.’ (Extract 28: l. 129) and 
‘super Posh.’ (Extract 28, l. 130), for example, typify this practice, casting the 
“classed” descriptions and categories to which they prepend along an un-explicated 
cline. 
 
As with availabilities and temporalities, these features represent eligible areas of 
inquiry for future EM/(M)CA research in their own right. It would be beneficial to 
investigate, for example, the differences in various stratifications (e.g. dichotomies 
[Extract 31], trichotomies [Extract 17], etc.) and the use of comparatively monistic 
(e.g. Extract 32) renderings of “social class” in talk-in-interaction, and their 
formational possibilities. Equally, it would be interesting to contrast those categories 
which somehow explicate a hierarchical position (e.g. ‘Middle class’ [Extract 13:  
l. 287]), and those which elide, subdue, or obscure it, linguistically (e.g. ‘the Wealthy 
 
254 My focus here concerns intra-categorial hierarchies. On inter-categorial hierarchies, see, 
e.g., Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 64-65) on the discovery of suicides, Sudnow (1967 [EJBH: Ch. 5] 
in Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 561) on announcements of death, and, differently, Jayyusi (2014 
[1984]: 23, 70, 137, italics in original) on ‘categorial precedence’. 
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Class:.’ [Extract 12: l. 57]; ‘working ↑class’’ [Extract 19: ls. 30-31]). This is an 
exigency examined by Jayyusi (2014 [1984]: 178), generically, and a line of inquiry 
that has been situated in relation to “social class” in previous EM/(M)CA texts  
(e.g. Benson and Hughes, 1983: 15). However, the possibilities of empirical research 
have yet to be canvassed and represent domains that are touched-off from this thesis. 
 
In both cases, the praxiological upshot of such investigations is an important area of 
investigation and remains available for future EM/(M)CA research. The two-set 
constitution of “classed” categories, after all, has been lauded by Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 
47-48) for its comparative potential. Two pragmatic functions of the hierarchical 
design of “classed” membership categories have also been anticipated. Depending 
upon the typology from which a “classed” category has been drawn, for example, can 
function not only to “relativise” (here, see Schegloff, 1992b: xxxiv) “classed” statuses 
(e.g. Extract 06), but can also position the classifier such that they are inspectable for 
how they can be classified, reciprocally; a property set forth by Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 
45-46) on “perspective”, “topics” (see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 754-755) and “category-
bound activities” (see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 223; 1992, Vol. I: 249). 255 How “social 
class” comes to be differently configured, therefore, and how these different 
configurations are employed as consequential, practical resources, is an area eligible 
for future EM/(M)CA research.  
 
 
255 For review, see §2.3.4 and §5.5.3.2. Note this is also implicit to Sacks’ (1992, Vol. I: 60-
61, 464, 598) analyses of “safe compliments” and “complaints” (see §6.5.1; fn. 221), and 
connects with what Schegloff (1984a: 49; 1996b: 20), building upon Sacks (e.g. 1992, Vol. I: 
60-61), has referred to as “derived actions”. Furthermore, this research, in so doing, would 
also provide a counterpart to comparable observations made regarding the ascription of 
categories indicative of “stages of life” (see, e.g., Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 222; 1992, Vol. I: 249, 
585-586, 587; Speier, 1973: 188-189, 195, fn. 53; W. Sharrock, 1974: 51; Cuff, G. Payne, 
Francis, Hustler and W. Sharrock, 1979: 146-147; Coulter, 1991: 46; Hester, 1992: 171-172; 
Schegloff, 1992b: xlii; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 217; McHoul and R. Watson, 1984: 286-288; 
Jalbert, 1989: 238), “ethnicity” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 586), “gender” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, 
Vol. I: 241), “race” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 241, 586; R. Watson, 1997b: 80, 82) and 
“sexuality” (e.g. ibid.: 80). 
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7.3.4 Pn-adequacy 
A fourth area for future inquiry concerns orientations towards the distribution of 
“social classes” and their members. This area of inquiry has been anticipated in this 
thesis through discussions of ‘the etcetera problem’ (e.g. Sacks, 1990 [1963]: 91).  
It will be recalled, for example, that for any member, more than one category is, 
theoretically, applicable. The focal upshot, therefore, is that the correctness of a 
membership category is not, necessarily, the salient criterion on the basis of which 
categorisations are warranted, uniquely. In previous EM/(M)CA literature, this quality 
has been articulated, classically, using Sacks’ (1972: e.g. 33; see also, Sacks, 1967) 
notions of ‘a Pn-adequate device, type 1’ and ‘‘which’-type sets” (e.g. Sacks, 1992, 
Vol. I: 40). 256 To borrow Schegloff’s (1992c: xxxvii, fn. 27) formulation, 
“Sex/Gender” is treated, conventionally, as a device that may be employed by 
members to categorise any population of persons (i.e. “P”) irrespective of whether  
it has (i.e. “a”; see Sacks, 1972: 430: fn. 8), or has not (i.e. “n”) been prespecified – 
that is, ‘counted, characterized or bounded [...] in some fashion’ (Schegloff, 1991: 49). 
Thus, the outcome of this procedure is that no member of the population analysed is 
left uncategorised (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 213; Schegloff, 1992a: 108). Insofar as 
“Sex/Gender” is serviced within talk-in-interaction, therefore, the device can be 
treated as “Pn-adequate (Type 1)”. 
 
“Pn-adequacy”, I propose, offers an underutilised heuristic for the analysis of 
“classed” distributions, and is one that is curiously absent from previous 
considerations of the notion in EM/(M)CA texts. Research could therefore begin by 
exploring this equivocal status. As it has been indicated in Chapter 4 (§4.3), after all, 
“social class” is not understood to correspond with a consensual nor stable set(s) of 
first-order referents. Both their nature, and the terms of their constitution, can instead 
be relativised depending on the indices of “social class” that are enshrined by co-
interlocutors, in situ, and/or by analysts, ex post facto. It is possible, for instance, that 
whether the device qualifies as “Pn-adequate (Type 1)” can vary according to its 
 
256 For FA reflections, see, e.g., Ossowski (1963: 142-143) on ‘exhaustive’ and ‘non-
exhaustive’ conceptualisations. See Pascale (2007: 92) and Savage et al. (2001: 882) for 
participant orientations to the latter. 
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underlying bases. Were it conceptualised by way of “occupation” (e.g. “blue-collar”, 
“white-collar”; e.g. Extracts 09 and 20), for example, the phenomenon would be 
unlikely to satisfy the conditions of “Pn-adequacy” – at least when adjudicated 
contemporarily on a Eurocentric purview. 257 Future EM/(M)CA research could, 
therefore, begin by clarifying this status through empirical research. Occasions  
could be investigated, for example, in which “social class” is constructed,  
variously, as P(n/a)-(in)adequate, and which could distinguish the practices and/or  
the purposes for which these alternative theorisations come to be (de)activated  
in talk-in-interaction.  
 
7.3.5 Delicacy  
A fifth and final candidate for investigation in future EM/(M)CA research concerns 
the productional features of “classed” categorisations. This aspect of inquiry is a 
further line of inquiry that has been acknowledged (e.g. Extract 39) but not focalised 
in this thesis. One dimension that is of particular note, and which warrants further 
exploration, is the designed “delicacy” with which orientations to “social class” are 
frequently (co-)produced. This feature forms an extant locus of inquiry of/for 
EM/(M)CA research. Features of lexical choice (e.g. Jefferson, 1978b: 137), turn-
design (e.g. Bergmann, 1992: 148-154; Silverman, 1994: 432, 433-435; Lerner, 2013), 
sequential organisation (e.g. Schegloff, 1980: 131-134; Kitzinger, 2000: 185-187; 
Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2007: 224) and footing (e.g. Clayman, 1992: 169-171, 195-
196), for example, have long been identified as indices of delicacy. 258 EM/(M)CA 
research has further observed that expressed incumbencies within membership 
categories can be treated as “delicate” interactional work (e.g. Silverman, 1994; 
Widdicombe, 2017), for which various practices are available by which co-
interlocutors can varnish this relevance (here, see Schegloff, 1996d: 447, 448-449; 
Jackson, 2011a: 216). 
 
 
257 Members of the category “children”, for example, could fail to fulfil this criterion (see 
Sacks, 1967: 18-20; Speier, 1974 [1970]: 205-206; Atkinson, 1978: 192); that is, without 
additional allowances. For one “unless clause” (here, see Wootton, 1975: 61) from FA 
research, see, e.g., E. O. Wright (1997: 27, italics in original) on “mediated class locations”. 
258 Relatedly, on instantiations of “cautiousness”, see Drew and Heritage (1992: 45-47). 
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The investigation of these indices of this designed delicacy thus represents a clear 
avenue for future research. The “classed” orientations adduced in this thesis, for 
example, have illustrated a number of suggestive components. Orientations were 
produced, for example, sotto voce (e.g. Extracts 34 and 39; see Lerner, 2013: 96-97) 
with qualifiers (e.g. “sort of” [Extract 20]; “kind of” [Extract 12]; “slightly” [Extract 
33]; e.g. Bergmann, 1992: 151-154; Lerner, 2013: 95-96), hesitance markers (e.g. 
“uhm”; Extracts 20, 22 and 30; e.g. Lerner, 2013: 101-102), and followed the 
emergence of lapses (e.g. Extract 16, 32, 38, 43; see Sacks et al., 1974: 714) and  
intra-turn pauses (e.g. Extracts 06, 11, 12, 14, 20, 22, 25, 26, 30, 33, 41, 42; e.g. 
Silverman, 1994: 432; Lerner, 2013: 104-106). These features have been recognised 
in previous research as possible instantiations of “delicacy”. The implications and 
consequences of this recurrence have not yet been examined, however, for “classed” 
identities, specifically, and warrants future EM/(M)CA research. Such an inquiry 
might also prompt the discovery of novel interactional exigencies. A link might be 
made, for example, to occasions in which the ascription of “classed” social  
identities is withstood (e.g. Extract 43). The designedly “delicate” production of 
“classed” categories therefore invites future research independently, but also 
represents a possible mainspring for further insights. 
 
7.3.6 Summary 
Several prospective lines of inquiry have been outlined in this chapter that are 
occasioned by the remit of this thesis, and into which examples can be found in 
extracts previously cited. Specifically, I have limited my remit to the constitutive 
features of “social class”. To qualify, these dimensions I have highlighted are not 
exhaustive. I have instead limited myself to a dimension of inquiry – namely, the 
constitution of “classed” orientations – which has not been pursued in this thesis in 
depth. I have shown in this section, however, that the analysis of linguistically  
(non-)“classed” orientations is “ripe” (here, see Schegloff et al., 1977: 375)  
for several prospective inquiries, concerning “availability”, “temporality”, 
“organisation”, “pn-adequacy” and “delicacy”. Each of these aspects have been 
introduced as an area of inquiry in their own right. At the same time, however, future 
EM/(M)CA research can also investigate the practical purposes for which these 
dimensions are (co-)produced. The realisation of both projects, I propose, will  
enhance our understanding of the logic of “classed” orientations, allowing for the 
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discovery of both the practices used to occasion their relevance (e.g. Chapters 4-5) 
and the social actions for which they are (co-/re-)produced (e.g. Chapter 6).  
 
To qualify, the contribution of such work would not be an attempt to delineate, 
exhaustively, every plane along which “classed” orientations could be stratified. As 
“occasioned” properties (see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 35), such an endeavour would not 
merely be ‘incorrect’ (Drew, 1978: 21, fn. 13), but ‘logically unobtainable’ (à la 
Coulter, 1973b: 173; here, see also, R. Turner, 1974 [1970]: 199; Atkinson and Drew, 
1979: 249, fn. 12; Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 166); inhibited by the indefinitely extensive 
transformative possibilities that are afforded through the natural language (here, see 
Coulter p.c. in Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 260, fn. 15). Furthermore, evaluations of the 
“truth” or “falsity” (howsoever adjudicated) of these components would also be 
immaterial (here, see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 569; Smith, 1978: 28); that is, unless 
occasioned, in situ (e.g. Edwards and Fasulo, 2006) – or in which their procedural 
bases are interrogated (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 549-556, 557-566). Instead, the 
objective of this inquiry would simply be to canvass the different ways in which 
“classed” orientations are indexed and made consequential for co-interlocutors,  
in situ (see Speier, 1973: 185; M. H. Goodwin, 2011: 254). 259 The five lines of  
inquiry outlined above in this way offer an indicative point of departure for  
research occasioned by my inquiry. 
 
7.4 Limitations 
The previous section has highlighted one area that future research can progress; 
namely, the study of the constitutive dimensions of “classed” categories. Five 
candidate lines of analysis that have been touched-off from this thesis have been 
highlighted to this effect. These domains exceeded the scope of this research and 
would, I claim, reward substantiation in future EM/(M)CA inquiries. I turn now to 
address two pitfalls of my research. The first is empirical. It concerns the level of 
detailed analysis that has been achieved on the data fragments analysed across 
Chapters 4-6 (n=44). The second is conceptual. This concerns what might be 
 
259 There are parallels here with Drew’s (1987: 230-232) analysis of “teases” and their 
“recognisability”. 
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considered insufficient engagement with influential theorists and notable concepts 
within FA “class-analysis”. For both shortcomings, inquiries are proposed which 
could advance the respecification of “social class” that has been initiated in this 
research.  
 
7.4.1 Empirical omissions 
This research has used EM/(M)CA to reveal a host of novel insights regarding 
orientations towards “social class” in ordinary, naturalistic forms of talk-in-
interaction. This has been my express intention from the outset, reflected in my 
research objectives (see §1.7.1 and §7.2). As detailed in Chapter 1 (i.e. §1.2), the 
dearth of EM/(M)CA research on “social class” formed the initial impetus for my 
inquiry, and the contours of existing empirical analyses informed its remit and 
trajectory (see §1.7 and §2.5.3). Specifically, as “social class” was a largely 
uninterrogated area for EM/(M)CA, I have taken the opportunity here to begin 
respecifying this domain vis-à-vis the consensual coordinates of EM/(M)CA. 
Practically, this has translated into a focus on several analytic concerns (e.g. 
“ontology” [i.e. Chapter 4]; “praxis” [i.e. Chapters 4 and 5]; and “praxiology”  
[i.e. Chapter 6]), culminating in the lamination (see fn. 221) of EM, MCA and CA 
sensibilities. To qualify, this multifaceted approach is unusual in the tradition of 
EM/(M)CA – and within CA research, especially (recall §3.2.3). It has been an 
“unintended consequence”, thereof, 260 that the depth of my analysis has been 
necessarily constrained, and it is on this basis, I propose, that it is not therefore 
representative of CA research in the classical mould.   
 
The resources I have enlisted from the inventory of EM/(M)CA have also been 
restricted in their selection and application. Occasionally, these have figured 
minimally, only, or have even been eclipsed by competing (e.g. “ontological”) 
concerns. It is conceivable that a more judicious selection of data fragments would 
have better potentiated a more thoroughgoing analysis. Equally, a more consistent 
focus on “social action” (cf. Chapter 6) would have likely enriched my study of 
“ontology” and “praxis”, two domains in which the activity of “accounting” 
 
260 Term associated with Weber, inter alia. Relatedly, see Merton (1936: 902-903). 
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underpinned multiple operations (e.g. §4.6.1 and §5.5.3.2, respectively). Future 
investigations that are devoted to EM, MCA and CA, independently, therefore, 
deserve recovery, and will be refined through research dedicated to their core 
apparatuses (e.g. “indexicality”, “predicates”, “sequence”, respectively). Such 
analyses will advance our understanding of the activities for which “classed” 
orientations come to be (co-)produced; how they are interconnected (e.g. “-bound” 
[see Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 584-589]; “-constitutive” [see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 25-26]; 
“-generated” [see R. Turner 1974 [1970]: 211]; “-relevant” [see Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 
104]; “-tied” [ibid.: 35]) with/to “predicates” (see R. Watson, 1978: 106; e.g. 
“activities” [see Sacks, 1974 [1972]: 222]; “enablements” [see Enfield, 2011: 293]; 
“perquisites” [see Jefferson and Lee, 1992: 534]; “obligations” [see R. Watson, 1978: 
106]); and how members rely upon the “inference-rich” (recall fn. 123 and 217) 
qualities of linguistically (non-)“classed” instantiations in the management of their 
quotidian affairs. In so doing, research is likely to yield social actions beyond 
“accounting” (cf. Chapter 6) for which “classed” orientations are (co-)produced, 
recurrently, in addition to further insights concerning the practical uses of 
linguistically non-“classed” orientations both inferentially and sequentially. My 
analyses of “complainability” (§6.5.2) and “place terms” (§5.7), for example, are 
promising directions for subsequent EM/(M)CA inquiry in these two respects. 
 
The use of novel analytic resources may also prove illuminating for future research. 
An analysis of “epistemics”, for example, following Heritage (e.g. 2005b; 2008: 309-
310; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d; 2013a; 2013b) and colleagues (see e.g. 
Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Raymond and Heritage, 2006; Stivers and Rossano, 
2010), is one resource that has not been employed in this inquiry. Provided its 
‘omnipresence’ (Maynard and Clayman, 2018: 137, fn. 15) and primordial status 
(here, see Drew, 2012), however, an exploration vis-à-vis “classed” orientations 
and/or enactments offers a clear frontier-in-waiting. 261 In one capacity, this might 
 
261 The predominance of this research in the contemporary zeitgeist of CA might also furnish 
such a warrant. A recent debate on “epistemics” has documented (perhaps catastrophized) the 
advent and purported ascendancy of such a focus. Lynch and Macbeth (2016), Lindwall, 
Lymer and Ivarsson (2016), Lynch and Wong (2016), MacBeth, Wong and Lynch (2016) and 
Macbeth and Wong (2016) offer the most recent rendition of these concerns. For responses, 
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involve an investigation of if/how “classed” social identities can be instantiated 
through the (in-)congruencies of members’ “epistemic statuses” and “stances”. The 
analysis of G. Raymond and Heritage (2006), for example, on the identity of 
“grandparent”, is at once a precursor and paragon in this respect, illustrating the 
relational and praxiological insights that are made available through an epistemic 
hiatus (here, see also, Clift, 2012: 74). Alternatively, where avowedly “classed” 
orientations are pursued, epistemics also offers a method for discerning their 
constitutive ontologies. How linguistically “classed” categories are constructed to 
accommodate, and even to own (here, see Moerman, 1974 in G. Raymond and 
Heritage, 2006: 680; W. Sharrock, 1974; Sacks, 1984b: 424-427; Heritage, 2005b: 
196-200; 2011b: 160, 182-183) particular phenomena, for instance – howsoever 
prismed or programmed – 262 remains poised for exploration.  
 
Future EM/(M)CA research might also further the empirical breadth of my 
investigation. The present research, it will be recalled, has had a unilateral,  
anglophone focus (for review, see Chapter 3). A comparative investigation of 
alternative communities (e.g. cultural, linguistic, etc.) would help diversify this 
analysis. This approach is already familiar to the EM/(M)CA tradition (see, 
differently, Moerman, 1996 [1988]; Lerner and Takagi, 1999; Zimmerman, 1999: 
196-198; Jefferson, 2002); 263 however, how familiarities with different cultures or 
 
see Button and W. Sharrock (2016), Steensig and Heinemann (2016), Bolden (2018), Clift 
and C. Raymond (2018), Drew (2018a; 2018b), Heritage (2018), Maynard and Clayman 
(2018) and G. Raymond (2018). For an earlier discussion, see Clift (2012), Drew (2012), 
Heritage (2012c) and Sidnell (2012). 
262 On the former, see Schutz (1964 in Sidnell, 2012: 55, fn. 2), Heritage (2013a: 392-393) 
and, differently, Bellman (1981: 8, 15-16) and Cuff (1993: Ch. 1). On the latter, see §4.6.1. 
263 For a burgeoning catalogue of interactional universals, see, e.g., Hopper, Doany, Johnson 
and Drummond (1990/1991) on telephone call-openings; Stivers, Enfield, Brown, Englert, 
Hayashi, Heinemann, Hoymann, Rossano, de Ruiter, Yoon and Levinson (2009) on turn-
taking; Dingemanse, Torreira and Enfield (2013) regarding the OCRI (Drew, 1997), “Huh”; 
and Dingemanse, Roberts, Baranova, Blythe, Drew, Floyd, Gisladottir, Kendrick, Levinson, 
Manrique, Rossi and Enfield (2015) on other-initiated repair, generally. On the genericity of 
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societies, for example, impact upon investigations of social identities, and on 
“classed” incumbencies, specifically, have not been inspected. It is expectable, for 
example, that my analysis of interactions that have occurred within communities 
which transcend my native and/or analytical competencies, has been insensitive to 
cases in which “classed” identities are occasioned. Interactions conducted in 
American-English (n=542), for example, are likely to represent a situs of probable 
neglect on this basis, and thereby warrant further research. This corpus might also 
justify special review provided the unique socio-cultural discourses and/or 
connotations concerning “social class” in America (recall fn. 28). Recordings of 
interactions from America and Britain, for example, may warrant comparison 
provided the different portraits of “social class” that have been painted within FA 
research vis-à-vis these societies (see Gerteis and Savage, 1998). Thus, it will be a 
task for future EM/(M)CA research to dissect if/how different socio-cultural 
competencies stratify and/or strain empirico-analytic insights, and to grasp their 
repercussions for the analysis of “classed” identities.  
 
7.4.2 Conceptual omissions 
Chapter 1 opened with a review of FA “class-analysis” in sociology and 
sociolinguistics. From Chapter 2, however, my focus has concerned extant 
EM/(M)CA research, specifically. Accordingly, my engagement with the former 
literature has been limited in scope, culminating in an abbreviated review of FA 
traditions, in addition to the wholesale omission of some influential theorists and 
noteworthy concepts. The seminal contributions of Basil Bernstein (1971; 1973; 
1975), for example, regarding “social class”, speech practices and educational 
attainment, were omitted from Chapter 1 for economy (recall fn. 8). To clarify, 
retrospectively, for Bernstein (1971; 1973; 1975), “social classes” undergird social 
structure, performing a regulative function in a moral and cultural faculty (see 
Bernstein, 1975: 23). The different values that are delimited or legitimated (see 
Bernstein, 1971: 61, 186-187) ideologically, thereby, are mediated by family-types 
(e.g. ibid.: 152-163; Bernstein, 1973: 8; 1975: 24-26) and exert constraints on the 
 
CA findings, recall fn. 80; see also, e.g., Drew (2003a), Clift and C. Raymond (2018: 109-
111) and Margutti, Tainio, Drew and Traverso (2018). 
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linguistic “modes” (e.g. Bernstein, 1971: 28, 133) and “codes” (e.g. ibid.: 76-77; 
Bernstein, 1975: 24) that are awarded primacy. This transmission is regulated by 
systems of control (e.g. Bernstein, 1971: 156-160, 164-165) from which arise 
differently privileged species of “meaning” (ibid.: 175-176) and ‘role relationships’ 
(ibid.: 180). The distribution of these values has implications for educational 
attainment (e.g. ibid.: 34-35, 36, 37, 136-137) and object-relations (e.g. ibid.: 25, 42). 
Critically, this furnishes the basis for systemic (e.g. “educational”) (in-)congruities 
(e.g. ibid.: 37, 51-53, 58, fn. 16 and 17, 136, 143-169, 183-184, 186, 190-201, 228, fn. 
4; Bernstein, 1973: 9-10; 1975: 16, 27-28, 42, 116-145; see also, Bernstein and Young, 
1973 [1967]: 21, 22; Bernstein and Henderson, 1973 [1969]: 42-43) for differently 
“classed” personnel, and has further ramifications for their “perception” (e.g. 
Bernstein, 1971: 28, 34, 35-38, 61-62) and “consciousness” (e.g. Bernstein, 1975: 23-
24, 29-30), more generally.  
 
Space does not permit a comprehensive statement of Bernstein’s (e.g. 1971; 1973; 
1975) theory, nor of how it coheres with the approaches detailed across Chapter 1. 
However, for illustration, one affinity visible in Bernstein’s (1971; 1973; 1975) 
“Class, Codes and Control” (Vol. 1-3) is his preservation of the concept as an 
“analytic resource” (i.e. §1.6.2). Specifically, “social class” is retained here as a 
concept that can be defined and prioritised by researchers, legitimately, at their 
discretion (e.g. Bernstein, 1971: 24-25, 61-62, 135, 143, 161-163, 175-176, 195-196, 
228, fn. 4; 1973: 4; 1975: 23-24, 136, fn. 3; Bernstein and Young, 1973 [1967]: 13, 
15; Bernstein and Henderson, 1973 [1969]: 25). 264 Such a willing determination of 
“classed” paramountcy, ex cathedra, dovetails Bernstein’s (1971; 1973; 1975) 
programme alongside other pre-eminent FA traditions of “class-analysis”; a 
homologue elaborated in Chapter 1. How this research figures relative to the 
 
264 This proclivity is also shared by Bernstein’s (i.e. 1973) collaborators and colleagues.  
See, e.g., Henderson (1973 [1971]: 49), Hawkins (1973 [1969]: 81), G. Turner and Pickvance 
(1973 [1971]: 95), W. Robinson and Creed (1973 [1968]: 124), G. Turner (1973: 149),  
W. Robinson (1973: 205, 219, 225-226) and Hawkins (1973: 236). 
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alternative commitments of EM/(M)CA, however, has eluded audit. 265 Whether 
manifestations of linguistic “codes”, for example, are deployed in a relevantly 
“classed” capacity by/for executants (here, see Bernstein, 1971: 132; see also, G. 
Turner, 1973: 179), and/or have a relevantly “classed” genesis (here, see Bernstein, 
1971: 114, 128, 135), awaits determination in future EM/(M)CA research (recall 
§1.6.3). Such an inquiry will not merely contextualise the novelty of EM/(M)CA 
relative to another FA programme of “class-analysis”, but it may also potentiate 
further lines of dialogue.  
 
Substantive examinations of FA concepts have also been missing from my remit. 
“Class-consciousness”, for example, is an abiding preoccupation that has unique 
significance for EM/(M)CA research. A respecification of “consciousness”, for 
instance, has been foreshadowed since Sacks’ (1984b: 416, 418, 424; 1992, Vol. II: 
218, 219) remarks regarding “doing being” ordinary (see also, Jefferson, 2004c; 
Wooffitt, 1992: Ch. 6) as a ‘cast of mind’; that is, whereby one’s perception is 
refracted, normatively, through a prism of mundanity. 266 Consciousness has been 
further embedded within (if not explicit to) analyses of “poetic” phenomena (e.g. 
“equivoques”, “puns”, etc.) in introspective narratives (e.g. Wooffitt and N. Holt, 
2011), talk-in-interaction (e.g. Sacks, 1992, Vol. II: 261-268, 291-331, 396-401; 
Beach, 1993; Jefferson, 1996; Schegloff, 2003a) and anecdotes of conduct (e.g. 
Schegloff, 2003b; 2005a; Wooffitt, 2018a; 2018b; 2019a; 2019b; see also, Peräkylä, 
2019). It has also been revivified as a practical accomplishment (e.g. Mehan and 
Wood, 1975a: 519; 1975b: 216), moral heuristic (e.g. Komter, 1997), sense-making 
practice (e.g. R. Watson, 1998); respecified as an ordinary-language concept (e.g. 
Coulter, 1973a: 80; 1994: 293; 1999: 170-171; 2010: 278-279; Button, Coulter, J. R. 
E. Lee, W. Sharrock, 1995: 46-49; Read, 2008: 63-70); and substantiated by the 
analysis of data derived from experiments which concern “consciousness”, 
 
265 For a partial sketch, regarding “socialisation”, see Cook (1973; see also, Bernstein, 1973: 
7-8). See also R. Watson (1992a: 6-7), Heritage and G. Raymond (2005: 20, fn. 6) and 
Wootton (1975: Ch. 5), for review.  
266 I owe this observation to Professor Robin Wooffitt (p.c.). Any errors are my own. For 
alternative readings of Sacks (e.g. 1992) on the “mind”, see R. Watson (1994: 182-184) and 
Coulter (2005: 88-91). 
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substantively (e.g. Wooffitt and Allistone, 2005; Allistone and Wooffitt; 2007; 
Wooffitt, 2007; Wooffitt and N. Holt, 2010; Wooffitt, N. Holt and Allistone, 2010). 
One aspect that future analyses might address concerns how co-interlocutors can 
configure, alias or camouflage some activity in terms of “class-consciousness”. This 
would address “consciousness” not as an academic (e.g. metaphysical) disposition 
imputed by analysts on the behalf of members, but as a concept hypostatised within 
talk-in-interaction. Alternatively, this research might address how members unite, 
collectively (see, e.g., Ryave and Schenkein, 1974; Wootton, 1977; Sudnow, 1979: 
Ch. 22, Ch. 27; Atkinson, 1984a; Atkinson, 1984b; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986; 
Clayman, 1993; Capps and Ochs, 2002; Glenn, 2003: Ch. 3; Lerner, 2004b); how they 
are formulable, as such (see, e.g., Sacks, 1992, Vol. I: 144-149, 333-340, 568-577); 
267 and how, specifically, members may demonstrably impart or proselytize 
intersubjective positions and/or perceive activities through an avowedly shared 
“classed” lens (e.g. “attitude”, “ideology”, “worldview”, etc.). 268 The analysis of 
“class-consciousness” as an occupant of talk-in-interaction or as a heuristic are, 
therefore, two plausible routes for EM/(M)CA respecification. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This research represents the first focussed examination of “social class” using 
EM/(M)CA in ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction. The prevailing objective of this 
thesis has been a modest one; namely, to investigate how “social class” is mobilised 
recurrently as an interactional resource. This has been identified not only as a 
programmatic omission of FA “class-analysis” (see Chapter 1), but also an area 
neglected, overwhelmingly, in extant EM/(M)CA research (see Chapter 2). My 
 
267 That is, e.g., qua ‘aggregations’ (e.g. Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007: 536), ‘alliances’ (e.g. 
Egbert, 2004: 1478), ‘collectivities’ (e.g. Jayyusi, 2014 [1984]: 52), ‘consociates’ (e.g. Lerner, 
1992: 249), ‘ensembles’ (e.g. Lerner, 1993: 216), ‘groups’ (e.g. Schegloff, p.c. in Egbert, 
2004: 1469), ‘parties’ (e.g. Schegloff, 1995b: 33; see also, Schegloff, 1988: 126; Jefferson, 
1990: 81-89), ‘partnership[s]’ (e.g. Stivers and Barnes, 2018: 1332), ‘team[s]’ (e.g. Sacks, 
1974 [1972]: 220; see also, Schegloff et al., 1977: n.p.g. [EJBH: 380] in Lerner, 1992: 264) 
and ‘unit[s]’ (see Clayman, 1992: 166). 
268 Two EM/(M)CA texts that address cohesion even include reference to “class-
consciousness” (i.e. Lerner, 1993: 236; Coulter, 1996: 341). 
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research has been directed towards the resolution of this lacuna and has resulted in a 
number of novel contributions. As summarised above (see §7.2), I have investigated 
how “social class” comes to be conceptualised by co-interlocutors (see Chapter 4); 
identified two families of practices that are employed to (co-)produce “classed” 
orientations (see Chapter 4 and 5); and distinguished three social actions into which 
they are employed recurrently (see Chapter 6).  
 
The analysis of “social class” within ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction, as a 
members’ phenomenon made demonstrably relevant by co-interlocutors, therefore 
encapsulates the substantive empirical contribution of this thesis. The findings 
gleaned, however, are not the only novel components. My findings are instead 
predicated reflexively upon a set of empirico-analytic contributions and 
methodological novelties in their own right. Illustrative of the former, for example, 
are the hitherto undescribed, interdisciplinary genealogies of “class-analysis” 
elaborated in Chapter 1 and 2. These two reviews are not only notable for their 
extensive purview but have further served to define the parameters of the present 
inquiry; a remit to which EM/(M)CA is positioned as uniquely equipped. Indicative 
of the latter, by contrast, is the scope of my inquiry. The analysis of a considerable 
corpus of interactions (n=959) distinguishes this research in its own right, and my 
commitment to ordinary forms of talk-in-interaction complements the focus of 
existing EM/(M)CA research.  
 
This thesis, therefore, is a significant investigation of “social class”; one that  
has been conducted on an unprecedented scale and which has been constructed 
through an extensive dialogue with existing research. This has culminated in a 
multifaceted investigation that has uncovered an array of novel findings and  
generated a number of lines of inquiry for future research. Focally, I have 
demonstrated that “social class” is not only eligible for EM/(M)CA  
“respecification”, and can be analysed profitably and productively through the 
consensual coordinates of the enterprise, but that it further represents a  
consequential resource that is defined, co-constructed and utilised by  
co-interlocutors within ordinary instances of talk-in-interaction, recurrently.  
What remains to be seen, only, is whether future research will recover this  
mantle, realising the promise of EM/(M)CA for “class-analysis” and the  
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promise of “social class” for the study of “social action”. The incipient  
turn towards the study of “classed” identities in perspicuous, institutional  
settings are heartening in this respect; however, the consolidation of this 
domain of inquiry requires a concerted commitment. It has been the aim of  
this thesis to offer the first focussed examination of this subject and to provide  
a stable foundation from which such a programme may not only proceed,  
but flourish. 
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Appendix 1.0 – Jeffersonian transcription conventions 
 
* Reproduced from Reuber, Chappell, Jackson and Toerien (2018: 121), mutatis 
mutandis, with the permission of Dr Merran Toerien (p.c.). Derived from Atkinson 
and Heritage (1984b) and Jefferson (2004b). 
 
A. Some aspects of the relative timing of utterances 
[  ] square brackets  Overlapping talk. 
= equals sign  No discernible interval between 
turns. 
(0.5) time in parentheses  Intervals within or between talk 
(measured in tenths of a second). 
(.) period in parentheses  Discernable interval within or 
between talk but too short to measure 
(less than 2 tenths of a second). 
≥ ‘Jump’ started talk. 
B. Some characteristics of speech delivery 
. period Closing intonation. 
, comma Slightly rising intonation (a little 
hitch up on the end of the word). 
? question mark  Fully rising intonation. 
- dash  Abrupt cut off of sound. 
: colon  Extension of preceding sound – the 
more colons the greater the extension. 
here underlining  Emphasised relative to surrounding 
talk. 
.tch Tongue click. 
hhh.  Audible outbreath (number of h’s 
indicates length). 
.hhh  Audible inbreath (number of h’s 
indicates length).  
>Talk< Speeded up talk. 
<Talk> Slowed down talk. 
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*  Croaky or creaky voice. 
£ Smiley voice. 
Hah hah or huh huh  etc. Beats of laughter. 
(    ) empty single brackets or words 
enclosed in single brackets 
Transcriber unable to hear words or 
uncertain of hearing. 
((word)) words enclosed in double brackets Transcribers’ comments.  
↑↓ Marked change in pitch. 
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Appendix 2.0 – Project information sheet 
 
Introduction 
Thank you for expressing interest in this research. If you are considering taking part, 
it is important that you understand why this research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please read through this leaflet carefully before you decide whether you wish 
to take part. If there is anything you don’t understand, please ask me and I’ll be very 
happy to discuss the research further with you. 
 
What is this research about? 
I am a PhD (doctoral) research student in Sociology, based at the University of York. 
My research focuses on how “social class” is made relevant for people during their 
ordinary conversations with one another. It is funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council and has passed ethical review at the University of York. In this 
research, I am not interested in the social class of individuals. I am aiming, instead, to 
find out how, where and for what purpose, class is made meaningful for people in their 
everyday conversations. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
Previous research into “social class” in ordinary conversations has looked only at talk 
between children. This research aims to extend such research by looking at the 
conversations of adults.  
 
What will it involve? 
If you are willing to take part, this research first involves the completion of an 
“Informed Consent Form” and a “Video Recording Release Form.” These forms 
will show that you have given permission for your conversation(s) to be recorded.  
You will be given copy to keep and I will keep a copy on record as well. These forms 
also give you the opportunity to choose what happens to your recordings after they 
have been collected. The research itself involves the completion of a short 
questionnaire and then having your conversation(s) recorded. It will not require you 
to talk about “social class” or any topics in particular. Instead, where possible you 
should have your conversations as if there is no recording equipment present, without 
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altering what you ordinarily say. It doesn’t matter whether you speak about “social 
class,” this research is just interested in ordinary conversations. 
 
Why does my conversation need to be recorded? 
While there is a lot of research into people’s experiences of “social class,” there has 
been almost none into how it is actually made meaningful in everyday conversations. 
We need to make recordings, therefore, as we are interested in the details of real 
interactions. There are many theories about social class, but we are interested in what 
actually takes place in our everyday conversations with one another. We are collecting 
video-recordings as it would help us to know what is happening in moments which 
cannot be captured by audio-recording alone, such as during silences. Video-recording 
will provide the researcher with access to the same visual information that is available 
to participants.  
 
What happens to my recording? 
After it has been collected, your recording will be transcribed and anonymised – so no 
one will be able to find out who has been recorded. This will involve changing any 
information which may be used to identify you, such as names and locations. Your 
recording(s) will then be studied alongside an existing collection of approximately 
two-hundred telephone calls. Your recording(s) will be studied by Edward Holmes 
and his two supervisors, Dr Merran Toerien and Dr Steph Lawler, using a research 
method known as Conversation Analysis. When it is not being studied, your recording 
will be kept on a password protected external hard drive in locked cabinet, in a locked 
office. 
 
What is Conversation Analysis? 
Conversation Analysis is a method used to study how “actions” are done through talk. 
It understands that when people are talking with one another, they are not simply 
exchanging information. Instead, they are accomplishing actions. For example, in our 
everyday lives we are not just talking with one another; we are doing things: like 
“offering,” “requesting,” “inviting” and “advising.” This is what Conversation 
Analysis is interested in – “action,” not necessarily the “content” of conversations 
themselves. 
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What are benefits of this research? 
The main benefit of this research is its potential for real-world impact. By studying 
the details of how social class is made meaningful for people in their everyday 
conversations, we can begin to get a better understanding of the nature of “social 
class.” As a result, we can use the findings of this research to get a better understanding 
of class inequalities. The study may not have immediate benefits for those who take 
part but will alter how we understand the very nature of “social class.” 
 
What are the disadvantages of taking part?  
Completing the questionnaire and having a recording will take a little bit of time, and 
you may find yourself inconvenienced by taking part. There is also a slight risk that 
you find yourself uncomfortable answering the questions included in the 
questionnaire, or by having your conversation recorded. Firstly, if there are any 
questions you would prefer not to answer, it is perfectly okay to miss these out. 
Secondly, before the recording begins, the researcher will show you how to switch on, 
pause and to switch off the recording equipment. So, if at any time you wish to stop 
the recording, you may do this at any point. You may also choose to withdraw your 
recording from the study at any point up to two weeks after the recording is made. If 
in the unlikely event you have been distressed by this research, there are a number of 
welfare services available for you to contact.  
 
Samaritans:    
Telephone:  
Address:  
Email:  
Web:  
 
Citizens Advice: 
 Telephone:  
 Web:  
 
Can I hear about the findings? 
If you provide your contact details in the informed consent form, the researcher will 
send you (electronically, or physically) a written summary of research findings. Your 
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contact information will not be distributed to any third-parties; stored with your 
recording or completed questionnaire; or included any publications. 
 
Many thanks for taking the time to consider taking part in this research.  Please do ask 
if you have further questions that are not answered by this leaflet. 
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Appendix 3.0 – Informed consent form 
 
Name of Researcher:  Mr Edward J. B. Holmes  
Name of Supervisors: Dr Merran Toerien 
Dr Steph Lawler 
 
Before signing this form, please read it through carefully and ask any questions that 
you might have. Through its completion, you are giving informed consent for the use 
of your recorded conversations for the purposes described in the ‘Project 
Information Sheet’. You understand that the information given in both the 
questionnaire and recordings are being collected by Edward Holmes for his PhD 
thesis. You understand that the information collected using these methods will be 
analysed by him and his two academic supervisors, Dr Merran Toerien and Dr Steph 
Lawler. You understand that the information you provide may be included in 
Edward’s PhD thesis and in its resulting publications. Here your recording will be 
included in the form of a written transcript, unless you have indicated otherwise in 
the ‘Video Recording Release Form’. 
 
Please also note that no information which may be used to identify you will be 
included in these publications, such as names or locations. Your transcribed recording 
will be anonymised thoroughly and pseudonyms will be given to disguise your 
identity. Furthermore, your information and recordings will not be shared with 
anyone, unless you have indicated otherwise in the ‘Video Recording Release Form’. 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, you can contact Edward 
Holmes and his two supervisors using the contact information below.  
 
Please tick one box only for each of the eight questions. 
 
1. I have read and understood the project information leaflet. 
Yes r No r 
 
2. I have been given an opportunity to ask questions about the research. 
Yes r No r 
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3. I understand that my conversation(s) is being recording and collected by Edward 
Holmes for the purposes of his PhD research.   
Yes r No r 
 
4. I have been shown how to use the video-camera and understand that I can turn this  
 equipment off at any time.   
Yes r  No r 
 
5. I understand that my information will be anonymised and kept confidential by the 
research team. 
Yes r No r 
 
6. I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this research up to two weeks 
after my conversation has been recorded. At which point, I can have any/all of my data 
deleted by Edward Holmes.  
Yes r  No r 
 
7. I have been told about a range of support services available to me if any distress is 
caused by this research. 
Yes r No r 
 
8. I agree to take part in this research. 
Yes r No r 
 
Name of Research Participant (in BLOCK letters)  
_________________________________ 
 
I consent to the recording of my conversation with the following participants: 
(Please complete where appropriate.) 
 
Participant 2: 
____________________________________ 
 
Participant 3: 
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____________________________________ 
 
Participant 4: 
____________________________________ 
 
Participant 5: 
____________________________________ 
 
I understand that I can be informed of the findings of this research by Edward Holmes 
upon its completion. These will be given to me via ___________________ in the form 
of a written summary. In giving my contact information, I understand that this will not 
be distributed to any third parties; stored with my recordings or completed 
questionnaires; or included in Edward’s PhD research or in its resulting publications. 
(Please complete where appropriate.) 
 
Email:   _________________________    
 
Address:  __________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Name: _______________________   Signed: 
_________________________ 
 
Date:  _______________________ 
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Appendix 4.0 – Video-recording release form  
 
* EJBH: Reproduced from Jackson (2011a: 294-295), mutatis mutandis, with 
permission of Dr Clare Jackson (p.c.). Derived from a template constructed by Ervin-
Tripp (n.d. in ten Have, 1999: 220-221). 
 
As part of this research, you have consented to the recording of your conversation by 
Edward Holmes. Please indicate below what your recordings can be used for, signing 
all of those which apply. Please note that your transcribed recording(s) will be 
anonymised during this research and no identifying information will be released. 
 
1. The recordings of my conversations can be studied by Edward Holmes and his 
supervisors, Dr Merran Toerien and Dr Steph Lawler, for the purposes of 
Edward’s PhD research. 
 
Signature: ________________ 
 
Date:        ________________ 
 
2. The recording of my conversation can be reused by Edward Holmes in his 
future academic work, such as publications and conferences. (Please circle 
those you consent to.) 
 
Signature: ________________ 
 
Date:        ________________ 
 
3. The recording of my conversation can be reused by Edward Holmes for the 
purposes of teaching. 
 
Signature: ________________ 
 
Date:        ________________ 
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4. The recording of my conversation can be archived online at the University of 
York Filestore and made accessible for others to listen to and watch when 
reading Edward’s written publications.  
 
Signature: ________________ 
 
Date:        ________________ 
 
5. The recording of my conversation can be used by other researchers in their 
future academic work, such as publications and conferences. (Please circle 
those you consent to.) 
 
Signature: ________________ 
 
Date:        ________________ 
 
6. The recording of my conversation can be used by students in their future 
assessed academic work. 
 
Signature: ________________ 
 
Date:        ________________ 
 
  
 349 
Abbreviations 
 
BSA  – British Sociological Association 
 
CA  – Conversation Analysis 
 
DP  – Discursive Psychology 
 
ELMPS – Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics  
Committee 
 
EM  – Ethnomethodology 
 
EM/(M)CA – Ethnomethodology; Membership Categorisation Analysis;  
Conversation Analysis 
 
ESRC  – Economic and Social Research Council 
 
FA  – Formal Analysis 
 
MCA  – Membership Categorisation Analysis 
 
OCRI  – Open class repair initiator 
 
P.D.  – Public Defender 
 
RP  – Received pronunciation 
 
VS  – Variationist Sociolinguistics 
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